Luke Walton, Lame Duck
TAKING A GOOD LOOK AT THE FILM AND DATA TO ASSESS LUKE WALTON’S STAFF
看看一下的影片和數據來評估L.Walton以及整個團隊。
The Lakers have underperformed the expectations the team and their fans had
this season. Luke Walton has been under fire as a result of that. Today, I
want to take a look at the performance of Luke and his staff in the ways we
should actually be assessing coaching staffs.
湖人本季的表現非常令人失望，也讓L.Walton受到嚴重的抨擊，我們今天就來檢視L.Walto
n以及他的助教團。
I want to start out by saying that I haven’t been of the opinion that the
Lakers should fire Luke Walton. In my eyes, their last reasonable chance to
do that and have a chance to get a new staff, their principles, and their
sets in was during the All-Star Break. We’re likely riding this out with
Luke for the rest of the season, upon which time LA will have the chance to
terminate his contract and explore other options.
我認為本季L.Walton並不會被湖人解雇，因為已經錯過時間點，我認為明星週時是最佳的
解雇時間，然後已經錯過時間，湖人將會在本季結束之後，在評估對於L.Walton的選項。
The options they can look at during the offseason will be far wider and
better than the jobless options available today. LA can’t go grab an
assistant like Ettore Messina from the Spurs or John Beilein and his staff
from Michigan today. Any move made now will be from a smaller and worse
candidate pool. I’ll save options for who should replace Luke and his staff
for later on, once we have a better idea of who will be available. But I will
say that I am 100.00% of the opinion that Walton and his staff are among the
worst in the NBA and should be replaced this offseason.
在球季中能選擇的不多，但休賽期能選擇就多了，我認為L.Walton以及他的助教團是全NBA
最爛的，我也認為在休賽期這個團隊是百分之百會被替換的。
That aside, let’s get into it.
EXCUSES / CONFOUNDING FACTORS 藉口/外在因素
First, let’s get these out of the way. 釐清以下幾件事情
‧No, Luke didn’t hand pick this roster.
‧No, Luke didn’t injure Lonzo Ball, LeBron James, Josh Hart, etc.
‧Luke hasn’t been the one starting trade rumors for seemingly every player on
the roster.
Those all make his job more difficult, but certainly don’t inhibit us from
assessing the performance of Luke Walton and his staff. And I don’t mean
with wins and losses.
這些都會使他的工作變得困難，但不影響我們對於L.Walton的評價。
We are where we are. Luke was dealt a poor hand. But good coaches still make
the most of what they’re given. A bad roster isn’t a unique issue. Injuries
happen. Over the last two seasons of the Lakers actually trying to win games,
they’ve had an average amount of games lost due to injuries, per
InStreetClothes. The situation is what it is. So what did they do about it?
L.Walton手上的牌並不好，但好的教練還是善用手上的這些牌打出應有的東西。球員名單
的壞並不是一個多大的問題。另外傷病問題，根據InStreetClothes，過去兩個賽季湖人在
爭取勝利，因為傷病左右球隊勝負的關鍵。然而情況就是這樣，但他們做了什麼？
Here are the ways I’ll be looking at Luke Walton and his coaching staff
today:
1.Rotations
2.Scheme
3.Player development
4.Culture & Leadership
5.Relations with media and the front office
I won’t be looking at roster construction and trades. I won’t be looking at
prospect scouting. Neither of those two things relate to Luke and his staff.
我不會去看球隊陣容的交易以及建設，我也不會去看球探報告，我認為這兩件事與L.Walto
n以及助教團無關。
EXPECTATIONS FOR LUKE WALTON L.Walton的期望
Our expectations for Luke Walton were unrealistic. There is a certain murky
culture around coaches and accountability. We know every player and what they
do, but almost none of us could rattle off every member of their favorite team
’s coaching staff and the roles and responsibilities of each member.
我們對於L.Walton的期望是不現實的，教練團之間對於劃分責任制這件事情有著模糊的界
線，我們了解每個球員以及他們能做的事情，但沒人可以抨擊他們每個成員的角色以及責
任。
The staffs are fine behind the scenes, but it makes speculation on our end as
media or fans much more difficult. The lack of understanding that breeds from
this cloudy profession leads to a lot of guessing. We saw that when Luke
Walton was hired from the Warriors to take over for the Lakers.
I directly interface with executives every day in my job. In my role I see
what they do, I have a decent sense of what they’re responsible for, and I
understand how to work with them to help achieve business success. I can even
repeat some of the common phrases or outline at a high level our strategies.
But if another firm were to hire me, I absolutely could not fulfill the roles
and responsibilities of those individuals I work with. I could do my job and
give you the human capital knowledge I provide today, because… ya know… that
’s what I was doing before. But I couldn’t set up a supply chain or any
number of the technical things my co-workers perform on a daily basis,
because my roles and responsibilities aren’t their roles and
responsibilities, and our KSAs (knowledge, skills, and abilities) are far
different.
Hiring Luke Walton, who by all accounts was a player development coach with
the Warriors, and expecting him to bring a skill set in Xs and Os that had
nothing to do with his job with the Dubs. I’m sure he could recite and draw
up several, but that’s a lot different from having the understanding to
teach an offense and adapt it in the ways necessitated by today’s highly
tactical NBA. I’d guess he could memorize and regurgitate some Xs and Os the
way I could with managerial accounting. I can spit it back up, but there’s
no way in hell I could teach it to people, or need to take my understanding
of the concepts and morph them to changing conditions. No way.
Sure, he can say ball movement is important and generally have the
egalitarian strategy down, but that’s about as deep as it’s gotten. The
schemes themselves are vastly different. The Warriors run the closest we have
in the NBA to a motion offense, with tons of set plays sprinkled in. And the
Warriors run probably the most sets and action in the NBA. They use strong
and weak side actions to get their players in positions to succeed,
constantly pressuring the defense and finding ways to get Steph Curry and
Klay Thompson wide open, which is the exact opposite of what every single
coach and team playing the Warriors want to allow.
I recently heard Coach Gibson Pyper mention on a podcast that he had about
130 set plays diagrammed from the Dubs and Steve Kerr’s offense. You may
know Coach Pyper as @HalfCourtHoops on Twitter, owner of the HalfCourtHoops
YouTube page, and the owner of The Basketball Playbook website. On his site,
he has a Kerr Warriors playbook breakdown for sale that includes: “Motion
Offense Clinic (45 Minutes), Motion Offense Concepts (1 Hour 45 Minutes),
Video Playbook (6 Hours), and a PDF Playbook (150 Pages).”
我最近從G.Pyper在廣播節目上說到，勇士整的進攻戰術大約有130個Set Play，他從一些
網站上可以看到把這些東西弄成一個Kerr Warriors Playbook拆成幾個細節在販售。
The Lakers’ offense is almost the antithesis of that, with probably less
than 30 sets that could be drawn up if you locked scheme fans in a room and
forced them to watch Laker film. It was so bad Walton’s first season that
when I was diagramming plays for 2K, I watched dozens of games and just could
not get to the number of sets they wanted from the Lakers, so I had to fit in
a handful of sets from my own playbook. And the magic number they were
looking for was 40 plays, not 130.
而湖人在進攻端戰術可能少於30個Set Play，在L.Walton第一個賽季時，在2K遊戲需要制
定球隊戰術時，湖人隊的戰術我看不到有多少戰術，剩下的必須靠自己腦補在想出戰術，
最後總共有40個Set Play戰術，不是130個。
Coach Pyper doesn’t have a Walton playbook up for sale, and I don’t expect
that’ll change. I recently surveyed a handful of scheme experts to see if
what I’ve been seeing is what they see, and the Lakers routinely came up as
one of the worst teams schematically on offense. I’ll go into the Lakers’
offensive scheme in more detail later, but I wanted to set the stage and say
that what Luke has brought to LA from Golden State stops at the high level
talking points and general philosophies.
最近有針對湖人的進攻戰術策畫進行研究，稍後會有詳細的介紹。
I’ve heard that Luke Walton’s brief stint as acting head coach of the
Warriors was the proof needed to say that he would be a great head coaching
option. There’s a lot wrong with that. And it doesn’t come down to wins and
losses (none of this does). What were his roles and responsibilities, and how
would they compare to his duties in LA? If they didn’t align, you’re not
learning much from what people would like to consider a Realistic Job Preview
(RJP) in HR talk.
我聽說L.Walton在勇士短暫的擔任代理總教練，給他證明自己的時候，但這有非常多的錯
誤，在這段期間中，L.Walton責任是什麼？對於他現在湖人的職責相比呢？那麼高層在對
於人力資源的應用就是個錯誤。
‧In that stint, Luke didn’t need to design an offense. One was in place. He
had to call out sets, but that’s far different from taking a roster and
designing 50+ set plays that align with their strengths and mitigate their
weaknesses. So the design component wasn’t there. The teaching component wasn
’t either. Just because someone can draw up some good Xs and Os doesn’t
mean they can teach the concepts and get players to understand, which is
vital for execution and adjusting as defensive coverages change. Luke wasn’t
challenged in that way.
在這段時間裡，Walton並不需要設計進攻戰術，他需要負責叫戰術，並且球隊陣容和其他
球隊有一定的落差，所以戰術設計、教導都不是L.Walton，所以L.Walton並沒有遭受挑戰
。
‧Rotations are another area he technically had charge of, but we didn’t see
much change. He didn’t need to put together that staff, which is an
essential part of head coaching.
輪替陣容則是他負責的區域，但我們並沒有看到什麼改變，而輪替陣容的安排就是總教練
的職責。
‧His in-game decision making was fine, but that is something that’s almost
never noticed unless it’s horrific. And looking back at those games, his
decision making wasn’t anything special. So while not a negative, not
burning games down isn’t the thing you point to for justification on hiring
a guy.
回顧L.Walton比賽中的決策並沒有太大的問題，但沒有burning games down。
‧Luke’s competencies relating to the media or front office, albeit a smaller
part of the job, wasn’t tested.
與媒體的應對只佔工作極小的部分，但沒有遇過什麼考驗。
‧Getting buy-in from players not just to work on the drill you’re having them
do, but buy into you and your philosophies when times get tough wasn’t
something Luke has to experience and test himself with either.
要受到球員信任，不能只靠平時訓練，特別是Luke不曾在如此艱困的狀況下試圖讓球員信
服他和他的帶隊哲學。
(感謝StephenChou指正)
So going into hiring Luke, we had a RJP that didn’t give us much, knowing he
did player development, and a career for the Lakers to go off of. That doesn’
t mean he wouldn’t be a good head coach, but it certainly wasn’t enough
from the outside to say he’d be a good one. You’d want to carefully vet him
as an option and compare with others, which they didn’t do. Luke was the
only candidate considered and interviewed. That’s poor HR.
從L.Walton擔任代理總教練來斷定他是否成為一個優秀教練是不夠的，但也不意味著他不
會成為一個優秀的教練，湖人隊在僱用時，沒有仔細審查並與他人比較，L.Walton成為唯
一的總教練僱用人選的候選人，這個人力資源的使用是不好的。
Ideally, you gauge how strong he is with specific areas of coaching (like the
ones mentioned above). If you do hire him, you do all you can to put
assistants around him that fill his gaps. This isn’t John Beilein or any of
the hundreds of current head coaches who have staffs they have histories of
working with that they’d bring with them. This was taking one piece of a
puzzle and hoping it’d give you the same pretty picture that the full set
did in Golden State.
理想情況下，如果你雇用他，但你必須盡可能利用好的助教團，去填補他的弱項。
Luke’s assistants are an absolutely paramount part of his hire, as they
would be for any assistant who didn’t already have that group together. And
with all the influence and money the Lakers do have, and with there being no
coaching salary cap, they still compiled a group of assistants with minimal
experience. Hell, one of the hires they made came from being a youth
volleyball coach to being a Lakers assistant. That was a key miss, and we’ve
felt the negative consequences of having people like Jesse Mermuys in
positions they aren’t succeeding in.
助教團是絕對重要的一環，憑藉著湖人的影響力以及資金，但湖人卻沒有善用，反而雇用
一群在NBA經驗極少的助教團，還包括一位原本是排球青年隊的教練J.Mermuys，這就是一
個關鍵的失敗。
To summarize, Luke’s position wasn’t competed among a pool of candidates in
a way you’d want, the expectations for what he’d bring to the table were
off-base, and his assistant staff was put together in a way that is nothing
like what you’d expect for the second most valuable NBA franchise (at
$3.7B), and we’ve gotten out of the staff what was put into it.
With all of that in mind, most have been very patient with Walton and his
staff. It doesn’t hurt that the first season he was on board was one where
the Lakers were more incentivized to lose than to win, or the idea that he’s
been leading a roster devoid of established talent. The environment was such
that real evaluation of Walton’s staff was difficult for most and had tons
of excuses readily available. But almost three full seasons into their
tenure, it’s time to look at what his staff actually does, not wins and
losses, to grade them out.
從第一個賽季到現在，或許L.Walton在領導一個沒有固定的陣容，因這樣的環境，讓大家
對於評估整個教練團是困難的，有著太多可用的藉口，但任職三年多的來說，現在可以去
看看這些教練團實際上做了什麼？
ROTATIONS 輪替陣容
You would find unhappy people for all 30 teams if you were to ask fans and
analysts about how their coaches handle rotations. It’s not a problem unique
to the Lakers.
你問所有的球隊，沒有人對於輪替陣容是滿意的，這不是湖人才有的問題。
What is a bit different is the degree to which Luke Walton infuriates and
confuses those watching the games. Hockey-style lineups, playing Rajon Rondo
(who has been horrible for several weeks) for a 17 minute continuous stint vs
New Orleans, the lineups put on the court with none of Ingram/LeBron/Kuzma
that literally everyone but Luke Walton knows will give up a run. It’s bad,
and it’s happening very often.
例如在面對鵜鶘的比賽，已經放棄比賽，而放著R.Rondo連續打17分鐘，而場上並沒有已經
Ingram、LeBron、Kuzma，這是非常不好的，但經常發生。
To get a better sense of the frequency, I asked Laker fans on Twitter just
how often they’re left upset and confused about Walton’s rotations. The
results weren’t promising…
我就在Twitter上問，對於L.Walton的輪替陣容感到沮喪或者困惑的情況。
https://twitter.com/T1m_NBA/status/1099469745919873024
That’s 1,005 responses, with over 75% of respondents saying that they’re
left feeling that way about rotations for at least 60% of games they’ve
watched. 45% said at least 80% of games.
Feel free to check out Laker Twitter *checks notes* literally any game to see
this expanded upon more. Or look at what Laker Twitter looked like for the
past several years. The lack of growth in this area and pervasiveness of the
issue is immensely aggravating. I won’t spend much time on it here, but it’
s very clearly an issue and one that we’re constantly seeing, and have
consistently seen, for almost three full seasons.
SCHEME 比賽計畫
To evaluate the team’s coaching staff, you’ll need to know who they are and
what they do. Here is some pertinent information in that regard:
Scheme
Offensive Coordinator: Jesse Mermuys 進攻策畫者：J.Mermuys
Defensive Coordinator: Brian Keefe 防守策畫者：B.Keefe
Optimization Data*
Offensive Optimization: Dead last among non-rookie active staffs
Defensive Optimization: Dead last among non-rookie active staffs
進攻跟防守的Optimization Data在全聯盟都是排名倒數最後一名。
*Optimization data compares roster talent with roster performance to attempt
to gauge how well players are deployed and utilized by the coaching staff. It
attempts to look at how much coaches are getting out of the talent they’re
given.
Optimization data是用來評估聯盟間每位教練的數據。
If you’d like to see optimization data for every coach since the 2013-14
season, check out our $5/month Data & Tools premium package.
如果要看從2013-14年的Optimization data需要付費。
OFFENSE – 13TH PERCENTILE OPTIMIZATION / F GRADE F等級
I want to first dispel the narrative that the Lakers can’t run plays because
they have LeBron James on their team. LeBron has played 15 full seasons in
the NBA in four different stints with teams. For the first seven seasons with
Cleveland, he ran plays. For the next four seasons with Miami, he ran plays.
That’s 73% of LeBron’s tenure in the NBA going into this season.
It’s the four most recent Cleveland seasons that have bred the idea that
LeBron can’t, or won’t, run set plays. Cleveland did, but did have a high
percentage of their offense that was primarily based around forcing a switch
and then attacking those mismatches with Kyrie, LeBron, or Love, with
shooters all around. It was a very legitimate strategy, and one that is very
similar to how the Rockets play (and they also mix sets in). They had the
personnel to do that. These Lakers do not.
I also want to note that the scheme issues I’ll share today aren’t new this
season or suddenly popped up when LeBron was added to the team. These have
been consistent every year under Jesse Mermuys. Only a handful of plays at
the start of the season, giving LA little chance to be strong offensively.
Then a slow morph into an incredibly rudimentary offense that high school and
college coaches all over the country would shake their heads at. Every year.
我今天要講的問題，先撇除L.James加入球隊後說發生的事情，而是在J.Mermuys每年都會
發生的事情，而他的基本進攻戰術，都會讓所有的高中、大學教練搖頭。
In general, running sets is important because, if actually designed and
executed well, they create advantages for the offense through screening
actions that get open shots or get players a step on their defender going
downhill. You can do this with motion offense as well. It’s the use of “
actions,” the screening and purposeful movement of players, that generates
the advantage.
一般來說，如果再跑陣地戰時，你能有一個好的設計以及執行，將會創造出不錯的進攻優
勢。
What we’ll often see with the Lakers are sets that use one action. One pin
down. One flare screen. One AI cut. But the often stop there. 79.1% of the
possessions I logged for a handful of games had no more than one action. That
’s bad. That’s really really bad. If you only try one attack before
devolving into isolation, you’re giving yourself less opportunities to cause
a mistake or compromise of the defense.
你常會看到湖人使用一個pin down、一個flare screen、一個AI cut，但就此打住球隊戰
術運轉，在一百回合的進攻中大約會發生79.1%，這是非常非常糟糕的，就會演變成只能
由Isolation來嘗試進攻，那麼你就會造成自己失誤的機率大增。
The following charter further details the percentage of plays with different
volumes of action (BLOB/SLOB plays not counted):
Actions Frequency
0 8.0%
1 71.1%
2 16.4%
3 3.2%
4 1.0%
5 0.3%
Very infrequently will the Lakers get easy buckets from set plays. They do a
good job with the couple lob sets they’ll run after timeouts, but there’s
not much else in this regard.
湖人在半場進攻很少得到easy buckets，但他們暫停過後的兩人小組配合做得不錯，但沒
有執行得太多。
To get a better sense for the types of attacks the Lakers run, here’s a
breakdown from the 5 games I logged:
為了更好理解湖人的進攻戰術，以下紀錄五場比賽：
https://i.imgur.com/i4qFyTP.jpg
I logged 32 specific actions the Lakers ran, but grouped them together into
these six “action families.” The execution rate shows the percentage of the
time LA actually screened and ran off the screens properly. The success rate
shows the percentage of the time the action run yielded an advantage over the
defense. This also counts creating mismatches, or actions that set up an
ensuing action. And on the far right, I listed some specific actions that
fall within those families.
我記錄32種進攻戰術，但分為六大類，計算出每場比賽的使用率以及執行的成功率。在最
右邊列出那些進攻戰術分為哪一類。
I find a couple things interesting about that data. Almost every type of
action has a higher execution rate than success rate. Due to poor spacing and
lack of other attacking on the defense, it’s a lot easier to stop a Laker
pin down or handoff than it might be against other teams through your help
defense. We see this a ton with LA’s back screens, where the spacing and
location of the passer in relation to the potential lob receiver are so
messed up that there’s no chance for the action to actually yield points.
Jesse Mermuys’ offensive scheme has low action volume. It’s the lowest of
the 7 teams I’ve tracked, and I’d guess it’s among the lowest in the
league. So the design is clearly not strong. Even if executed at normal
levels, the poor design leaves the Lakers with a low ceiling for easy
offense. Players are left to “make stuff happen,” which is never optimal. It
’s fine late clock, but shouldn’t be the go-to offense with 15 seconds left
on the clock.
J.Mermuys的進攻規劃非常的少，從我有關注的七支球隊中是最少的，我猜大概也是全聯盟
墊底。顯然缺乏設計，且糟糕的設計也讓湖人的上限降低，讓球員只能等待make stuff ha
ppen，也讓球隊在進攻時間部屬上有問題。
Let’s compare some Laker plays with what we see from other teams. Here’s a
simple horns set that gets a SG looking to attack downhill or a 3-point
attempt (depending on how the defense plays the handoff), with options to hit
a rolling 5-man, hit 4 slipping, or hit 3 coming off the staggered screens
for a 3-point look. That stagger removes the chance you’ll see any help
defense, making the dribble handoff much more effective. Simple yet solid.
接下來，利用湖人隊的進攻部屬來跟其他球隊進行比較。
Denver Nuggets - Horns DHO Stagger featured in our latest Plays of the Week.
https://twitter.com/FastModel/status/1096227665110020096
Here’s a set from the Trail Blazers. No rocket science, but multiple scoring
options that work together to help what are already good players look even
better with easy shots. This very simple play is also from the horns
alignment, and uses a weak side flare screen to look to either remove help on
the primary action ball screen, or give you an open 3-pointer if the help
defense does come.
https://twitter.com/FastModel/status/1094317540694728705
And here’s a 76ers set that again gives the offense multiple opportunities
to score. The ball screen that low on the court (a “logo” ball screen)
prevents any help on the roll man, which LA could murder teams with by
finding McGee lobs.
https://twitter.com/FastModel/status/1094612154769117186
Now here’s what a Laker play might look like. A single action (a pin down in
this case), with nothing setting it up and nothing following it.
接下來是湖人隊的進攻部屬情況
https://i.imgur.com/J3aTXJy.jpg
Also, as seen in the chart above, the actions work less than half the time,
and are executed 56% of the time. Jesse Mermuys and Luke Walton struggle to
get their players to set fundamental screens and run the correct ways off of
screens. Such a large part of offense is execution, which is about focus and
understanding rather than talent. The reads, especially in a rudimentary
offense like what LA runs, are fairly easy. Go watch some Virginia, Michigan
State, Michigan, Davidson, Tennessee, Purdue, Wisconsin, or Virginia Tech
tape if you want to see some of the reads executed well from shooters
fading/curling/coming off screens straight.
It’s more about the teaching of concepts and drills to get players to
understand how to see what the defense it taking away and react to it in a
way that makes their own life easier and make themselves much more likely to
get and score on an open shot. The Lakers leave much to be desired when it
comes to offensive execution, and the fact that those errors have persisted
for three different rosters and for vets and young players alike makes it
clear it’s more on the unqualified coaching staff than the players.
關於這些戰術的教導、觀念、技巧，讓球員知道面臨什麼防守時，該如何去應對出一個進
攻戰術，讓球隊可以得到open shot的機會。在進攻的執行面，湖人有太多不足的地方，這
些錯誤，也顯示出這些不合格的教練團們的問題。
But the offensive scheme isn’t all doom and gloom. There are a couple
concepts they do use well, such as their step up ball screens in their
secondary break, which either get a ball handler going downhill or get a
mismatch early in the shot clock. LA executed on those 79% of the time they
tried them, so there’s one of the few designed and executed actions the
Lakers add value to their offense through. I’d certainly love to see more in
terms of secondary breaks, since it’s a great way to attack before the
defense is set and there are certain actions that are even more effective in
those scenarios, but it’s a start.
Things also tend to go well on the rare occasions that Ingram is used off of
handoffs, cross screens, and back screens. I’d love to see more of those
types of actions to get him going downhill off of the catch, rather than off
of a live dribble (where he’s still less refined).
We have seen some new positive developments post-All-Star Break that aren’t
reflected in that data. The Lakers have discovered pin-in screens, and have
done a better job finding shooters off these types of flares for shots. They’
ve also been much better about making off-ball screeners threats to score if
the defense switches, through sealing their man and making themselves a
dump-off target.
Moving forward, I don’t expect the Lakers to suddenly make great strides
with their offensive scheme, barring some consultants being brought in. They’
ve run similar stuff for three years, and the quality of that offense has
stayed fairly consistent throughout.
對於未來我不認為，湖人在對於進攻戰術的部屬計畫中有多大的進步，除非能有一些顧問
能加入他們。畢竟這些東西他們已經用了三年，且進攻的質量保持一致。
The lowest hanging fruit for improvement, however, would be to implement some
freelance motion on post ups and pick and roll plays. Right now everything is
stagnant in those scenarios. With some simple principles, players will know
where their options are and the team would be creating more pressure with
action rather than standing around or using one cut against a set defense.
Split cuts on post ups and weak side flare screens on pick and rolls should
be very doable, and would make a huge difference in creating extra scoring
opportunities that simultaneously remove the help defense dampening the
effectiveness of those primary actions LA runs.
然而目前最好改善的是，再進行Post Up以及P&R的執行中，做的細膩一些，讓球員透過簡
單的原則，球員知道他們的能傳球的點在哪，而不是小組配合的人在打比賽，其他人站在
一旁看，讓強邊再進行擋拆時弱邊的球員進行flare Screen，創造出得分機會。
In addition, it would behoove the team to have a more organized late-clock
offense. Once the shot clock gets to 8 seconds, if someone isn’t currently
attacking, get into a go-to action. If LeBron is on the court, maybe it’s a
Bron perimeter or mid-post iso. If he’s not, perhaps it’s a pick and roll
or a pin down. Something to get the ball in the hands of the right players
late in the clock so we don’t need to see Rondo or McGee late-clock iso
offense anymore.
此外在讀秒階段，如果LBJ在場上，當然是把球給LBJ進行Isolation，如果LBJ不在，那麼
或許使用P&R或者Pin Down，讓球轉移到正確的球員手上去執行進攻，就不用在讀秒階段看
到Rondo或McGee在最後時刻在Isolation。
Until the Lakers pick it up here, they’ll have a ton of stress on individual
players to create plays. An off-day or injury from just one key guy can cause
greater issues in that kind of offense. But that failure to put players in
positions to succeed and Ingram being put in pick and rolls with stagnant
players off-ball or in a plethora of iso situations will instead be viewed as
Brandon Ingram just not being good.
如果未能把球員放在正確的位置，就會導致像B.Ingram陷入停滯不前的窘境。
Please, Jesse Mermuys. Please.
Side note: It’s fair to wonder what these promising young players would look
like if they weren’t operating in what our data considers to be the worst
environment for them to shine. We might see what appears to be a large jump
in development next season purely from a coaching change and average or
better scheme. Our player talent grades, which attempt to remove the impact
scheme and environment has, have the comparison between Celtics and Lakers
young players much closer than most realize.
DEFENSE – 17TH PERCENTILE OPTIMIZATION / F GRADE F等級
Brian Keefe runs the Laker defense. I wouldn’t say the scheme has been
anywhere near as poor as the offense, but it’s been pretty vanilla. I’ll
routinely see opposing teams use creative tactics to stymie Laker plays
(3-man switches, pre-rotating in anticipation of actions, etc.). The Lakers
don’t do that. The one creative tactic I’ve noticed LA using under Walton
has been when they put a player like Josh Hart on someone like Tarik Black or
Draymond Green defensively who can’t usually punish you in that mismatch.
That’s great, but you need to have more than that in your bag of tricks in
today’s NBA.
B.Keefe是負責湖人防守計畫，但我不會說防守計畫跟進攻計畫一樣差，但防守計畫很vani
lla。我很常看到對手利用有創意的防守來阻礙湖人隊的進攻play (三人換防、預先輪轉等
方法），但湖人沒這種東西。湖人有創意的防守我只有看到一個，是Walton拿Josh Hart這
類型的球員去防守像是T.Black或Draymond Green，即使對他們是錯位，但他們也討不到便
宜。這個很棒，但你需要有更多這樣的東西才足以應付現在的NBA。
(感謝alankira與rex7152指正)
When I say LA’s defensive scheme is vanilla, it’s that lack of creativity
along with a standard game plan that results in making it quite cookie
cutter. The Lakers seemingly go into many of these matchups the way many of
us do in 2K, where our defensive coverages are whatever the defauts are and
we don’t change them based on who we play (I do, but nobody likes that guy
taking 10 minutes to switch things around when you want to play with friends).
This isn’t to say they always do this, but they apply the same game plan a
lot more than I’m used to, compared to what my high school and AAU teams
did, what the teams do at those levels I’ve consulted with, what the college
teams do I watch consistently, and from what I see other NBA teams do. I don’
t have any numbers for this, but LA definitely seems to be on the low end of
customization in this regard. Many times it works okay, sometimes it’s
horrific, and sometimes it’s the perfect strategy. Praising the staff for an
amazing game plan when the round peg finally meets the round hole isn’t the
approach I’d take.
LA has players with certain limitations, but they do little to work around
that and mix up coverages defensively, opponent by opponent. Even in-game,
they adjust very slow to opposing teams burning their same screen coverages
the same ways over and over again. You can’t win in the playoffs like that.
Luke and Brian need to figure this out, or LA will struggle in the postseason
defensively more than they have so far during the regular season. And in
2019, there’s virtually nothing teams can do that hasn’t been done before,
so it’s just a matter of having the right people on staff with the knowledge
and research to understand that rock beats scissors and scissors beats paper.
Overall, I’d say LA is probably a C- strategically and a D tactically on
defense. Then comes in execution. Many of LA’s defensive issues come down to
veterans not executing and lots of either blown help coverage or over
helping. Very fundamental issues, and ones that have seemed to get worse as
the year has gone on for the Rondos and McGees of the team.
Part of coaching is getting guys to go out there and play hard. And playing
hard isn’t just diving on the floor and boxing out (which LA doesn’t do
well at all), but focusing on defensive execution and doing the little
things. This is particularly the case on defense. When it comes down to it,
there’s little that separates NBA defenses from what we see in college or
high school. Icing screens is still not mainstream at those levels, but most
of the concepts are the same. At any level, it’s more about executing
fundamentals defensively than it is trying to mastermind sets the way it can
be on offense. This staff hasn’t been able to get that buy-in from capable
players to do those little things, and it hurts them on a daily basis.
(防守這段一起翻譯)
湖人隊現在既定的防守計畫是非常非常基本的，湖人在面對各球隊時並沒有非常明確且應
對的防守計畫，也讓人看起來湖人的防守計畫非常的呆板沒有對策。教練的職責除了讓球
員努力打球之外，對於場上的防守細節做的非常非常的差，當教練無法給予球員正確的防
守觀念以及計畫，這樣只是在每天每天的傷害球員。
PLAYER DEVELOPMENT 球員發展
One area I’ve heard listed as a pro for Luke Walton and his staff has been
player development. In his first year or two, when the team realistically had
no chance to be a contender, this was the focus. So how well has he done in
this regard?
我聽說L.Walton和他的助教團是有列出球員的發展方向，但球隊在第一年跟第二年是在沒
有競爭力的情況下，那這部分就顯得非常重要，而他做得如何？
We’ve recently developed Player Development ratings for coaching staffs at
BBall Index. These ratings look at players who played under a coach for year
A and year B, then measure the growth in a particular talent area from A -> B
against the expected growth in that skill set, which is calculated from our
database of player growth from the 2013-14 season until today, and factors in
advanced position (Guard/Wing/Big) and age to calculate the expectation.
根據BBall Index對於教練制定球員發展的評級，考察A年與B年在同一個教練下，球員發展
的情況。
Here is how Luke Walton’s staff has graded out in each area, with grades
listed being a conversion of percentiles against the other coaching staffs
since 2013-14.
以下是L.Walton以及助教團在從2013-14年來對於球員發展的評級。
Talent Category Grade
Perimeter Defense A
Interior Defense A-
Post Play B+
Off-Ball Movement B
Finishing C
One on One D+
Roll Gravity D+
Perimeter Shooting F
Playmaking F
Offensive Rebounding F
Defensive Rebounding F
Overall, Walton’s staff grades out as a D- Offensively, an A Defensively,
and an A- Overall. The staffs rating out ahead of Luke’s are led by Rick
Carlisle, Brad Stevens, Alvin Gentry, and Fred Hoiberg. Right behind Luke’s
staff are those led by Gregg Popovich, J.B. Bickerstaff, and Steve Kerr.
整體來說Walton以及助教團得到的評價是D級進攻、A級防守，整體評價A。
(防守評價A讓我有點疑問)
While player development coach turned head coach Luke Walton didn’t bring
the scheme we were hoping he would from the Warriors, his staff has developed
players fairly well overall, and especially defensively. His staff doesn’t
utilize his guys well to optimize that talent, but the talent is certainly
growing from year to year.
If you’d like to see player development data for every coach since the
2013-14 season in every category, check out our $5/month Data & Tools premium
package.
CULTURE & LEADERSHIP 球隊文化&領導
We’ve now moved to the off-court portion of the analysis. The other area it
was expected that Luke would positively impact the Lakers was with his
Warriors-like approach to culture. Guys would be having fun, they’d have an
egalitarian method of play and playing time rewarded, and the team would play
hard behind their player coach of a leader.
Some of that has materialized. Some not as much. The players seem to have
fun. Or did earlier in the season. That’s definitely gone down recently, but
the locker room does generally seem to fit with what Walton wants.
LA comes to play hard on most days, but they do struggle with playing focused
and executing the basics. This piece of it, and particularly the defensive
buy-in to basic concepts that just require some focus and a little work, isn’
t constantly there.
Luke’s rotations and their relation to play also don’t seem aligned, with
players like Julius Randle being seemingly nitpicked and benched while
others, like Lance and Rondo this season, consistently not executing and not
facing any negative consequences from it. Game to game or in-game, the
execution by Luke of the egalitarian component doesn’t quite seem right.
Where Luke has done a decent job, especially under the circumstances, is how
little we hear about a fractured locker room. With as many 1-year guys and
trade rumors as we’ve had in his three years, it’s impressive how little we
hear about times like the voiced displeasure from some of the Laker veterans
a couple weeks back.
RELATIONS WITH MEDIA AND THE FRONT OFFICE 與媒體及高層的關係
The last piece if this breakdown is how Luke relates to the media and front
office. I’d say he’s been fine in both areas. He’s by no means become an
enemy of the media or created any hostility, and does a good job giving
positive answers and deflecting. Lots of coach speak and little substance,
for sure. But that’s the norm, not a criticism.
We don’t have much to go off of when it comes to Luke’s relationship with
the front office. A big part of that his how 99% of it is behind the scenes.
Part of it is that the front office isn’t one that we can assume is acting
logically.
我會說L.Walton在這兩個關係應對的非常好，他不會成為媒體的敵人或製造敵意，能夠在
應答上做的好。而與球隊高層的關係，我們沒啥好說的，我們得到的資訊有99都是場邊的
花絮，我也不是高層的人，不是我們可以假設的地方。
LA’S PERFORMANCE AND PLAYOFF CHANCES 湖人隊的表現以及晉級季後賽的機會
While the Lakers haven’t seen the current roster all healthy at the same
time, we did see the pre-trade roster healthy at the start of the season. And
that performance may have set expectations higher than they should have.
The Lakers had a 20-14 record before LeBron went down, good for a 48 win
pace. In reality, the team was playing much worse. Based on the luck-adjusted
data, which will attempt to suss out the variance and randomness that will
natural appear in the data (especially at a smaller sample like that), the
Lakers with LeBron for that stretch were performing to the level of a team
that’d be expected to be 16.9-17.1, on pace for 40.7 wins.
The difference between 48 wins and 41 wins last season would have been the
difference between a tie for the 4 seed in the West and the 11 seed. So while
LeBron James is undeniably a monster on the court, it’s very possible the
Lakers were already a bad team that were just being held together by perhaps
the greatest player to ever play the game.
Since that time, the Lakers have played like a 30-52 full-season team
according to the luck-adjusted data. They’re going to need to flip a hell of
a switch to make it to the playoffs. In the small sample since the All-Star
Break, they’ve played like a 43-39 full-season team. Based on BBall
Reference playoff odds, it looks like 45 wins makes the playoffs as the
eighth seed. That would require them to be winning at a 57-25 full-season
pace for the rest of the season, which is what the Warriors’ actual full
season record is projected to be on their site. The odds aren’t good at all,
and will require a completely different kind of performance from LA we haven’
t seen this season.
上賽季48勝與41勝的差距就是西區排名第4跟第11的差距，而目前看起來45勝成為西區第8
晉級季後賽的話，以現在湖人的戰績來說，需要在接下來的比賽中取得全勝。
TYING IT ALL TOGETHER
So where does that leave us? Walton seems to do okay to above average with
the lesser valued off-the court components. He’s done well with player
development, but offensively is lacking quite a bit. And the rotations and
scheme are major liabilities.
With the Lakers looking to compete, and do it through adding talent in free
agency, the focus should be on strengths in Walton’s staff’s two weakest
areas, rotations and scheme.
Those are the problems, but what are the solutions?
LA had a window of time this year where they could have moved on from Walton
and given a new staff some time to get their feet under them. That time has
passed. But that time will come again this offseason, and that’s when I
predict the Lakers will make a move. They have all the information they need
on Walton and his staff to reasonably predict future performance. Hiding
behind the roster not being fully healthy to say they can’t assess the staff
would be a gross misunderstanding of how to conduct performance management.
There was also a time this season to make assistant coach changes, and that
window may still be open. Coincidentally, the areas the Lakers need the most
growth are ones that can be improved by getting new assistants. That would
allow the consistency of having the same head coach to hopefully keep the
locker room together. That’s my pipe dream for the rest of this season, but
it’s also likely just a dream now that we’ve passed the All-Star Break,
which would have afforded LA a chance to install new offense.
I’ll break down coaching options in more detail at a later date, but the
candidates like Mark Jackson, Jason Kidd, and Ty Lue don’t look all that
appealing once their scheme film and optimization and development data is
broken down. The names that will ultimately end up being top contenders are
likely ones the Lakers can’t hire today. There’s a reason those candidates
don’t have coaching jobs today.
But gun to my head, I’d say the best options available today that would be
worth a deeper look are Stan Van Gundy, Jeff Van Gundy (I’m skeptical), and
Kevin McHale. Not great compared to the names I’m about to rattle off.
Among the college ranks, John Beilein, Mark Few, Bob McKillop, Bill Self,
Tony Bennett, Tom Izzo, Greg Gard, or Jay Wright would all be viable (if
interested).
If they were to get fired for some reason Alvin Gentry or Brett Brown are
both very good coaches with great data to back up their schemes and
leadership.
Even with just adding assistants to the current staff, defensive guru Luke
Yaklich or Brad Soderberg would be good options from college and likely
attainable if LA were to throw money at them. NBA assistants like Ettore
Messina would be worth a look as well. With any assistants, you’d want to do
a lot of extra vetting to understand who is responsible for what and what
their talent levels are in the core competencies of the job.
The odds are, someone among those 11 head coach options not currently
available will have interest during this offseason. I’d take any of them and
their staffs over Walton’s staff in a heartbeat, and it has nothing to do
with their wins and losses or coach speak in interviews. It’s about what the
key components of being a head basketball coach are, and how good each of
those candidates is at each of those competencies.
簡單說就是在季中更換教練的時間或者補強助教團的時間已過，然而接下來只剩在休賽期
看湖人怎麼處理總教練這個位置，或者是利用助教團去彌補起L.Walton的弱項。而提到總
教練人選有Mark Jason、Jason Kidd、Ty Lue，甚至是Stan Van Gundy、Jeff Van Gundy
、Kevin McHale。在NCAA中如果這些教練感興趣的話有，John Beilein(Michigan)、Mark
Few(Gonzaga)、Bob McKillop(Davidson)、Bill Self(Kansas)、Tony Bennett(Virginia)
、Tom Izzo(Michigan State)，Greg Gard(Wisconsin)或Jay Wright(Villanova)。或者防
守大師Luke Yaklich、Brad Soderberg，或現在NBA其他球隊的助理教練例如Ettore Messi
na，湖人隊對於教練人選要有更大量的觀察以及評估，了解他們各自的工作核心已經能力
。
來源：http://www.bball-index.com/luke-walton-lame-duck/