Donald Trump should know, the world cannot afford another Thirty Years' War
(川普須知世界無法承受另一個30年戰爭)
原文網址：https://tinyurl.com/y3lav93s
中譯：https://www.guancha.cn/NiEr-FuGeSen/2019_06_14_505078.shtml
Niall Ferguson
哈佛大學歷史講座教授
History suggests the US-China conflict will need a Westphalian resolution
(歷史顯示美中衝突將需要一個威斯特伐利亞和約)
Regular readers of this column will not have been surprised by the outbreak
of the Second Cold War. Ever since Donald Trump imposed the first tariffs on
Chinese imports last year, I have argued that the trade war between the
United States and China would last longer than most people expected and that
it would escalate into other forms of warfare.
(本專欄的老讀者們並不會對第二次冷戰的爆發感到意外。自從唐納德·川普去年首次對
中國進口商品加征關稅以來，我一直認為，美國和中國之間的貿易戰將比大多數人預期的
持續時間更長，並且衝突會進一步升級並在其他領域表現出來。)
The tech war — exemplified by last week’s US measures against the Chinese
telecoms company Huawei — is now in full swing. The passage of the destroyer
USS Preble through the Taiwan Strait was a reminder that shows of military
force are also part and parcel of a cold war. And the propaganda war is now
well under way, too, with Chinese state television digging out old Korean War
films in which the Americans are the bad guys.
(以5月美國對中國電信設備製造商華為公司所採取的措施為例，這場科技戰爭目前正在全
面展開。美國驅逐艦USS Preble通過台灣海峽的舉動提醒人們，展示軍事力量也是冷戰的
重要組成部分。隨著中國國家電視台重新播放抗美援朝老電影並展現其中扮演壞人角色的
美國人形象，宣傳戰也在如火如荼地進行。)
If you still think peace will break out when Trump meets Xi Jinping at the
G20 summit in Osaka next month, you’re in for a disappointment. Zhang
Yansheng, chief researcher at the China Centre for International Economic
Exchanges in Beijing, predicted last week that the friction could continue at
this level until 2025.
(如果你仍然認為下個月在大阪舉行的G20峰會上，川普與習近平會面時會實現和平，那你
一定會失望。位於北京的中國國際經濟交流中心的首席研究員張燕生上週預測，中美之間
的摩擦可能會持續到2025年。)
Historical analogies are powerful. More than any formal model from the social
sciences, they help us make sense of contemporary events. As the former US
defence secretary Ash Carter said at the recent applied-history conference at
Harvard, in the corridors of power “real people talk history, not economics,
political science or IR [international relations]”. The first question they
ask is: what is this like? And, yes, this sudden escalation of Sino-American
antagonism is a lot like the early phase of the Cold War.
(歷史類比是強有力的，它們比任何來自社會科學的形式模型都更能幫助我們理解當代事
件。正如美國前國防部長Ash Carter最近在哈佛大學召開的應用歷史學會議上所提到的：
在權力的舞台上，“真正的人物喜歡談論歷史，而不是政治、經濟或國際關係”。是的，
這種美中對抗的突然升級很像冷戰的早期症狀。)
But the next question the applied historian asks is: what are the
differences? Before the idea of the Second Cold War gets so well established
that it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, it’s time to take a step back
and acknowledge that 2019 isn’t 1949, not least because of the profound
economic, social and cultural entanglement of America and China, which is
quite unlike the almost total separation of the United States from the Soviet
Union 70 years ago.
(但應用歷史學家提出的下一個問題是：它們之間有什麼區別？之前第二次冷戰的想法變
得根深蒂固，以至於在它成為一個自我實現的預言之前，是時候後退一步，承認2019年不
是1949年，尤其是因為現在美中兩國深陷在政治、經濟、社會和文化的摩擦之中，這與70
年前蘇聯與美國幾乎完全分離的情況是非常不同的。)
The networked world forged by decades of commercial aviation, globally
integrated markets for commodities, manufactures, labour and capital and —
above all — the internet is radically different from the segmented and
half-ruined world that Harry Truman and Joseph Stalin carved up between them.
In the late 1940s it was possible for Soviet Russia to bring down Winston
Churchill’s metaphorical Iron Curtain because the limited channels of
communication between eastern and western Europe were so easy to shut down.
Although the phrase “digital Iron Curtain” is doing the rounds, I am
frankly doubtful that such a severance of ties is possible today.
(幾十年來，商業飛行、大宗商品貿易、製造業、勞動力和資本的全球一體化，以及最重
要的互聯網，這些為我們造就了一個網絡化的世界，與杜魯門和斯大林瓜分的那個四分五
裂、幾近毀滅的世界截然不同。上世紀40年代末，有可能打造丘吉爾所比喻的鐵幕，因為
東歐和西歐之間有限的溝通渠道很容易被關閉。儘管“數字鐵幕”一詞正在流傳，但坦率
地說，我很懷疑如今美中之間這種關係的中斷是否有任何可能性。)
Because the internet and the smartphone have enlarged, accelerated and
empowered social networks in the same way as the printing press did in the
16th and 17th centuries, today’s strategic rivalry is being played out in a
near-borderless world, altogether different from the world of early John le
Carré.
(由於互聯網和智能手機已經獲得了廣泛應用，像16、17世紀的印刷媒體一樣加速和增強
了社會網絡，今天的戰略競爭正在一個近乎無國界的世界中展開，這與昔日的世界完全不
同。)
The 17th century had it all: climate change (the Little Ice Age that often
froze the Thames), refugee crises (as Protestant zealots crossed the
Atlantic), extreme views (as Catholics and Protestants sought to smear one
another) and fake news (as witch-finders condemned thousands of innocent
people to death). But its most familiar feature to our eyes is the erosion of
state sovereignty.
(17世紀發生了很多事情：氣候變化(使泰晤士河經常結冰的小冰河期)、難民危機(如新教
徒狂熱分子橫渡大西洋)、極端觀點(如天主教徒和新教徒試圖互相詆毀)和假新聞(如女巫
發現者造成成千上萬無辜的人被處死)。但在我們看來，它最熟悉的特徵是對國家主權的
侵蝕。)
Catholics and Lutherans had been given a certain amount of clarity by the
Peace of Augsburg of 1555, which left it to each individual prince to decide
the denomination of his realm without fear of outside interference. But that
principle seemed under threat by the early 1600s. In any case, it had created
an incentive for the proponents of the Counter-Reformation to replace
Protestant rulers with Catholic ones. The war of religion had no respect for
borders: Jesuits infiltrated Protestant England just as Russian trolls now
meddle in western democracies.
(1555年的《奧格斯堡和約》為天主教徒和路德宗新教徒明確了一點，即每個諸侯有決定其
領地內宗教教派的權力，無需擔心受到外來干涉。但到了17世紀初，這一原則似乎受到了
威脅，它變相鼓勵反宗教改革勢力擁立信仰天主教的統治者，來取代信仰新教的統治者。
宗教戰爭根本不管什麼邊界不邊界：天主教的耶穌會滲透了信奉新教的英格蘭，跟今天俄
羅斯網絡水軍干涉西方民主國家沒什麼兩樣。)
The Thirty Years’ War was as much about power as it was about religion,
however. Unlike the Cold War, which was waged by two superpowers, it was a
multiplayer game. The Holy Roman Emperor sought to reimpose Catholicism on
Bohemia. Spain wanted to bring the rebellious Dutch back under Habsburg rule.
Despite being Catholic, France sought to challenge the power of both Spain
and Austria. Sweden seized the moment to thrust boldly southwards. Although
also Lutheran, Denmark ended up as Sweden’s foe. Although also Catholic,
Portugal threw off Spanish rule.
(然而，三十年戰爭既是一場宗教戰爭，也是一場權力戰爭。它與由美蘇兩個超級大國發動
的冷戰不同，它是一場多人遊戲。神聖羅馬帝國皇帝試圖強迫波希米亞重新尊奉天主教。
西班牙想讓叛逆的荷蘭人回歸哈布斯堡王朝的統治。法國儘管是天主教國家，卻試圖挑戰
西班牙和奧地利的權力。瑞典抓住時機大膽地向南推進。丹麥雖與瑞典同屬新教路德宗，
卻成了瑞典的敵人。儘管葡萄牙和西班牙一樣也信天主教，它卻擺脫了後者的統治。)
In the same way, today’s world is not bipolar. America may tell others to
boycott Huawei, but not all Europeans will comply. China is the biggest
economy in Asia, but it does not control India.
(同樣，當今世界也不是兩極的——美國可能會告訴自己的盟友抵制華為，但不是所有歐
洲國家都會遵從美國的旨意；中國的確是亞洲最大的經濟體，但它也無法支配印度。)
The Cold War created vast tank armies and nuclear arsenals, pointed at each
other but never used. The Thirty Years’ War was a time of terrorism and
gruesome violence, with no clear distinction between soldiers and civilians.
(Think Syria today.) Then, as now, the worst-affected areas suffered death
and depopulation. There was no deterrence then, just as there is none now in
cyber-warfare. Indeed, states tended to underestimate the costs of getting
involved in the conflict. Both Britain and France did so — only to slide
into civil war.
(冷戰創造了龐大的坦克部隊和核武庫，它們相互瞄準，但從未使用過。30年戰爭是一個
充滿恐怖主義和可怕暴力的時代，士兵和平民之間沒有明顯的區別(想想今天的敘利亞)。
當時和現在一樣，受影響最嚴重的地區遭受了死亡和人口減少。當時沒有威懾，就像網絡
戰現在沒有威懾一樣。事實上，各國往往低估了捲入衝突的成本。英國和法國都這樣做了
，結果卻陷入了內戰。)
The implications of this analogy are not cheering. The sole consolation I can
offer is that, thanks to technology, most things nowadays happen roughly 10
times faster than they did 400 years ago. So we may be heading for a Three
Years’ War, rather than a Thirty Years’ War. Either way, we need to learn
how to end such a conflict.
(這個類比的含義並不令人高興。唯一能讓我感到安慰的是，多虧了科技，如今大多數事
情的發生速度比400年前快了大約10倍。因此，我們可能正在走向一場持續3年的戰爭，而
不是30年的戰爭。無論哪種方式，我們都需要學習如何結束這樣的衝突。)
The end of the Thirty Years’ War was not brought about by one treaty, but by
several, of which the most important were signed at Münster and Osnabrück
in October 1648. It is these treaties that historians refer to as the Peace
of Westphalia. Contrary to legend, they did not make peace, as France and
Spain kept fighting for 11 more years. And they certainly did not establish a
world order based on modern states.
(30年戰爭的結束不是由一個條約帶來的，而是由幾個條約帶來的，其中最重要的是1648
年10月在明斯特和奧斯納布呂克簽署的《明斯特和約》與《奧斯納布呂克條約》。正是這
些條約被歷史學家稱為《威斯特伐利亞和約》。與傳說相反的是，它們沒有締造和平，因
為法國和西班牙又打了11年的仗。他們當然沒有建立一個以現代國家為基礎的世界秩序。
)
What the Westphalian settlement did was to establish power-sharing
arrangements between the emperor and the German princes, as well as between
the rival religious groups, on the basis of limited and conditional rights.
The peace as a whole was underpinned by mutual guarantees, as opposed to the
third-party guarantees that had been the norm before.
(威斯特伐利亞協議所做的是在有限和有條件的權利的基礎上，在皇帝和德國諸侯之間以
及敵對的宗教團體之間建立權力分享安排。和平作為一個整體是以相互保證為基礎的，而
不是以之前作為規範的第三方保證為基礎。)
The Cold War ended when one side folded. That will not happen in our time.
The democratic and authoritarian powers can fight for three or 30 years;
neither side will win a definitive victory. Sooner or later there will have
to be a compromise — in particular, a self-restraining commitment not to
take full advantage of modern technology to hollow out each other’s
sovereignty.
(美蘇冷戰是以一方屈服而告終的。這樣的結局不會出現在我們的時代。民主國家和威權國
家之間可能較量三年或三十年，仍然沒有哪一方贏得決定性勝利。遲早有一天，雙方不得
不達成妥協——具體而言，就是要恪守自我約束的承諾，不充分利用現代技術來挖空對方
的主權。)
Our destination is 1648, not 1989 — a Cyber-Westphalia, not the fall of the
Great Firewall of China. If we have the option to get there in three years,
rather than in 30, we should take it.
(我們要去的未來應該是1648年，而不是1989年。我們要爭取的是網絡版的《威斯特伐利亞
和約》，而不是拆掉所謂的防火長城。如果可以選擇的話，我們當然應該在三年內，而不
是三十年內，實現這一目標。)