The Self-Destruction of American Power
美國霸權的自我毀滅
原文 (Foreign Affairs)：https://tinyurl.com/y6bzvx9u
中譯(觀察者)：
https://www.guancha.cn/FaLiDe-ZhaKaLiYa/2019_06_23_506710_s.shtml
Fareed Zakaria
《華盛頓郵報》專欄作家
Sometime in the last two years, American hegemony died. The age of U.S.
dominance was a brief, heady era, about three decades marked by two moments,
each a breakdown of sorts. It was born amid the collapse of the Berlin Wall,
in 1989. The end, or really the beginning of the end, was another collapse,
that of Iraq in 2003, and the slow unraveling since. But was the death of the
United States’ extraordinary status a result of external causes, or did
Washington accelerate its own demise through bad habits and bad behavior?
That is a question that will be debated by historians for years to come. But
at this point, we have enough time and perspective to make some preliminary
observations.
美利堅的全球霸權已經崩塌，具體時間就在過去兩年裡的某一刻。美利堅合眾國曾經是這
個世界上唯一的超級大國，那是短暫的、令人陶醉的30年。在這段歷史裡發生了兩個標誌
性的事件，它們在某種意義上都可以被看成是一種崩塌：1989年柏林牆的倒塌，美利堅超
級大國時代便是從那一刻開始的；2003年伊拉克的分崩離析，美利堅超級大國時代從那一
刻開始逐漸走向終結。美國在全世界範圍內失去自己的卓越地位是外部因素導致的嗎？還
是說這一結果是華盛頓自己的不良心態和糟糕政策造成的呢？這是一個可供歷史學家們在
未來詳細討論的話題。然而此時此刻，我想我們應該可以對這一現象進行一些初步的分析
。
As with most deaths, many factors contributed to this one. There were deep
structural forces in the international system that inexorably worked against
any one nation that accumulated so much power. In the American case, however,
one is struck by the ways in which Washington—from an unprecedented position
—mishandled its hegemony and abused its power, losing allies and emboldening
enemies. And now, under the Trump administration, the United States seems to
have lost interest, indeed lost faith, in the ideas and purpose that animated
its international presence for three-quarters of a century.
正如許多事物的消亡一樣，美國超級大國地位的消亡也是多種因素共同作用的結果。對於
一個已經累積了如此龐大實力的國家來說，在國際體系中一定存在著與其相對立的某種深
刻的結構性力量。很多人也許已經注意到，第一次坐上超級大國寶座的美國對於手中的霸
權並沒有形成正確的認識，華盛頓濫用了自己的力量。在這一過程中，它不但失去了盟友
，而且還鼓舞了敵人的士氣。如今美國進入了川普時代，這個國家似乎已經對那些使自己
在過去四分之三個世紀裡令全世界景仰的理想和目標失去了興趣，或者也可以說，失去了
信仰。
A STAR IS BORN
新星誕生
U.S. hegemony in the post-Cold War era was like nothing the world had seen
since the Roman Empire. Writers are fond of dating the dawn of “the American
century” to 1945, not long after the publisher Henry Luce coined the term.
But the post-World War II era was quite different from the post-1989 one.
Even after 1945, in large stretches of the globe, France and the United
Kingdom still had formal empires and thus deep influence. Soon, the Soviet
Union presented itself as a superpower rival, contesting Washington’s
influence in every corner of the planet. Remember that the phrase “Third
World” derived from the tripartite division of the globe, the First World
being the United States and Western Europe, and the Second World, the
communist countries. The Third World was everywhere else, where each country
was choosing between U.S. and Soviet influence. For much of the world’s
population, from Poland to China, the century hardly looked American.
美國在冷戰結束後獲得了世界霸權，美國成為了自羅馬帝國時代以來人類從未經驗過的一
支全球性力量。一些文章喜歡將“美國世紀”（the American century）的起始點設定在
1945年，《時代》週刊共同創辦人亨利·盧斯（Henry Luce）1941年第一次使用了這一表
述。不過，二戰後時代與冷戰後時代，兩者之間還是存在著巨大差異的。1945年以後，在
世界上的大片地區，英國和法國仍然保留著自己的帝國遺產，這兩個國家仍然在很多地區
發揮著巨大的影響力。二戰後不久，蘇聯便以美國的超級對手的身份登上了歷史舞台，這
個國家開始在地球的每一個角落與美國爭奪影響力。還記得人們對“三個世界”的劃分嗎
？美國和西歐是第一世界，共產主義國家是第二世界，其他國家則被劃入第三世界，那些
國家都面臨著在美蘇之間站隊的選擇。從波蘭到中國，這個世界上的大部分人口當時並沒
有感受到自己生活在“美國世紀”。
The United States’ post-Cold War supremacy was initially hard to detect. As
I pointed out in The New Yorker in 2002, most participants missed it. In
1990, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher argued that the world was
dividing into three political spheres, dominated by the dollar, the yen, and
the deutsche mark. Henry Kissinger’s 1994 book, Diplomacy, predicted the
dawn of a new multipolar age. Certainly in the United States, there was
little triumphalism. The 1992 presidential campaign was marked by a sense of
weakness and weariness. “The Cold War is over; japan and Germany won,” the
Democratic hopeful Paul Tsongas said again and again. Asia hands had already
begun to speak of “the Pacific century.”
美國在冷戰結束後成為了唯一的超級大國，然而美國的這種優勢地位在當時並未被人們清
晰地感知到。2002年，我曾在《紐約客》雜誌的一篇文章中指出：大多數國際體系的參與
者並沒有及時注意到美國已經在冷戰後取得世界主導地位的現實。1990年，時任英國首相
撒切爾認為，世界正在分裂為被美元、日元和德國馬克統治的三個陣營；基辛格在其1994
年出版的名著《大外交》（Diplomacy）一書中則預測多極化時代即將到來。當然，在美
國國內你也很難感受到很明顯的樂觀情緒。1992年，正在舉行總統大選的美國給人留下了
一種虛弱和疲憊的印象。“冷戰結束了，日本和德國才是最終的勝利者”，當時民主黨頗
有希望獲勝的候選人保羅·桑格斯（Paul Tsongas）曾到處宣揚這樣的觀點。而美國的亞
太事務專家們早在那時便已經開始提出“太平洋世紀”（the Pacific century）的概念
了。
There was one exception to this analysis, a prescient essay in the pages of
this magazine by the conservative commentator Charles Krauthammer: “The
Unipolar Moment,” which was published in 1990. But even this triumphalist
take was limited in its expansiveness, as its title suggests. “The unipolar
moment will be brief,” Krauthammer admitted, predicting in a Washington Post
column that within a very short time, Germany and Japan, the two emerging “
regional superpowers,” would be pursuing foreign policies independent of the
United States.
不過，例外也是有的。頗具保守色彩的評論家查爾斯·克勞薩默（Charles Krauthammer
）1990年在《外交事務》雜誌發表了一篇很有前瞻性的文章《單極時刻》（The
Unipolar Moment）。正如此文標題所揭示的，文章作者對情況的樂觀判斷還是被“時刻
”這個概念侷限住了。“單極時刻將是短暫的”，查爾斯·克勞薩默在《華盛頓郵報》的
一篇專欄文章中指出，德國和日本這兩個正在崛起的“地區性超級大國”將很快在美國設
定的框架之外尋求自己獨立的外交政策。一些決策者很願意送走“單極時刻”，他們相信
那是很快就會發生的現實。1991年，巴爾幹半島陷入了戰火。時任歐盟理事會主席雅克·
普斯（Jacques Poos）宣稱：“歐洲有所作為的時刻到了……如果歐洲人只能解決一個問
題，那麼它一定是南斯拉夫問題。南斯拉夫是一個歐洲國家，那裡的問題不應該由美國人
來插手”。然而事實證明，只有美國具備進行有效干預並成功處理危機的綜合實力和影響
力。
Similarly, toward the end of the 1990s, when a series of economic panics sent
East Asian economies into tailspins, only the United States could stabilize
the global financial system. It organized a $120 billion international
bailout for the worst-hit countries, resolving the crisis. Time magazine put
three Americans, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, Federal Reserve Chair Alan
Greenspan, and Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, on its cover with
the headline “The Committee to Save the World.”
另一個類似的事件發生在上世紀90年代末，當時經濟危機使東亞經濟完全失控，只有美國
展現出了穩定全球金融體系的能力。美國為受到衝擊最嚴重的亞洲國家籌集了1200億美元
國際緊急財政援助資金，並讓那些國家平安度過了危機。《時代》週刊把美國財政部長羅
伯特·魯賓（Robert Rubin）、聯邦儲備委員會主席艾倫·格林斯潘（Alan Greenspan）
和財政部副部長勞倫斯·薩默斯（Lawrence Summers）作為封面人物放在一起並為文章冠
以《拯救世界三人組》的標題。
THE BEGINNING OFTHE END
結束的開始
Just as American hegemony grew in the early 1990s while no one was noticing,
so in the late 1990s did the forces that would undermine it, even as people
had begun to speak of the United States as “the indispensable nation” and “
the world’s sole superpower.” First and foremost, there was the rise of
China. It is easy to see in retrospect that Beijing would become the only
serious rival to Washington, but it was not as apparent a quarter century
ago. Although China had grown speedily since the 1980s, it had done so from a
very low base. Few countries had been able to continue that process for more
than a couple of decades. China’s strange mixture of capitalism and Leninism
seemed fragile, as the Tiananmen Square uprising had revealed.
美國在上世紀90年代初開始確立自己在世界上的主導地位，這一趨勢當時並沒有引發太多
人的關注；90年代末，那些有潛力削弱美國地位的力量也逐漸崛起，而那時人們已經開始
把美國視為一個“不可或缺的國家”和“全球唯一的超級大國”。在那些有潛力削弱美國
地位的國家中，如今人們首先會想到的便是中國。在今天看來，我們很容易得出“北京是
華盛頓唯一真正意義上的對手”的結論，然而在四分之一個世紀前，歷史的輪廓並沒有今
天這樣清晰。中國的快速發展早在80年代就已經開始了，不過這個國家的起點非常低。人
們當時認為一個貧窮國家的快速增長是很難持久的，而且人們從中國80年代的歷史中得出
結論：將列寧主義和資本主義結合在一起的社會是十分脆弱的。
But China’s rise persisted, and the country became the new great power on
the block, one with the might and the ambition to match the United States.
Russia, for its part, went from being both weak and quiescent in the early
1990s to being a revanchist power, a spoiler with enough capability and
cunning to be disruptive. With two major global players outside the
U.S.-constructed international system, the world had entered a post-American
phase. Today, the United States is still the most powerful country on the
planet, but it exists in a world of global and regional powers that can—and
frequently do—push back.
然而中國的崛起勢頭一直持續到今天，中國已經成為一個有能力和意圖與美國平起平坐的
國家。至於俄羅斯，這個國家在上世紀90年代初還十分虛弱、沉寂，如今它已經變身為一
股復仇的力量、一個頗具智慧和實力的攪局者。在美國構建的國際體系之外已經出現了兩
個強大的全球性玩家，因此我們完全可以說，這個世界已經進入了後美國時代。今天的美
國仍然是這個星球上最具實力的國家，然而這個星球上存在著很多全球性和地區性強國，
他們有能力與美國對立而且也的確十分頻繁地表現出與美國對立的態度。
The 9/11 attacks and the rise of Islamic terrorism played a dual role in the
decline of U.S. hegemony. At first, the attacks seem to galvanize Washington
and mobilize its power. In 2001, the United States, still larger economically
than the next five countries put together, chose to ramp up its annual
defense spending by an amount—almost $50 billion—that was larger than the
United Kingdom’s entire yearly defense budget. When Washington intervened in
Afghanistan, it was able to get overwhelming support for the campaign,
including from Russia. Two years later, despite many objections, it was still
able to put together a large international coalition for an invasion of Iraq.
The early years of this century marked the high point of the American
imperium, as Washington tried to remake wholly alien nations—Afghanistan and
Iraq—thousands of miles away, despite the rest of the world’s reluctant
acquiescence or active opposition.
在美國霸權衰落的過程中，911事件以及伊斯蘭恐怖主義勢力的崛起不僅使美國本土受到
了攻擊，它們實際上扮演了雙重角色。最初，911恐怖襲擊事件似乎使華盛頓深受震動並
促使其動員起手中大批力量。2001年，GDP規模比排在後面5個國家之和還要大的美國決定
增加500億美元國防開支，僅這個增加的數目就已經比英國全年的國防預算還要多了。當
華盛頓決定對阿富汗進行干預的時候，甚至俄羅斯也表達了支持。而兩年之後，雖然面臨
不少反對聲音，可美國仍然能在入侵伊拉克之前組織起一個強大的國際聯盟。在本世紀最
初的幾年裡，美國以自身意志行事的心態發展到了頂點——雖然其他國家並不願表達支持
甚至有些國家十分反對，可美國還是執意要讓阿富汗和伊拉克這兩個數千英里之外與己無
關的國家改天換地。
Iraq in particular marked a turning point. The United States embarked on a
war of choice despite misgivings expressed in the rest of world. It tried to
get the un to rubber-stamp its mission, and when that proved arduous, it
dispensed with the organization altogether. It ignored the Powell Doctrine—
the idea, promulgated by General Colin Powell while he was chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Gulf War, that a war was worth entering only
if vital national interests were at stake and overwhelming victory assured.
The Bush administration insisted that the vast challenge of occupying Iraq
could be undertaken with a small number of troops and a light touch. Iraq, it
was said, would pay for itself. And once in Baghdad, Washington decided to
destroy the Iraqi state, disbanding the army and purging the bureaucracy,
which produced chaos and helped fuel an insurgency. Any one of these mistakes
might have been overcome. But together they ensured that Iraq became a costly
fiasco.
對美國來說，伊拉克戰爭是一個關鍵的轉折點。雖然其他國家都對入侵伊拉克顧慮重重，
但美國還是發動了這場並不十分必要的戰爭。美國曾試圖獲得聯合國的授權，然而當發現
這幾乎沒有可能時，美國乾脆繞開了聯合國。當時的美國領導人完全忽視了“鮑威爾原則
”（1993年，時任美國參謀長聯席會議主席鮑威爾在《外交》雜誌上發表《美國軍隊——
今後的挑戰》一文，列舉了美國決策者在發動戰爭之前應該對自己提出的幾個問題：關鍵
的國家安全利益是否已經受到威脅？美國是否具有明確而現實的戰爭目標？美國是否充分
並坦率地分析了戰爭的風險和代價？是否其他所有非暴力手段都宣告無效？美國政府是否
獲得了美國人民的支持？美國的戰爭行為是否能獲得廣泛的國際支持？上述內容後來被稱
為“鮑威爾原則”——觀察者網注）的存在，他們並沒有在發動伊拉克戰爭前問自己如果
不發動這場戰爭美國的核心利益是否會受到損害，他們更不具備贏得戰爭的完全把握。小
布什政府認為，對伊拉克實施佔領並不需要太多軍隊，伊拉克並不是一塊太難啃的骨頭。
而根據當時的說法，伊拉克自會承擔美軍行動的一切成本。當美軍進入巴格達後，華盛頓
決定徹底摧毀伊拉克政府，伊拉克軍隊遭解散，政府官員遭清洗，伊拉克社會很快就陷入
了混亂，武裝暴動的引信被點燃了。對美國來說，也許上述任何一個錯誤所帶來的問題都
是可以解決的，然而當所有這一切一起發生的時候，代價高昂的伊拉克戰爭便注定會以失
敗收場。
After 9/11, Washington made major, consequential decisions that continue to
haunt it, but it made all of them hastily and in fear. It saw itself as in
mortal danger, needing to do whatever it took to defend itself—from invading
Iraq to spending untold sums on homeland security to employing torture. The
rest of the world saw a country that was experiencing a kind of terrorism
that many had lived with for years and yet was thrashing around like a
wounded lion, tearing down international alliances and norms. In its first
two years, the George W. Bush administration walked away from more
international agreements than any previous administration had. (Undoubtedly,
that record has now been surpassed under President Donald Trump.) American
behavior abroad during the Bush administration shattered the moral and
political authority of the United States, as long-standing allies such as
Canada and France found themselves at odds with it on the substance,
morality, and style of its foreign policy.
911恐怖襲擊事件發生後，華盛頓深受一些重大決策的負面影響的困擾，那些決策都是陷
入恐懼的華盛頓在非常倉促的情況下做出的。美國覺得自己到了生死關頭。入侵伊拉克、
在國土安全領域投入數目無法公開的巨資、對犯人嚴刑拷打……美國政府認為，為了實現
保障國家安全的目的可以使用任何手段。在世界上其他國家看來，美國所經歷的恐怖主義
在很多國家那裡不過是持續多年的常態，而美國卻像一頭受傷的獅子，不斷破壞國際規則
和自己的國際聯盟體系。在小布什政府的最初兩年裡，這位總統比此前任何一位美國總統
破壞的國際協議都要多（小布什的這個記錄毫無疑問已經被今天的唐納德·川普打破了）
。在小布什政府時期，美國在國外的所作所為在道德層面和政治層面破壞了美國的公信力
，諸如加拿大和法國這樣的長期盟友在一些基本原則、道德標準和對外政策方面都與美國
發生了分歧。
OWN GOAL
烏龍球
So which was it that eroded American hegemony—the rise of new challengers or
imperial overreach? As with any large and complex historical phenomenon, it
was probably all of the above. China’s rise was one of those tectonic shifts
in international life that would have eroded any hegemon’s unrivaled power,
no matter how skillful its diplomacy. The return of Russia, however, was a
more complex affair. It’s easy to forget now, but in the early 1990s,
leaders in Moscow were determined to turn their country into a liberal
democracy, a European nation, and an ally of sorts of the West. Eduard
Shevardnadze, who was foreign minister during the final years of the Soviet
Union, supported the United States’ 1990-91 war against Iraq. And after the
Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia’s first foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev,
was an even more ardent liberal, an internationalist, and a vigorous
supporter of human rights.
使美國全球霸權受到侵蝕的到底是什麼？是新出現的挑戰者還是帝國力量的過度使用？就
像任何宏大而複雜的歷史現象一樣，單一原因無法提供全面的解釋。中國崛起是國際體系
中的一種結構性變化，任何一個超級大國（無論其外交藝術多麼嫻熟完美）都無法做到自
己手中的霸權能絲毫不受其侵蝕。至於俄羅斯作為大國的再度歸來，那是一個更加複雜的
故事。如今人們大多已經忘記了，在90年代初，當時莫斯科的領導人是很希望自己的國家
能走上自由民主的道路的，是很希望俄羅斯能成為一個真正意義上的歐洲國家的，甚至是
很希望自己能成為西方某種意義上的盟友的。在前蘇聯存在的最後幾年裡，愛德華·謝瓦
爾德納澤（Eduard Shevardnadze）這位外交部長還對美國在1990年發動的海灣戰爭表達
了支持。蘇聯解體之後，俄羅斯聯邦的首位外交部長安德烈·科濟列夫（Andrei Kozyrev
）甚至是一個更加激進的自由主義者、國際主義者和西方人權理念的支持者。
Who lost Russia is a question for another article. But it is worth noting
that although Washington gave Moscow some status and respect—expanding the
G-7 into the G-8, for example—it never truly took Russia’s security
concerns seriously. It enlarged nato fast and furiously, a process that might
have been necessary for countries such as Poland, historically insecure and
threatened by Russia, but one that has continued on unthinkingly, with little
concern for Russian sensitivities, and now even extends to Macedonia. Today,
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggressive behavior makes every action
taken against his country seem justified, but it’s worth asking, What forces
produced the rise of Putin and his foreign policy in the first place?
Undoubtedly, they were mostly internal to Russia, but to the extent that U.S.
actions had an effect, they appear to have been damaging, helping stoke the
forces of revenge and revanchism in Russia.
誰應該為我們失去俄羅斯負責？就這個話題我完全可以單獨再寫一篇文章。不過應該指出
的是，雖然華盛頓對莫斯科表達了一些尊重、給了它某種身份（比如將G7擴大為G8），但
華盛頓從未認真看待俄羅斯的安全關切。美國瘋狂地推進北約東擴，把像波蘭這樣在歷史
上深受俄羅斯威脅、嚴重缺乏安全感的國家納入北約的確有些道理，然而北約東擴的推進
的確是欠缺考慮的，美國並沒有認真對待俄羅斯的安全關切，如今甚至馬其頓也已經加入
了北約。今天，俄羅斯總統普京對西方的強勢態度似乎讓我們覺得針對俄羅斯採取任何措
施都算不得太過分。不過，我們應該問自己這樣一個問題：到底是什麼力量促成了推行強
勢對外政策的普京的崛起？毫無疑問，這股力量大多來自俄羅斯國內。不過當我們把美國
對俄政策所造成的結果納入考慮，這股力量顯然是帶有一定的復仇主義色彩的。
The greatest error the United States committed during its unipolar moment,
with Russia and more generally, was to simply stop paying attention. After
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Americans wanted to go home, and they did.
During the Cold War, the United States had stayed deeply interested in events
in Central America, Southeast Asia, the Taiwan Strait, and even Angola and
Namibia. By the mid-1990s, it had lost all interest in the world.
Foreign-bureau broadcasts by nbc fell from 1,013 minutes in 1988 to 327
minutes in 1996. (Today, the three main networks combined devote roughly the
same amount of time to foreign-bureau stories as each individual network did
in 1988.) Both the White House and Congress during the George H. W. Bush
administration had no appetite for an ambitious effort to transform Russia,
no interest in rolling out a new version of the Marshall Plan or becoming
deeply engaged in the country. Even amid the foreign economic crises that hit
during the Clinton administration, U.S. policymakers had to scramble and
improvise, knowing that Congress would appropriate no funds to rescue Mexico
or Thailand or Indonesia. They offered advice, most of it designed to require
little assistance from Washington, but their attitude was one of a distant
well-wisher, not an engaged superpower.
美國在“單極時刻”所犯下的最為嚴重的錯誤（無論在對俄政策方面還是在更加廣泛的對
外事務上），就是美國突然對外面的世界不再感興趣了。蘇聯解體之後，很多美國人都覺
得該收收心在家裡好好過日子了，而且他們真地這樣做了。冷戰時期，美國曾對中美洲、
東南亞、台灣海峽甚至安哥拉和納米比亞的事務十分關注。然而到了90年代中期，美國已
經對全世界失去了興趣。美國全國廣播公司（NBC）的國際新聞內容從1988年的1013分鐘
下降到了1996年的327分鐘。在小布什時期，無論在白宮還是國會，人們對與俄羅斯加強
接觸或對其加以改造的話題都缺乏胃口，他們對推出新版“馬歇爾計畫”也毫無興趣。即
便在克林頓政府時期國外發生經濟危機時，美國的政策制定者們也只能倉促應對，他們知
道國會不會為了救援墨西哥、泰國或印尼批准任何撥款。不過他們還是對那些陷入危機的
國家提供了建議，他們在那些建議裡絲毫沒有提到美國會如何撥款援助，他們只是從遠處
向那些國家送上了祝福，其表現完全不像一個有擔當的超級大國的樣子。
Ever since the end of World War I, the United States has wanted to transform
the world. In the 1990s, that seemed more possible than ever before.
Countries across the planet were moving toward the American way. The Gulf War
seemed to mark a new milestone for world order, in that it was prosecuted to
uphold a norm, limited in its scope, endorsed by major powers and legitimized
by international law. But right at the time of all these positive
developments, the United States lost interest. U.S. policymakers still wanted
to transform the world in the 1990s, but on the cheap. They did not have the
political capital or resources to throw themselves into the effort. That was
one reason Washington’s advice to foreign countries was always the same:
economic shock therapy and instant democracy. Anything slower or more complex
— anything, in other words, that resembled the manner in which the West
itself had liberalized its economy and democratized its politics—was
unacceptable. Before 9/11, when confronting challenges, the American tactic
was mostly to attack from afar, hence the twin approaches of economic
sanctions and precision air strikes. Both of these, as the political
scientist Eliot Cohen wrote of airpower, had the characteristics of modern
courtship: “gratification without commitment.”
自第一次世界大戰大戰結束以來，美國一直希望能按照自己的意願重塑這個世界。到了上
世紀90年代，美國距離這個目標的實現比此前任何時期都要接近。當時全球各國都在向美
國模式靠攏。在世界秩序的演化歷史上，海灣戰爭的爆發是一個具有里程碑意義的事件。
這場範圍有限的戰爭獲得了諸多大國的支持，在國際法層面也無可指摘，而且這場戰爭還
為各國確立了一套行為規範。可是在所有這些積極因素匯聚在一起時，美國卻突然對一切
都失去了興趣。美國的政策制定者們在90年代的確還有意重塑這個世界，但他們希望能以
較低的成本、簡化的手段進行操作。他們實際上已經沒有政治資本或政治資源對這個世界
進行真正意義上的重塑了。這也就解釋了為何華盛頓在對其他國家提供建議時給出的總是
萬年不變的同一套方案——休克療法和快速民主化。那些見效緩慢、過程複雜的方案對美
國來說都是不可接受的，然而西方自身經濟自由化和政治民主化的過程卻的確是緩慢而複
雜的。在911事件發生前，每當遭遇挑戰時，美國大多數時候採取的都是經濟制裁或空中
精確打擊等遠距離攻擊的戰術。政治學者埃略特·科恩（Eliot Cohen）認為上述兩種手
段與現代人追逐愛情的方式之間有某種相似之處：在使自己獲得愉悅的同時，卻不願做出
任何承諾。
Of course, these limits on the United States’ willingness to pay prices and
bear burdens never changed its rhetoric, which is why, in an essay for The
New York Times Magazine in 1998,1 pointed out that U.S. foreign policy was
defined by “the rhetoric of transformation but the reality of accommodation.
” The result, I said, was “a hollow hegemony.” That hollowness has
persisted ever since.
美國在重塑世界時缺乏承擔壓力和付出代價的意願，但這並不影響美國政府對自身政策的
官方表述。我曾在1998年的一期《紐約時報》雜誌中指出，美國的對外政策“在表述時決
意重塑世界，但在實際行動上，卻是希望與現實和解”。結果，美國就變成了一個虛偽的
霸權。美國對外政策的這種虛偽性一直延續至今。
THE FINAL BLOW
最後一擊
The Trump administration has hollowed out U.S. foreign policy even further.
Trump’s instincts are Jacksonian, in that he is largely uninterested in the
world except insofar as he believes that most countries are screwing the
United States. He is a nationalist, a protectionist, and a populist,
determined to put “America first.” But truthfully, more than anything else,
he has abandoned the field. Under Trump, the United States has withdrawn from
the Trans- Pacific Partnership and from engaging with Asia more generally. It
is uncoupling itself from its 70-year partnership with Europe. It has dealt
with Latin America through the prism of either keeping immigrants out or
winning votes in Florida. It has even managed to alienate Canadians (no mean
feat). And it has subcontracted Middle East policy to Israel and Saudi
Arabia. With a few impulsive exceptions—such as the narcissistic desire to
win a Nobel Prize by trying to make peace with North Korea—what is most
notable about Trump’s foreign policy is its absence.
川普入主白宮後，美國的外交政策遭到進一步掏空。川普與美國第七任總統安德魯·傑克
遜有些相似，傑克遜總統就對美國以外的世界缺乏興趣，而且他覺得似乎全世界都在算計
美國。川普是一個民族主義者、貿易保護主義者，甚至是一個民粹主義者，他執意要一切
“以美國為優先”。然而事實上，正是川普在放棄美國已經佔領的陣地。在川普政府的領
導下，美國從TPP談判中抽身離去，美國不再認為與亞洲建立密切關係有什麼必要；對於
已經有70年歷史的美歐關係，川普政府也不再重視；至於拉丁美洲，它在川普眼中要麼意
味著非法移民問題，要麼意味著佛羅里達州的選票；在中東事務方面，川普已經把決策工
作轉包給了以色列和沙特阿拉伯；甚至加拿大人也已經開始疏遠美國，一位美國總統能做
到這一點也是很不容易了。川普外交政策的最大特點就是讓美國在一切領域缺席。當然例
外也是有的，比如說自戀的川普就曾希望借助實現美朝和解獲得諾貝爾和平獎。
When the United Kingdom was the superpower of its day, its hegemony eroded
because of many large structural forces—the rise of Germany, the United
States, and the Soviet Union. But it also lost control of its empire through
overreach and hubris. In 1900, with a quarter of the world’s population
under British rule, most of the United Kingdom’s major colonies were asking
only for limited autonomy—“dominion status” or “home rule,” in the terms
of the day. Had the country quickly granted that to all its colonies, who
knows whether it would have been able to extend its imperial life for
decades? But it didn’t, insisting on its narrow, selfish interests rather
than accommodating itself to the interests of the broader empire.
當英國作為一個超級大國開始走下坡路的時候，的確存在一些結構性因素導致其霸權遭到
侵蝕，德國、美國和蘇聯都是在那時崛起的。然而大英帝國時代的落幕也與其傲慢自大的
心態和國力的過度使用有關。1900年，全球四分之一的人口都在大英帝國的統治之下。當
時一些主要的英殖民地僅提出了“自治領地位”或“地方自治權”的要求。如果英國當時
能滿足各殖民地的要求給予它們相應的地位，也許英國的帝國時代還能再延續幾十年。然
而英國並沒有那樣做，它過於看重自己狹隘、自私的利益，大英帝國在宏觀層面上更大的
利益卻被忽視了。
There is an analogy here with the United States. Had the country acted more
consistently in the pursuit of broader interests and ideas, it could have
continued its influence for decades (albeit in a different form). The rule
for extending liberal hegemony seems simple: be more liberal and less
hegemonic. But too often and too obviously, Washington pursued its narrow
self-interests, alienating its allies and emboldening its foes. Unlike the
United Kingdom at the end of its reign, the United States is not bankrupt or
imperially overextended. It remains the single most powerful country on the
planet. It will continue to wield immense influence, more than any other
nation. But it will no longer define and dominate the international system
the way it did for almost three decades.
美國的情況與英國有些相似。如果美國能在追求更高層面的利益和理想時保持政策的連續
性，那麼美國在全球的影響力就還能維持數十年之久（也許影響力的表現形式會與過去有
所不同）。一個自由主義霸權的生存法則是非常簡單的：多一些自由主義，少一些霸權主
義。然而實際情況顯然並非如此，美國經常過於追求自身狹隘的利益，這使得盟友們開始
疏遠美國，而且敵人們的情緒還受到了鼓舞。與英國的情況不同，今天的美國還沒有破產
，美國也不存在帝國過度擴張的問題。美國仍然是這個世界上最為強大的國家，美國所擁
有的影響力仍然是其他國家難以望其項背的。然而與過去30年相比，美國已經無法繼續按
照自己的意願定義並主導國際體系。
What remains, then, are American ideas. The United States has been a unique
hegemon in that it expanded its influence to establish a new world order, one
dreamed of by President Woodrow Wilson and most fully conceived of by
President Franklin Roosevelt. It is the world that was half-created after
1945, sometimes called “the liberal international order,” from which the
Soviet Union soon defected to build its own sphere. But the free world
persisted through the Cold War, and after 1991, it expanded to encompass much
of the globe. The ideas behind it have produced stability and prosperity over
the last three-quarters of a century. The question now is whether, as
American power wanes, the international system it sponsored— the rules,
norms, and values—will survive. Or will America also watch the decline of
its empire of ideas?
不過美國還有自己的理念。一直以來，美國是一個很獨特的霸權，伍德羅·威爾遜（
Woodrow Wilson）總統提出了建立新的世界秩序的理想，而富蘭克林·羅斯福（
Franklin Roosevelt）總統為此進行了具體的構思。美國通過構建全新的世界秩序拓展了
自己的影響力。1945年，美國人心中的世界秩序（一些人稱之為“自由主義國際秩序”）
建設工程已經完成過半，然而很快前蘇聯就開始構建自己的世界。自由世界最終還是挨過
了冷戰，1991年之後，全世界大部分國家都接受了自由主義國際秩序。在過去四分之三個
世紀裡，該秩序背後所蘊含的理念為人類創造了一個穩定而繁榮的世界。如今的問題在於
，隨著美國地位的衰落，它所構建的國際體系（包括相應的各種規則、規範和價值觀）是
否還能繼續維持下去呢？美國會見證自己的理念與自己的霸權一同走向終結嗎？