1.新聞網址︰
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https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-world-and-a-small-war/
2.新聞來源︰
Geopolitical futures
3.完整新聞標題
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The World and a Small War
世界的小戰爭
4.完整新聞內容︰
※ 請完整轉載原文 請勿修改內文與編排 ※
No war is small when you are living in it, but the world is large, and large w
ars are rare. At the same time, wars reverberate in unexpected ways. A small w
ar here might make another war elsewhere deadlier, or it might help prevent a
war elsewhere. No war can be understood simply in and of itself. Therefore, th
e war in Ukraine must be considered not only in its own terms but also in term
s of its reverberations. And since reverberations are by definition disorderly
, in terms of their connection to both the primary war and its ultimate import
ance, I will arbitrarily embed the reverberations into my model of the world.
生活中，沒有戰爭是小的，但世界很大，大的戰爭是罕見的。 與此同時，戰爭以意想不
到的方式迴響。 這裡的一場小型戰爭可能會使其他地方的另一場戰爭更加致命，或者它
可能有助於防止其他地方的戰爭。 任何戰爭都不能簡單地理解其本身。 因此，烏克蘭戰
爭不僅要考慮其本身，還要考慮其影響。 由於混響在定義上是無序的，就 它們與主
要戰爭及其最終重要性的聯繫而言，我將任意將混響嵌入到我的世界模型中。
Poland has emerged, for the moment, as the leader of Europe. Geographically, i
t is closest to Ukraine, and therefore much of NATO’s force has been statione
d there. Most important, the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division is there. That means
that the 82nd is working with Polish forces, many of whom have already trained
for several years with U.S. armored forces in Poland. For the U.S., that mean
s its forces are made aware of the terrain they may be fighting on and get the
chance to develop some familiarity with Poles. Their mission is to deter or r
epel a Russian invasion of Poland or, if ordered, to move into Ukraine and eng
age and defeat Russian forces there.
目前，波蘭已成為歐洲的領導者。 從地理上來看，它離烏克蘭最近，因此北約的大部分
部隊都駐紮在那裡。 最重要的是，美國第 82 空降師在那裡。 這意味著第 82 師正在與
波蘭軍隊合作，其中許多人已經在波蘭的美國裝甲部隊訓練了幾年。 對美國來說，這意
味著其部隊了解他們可能正在作戰的地形，並有機會熟悉波蘭人。 他們的任務是阻止或
擊退俄羅斯對波蘭的入侵，或者如果接到命令，則進入烏克蘭並與那裡的俄羅斯軍隊交戰
並擊敗。
After World War II, to ward off Soviet domination of the Continent, the United
States had to position its forces in Europe by placing a main force in German
y. Inevitably, this wove the two previously hostile countries together politic
ally and socially. It also created necessary investments that had a role in th
e German economic miracle, a miracle that eventually made Germany the leading
power in Europe – something inconceivable in 1945. German well-being became a
strategic requirement for the United States, and being an American priority i
n a shattered Europe meant a great deal.
二戰後，為了抵禦蘇聯對歐洲大陸的統治，美國不得不通過在德國部署主力來將其部隊定
位在歐洲。 不可避免地，這在政治和社會上將這兩個以前敵對的國家聯繫在一起。 它還
創造了必要的投資，這些投資在德國經濟奇蹟中發揮了作用，這一奇蹟最終使德國成為歐
洲的主導力量——這在 1945 年是不可想像的。德國的福祉成為美國的戰略要求，成為美
國的優先事項在一個支離破碎的歐洲意味著很多。
The situation today is not as stark as it was in 1945. The basing of U.S. forc
es in a country makes the host country’s stability and predictability a U.S.
strategic interest, and Polish geography and interests now link to American in
terests in a relationship that is blossoming from what it was. The United Stat
es has felt alienated from Europe because of Europe’s reluctance to fulfill i
ts financial commitments to NATO, and Europe felt alienated from what it saw a
s American hyper-militarism. Ukraine has generated a shift in Europe that may
or may not last. But what will likely last is the presence of American troops
in Poland. The U.S. still has troops in Germany more than 30 years after the e
nd of the Cold War. For the Americans, deployments are habit-forming.
今天的情況不像 1945 年那樣嚴峻。美軍在一個國家的基地使東道國的穩定性和可預測性
成為美國的戰略利益，而波蘭的地理和利益現在與美國的利益聯繫在一起，這種關係正在
蓬勃發展。由於歐洲不願履行其對北約的財政承諾，美國感到與歐洲疏遠，而歐洲則感到
與它所認為的美國超軍國主義疏遠。 烏克蘭已經在歐洲產生了可能會或可能不會持續的
轉變。 但可能會持續下去的是美國軍隊在波蘭的存在。 冷戰結束30多年後，美國仍然在
德國駐軍。 對於美國人來說，部署是一種習慣。
Poland’s geography and its memory of the consequences of war bond it with the
Americans. The end of the Ukraine war will imprint a model on the U.S. of fut
ure threats that aligns with Poland’s own view. Poland is under threat of de
facto expulsion from the EU for violating EU judicial standards. That is a min
or test of how the European balance of power might shift.
波蘭的地理環境和對戰爭後果的記憶與美國人息息相關。 烏克蘭戰爭的結束將為美國樹
立一個符合波蘭自己觀點的未來威脅模型。 波蘭因違反歐盟司法標準而面臨事實上被歐
盟驅逐的威脅。 這是對歐洲力量平衡可能如何轉變的一個小考驗。
Elsewhere, the Turks have done an interesting thing, sortieing a substantial p
art of their navy into the Black Sea, where the Russian ship Moskva was sunk.
Turkey has kept its distance from much of the Ukraine war, although it made so
me drones available to Ukrainian forces. Turkey is historically hostile to Rus
sia but lately regards the U.S. as unpredictable. It has balanced carefully th
ere. But the poor performance of Russian forces in Ukraine has likely caused t
he Turks to reevaluate Russia’s threat. Turkey likely no longer equates Russi
an and American strength. From Turkey’s point of view, if Russia were able to
use its navy to impose itself on the Black Sea while eliminating or forcing U
krainian forces armed with anti-ship missiles farther away from the coast, thi
s would ease Russian operations in the Black Sea. Such an outcome would also p
ose a potential threat to Turkey. Turkey is a member of NATO, and Russia may e
ventually decide Turkey’s fleet is a threat and strike its ships and ports. T
he Turks have moved into the Black Sea to preempt a Russian move by raising th
e risks beyond what Russia can incur. At the same time, this will involve a de
gree of coordination with Ukraine.
在其他地方，土耳其人做了一件有趣的事情，他們將大部分海軍出動到黑海，俄羅斯船隻
莫斯科號就是在黑海沉沒的。 土耳其一直與烏克蘭戰爭的大部分時間保持距離，儘管它
向烏克蘭軍隊提供了一些無人機。 土耳其歷來對俄羅斯懷有敵意，但最近認為美國不可
預測。它在那裡仔細平衡。 但俄羅斯軍隊在烏克蘭的糟糕表現可能導致土耳其人重新評
估俄羅斯的威脅。 土耳其可能不再等同於俄羅斯和美國的實力。 從土耳其的角度來看，
如果俄羅斯能夠利用其海軍將自己強加於黑海，同時消滅或迫使配備反艦導彈的烏克蘭軍
隊遠離海岸，這將緩解俄羅斯在黑海的行動。 這樣的結果也將對土耳其構成潛在威脅。
土耳其是北約成員國，俄羅斯最終可能會認定土耳其的艦隊構成威脅，並襲擊其船隻和港
口。 土耳其人已經進入黑海，通過提高俄羅斯所能承受的風險來搶先於俄羅斯的行動。
同時，這將涉及與烏克蘭的一定程度的協調。
In challenging Russia in the Black Sea, another avenue is opened up. Turkey ha
s significant interests in both the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia ha
s been advancing its interests there to the concern of Turkey. Russia is in no
position to pose a military challenge to Turkey at the moment, nor is Turkey
likely to move militarily. Covert actions and diplomacy are the key. And given
Russia’s performance in Ukraine, countries like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan mi
ght reconsider their relations to Russia. The weakness of Russia to this point
opens the door to strategic realignments, forces Turkey to assert itself in t
he Black Sea and potentially clears a path for Turkey to pursue other interest
s.
在黑海挑戰俄羅斯，開闢了另一條途徑。 土耳其在南高加索和中亞都有重大利益。 俄羅
斯一直在推進其在土耳其的利益，從而引起土耳其的關注。 俄羅斯目前無法對土耳其構
成軍事挑戰，土耳其也不太可能採取軍事行動。 秘密行動和外交是關鍵。 鑑於俄羅斯在
烏克蘭的表現，亞塞拜然和哈薩克等國可能會重新考慮與俄羅斯的關係。 俄羅斯在這一
點上的弱點為戰略調整打開了大門，迫使土耳其在黑海維護自己的地位，並可能為土耳其
追求其他利益掃清道路。
Then there is China. China entered into a relationship with Russia to create a
massive counterweight to the United States. But despite their public statemen
ts, the Chinese have realized that a relationship with Russia is a liability a
nd not an asset. Russia does not have the weight to draw the U.S. away from th
reatening China. It lacks the military force to execute the Ukrainian campaign
without calling on Syrian reinforcements. China is not in a position to send
forces to aid Russia. First, saving Russia’s campaign would provide no direct
benefit to China, and a Chinese intervention could be disastrous. Second and
more important, China has seen the impact of U.S.-led economic warfare. Becomi
ng active in Ukraine or providing significant aid to Russia might trigger a si
milar economic attack on China.
然後是中國。 中國與俄羅斯建立了關係，以建立對美國的巨大製衡。 但儘管發表了公開
聲明，但中國人已經意識到，與俄羅斯的關係是一種責任，而不是一種資產。 俄羅斯沒
有能力讓美國遠離對中國的威脅。 它缺乏在不呼籲敘利亞增援的情況下執行烏克蘭戰役
的軍事力量。 中國沒有能力派兵援助俄羅斯。 首先，挽救俄羅斯的戰役不會給中國帶來
直接的好處，中國的干預可能是災難性的。 其次，更重要的是，中國已經看到了美國主
導的經濟戰的影響。 在烏克蘭變得活躍或向俄羅斯提供大量援助可能會引發對中國的類
似經濟攻擊。
China, like Russia, is not nearly as powerful as it appears. Its per capita gr
oss domestic product ranks 81st in the world. (Russia’s is 85th.) Its domesti
c market for sophisticated goods is limited. It must have the ability to expor
t, without which it destabilizes. The United States, even with tariffs on Chin
ese goods, is China’s largest customer. Facing both a loss of exports and an
economic war at a time when China’s economic growth rate is contracting and s
ocial tension over wealth inequality is rising would be dangerous. Invading Ta
iwan would be insane, as it would give China the only thing it has enough of
– land. It could also fail. And the U.S. economic response would be intense a
t a time when China’s economy cannot withstand it.
中國和俄羅斯一樣，並沒有看上去那麼強大。 人均國內生產總值居世界第81位。（俄羅
斯排在第 85 位）其複雜商品的國內市場有限。它必須具有出口能力，否則就會破壞穩定
。 即使對中國商品徵收關稅，美國也是中國最大的客戶。 在中國經濟增長放緩、財富不
平等引起的社會緊張局勢加劇之際，同時面臨出口損失和經濟戰爭將是危險的。 入侵台
灣將是瘋狂的，因為它將給中國唯一足夠的東西——土地。 它也可能失敗。 在中國經濟
無法承受的時候，美國的經濟反應會很激烈。
So we see Poland and Turkey taking on greater significance as a result of the
war, and China losing significance. There are many other reverberations. I cho
se these three, if it is not already obvious, because in my book “The Next 10
0 Years” I predicted the rise of Poland and Turkey and the decline of China.
So while there are many other effects, there is no reason not to start with th
ese.
因此，我們看到波蘭和土耳其因戰爭而變得更加重要，而中國則失去了重要性。 還有許
多其他的迴響。 我選擇了這三個，如果不是很明顯的話，因為在我的《下一個 100 年》
一書中，我預測了波蘭和土耳其的崛起以及中國的衰落。 因此，雖然還有許多其他影響
，但沒有理由不從這些開始。
5.附註、心得、想法︰
※ 40字心得、備註 ※
幫大家一段一段的翻譯
簡單來說俄烏戰爭波蘭跟土耳其將會崛起
原因我就不一一贅述了
反倒作者說中國一堆問題
甚至說出侵略台灣只能拿到土地且有很高的機率失敗
內容很有料可以看看
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