※ 引述《cgi0911 (勝者的迷思)》之銘言：
: 前個禮拜博士答辯完，我跟女朋友開車去上州玩了一趟。回程的時候
: 路過在Hyde Park 小羅斯福總統的故居博物館參觀。
: 我看完以後頗有感觸。
: 近幾年台灣一直有種理論叫「文組誤國」，尤其像我這種純純正正理
: 工宅男血統的人，難免都會有瞧不起文組的本位主義。但是，看完小
: 羅斯福總統生平的相關展示以後，給我不小的觀念衝擊。
讓大家看看什麼叫做"文組誤國"
Protectionism
保護主義
The battle of Smoot-Hawley
斯姆特-霍利之戰
Dec 18th 2008| From The Economist print edition
A cautionary tale about how a protectionist measure opposed by all
right-thinking people was passed
警世恆言：一條所有思維健全的人都反對的保護主義措施是怎麼在國會通過的
Library of Congress
國會圖書館
EVEN when desperate, Wall Street bankers are not given to grovelling. But in
June 1930 Thomas Lamont, a partner at J.P. Morgan, came close. 「I almost
went down on my knees to beg Herbert Hoover to veto the asinine Hawley-Smoot
Tariff,」 he recalled. 「That Act intensified nationalism all over the world.
」
就算絕望，華爾街銀行家也不會卑躬屈膝。不過摩根大通（J.P. Morgan）合伙人托馬斯
‧拉蒙特（Thomas Lamont）1930年6月差點就這麼做了。「我幾乎要跪下來懇求赫伯特‧
胡佛（Herbert Hoover）否決其蠢無比的《斯姆特-霍利關稅法案》，」他回憶道，「就
是那個法案加劇了世界範圍內的民族主義。」
According to David Kennedy, an historian, Lamont was 「usually an influential
economic adviser」 to the American president. Not this time. Hoover signed
the bill on June 17th: 「the tragic-comic finale」, said that week’s
Economist, 「to one of the most amazing chapters in world tariff history…one
that Protectionist enthusiasts the world over would do well to study.」
據歷史學家大衛‧甘迺迪所說，拉蒙特是對美國總統「通常具影響力的經濟顧問」。這次
胡佛卻不為所動，於6月17號簽署了法案：「終局亦喜亦悲，」那一周的《經濟學家》寫
道，「世界關稅史上最震驚的一頁……值得全世界的保護主義分子仔細研究。」
The Tariff Act of 1930, which increased nearly 900 American import duties,
was debated, passed and signed as the world was tumbling into the Depression.
Its sponsors—Willis Hawley, a congressman from Oregon, and Reed Smoot, a
senator from Utah—have come to personify the economic isolationism of the
era. Sixty-three years later, in a television debate on the North American
Free-Trade Agreement, Al Gore, then vice-president, even presented his
unamused anti-NAFTA opponent, Ross Perot, with a framed photograph of the
pair. Now, with the world economy in perhaps its worst pickle since the
Depression, the names of Hawley and Smoot are cropping up again.
1930年的關稅法案增加了近900項美國進口關稅，而就在人們圍繞法案展開爭論、國會審
議通過、總統簽署生效的過程中，世界經濟一步步陷入蕭條。法案提議者，俄勒岡州國會
議員威利斯‧霍利（Willis Hawley）和猶他州參議員里德‧斯穆特（Reed Smoot）成了
那個時代經濟孤立主義的象徵。63年之後，在一次關於北美自由貿易協定的電視辯論中，
時任副總統的戈爾（Al Gore）甚至把這兩人的裝裱畫像展示給反北美自由貿易協定的競
爭對手羅斯‧佩羅（Ross Perot）看，當然佩羅不覺得好笑。現在，世界經濟正處於大蕭
條以來也許是最為困難的境地，霍利和斯姆特的名字又出現在人們嘴邊。
In fact, few economists think the Smoot-Hawley tariff (as it is most often
known) was one of the principal causes of the Depression. Worse mistakes were
made, largely out of a misplaced faith in the gold standard and balanced
budgets. America’s tariffs were already high, and some other countries were
already increasing their own.
實際上，沒有幾個經濟學家認為斯姆特-霍利關稅法案是大蕭條的主要原因。更大的失誤
在於盲目迷信金本位制和平衡預算。要知道當時美國的關稅已處於高水平，其他國家也已
著手增加本國關稅水平。
Nevertheless, the act added poison to the emptying well of global trade (see
chart). The worldwide protection of the 1930s took decades to dismantle. And
bad monetary and fiscal policies were at least based on the economic
orthodoxy of the day: economists would tear each other apart over the
heresies of John Maynard Keynes. On protection, there was no such division.
More than a thousand economists petitioned Hoover not to sign the
Smoot-Hawley bill. Bankers like Lamont sided with them; so did editorialists
by the score.
儘管如此，法案的出台對世界貿易仍不啻於雪上加霜（見圖）。上世紀30年代瀰漫全球的
保護主義潮流歷經幾十年才消退。現在看來很糟糕的貨幣、財政政策至少反映了當時的經
濟學正統觀念（彼時經濟學家還在為約翰‧梅納德‧凱恩斯（John Maynard Keynes）的
異端學說激烈論戰）。而對於貿易保護主義，經濟學家是沒有分歧的。一千多個經濟學家
上書請求胡佛不要簽署斯姆特-霍利法案。銀行家諸如拉蒙特也和經濟學家同一陣線；社
論亦是如此。
原文網址：https://read01.com/2GNO2n.html實際上，沒有幾個經濟學家認為斯姆特-霍利關稅法案是大蕭條的主要原因。更大的失誤
在於盲目迷信金本位制和平衡預算。要知道當時美國的關稅已處於高水平，其他國家也已
著手增加本國關稅水平。
Nevertheless, the act added poison to the emptying well of global trade (see
chart). The worldwide protection of the 1930s took decades to dismantle. And
bad monetary and fiscal policies were at least based on the economic
orthodoxy of the day: economists would tear each other apart over the
heresies of John Maynard Keynes. On protection, there was no such division.
More than a thousand economists petitioned Hoover not to sign the
Smoot-Hawley bill. Bankers like Lamont sided with them; so did editorialists
by the score.
儘管如此，法案的出台對世界貿易仍不啻於雪上加霜（見圖）。上世紀30年代瀰漫全球的
保護主義潮流歷經幾十年才消退。現在看來很糟糕的貨幣、財政政策至少反映了當時的經
濟學正統觀念（彼時經濟學家還在為約翰‧梅納德‧凱恩斯（John Maynard Keynes）的
異端學說激烈論戰）。而對於貿易保護主義，經濟學家是沒有分歧的。一千多個經濟學家
上書請求胡佛不要簽署斯姆特-霍利法案。銀行家諸如拉蒙特也和經濟學家同一陣線；社
論亦是如此。
The 「asinine」 bill began as a much smaller beast: the plan was to help
American agriculture, which had slumped in the early 1920s. Congress passed
several bills to support prices and subsidise exports, but all were vetoed by
Calvin Coolidge, Hoover’s predecessor. With no obvious logic—most American
farmers faced little competition from imports—attention shifted to securing
for agriculture the same sort of protection as for manufacturing, where
tariffs were on average twice as high. To many of its supporters, 「tariff
equality」 meant reducing industrial duties as well as raising those on farm
goods. 「But so soon as ever the tariff schedules were cast into the
melting-pot of revision,」 this newspaper wrote, 「logrollers and politicians
set to work stirring with all their might.」
這樁「其蠢無比」的法案的前身是為了扶助上世紀20年代早期日益下滑的美國農業而制定
的類似法案。當時國會通過了若干法案，意在維持價格、補貼出口，但是全被胡佛的前任
卡爾文‧科立芝（Calvin Coolidge）否決了。儘管多數美國農場主很少面臨來自進口品
的競爭，但毫無道理的，焦點突然轉移到給予美國農業同製造業類似的保護力度上（當時
工業品關稅平均是農產品關稅的兩倍）。很多支持者認為，「關稅平等」意味著在降低工
業品關稅的同時提高農產品關稅。「但是，和以往一樣，很快關稅計劃又開始被重新修訂
」，報紙寫道，「代表各方利益的政客開始討價還價，商量怎麼交換選票。」
Start rolling
開始啟動
In the 1928 election campaign Hoover and his fellow Republicans promised to
revise the tariff. The Democrats, then the freer-trading party, were
unusually acquiescent. After comfortable Republican wins in November, Hawley,
the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, set to work. By the time
Hoover was inaugurated in March 1929 and called a special session of Congress
to tackle the tariff, his committee had gathered 43 days』, five nights』 and
11,000 pages』 worth of testimony. The door was open to more than just
farmers; Hawley’s committee heard mainly from small and medium-sized
industrial businesses.
胡佛及以其為首的共和黨在1928年的大選中承諾修改關稅。彼時支持自由貿易的民主黨人
，卻反常地沉默。共和黨11月輕鬆取勝後，眾議院籌款委員會（House Ways and Means
Committee）主席霍利開始行動。到了1929年5月胡佛宣誓就職並專門召集國會商討關稅問
題的時候，霍利領導下的籌款委員會已經花43天連5個晚上搜集了11,000頁證詞。不光是
農場主， 委員會還訪問並聽取了中小型工業企業的意見。
The House bill, passed in May, raised 845 tariff rates and cut 82. Douglas
Irwin, an economist at Dartmouth and author of a forthcoming book (「The
Battle over Protection: A History of US Trade Policy」) on which this article
draws heavily, says it 「tilted the tariff nearly as much toward higher
duties on manufactured goods as it increased duties on agricultural imports.」
法案的眾院版本於5月通過，該版本提高了845種產品的關稅，降低了82種產品的關稅。達
特茅斯學院（Dartmouth）經濟學家道格拉斯‧厄文（Douglas Irwin）認為，該法案「確
立了工業品高關稅政策，農業品進口關稅也遭到了幾乎同等幅度的提高」。道格拉斯‧厄
文的新書《貿易保護之戰：美國貿易政策史》（」The Battle over Protection: A
History of US Trade Policy」） 即將出版，本文亦從中借鑑良多。
The bill then went to the Senate, where Smoot chaired the Finance Committee.
Senators who thought their constituents had lost out in the House—from
farming and mining states—were spoiling for a fight. Smoot’s committee
increased 177 rates from the House version and cut 254. In the next committee
stage—which lasted from the autumn of 1929 until March 1930—the whole
Senate could take part. Farming- and mining-state senators pruned Hawley’s
increases in industrial tariffs.
法案隨即遞交參院討論，斯姆特時任參院金融委員會（the Finance Committee）主席。
那些覺得本州選民在法案的眾院版本中未獲好處的參議員（來自農業州和採礦州），已在
迫切等待這一輪參院廝殺的到來。斯姆特領導下的參院金融委員會把眾院版本改成提高
177項關稅，降低254項關稅。下一階段的金融委員會審議從1929年秋到1930年3月結束，
整個參議院都參與了。農業州和採礦州的參議員刪除了霍利提高的工業品關稅。
In the last Senate stage, senators from industrial states regrouped,
fortified by the gathering economic gloom. 「A different voting coalition
emerged,」 says Mr Irwin, 「not one based on agricultural versus industrial
interests but on classic vote-trading among unrelated goods.」 Some senators
disapproved: Robert LaFollette, a Republican from Wisconsin, called the bill
「the product of a series of deals, conceived in secret, but executed in
public with a brazen effrontery that is without parallel in the annals of the
Senate.」
在最後的參院審議階段，日漸慘澹的經濟形勢幫了工業州的參議員的忙，他們重振旗鼓。
「一個新的投票聯盟出現了，」厄文說，「聯盟不是根據農業利益v.s.工業利益劃分的，
而是依據傳統的選票交換方式形成的。」一些參議員對此不以為然：威斯康辛州參議員共
和黨人Robert LaFollette把法案稱作「一系列交易的產物，這些交易於私下裡偷偷達成
，卻在光天化日之下操作，其厚顏無恥之甚在參院歷史上絕無僅有。」
Others saw nothing wrong. Charles Waterman, a Republican from Colorado,
declared: 「I have stated…that, by the eternal, I will not vote for a tariff
upon the products of another state if the senators from that state vote
against protecting the industries of my state.」 The tariff’s critics—
including Franklin Roosevelt, in his presidential campaign in 1932—dubbed
the bill the 「Grundy tariff」, after Joseph Grundy, a Republican senator
from Pennsylvania and president of the Pennsylvania Manufacturers』
Association. Grundy had said that anyone who made campaign contributions was
entitled to higher tariffs in return.
其他人並不覺得這麼做有什麼問題。科羅拉多州參議員共和黨人Charles Waterman宣稱：
「我已經說得很明白了……如果某州參議員投票反對保護我州的工業，我就不會投票贊成
對該州的產品征關稅。」反關稅人士，包括1932年大選中的富蘭克林‧羅斯福（
Franklin Roosevelt），把這項法案稱為「Grundy關稅法（Grundy tariff）」。「
Grundy」是賓夕法尼亞州參議員兼賓夕法尼亞製造者協會（Pennsylvania Manufacturers
』 Association）主席、共和黨人Joseph Grundy的姓。Grundy曾經說過，只要為競選捐
過錢，就有權得到高關稅作為回報。
The Senate’s final bill contained no fewer than 1,253 changes from the House
’s version. The two houses compromised, broadly by moving the Senate’s
rates up rather than the House’s down. In all, 890 tariffs were increased,
compared with the previous Tariff Act, of 1922, which had itself raised
duties dramatically (for examples, see table); 235 were cut. The bill
squeezed through the Senate, by 44 votes to 42, and breezed through the House.
參院通過的最終法案與眾院版本相比修改之處達1,253處之多。最終兩院能妥協一致，更
多是靠參院妥協、同意提高徵稅產品的種類，而不是眾院減少徵稅產品的種類。總之，與
1922年的關稅法案（該法案大幅提高了當時的關稅水平，詳見下表）相比，本次法案增加
了890項關稅，減少了235項關稅。法案以44票對42票勉強在參院通過，在眾院通過則不費
吹灰之力。
Of all the calls on Hoover not to sign the bill, perhaps the weightiest was a
petition signed by 1,028 American economists. A dozen years later Frank
Fetter, one of the organisers, recalled their unanimity. 「Economic faculties
that within a few years were to be split wide open on monetary policy,
deficit finance, and the problem of big business, were practically at one in
their belief that the Hawley-Smoot bill was an iniquitous piece of
legislation.」
Some of the names are familiar even now. One was Frank Taussig, a former head
of the Tariff Commission (which advised on whether duties should be raised or
lowered). Another was Paul Douglas, later a senator (undergraduates are still
introduced to the Cobb-Douglas production function). And a third was Irving
Fisher.
在眾多敦促胡佛不要簽署該法案的聲音中，最有分量的可能就屬1,028名經濟學家的聯名
上書了。12年之後，當年的組織者之一Frank Fetter，回憶起經濟學家的意見是如何統一
。「短短几年後這些經濟界人士就會因貨幣政策、赤字財政、大企業壟斷的問題各持己見
、爭論不休，但是對斯姆特-霍利法案，所有人的意見無比統一，這是一樁不公平的立法
。」這當中，有些人的名字今天聽起來還很耳熟。前關稅委員會（the Tariff
Commission）（負責向國會建議關稅應增加或減少）主管弗蘭克‧陶辛格（Frank
Taussig），後來成為參議員的保羅‧道格拉斯（Paul Douglas）（本科生今天還會學習
柯布—道格拉斯生產函數），還有歐文‧費雪（Irving Fisher）。
Fisher is still a giant of economics, best known for his work on monetary
theory and index numbers. (He was fallible, though. Shortly before the 1929
stockmarket crash, he declared, 「Stock prices have reached what looks like a
permanently high plateau.」) According to Fetter, Fisher suggested that the
petition refer explicitly to the importance of trade to America as a huge
creditor nation: if other countries could not sell to the United States, how
could they repay their debts? It was also thanks to Fisher that so many
economists signed it. He proposed that it be sent to the entire membership of
the American Economic Association, rather than to one member of each
university’s faculty, and offered to meet the extra expense. The total cost
was $137, of which Fisher paid $105.
費雪今天仍是經濟學的大家，他最為出名的是在貨幣理論和物價指數方面做出的貢獻。（
費雪並非沒犯過錯。1929年股市大崩潰前不久，他還聲稱，「看起來股價已經上升到一個
永久性的高水平」）據Fetter說，費雪建議上書著重提到貿易對於美國這樣一個大債權國
的重要性：如果其他國家不能賣東西給美國，他們怎麼有錢還債？也因為費雪，才有如此
眾多的經濟學家聯名簽署。是他提議將請願書寄給美國經濟學會（American Economic
Association）的每個會員，而不是每所大學寄一個教員；他還主動承擔了由此產生的額
外費用。郵費總共花了$137，費雪付了$105。
Expensive ink
沉重的簽名
Hoover’s signature cost rather more—even though the direct effect on
American trade was limited. The average rate on dutiable goods rose from 40%
to 48%, implying a price increase of only 6%. And most trade, Mr Irwin points
out, was free of duty (partly because high tariffs discouraged imports). He
estimates that the new tariff reduced dutiable imports by 17-20% and the
total by 4-6%. Yet the volume of American imports had already dropped by 15%
in the year before the act was passed. It would fall by a further 40% in a
little more than two years.
法案經胡佛簽署，給美國貿易帶來了不小的衝擊—但其直接影響有限。應稅品平均稅率從
40%上升到48%，即進口物品價格僅上漲6%。厄文指出，大多數貿易品是無需繳納關稅的（
部分原因在於高關稅扼制了進口）。他估計新增的關稅使得應納稅之進口下降了17%-20%
，使得總進口下降了4%-6%。但是在法案通過的前一年，美國進口量已經下降了15%。隨後
的兩年多，進口量進一步下降了40%。
Other, bigger forces were at work. Chief among these was the fall in American
GDP, the causes of which went far beyond protection. The other was deflation,
which amplified the effects of the existing tariff and the Smoot-Hawley
increases. In those days most tariffs were levied on the volume of imports
(so many cents per pound, say) rather than value. So as deflation took hold
after 1929, effective tariff rates climbed, discouraging imports. By 1932,
the average American tariff on dutiable imports was 59.1%; only once before,
in 1830, had it been higher. Mr Irwin reckons that the Tariff Act raised
duties by 20%; deflation accounted for half as much again.
其他更重要的因素在起作用。首先是美國GDP的下降，GDP下降的原因遠遠不止保護主義作
祟。另一個因素是通貨緊縮，通縮放大了現行關稅及斯姆特-霍利法案所增加之關稅對經
濟產生的影響。當時，多數關稅是根據物品數量徵稅（例如每磅多少美分），而不是根據
價值徵稅。1929年美國經濟出現通縮之後，實際關稅稅率上升，從而阻礙了進口。1932年
，美國應稅品的平均關稅稅率為59.1%；這個數字僅次於1830年的歷史最高水平。厄文估
計關稅法案使得關稅升高了20%；其中通縮的因素占了一半。
Smoot-Hawley did most harm by souring trade relations with other countries.
The League of Nations, of which America was not a member, had talked of a 「
tariff truce」; the Tariff Act helped to undermine that idea. By September
1929 the Hoover administration had already noted protests from 23 trading
partners at the prospect of higher tariffs. But the threat of retaliation was
ignored: America’s tariffs were America’s business. The Congressional
Record, notes Mr Irwin, contains 20 pages of debate on the duty on tomatoes
but very little on the reaction from abroad.
斯姆特-霍利法案最嚴重的後果是造成了美國對外貿易關係的惡化。國際聯盟（The
League of Nations）—美國不是成員國，曾提議各國達成「關稅休戰協議」（tariff
truce）；關稅法案的出台使這個希望破滅了。至1929年9月為止，胡佛政府已收到來自23
個貿易夥伴國的抗議，反對高關稅。但美國政府無視可能的報復性措施的威脅：美國政府
覺得關稅多高是自己的事，別人管不著。厄文注意到，國會歷史記錄中有20多頁是關於番
茄關稅的辯論，卻幾乎沒有涉及外國的反應。
A study by Judith McDonald, Anthony Patrick O』Brien and Colleen Callahan*
examines the response of Canada, America’s biggest trading partner. When
Hoover was elected president, the Canadian prime minister, Mackenzie King,
wrote in his diary that his victory would lead to 「border warfare」. King,
who had cut tariffs in the early 1920s, warned the Americans that retaliation
might follow. In May 1930, with higher American tariffs all but certain, he
imposed extra duties on some American goods—and cut tariffs on imports from
the rest of the British empire.
Judith McDonald，Anthony Patrick O』Brien和 Colleen Callahan*研究了美國最大的
貿易夥伴—加拿大的反應。胡佛當選為美國總統之際，加拿大總理麥肯齊‧金（
Mackenzie King）在日記中寫道，胡佛的當選將導致美加兩國的「邊界戰爭」。金在20世
紀20年代曾削減過關稅，他警告美國政府可能會採取報復行動。1930年5月，眼見美國提
高關稅已成定局，金對某些美國貨物開徵特稅，對大英帝國其他領地的進口貨物降低關稅
。
He promptly called a general election, believing he had done enough to
satisfy Canadians』 resentment. America, wrote the New York Times, was 「
consciously giving Canada inducements to turn to England for the goods which
she has been buying from the United States.」 Canadians agreed. King’s
Liberals were crushed by the Conservatives, who favoured and enacted even
higher tariffs.
金認為這些行動已夠平息加拿大人的不滿情緒，不久他解散議會、舉行大選。紐約時報（
the New York Times）寫道，美國「有意在刺激加拿大，使其轉而向英國購買本從美國進
口的貨物」。加拿大人顯然也這麼認為。大選中，金領導的自由黨被主張高關稅的保守黨
擊敗，保守黨執政後奉行的關稅政策是比美國更高。
All this, of course, is history. There are plenty of reasons to think that
the terrible lesson of the 1930s will not have to be learnt again.
Governments have reaffirmed their commitment to open trade and the World
Trade Organisation (WTO). The complex patterns of cross-border commerce, with
myriad stages of production spread over so many countries, would be
enormously costly to pull apart.
所有這些，當然已成為過去。我們有很多理由相信世人已經獲得了教訓，上世紀30年代的
歷史不會重演。各國政府已重申支持貿易開放和世界貿易組織（WTO）的立場。跨國商業
活動已經發展到如此複雜的程度—生產鏈的各個環節分布在不同國家，破壞這種商業模式
必定付出高昂的代價。
And yet. Tariffs can be increased, even under the WTO. The use of
anti-dumping is on the rise. Favours offered to one industry (farming then;
cars now?) can be hard to refuse to others. And the fact that politicians
know something to be madness does not stop them doing it. They were told in
1930: 1,028 times over.
可是，即使在WTO的規範下，增加關稅仍是可能的。目前各國反傾銷訴訟的增多就是一個
例證。一旦實施對某個產業的保護（曾今的農業，如今的汽車工業？），政府就很難拒絕
對其他行業採取類似的保護措施。更何況政客即便知道做某件事很蠢也並不妨礙他們這麼
做。別忘了1930年的時候，有人就告訴了他們1028遍！
* 「Trade Wars: Canada’s Reaction to the Smoot-Hawley Tariff」. Journal of
Economic History, December 1997.
* 《貿易戰：加拿大對斯姆特-霍利關稅法案的反應》，《經濟史》，1997年12月。
譯註：
1. bill: 美國國會議員可以以四種不同的形式提出新立法， 這四種形式包括法案
(Bills)、聯合決議案(Joint Resolution)、共同決議案(Concurrent Resolution)和簡單
決議案(Simple Resolution)。
2. logroller: Logrolling is the trading of favors or quid pro quo, such as
vote trading by legislative members to obtain passage of actions of interest
to each legislative member. logrolling 譯為滾木立法，並與「選票交換」、「互投
贊成票」這兩個詞與概念互換使用
3. vote-trading: Vote trading is the practice of supporting someone else's
initiative in exchange for their support of one's own initiative. It
frequently takes place in legislative bodies. An example would be Congressman
A voting for a dam in Congressman B's district in exchange for Congressman
B's support for farm subsidies in Congressman A's district.
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vote_trading)
4. 美國立法程序： 得到委員會多數贊成通過的立法將被送到眾議院全院，在眾議院院會
中讓全體議員對立法進行審議，辯論和投票。這項立法通過適當議事程序在眾議院全院表
決後，將送到參議院審議。如果參議院對眾議院的立法有修改，這整個修改後的立法必須
再送回眾議院審議。最終，如果兩院希望能制定一項新的移民法規，他們必須擬定一個兩
院統一的版本。參議院和眾議院必須對一個完全一樣的統一版本進行投票。兩院在這個過
程中必須做出很多妥協，並解決雙方的分歧
原文網址：https://read01.com/2GNO2n.html
"文組誤國"
"文組誤國"
"文組誤國"
更正一下，是：
"爛文組誤國"
"爛文組誤國"
"爛文組誤國"
: 民主黨的小羅斯福，他的前任是共和黨的赫伯特．胡佛。這兩個人可
: 以說是兩個光譜極端的人。
: 胡佛是中西部鄉下的鐵匠之子，身世雖算不上貧窮但也好不到哪去；
: 他的學歷是當時還名不見經傳的史丹佛大學，畢業以後在加州當採礦
: 工程師。他生活儉素，講求效率，以數字管理為本位。他在美國本土
: 公職的起點就是糧食管理局的局長，以嚴控產銷、杜絕浪費的作風而
: 聞名。從台灣人的角度來講，胡佛是個不折不扣的理工人，有豐富的
: 管理經驗，又是老練的財經首長。
: 反過來說，小羅斯福是東岸富豪世家么子，在紐約是數一數二的銀湯
: 匙少爺（羅斯福家族曾經擁有包括今天帝國大廈在內的曼哈頓大筆土
: 地）。他的學歷是哈佛加哥大，雖然書唸得不怎麼樣，在兄弟會裡面
: 倒是十分活躍。在大牌律師事務所當助理混了一兩年以後就從政選州
: 參議員，自此以後就再也沒有離開政治這一行。羅斯福生活闊綽，從
: 政散財毫不手軟，他的對手總說他是個不知民間疾苦、光會嘴炮的公
: 子哥兒。更慘的是，他還明著在老婆眼皮底下搞外遇。
: 光是從這兩個人的背景資料來看，胡佛正是台灣人求之不得的「理科
: 系領導人」，而羅斯福根本就是個靠爸誤國族。
: 但我們都知道，在經濟大恐慌面前灰頭土臉的是胡佛，而民粹崛起的
: 小羅斯福，最終領導著美國挺過大恐慌與第二次世界大戰。
: 所謂時勢造英雄、英雄造時勢。胡佛未必就是個無能的總統，小羅斯
: 福更談不上是聖賢。但是，放在１９３０年代的時間點來看，小羅斯
: 福成了那個「對的人」，而胡佛只能在歷史的舞台上黯然失色。
: 我不是研究歷史的專家，但是總結我看到的展示資料，我必須說小羅
: 斯福作為美國最優秀的總統之一，跟他的人格特質是有關的：
: 1.他有包括外表在內的強大個人魅力，優秀的口語溝通能力與民主選
: 舉必備的群眾號召力，但反過來說他就是當代美國的民粹大王。
: 2.他有堅強不屈的意志，但往難聽一點講，就是他橫著豎著都要照自
: 己的意思幹，土豪鴨霸連自己的副總統都反目成仇。
: 3.他有閉著眼睛跳入萬丈深坑的獻身精神，但是有時候他勇敢到讓人
: 為他的愚蠢感到瞠目結舌的地步。
: 4.他凡事抓大放小，執行面完全信賴優秀的專業閣僚，甚至在戰爭的
: 　期間他與馬歇爾的人事佈局堪稱戰略史上的經典。但反過來說，產
: 　業經貿、數字管理什麼的他一概不懂。
: 5.他是個久經歷練的民選領袖，總能在派系之間縱橫捭閤，獲取新政
: 　所需要的政治能量。但反過來說，他新政裡面丟出了一桶又一桶的
: 　牛肉，在很多人眼裡他根本就是腐敗到不行的政客。
: 看完了展覽，我不禁省思，我常常跟人嘴炮「文組誤國」，但，帶領
: 美國挺過驚濤駭浪十二年的，不正是我最看不起的那種政客嗎？
: 理工人其實是有理工人的思維盲點的。我們做事以前，總是會瞻前顧
: 後，想好了可行性再下手；但是在危機火燒屁股的時候，能夠閉著眼
: 睛跳下去做的，往往不是我們這種人。我們自奉理性，但是在政治合
: 縱連橫的場合上，往往無法跟人交心搏挪。
: 世局承平的時候，一個理性、有效率、思慮周全、清廉自奉的人往往
: 可以成為好領導。但是世局險惡的時候，往往那個我們理工人看不起
: 的愚蠢、民粹又腐敗的王八蛋，才能號召老百姓一起衝出難關。很多
: 承平時期看起來是嚴重缺陷的人格特質，在危機之下反而成了勝負的
: 關鍵點。
: 所以現在我真的不相信什麼「文組誤國」、「理組興國」的理論了。
: 事實上，一百個人有一百零一種性格，又有誰能界定理組出身的人就
: 會怎樣怎樣個性，文組出身的又會怎樣怎樣個性？一個時代需要的就
: 是一種人；在政治上面，真的不是理性走遍天下。
: ※ 引述《RevanKai (戰文大師ChaoSole)》之銘言：
: : 文組誤國
: : 長期以來已有共識
: : 文組
: : 生產力低落，思考沒有邏輯，容易被新聞洗腦，幾乎無常識可言
: : 沒有專業技能，就算有也對人類的發展毫無幫助
: : 可以說根本就是來混分的類別
: : 現在所有對人類而言很方便的科技，可以說完全都是理組製造、發明出來的
: : 未來人類要上火星，前往新殖民地，靠的也是理組
: : 那麼我們國家到底需要文組做甚麼呢?
: : 刪除文組讓更多人才釋放出來，別在學校瞎混時間
: : 是不是可以讓台灣國力更為強盛呢?
: : 反正台灣的文組職業，理組的去閉著眼睛考也是隨便上(但是薪水太低沒人願意考QQ)
: : 沒有需要特地開一個學院出來詐騙學生的錢吧?
: : 有掛嗎o'_'o?