同一本雜誌，過兩天有人出來打臉了
http://tinyurl.com/nroa9c8
Two Myths About Taiwan’s DPP That Need to Be Laid to Rest
The DPP will not ruin cross-strait relations, and it isn’t manipulating
popular protests from behind the scenes.
In his piece “Time to Review US Policy on Taiwan?” Dennis V. Hickey makes
several important points about the future of the United States’ relationship
with Taiwan, and there is no doubt that those should be addressed seriously
to ensure continued stability in the Taiwan Strait. Unfortunately, the author
presents a picture of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),
currently the favorite in the January 2016 elections, and Taiwan’s civil
society that is highly misinformed and which risks misleading the very
American officials who will be charged with formulating a coherent
U.S.-Taiwan strategy for the future.
Dennis V. Hickey的文章點出維持台灣海峽穩定是重點大家都同意，但關於DPP
和台灣公民社會部分嚴重誤導。
To begin with, Hickey writes that while the DPP has sought to “‘rebrand”
itself as a “responsible” alternative to the Chinese Nationalist Party
(KMT), “U.S. defense planners cannot help but wonder if the DPP will seek to
entrap the U.S. in a cross-strait crisis in an effort to achieve its dreams
of independence from China.”
首先，Hickey說，雖然DPP自稱是負責任的政黨，但美國防衛計畫制定者們卻忍不住
猜想，DPP會為了追求從中國獨立而將美國捲入海峽危機。
Hickey doesn’t seem to realize that the DPP under chairperson and
presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen is no longer the party that caused the
U.S. administration headaches when Chen Shui-bian was president. Not only did
it learn its lessons from the past, DPP officials are also well aware that
returning to the contentious practices of the past would cost it the
confidence and support that it has earned back over the years. Academics have
no problem assuming that Beijing learned its lessons from the 1995-96 Missile
Crisis and that it would not return to the path of belligerence, and yet they
seem incapable of acknowledging that the DPP—a party that, unlike its
counterpart in Beijing, must actually abide by democratic rules—can also
have learned from the past, a bias that often clouds judgment.
Additionally, the DPP has had close, sustained, and highly constructive
dialogue with U.S. officials based in Taipei, ensuring that the two sides are
on the same page on the important issues.
Hickey可能不了解，現在民進黨已經是蔡英文而不是阿扁當家，而民進黨高層們也認知到
再做些引起爭議的動作，會把過去幾年好不容易贏得的支持和信任花光光。美國學界
也認為北京從95-96飛彈危機中學到教訓，不會再擺出不惜一戰的猙獰面孔，但北京
似乎還無法了解，民進黨也已經學到教訓了，偏見總是遮蔽正確判斷。
此外，民進黨一直與美國在台官方單位有緊密、持續和高度建設性的對話。確保兩方
在關鍵議題上保持一致。
Despite Hickey’s contention that she “has done little to assuage such fears
” and that her positions “on many of the most important issues of the day
remain opaque and unclear, especially her plans for handling relations with
Beijing,” Tsai has been rather clear on the point that her cross-strait
platform is based on maintaining the “status quo” under the current
constitutional framework (i.e., the Republic of China) and “accumulated
outcomes” (i.e., not undoing what has been achieved in cross-strait
rapprochement by previous administrations). In other words, Tsai promises
continuity under a policy that is strikingly similar to that of her
predecessor, President Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT—so much so, in fact, that the
deep “green” elements within Taiwanese society have repeatedly accused her
of engineering a KMT-ization of her party. Two pro-independence parties were
established recently in reaction to that perceived shift toward the center.
儘管Hickey質疑蔡英文"撫平美方陷入海峽危機的疑慮"做的太少，以及"在許多重要議題
，尤其是處理與北京關係的計劃，依舊模糊"。蔡英文的主張"在當今憲法架構下維持現狀"
、"accumulated outcome"(不會撤除上一任政府簽的任何海峽兩岸協議)已經講的
相當清楚。換句話說，蔡表明政策的延續性，與國民黨的馬英九相當近似，事實上深綠
一直在質疑民進黨的國民黨化，最近兩個追求獨立的政黨先後成立，以回應民進黨
往中間靠攏。
Moreover, Tsai has engaged in dialogue with her counterparts in China and has
actively sought to establish a workable modus vivendi for the two sides. The
only line that Ms. Tsai will not cross—and she has also been clear on that
point—is adherence to the “1992 consensus” and its attendant “one China”
framework. There is no secret plan to drag the U.S. into a war with China to
realize the dream of de jure independence, for in Tsai’s mind, Taiwan (or
the ROC) is already independent; her biggest task if and once she is elected
would be to revive a still-stagnant economy and modernize the social safety
net, among other issues.
Relations between Taiwan and China exist in the grey area between two
extremes, one of which (“unification”) is unacceptable to the Taiwanese.
Therefore no policy will ever be completely clear, and politicians in Taipei
and Beijing must navigate between those two extremes (knowing that Taiwanese
won’t accept unification forces Beijing to also adopt a
less-than-perfectly-clear cross-strait policy).
更進一步，蔡英文一直參與和對岸的對話，並積極的尋求建立可運作的雙方
暫定協定(modus vivendi)，唯一蔡不會跨過的線