In War Against Coronavirus: Is China Foe—or Friend?
美國抗疫戰爭中，中國是敵是友？
原文：The National Interest https://tinyurl.com/stezn95
譯文：觀察者 https://www.guancha.cn/GrahamAlison/2020_04_01_544889_s.shtml
作者：Graham Allison
譯者：朱曈菲
[導讀]結構性衝突決定了中美必然是無情的敵人，但是應對新冠病毒需要雙方成為親密的
朋友。現實之下中美雙方日益激烈的競爭成為了國際關係的基本特徵。但是，行勝於言，
面對新冠病毒疫情的大考，中國已經成功控制了病毒的傳播，得到了金融市場的押注。至
少在當下，美國的緊迫挑戰並不是中國而是自己的失敗。因此，美國需要在三個關鍵領域
與中國開展合作，這些領域包括數據、診斷及公共衛生措施、生物醫學研究領域中的基礎
研究和轉化研究。本文於3月27日原載於美國國家利益網站。
For America to defeat the coronavirus and return to a version of life as it
was before this nightmare, should we identify China as an adversary against
whom to mobilize? Or alternatively, must we recognize it as a partner whose
cooperation is essential for our own victory? While the consensus in
Washington has moved sharply toward defining China as part of the problem,
the fact is that we cannot succeed in this war against coronavirus without
making China part of the solution.
為了讓美國戰勝冠狀病毒並回到這場噩夢之前的生活，我們是應該把中國當作一個應群起
攻之的敵人？還是該承認它是一個合作夥伴，並且與其合作對我們的勝利至關重要？儘管
，華盛頓方面對中國的貢獻嗤之以鼻，但事實是，如果不讓中國參與進來，成為我們的解
決方案的一部分，我們就無法在這場抗擊冠狀病毒的戰爭中取得成功。
The increasingly ruthless rivalry between the U.S. and China will be a
defining feature of their relations as far as any eye can see. This is an
inescapable consequence of structural realities: however anyone tries to
disguise or deny it, a rapidly rising China really is threatening to displace
the U.S. from our position at the top of every pecking order. The question
is whether despite this reality, when confronting specific threats neither
can defeat by itself, statesmen can be wise enough to find ways for rivals to
simultaneously be partners.
目前，在所有人看來，美中之間日益殘酷的競爭將是兩國關係的一個決定性特徵。這是結
構性現實裡不可避免的後果：無論誰試圖掩蓋或否認這一點，一個快速崛起的中國確實有
可能取代美國在所有國家中的地位。問題在於， 在這樣的背景下，當雙方政治家面對具
體卻又無法被單獨解決的威脅時，他們是否有足夠的智慧，找到讓競爭對手同時成為合作
夥伴的方法。
Viruses carry no passports, have no ideology, and respect no borders. When
droplets from an infected patient who sneezes are inhaled by a healthy
individual, the biological impact is essentially identical whether the person
is American, Italian, or Chinese. When an outbreak becomes a pandemic
infecting citizens around the world, since no nation can hermetically seal
its borders, every country is at risk. The inescapable fact is that all 7.7
billion people alive today inhabit one small planet Earth. As President
Kennedy noted in explaining the necessity for coexistence with the Soviet
Union in facing mutual, existential nuclear danger: “We all breathe the same
air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal.”
病毒沒有護照，沒有意識形態，不受國界限制。當一個健康的人從一個打噴嚏的病人身上
吸入飛沫時，無論這個人是美國人、意大利人還是中國人，其受到的生物影響基本上是相
同的。當疫情爆發成為全球範圍內的流行病時，沒有一個國家能夠做到與世隔絕，每個國
家都面臨著風險。今天， 77億人共同生活在同一個小星球 —— 地球上，這是一個不可
避免的事實。正如肯尼迪總統在解釋與蘇聯共存、共同面對核危機的必要性時所指出的那
樣:“我們都呼吸著同樣的空氣。我們都珍惜孩子的未來。我們都是凡人。”
When a crisis strikes, the first question many ask is: Who is to be blamed?
當危機爆發時，許多人問的第一個問題是：誰應該受到指責？
If central casting were searching for a villain, China is fit for the role.
Where did the coronavirus first appear? In China. Who failed to nip the
crisis in the bud? Chinese authoritarianism has displayed all its ugly
features in suppressing initial reports, delaying transmission of bad news to
superiors, and dissembling. Despite the Chinese government’s best efforts to
re-write the narrative, it cannot disguise the fact that there is much in
this case for which China deserves blame.
如果劇組要找一個反派角色，中國倒是很適合：「 冠狀病毒最初出現在哪裡？ 在中國。
誰沒有把危機扼殺在萌芽狀態？ 中國。中國威權主義展現醜陋的一面，壓制報導，隱瞞
疫情。 儘管中國政府盡了最大的努力改寫劇本，但它不能掩蓋這樣一個事實：在這種情
況下，中國應該受到很多指責。」
But the effort by many in Washington as well as the Blob to make this the
primary storyline is escapist—an attempt to duck responsibilities for their
own failures. President Trump insists on calling the pathogen the “Chinese
virus.” A leading Republican Senator fed social media conspiracy theorists
by suggesting that the virus had escaped from a Chinese bio-weapons lab.
但是，華盛頓的大官們把矛頭對準中國是逃避現實的 —— 他們試圖逃避為自己的失敗承
擔責任。川普總統堅稱這種病菌為“中國病毒”，某共和黨參議院拿病毒污名化中國等言
行，都助長了社交媒體上陰謀論者的氣焰。
Adults should move on. The urgent challenge America faces in attempting to
defeat coronavirus is not China. It is our own failures to mobilize a
response proportionate to the threat. How many weeks after countries like
Singapore and South Korea began implementing emergency measures did the U.S.
government remain in denial? Who failed to prepare for the next pathogen
after we saw earlier versions of this movie with the MERS outbreak in 2012,
Swine Flu in 2009, and SARS in 2003? In a world where South Korea began
testing 10,000 citizens a day within weeks of patient zero—and can now do
20,000 a day—who is still floundering with one excuse after another?
大人們應該成熟點，往前進了。在試圖戰勝冠狀病毒這方面，美國面臨的緊迫挑戰並不是
中國，而是我們自己未能調動起與威脅相匹配的反應。新加坡和韓國等國的緊急措施實施
已實行多周，但美國政府卻還停留在否認的階段。在2012年中東呼吸綜合症(MERS)、2009
年豬流感和2003年非典(SARS)爆發之後，是誰沒有為下一種病毒的到來做好準備？韓國在
零號病人出現後的幾週內就踐行了每天為1萬名公民提供測試的承諾（而這個數字現在達
到了2萬），在這個世界上，又是誰還在為接連不斷的藉口折騰?
To be clear, to insist that we face ugly facts about our own failures, and
recognize others’ successes, is not to imply any moral equivalence. Like
most Americans, as a matter of faith we begin with the conviction that
American democracy is basically good, and China’s Party-led authoritarianism
that denies its citizens certain rights we believe are their endowments from
the Creator bad.
明確地說，面對自己失敗的醜陋事實，承認別人的成功，並不涉及任何道德層面。就像大
多數美國人一樣，作為一個信仰問題，我們首先堅信美國民主基本上是好的，中國黨領導
的獨裁主義剝奪了公民的某些權利，而我們認為這些權利來自造物主的天賦。
But brute facts are hard to deny. After a month of costly delay, on January
20 China’s government publicly recognized the threat, announcing that the
virus could pass from human to human. Two weeks earlier, it had informed the
WHO about the illness, sequenced the genome, and posted that online so that
scientists around the world could begin the search for a vaccine. (A
Boston-based company, Moderna, heard the call and in less than two months
created a vaccine that has now entered the U.S. government’s testing
labyrinth.)
但我們很難否認殘酷的事實。經過一個月的拖延代價，中國政府公開承認了這一威脅，並
於1月21日宣佈病毒能人傳人。兩週前，它向世衛組織通報了這種疾病，對基因組進行了
測序，並將其張貼在網上，以便世界各地的科學家能夠開始尋找疫苗。 （一家總部位於
波士頓的公司，現代製藥公司聽到了這一呼籲，在不到兩個月的時間裡，研製出了一種疫
苗，現在已經進入美國政府的測試階段。）
Once it recognized the threat and its paramount leader declared the epidemic
“a crisis and big test,” on January 21 China mounted the most aggressive
war on a virus the world has ever seen. This included locking down Wuhan, a
city of 10 million where the virus first appeared. Days later, China drew a
cordon sanitaire around the population of more than 50 million people in the
province of Hubei. It installed mandatory testing checkpoints around the city
in residential neighborhoods and public transit points; converted hotels,
stadiums, and schools into makeshift medical centers; flooded the city with
thousands of construction workers along with cement mixers and trucks to
build new hospitals from the ground up at astonishing speed (one 1,000-bed
hospital was built in 10 days); and mobilized tens of thousands of PLA
personnel to distribute medical supplies and manage operations.
一旦中國認識到這一威脅，最高領導人宣佈該疫情是“一場危機和重大考驗”，1月21日
，中國發起了令世界矚目的對抗病毒的激烈戰爭。這包括封鎖了武漢 —— 這個有著1000
萬人口的城市是病毒最開始出現的地方。幾天後，中國在湖北省5000多萬人口的周圍拉起
了警戒線。它在城市周圍的居民區和公共交通點設置了強制性的檢測點，將旅館、體育館
和學校改造成臨時醫療中心。中國還調動了成千上萬的建築工人、水泥攪拌車和卡車以驚
人的速度開始建造新的醫院(10天內建成了一座有1000個床位的醫院)，並動員了成千上萬
的解放軍人員負責分發醫療用品和管理運營。
Announcements from the Chinese government can never be taken at face value.
Its government has manipulated data and even the criteria for what counts as
a new case. Unquestionably, Beijing’s spinners have been hard at work
attempting to shape a narrative that disguises their failures in the first
phase of this undertaking. A Deputy Spokesman for China’s Foreign Ministry
has had the audacity to puff a propagandized conspiracy theory that the U.S.
Army introduced the virus. But despite this noise, at this point, the
evidence from all sources suggests that these efforts have actually succeeded
in bending the curve of infections toward zero. American retailers including
Apple, Starbucks, and McDonalds are now open for business in China.
我們絕不能只看中國政府聲明的表面。它的政府操縱了數據，甚至是改變檢測標準。 毫
無疑問，北京一直在努力嘗試塑造一個掩蓋他們在這項事業的第一階段失敗的敘事。 中
國外交部一位副發言人厚顏無恥地大肆宣揚美國軍隊引入病毒的陰謀論。 儘管如此，目
前所有來源的證據都表明，這些努力實際上已經成功地控制住病毒在中國的傳播，包括蘋
果、星巴克和麥當勞在內的美國零售商現在都已重新在中國營業。
The imperative for the U.S. today is to do everything possible to stop
coronavirus from infecting millions of our fellow citizens, killing hundreds
of thousands, and crushing our society. If medical scientists in China are
able to develop anti-viral drugs that mitigate the impact on the infected,
should Americans import them? Imagine that in the next month or two Chinese
scientists invent a vaccine while American authorities insist they will not
have one approved for well over a year. Once it has been demonstrated to be
effective in Singapore or South Korea, would the reader wait for our FDA?
今天，美國的當務之急是盡一切可能阻止冠狀病毒感染數百萬同胞，殺死數十萬人，摧毀
我們的社會。如果中國的醫學家能夠開發出抗病毒藥物來減輕對感染者的影響，那麼美國
應該進口嗎？美國當局卻堅稱，他們在一年多的時間內不會批准任何疫苗。一旦中國研發
的疫苗在新加坡或韓國被證明是有效的，美國民眾會怎麼看待我們的食品及藥物管理局（
FDA）？
Given the chorus of cries from hospitals across the US and first-line
responders for N-95 masks, if China were prepared to send millions of masks
to the US, as it did to Italy recently, should Americans welcome them? If
lessons China has learned in creating a diagnostic funnel—begin with
pervasive taking of temperatures, subjecting those with fevers to a CT scan,
and if an individual is still suspect taking a swab that is then analyzed
before declaring someone infected—have proved effective, should we refuse to
learn from that experience because of its origin?
鑑於美國各地醫院和一線急救人員對N-95口罩的急切需求，如果中國準備向美國運送數百
萬個口罩 —— 就像它最近援助意大利那樣 —— 美國人應該歡迎它們嗎？如果中國建立
的診斷經驗——首先是普遍接受溫度，然後對發燒患者進行CT掃瞄，如果一個人仍然懷疑
服用了一個拭子，然後再對其進行分析，然後才宣佈感染——已經證明是有效的，我們是
否應該因為它的來源而拒絕學習這一經驗?
But we should harbor no illusions. At the same time defeat of this pandemic
underlines a vital national interest neither the US nor China can secure
without the cooperation of the other, the performance—and non-performance—
of the two nations will have profound consequences for the larger rivalry for
leadership. From economic growth over the next 12 months, to its citizens’
confidence in their government, and each nation's standing around the world,
successes and failures in meeting a test that has captured the global mind
will matter hugely.
但我們不應對此抱任何幻想。與此同時，疫情突顯出一種至關重要的國家利益—— 若沒
有與對方的合作，美國和中國單方面都無法確保這種利益。兩國的作為以及不作為，都將
對更大範圍內領導權的爭奪產生深遠影響。從未來12個月的經濟增長，到國民對政府的信
心，再到中美兩國在世界各地的地位來看：能否成功應對這場全球矚目的考驗，對中美至
關重要。
Unfortunately, most of the commentary about this aspect of the crisis has
been mesmerized by China’s effort to manipulate the narrative. Of course,
China is vigorously selling its storyline and shading facts to show itself in
the best light. But preoccupation with the “narrative war” that focuses on
words rather than deeds misses the mountain behind the molehill.
不幸的是，關於危機這一方面的大多數評論都被中國操縱的敘事迷住了。當然，中國正在
大力出售其抗疫故事，遮掩黑暗面，以最好的方式展示自己。但是，我們的關注若只集中
在“宣傳戰”的言語而不是行為上，卻是因小失大。
In real wars, dead bodies count. In economics, real growth produces more
stuff. In relations with other nations, the arrival of much-needed medical
equipment for which others are desperate drowns out any words.
在真正的戰爭中，死亡人數可以計算。在經濟學中，實際的增長可以產生可見的效益。而
在與其他國家的關係中，絕望的人們對醫療設備的急需卻淹沒了其他所有言語。
Today, financial markets are betting that China has essentially succeeded in
the first battle in this long war. If after its sharp decline in the first
quarter, it now returns to robust economic growth, on the one hand, and the
U.S. teeters on the brink between an extended recession and a genuine
depression, on the other, the gap between the GDP of the U.S. and China will
grow. If an authoritarian government demonstrates competence in ensuring its
citizens' most basic human right—the right to life—as a democratic,
decentralized government flounders, objections to the measures China has used
to do so will sound to many like sour grapes.
今天，金融市場押注的是，中國基本上已經在這場曠日持久的戰爭中打贏了第一仗。在經
歷了第一季度的大幅下滑後，如果中國經濟恢復了強勁增長，而美國又在長期衰退和真正
的大蕭條之間徘徊，那麼美國和中國GDP之間的差距將會拉開(註：應指by PPP)。若中國
作為一個專制政府通過控制疫情證明了自己的能力，而所謂民主的、權力分散的美國政府
還仍在疫情裡不斷掙扎，那麼美國對中國過去的反對態度，在許多人聽來就像酸葡萄心理
。
Moreover, we should never forget the larger canvas. There China’s
meta-narrative is a story of its inevitable rise and America’s decline. A
nation that began the century with a GDP less than a quarter of America’s
has now overtaken the US to create an economy larger than ours. A military
that was forced to back down in the Taiwan straits crisis of 1996 when the
U.S. sent two carriers to the theater has over the past two decades built up
an arsenal of “carrier-killer” missiles that would force the U.S. to make
different choices today. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, China
’s leadership was emboldened by its success in returning rapidly to rapid
growth as the US was stuck in secular stagnation. Unless the US can find a
way to rapidly meet the current coronavirus test, China could be tempted to
take greater risks, including forcibly bringing Taiwan under Beijing’s rule.
此外，我們不應該忘記更大的背景，那就是中國敘事裡中國不可避免的崛起和美國的衰落
。本世紀初，中國的國內生產總值(GDP)還不到美國的四分之一，如今卻已超過美國並創
造了比美國還要大的經濟體。在1996年台灣海峽危機中，美國向戰區派遣兩艘航母，中國
軍方被迫退縮。20年過去，他們建立了一個“航母殺手”導彈庫，迫使美國今天改變戰略
。在2008年金融危機使美國陷入長期停滯之際，中國成功地迅速恢復了快速增長，這讓中
國更加感到自信和有底氣。除非美國能找到迅速應對目前的冠狀病毒檢測的辦法，否則中
國可能會在各種議題上更冒進，包括強行將台灣置於北京統治之下。
Opportunities for collaboration
合作的機會
Science’s search for knowledge about diseases, discovery of medicines to
treat them, and the development of protocols for prevention and healing are
inherently open, international undertakings. Biomedicine advances through
discoveries in laboratories all around the world. Research is inherently
collaborative, more than one-third of scientific articles published by
Americans today having at least one foreign co-author. A third of all
American doctorate degrees in STEM are earned by Chinese students.
探索疾病知識、發現治療疾病的藥物以及制定預防和治療方案，本質上都是開放的國際事
業。生物醫學的進步是通過世界各地實驗室的發現而實現的，研究的本質是合作。今天，
美國人發表的三分之一以上的科學論文中，至少有一位外國合作者；美國三分之一的STEM
博士學位是由中國學生獲得的。
So in the campaign to defeat coronavirus now, and build a foundation for
preventing a pandemic caused by new novel viruses in the future, where should
the US and China be engaging as partners? Three key areas cry out for
cooperation.
因此，在當前戰勝冠狀病毒的戰役，以及為預防未來由新病毒引起的大流行奠定基礎的過
程中，美國和中國應該在哪些方面發揮合作夥伴的作用呢？有三個關鍵領域需要合作。
The first is data—from genomic to epidemiologic. In attempting to assess
what we now confront and to consider responses, a central factor is
uncertainty: because it is a novel virus, we learn more about it daily as
more data are collected and analyzed. But a second factor is the scarcity of
quality data about what’s happening in various “laboratories” provided by
outbreaks in various countries. The need for trusted data from each country
is a reminder of the importance of agreeing on processes and transparency in
international organizations like the WHO.
合作的第一個領域首先是從基因組到流行病學的數據。面對新型病毒，只有收集和分析的
數據越來越多，我們對其的瞭解才會越來越多。在試圖評估我們現在面臨的問題並考慮應
對措施時，不確定性是核心因素。此外，缺乏由各疫情爆發國實驗室提供的高質量數據是
第二個關鍵因素。每個國家都需要可信的數據，這就提醒了我們：在像世衛組織（WHO）
這樣的國際組織中，程序一致和透明度非常重要。
When Chinese scientists quickly sequenced the novel coronavirus genome and
released it to the world, they enabled a massive global research effort. Two
weeks later, scientists at the NIH used the sequence to confirm the mechanism
by which the virus entered the cells of those it infected, a finding
reproduced by a Chinese lab the next day. Even the hunt for a vaccine
currently underway relied on an early release of the virus’s genome. When
the first vaccine trial began in America, as NIAID Director Anthony Fauci
observed, it was “the fastest that we have ever gotten from the time we got
the sequence to the time into a human.” What’s more, with genomic
information, scientists can compare infections and map the spread of a virus
meticulously in a way akin to constructing a family tree.
中國科學家很快對新的冠狀病毒基因組進行了測序，並將其發佈到世界各地，這使得一場
大規模的全球研究工作得以展開。兩週後，美國國立衛生研究院（NIH）的科學家利用這
一序列，確認了病毒進入被感染者細胞的機制。次日，中國的一個實驗室證實了這一發現
。即使是目前正在進行的尋找疫苗的工作也依賴於早期公佈的病毒基因組。正如美國國家
過敏症和傳染病研究所（NIAID）主任安東尼‧福奇（Anthony Fauci）所觀察到的那樣，
美國進行的第一次疫苗試驗是 “我們從獲得序列到進入人體的時間最快的一次”。更重
要的是，有了基因組信息，科學家就可以比較感染情況，並以類似於構建家譜的方式一絲
不苟地繪製病毒的傳播圖譜。
During an epidemic, rapid data-sharing during the initial outbreak enables
countries to better understand the virus’s behavior. Because the earliest
cases occurred in Wuhan, data collected by Chinese physicians gave rise to
the world’s first estimates of the virus’s transmissibility, enabling
epidemiologic models that served as the basis for responses by governments of
many countries. And because China bore the brunt of the initial deaths, it
provided the first set of data for global health experts to estimate the case
fatality rate and to create models to predict the scope, spread, and severity
of the disease, ensuring more robust policy responses.
疫情爆發初期迅速共享數據的行為使得各國能夠更好地瞭解病毒。由於最早的病例發生在
武漢，中國醫生收集的數據使世界首次得以預估病毒的傳播能力。這使得流行病學模型成
為許多國家政府應對措施的基礎。由於中國首當其衝地承受了死亡最初的衝擊，它為全球
衛生專家提供了第一套數據。該數據被用以估計致死率，並通過創建模型來預測該病的範
圍、傳播和嚴重程度，從而確保了更有力的政策應對措施。
A second area of cooperation involves diagnostics and public health measures.
If China developed an efficient process for screening people that could be
industrially scaled and applied in airports, businesses, and schools, could
the United States adopt it? Conversely, if researchers develop and validate a
high-throughput diagnostic that proves to be cheaper, quicker, and more
accurate, would that not be shared? Of the $22 billion of medical equipment
the United States imports annually, much of which is essential for the
American health care system to respond to the skyrocketing number of COVID-19
cases domestically, about a quarter came from China before the tariff war.
合作的第二個領域涉及診斷和公共衛生措施。如果中國開發出一種有效的人員篩選程序，
可以在機場、企業和學校進行大規模的應用，那麼美國能採用這種方法嗎？相反，如果研
究人員開發並驗證出一種更便宜、更快、更準確的高通量診斷方法，它該被共享嗎？在美
國每年進口的220億美元醫療設備中，約有四分之一來自關稅戰前的中國。這些設備對當
前美國醫療體系應對國內激增新冠肺炎病例至關重要。
The third area is biomedical research—basic and translational. To that end,
Harvard Medical School has recently announced a new collaboration with a
Chinese counterpart to defeat COVID-19. The leader of the Chinese partner is
Zhong Nanshan, the doctor also leading the Chinese government’s coronavirus
task force. In 2003 he was the first person to identify SARS. This
Harvard-Guangzhou Institute joint venture is seeking to understand the basic
biology of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and the ways it interacts with those it
infects to accelerate development of better diagnostics and treatments.
第三個領域是生物醫學研究領域中的基礎研究和轉化研究。為此，哈佛醫學院（Harvard
Medical School)最近宣佈了一項與中國同行一起擊敗新冠病毒的新合作項目。中方合作
夥伴的負責人是鐘南山，他也是中國政府冠狀病毒工作組的負責人。2003年，他是第一個
發現SARS病毒的人。這家哈佛—廣州研究所正試圖瞭解SARS-CoV-2病毒的基礎生物學以及
它與感染者相互作用的方式，以加速診療方法的發展。
In order to develop antivirals, for example, scientists need to understand
how the virus infects humans—and identifying the door the coronavirus uses
to enter host cells could provide clues for designing a lock. To produce
better diagnostics and monitor disease progression, they will need to
identify accurate biomarkers. Even in the quest to develop a vaccine, because
unbalanced immunity could result in a phenomenon called “antibody-dependent
enhancement,” where the defensive proteins in our bodies instead accelerate
the infection, there is an urgent need to define the precise “correlates of
immunity.”
例如，為了研發抗病毒藥物，科學家們需要瞭解病毒是如何感染人類的。他們可以通過識
別冠狀病毒進入宿主細胞的“門”而獲得的線索來設計對應的“鎖”。為了進行更好的診
斷並監測疾病的進展，科學家們需要識別準確的生物標記。在開發疫苗的過程中，由於不
平衡的免疫可能導致一種被稱為“抗體依賴增強”（ antibody-dependent enhancement
）的現象（即我們體內的防禦蛋白反而加速了感染），學界迫切需要定義精確的“免疫相
關物”。
As scientists repeatedly affirm, collaboration in research generally leads to
better outcomes. And in an era when no country maintains a monopoly on
scientific creativity, collaboration on an urgent topic like coronavirus
creates more gains than losses. As governments around the globe seek to
confront the pandemic, they should bear in mind that collection and
integration of data, sharing of reagents and tools will require intense
communication across continents.
如科學家們反覆強調的那樣，研究中的合作通常會帶來更好的結果。在沒有任何一個國家
可以壟斷科學創新的時代，在冠狀病毒這類緊迫課題上的合作利大於弊。在努力應對這一
疫情之際，全球各國政府應該牢記：收集和整合數據、共享試劑和工具將需要各大洲之間
的密切溝通。
In sum, instead of mutual demonization, thinking Americans and Chinese should
recognize that each nation needs the other to defeat this deadly enemy.
Partnership, even if only a limited partnership, is thus a strategic
necessity.
總之，與其相互妖魔化，中美都應該認識到，彼此都需要對方來擊敗病毒這個致命的敵人
。因此，夥伴關係，即使是有限的夥伴關係，在戰略上也是必要的。
Can the US and China be ruthless rivals and intense partners at the same
time? Holding two seemingly contradictory ideas in our head simultaneously
will be difficult. But success in defeating this demon will require nothing
less.
美國和中國能在同一時間內既成為無情的對手，又成為親密的夥伴嗎？同時持有兩個看似
矛盾的想法是很困難的。但是，要想成功地擊敗這個病毒，所需要的不過如此。

呵 跟騙子合作 嫌命長是不是