美方對台的政策，一直都有「連貫性」，而且絕對不分執政黨是哪一黨當家作主！!
國內是很多人在裝傻？還是真的不知道美方的一貫態度！
http://talk.ltn.com.tw/article/paper/1193869
一九七八年五月，布里辛斯基前往北京與中國兩位最高領導人—鄧小平和華國鋒會談。
鄧、華兩人強調，中國不會對「和平解放台灣」做出承諾。
鄧小平表示，「你們美國可以表達自身期盼」，
但要以什麼方式、在什麼時候解決台灣問題，是中國人自己的事情。
國務院總理華國鋒則詳細解釋，
「如果我們承諾不以武力解放台灣，
美國卻以軍事裝備協助武裝台灣，這會產生什麼後果？
…我認為，這就是在製造『一個中國、一個台灣』，或者『兩個中國』。」
布里辛斯基隨即發電報向卡特報告：
「華國鋒所言似乎暗示…美國對美中關係正常化問題有兩個選擇，
一是持續軍售台灣，但無法獲得北京對於和平解決的承諾；
二是美方停止軍售，換取北京許諾和平解決台灣問題。」
卡特看過電報後，在空白處標記這項結論。
國家安全會議的中國問題專家奧森柏格則視此為突破，
「華、鄧兩人的說法暗示性地透露，
北京了解、也接受美方將在美中關係正常化後，繼續與台灣維持軍售關係。」
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2018/04/17/2003691459/3
By May 1978, Brzezinski was in Beijing for talks with China’s top leaders,
Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) and Hua Guofeng (華國鋒).
Deng and Hua stressed China would give
“no pledge of peaceful liberation of Taiwan.”
Deng conceded “your side can express its hopes”
but how and when China solves the Taiwan problem is the business
of the Chinese themselves.
Premier Hua separately spelled it out:
“If we undertake a commitment that China not liberate Taiwan by arms,
then on the other hand, the US side is helping and arming Taiwan with
its military equipment, what will be the result …
I think it is the creation of one China, one Taiwan or two Chinas.”
Brzezinski promptly cabled Carter that
“seemingly implicit in Hua’s remarks ...
is that we have a choice as to the formula for normalization,
either we can continue to supply arms to Taiwan after normalization without
obtaining a Chinese statement of peaceful intent,
or we can obtain the statement while terminating arms sales.”
As Carter read his advisor’s telegram,
he drew a line in the margin to highlight this conclusion.
Michel Oksenberg, a China specialist with the National Security Council,
noted a breakthrough.
“Hua and Teng’s [Deng’s] presentations tacitly revealed that
the Chinese understand and accept that we intend to sustain an arms sales
relationship with Taiwan after normalization.”
※ 引述《coober ()》之銘言：
: 原文在這裡
: https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5680/text
: 節錄關於第四章節
: 法案有台灣防衛評估委員會的描述
: SEC. 4. TAIWAN DEFENSE ASSESSMENT COMMISSION.
: 台灣防衛評估委員會 (應該是這樣翻吧)
: (a) Establishment.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
: this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall establish a commission, to be known
: as the “Taiwan Defense Assessment Commission”, to conduct a comprehensive
: assessment of Taiwan’s defense establishment and provide recommendations to
: improve the efficiency, effectiveness, readiness, and resilience of Taiwan’s
: self-defense capability in the following areas:
: (a)在本法頒布之日起90天內 國防部長應設立一個叫"台灣防衛評估委員會"的委員會
: 全面評估台灣的防務建立並提出建議
: 在下列範圍內 改善台灣防衛能力的效率 有效性 準備程度和應變能力
: (1) Strategic planning and resource management.
: 戰略計畫和資源管理
: (2) Personnel management and force development.
: 人員管理和力量發展
: (3) Joint operational planning and assessment.
: 聯合作戰計畫和評估
: (4) Military readiness measurement and assessment.
: 軍事準備程度和評估
: (5) Command, control, communications, and intelligence.
: 指揮 控制 通信和情報
: (6) Technology research and development.
: 科技發展與研發
: (7) Defense article procurement and logistics.
: 國防物品採購和後勤
: (b) Report.—Not later than 1 year after the date on which the commission is
: established under subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall submit to
: Taiwan’s Defense Minister and the congressional defense committees a report
: on the recommendations of the Commission under subsection (a).
: （a）條款成立後一年內 國防部長應向台灣國防部長和國會國防委員會(美方的)
: 提交一份關於委員會建議的報告