標題: 烏克蘭門風暴》美國代理國家情報總監：這次揭密者控告史無前例，他做了對的事
新聞來源: (須有正確連結)
https://www.storm.mg/article/1759612
前情提要:
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簡恒宇 2019-09-26 23:34
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K0YZZnRhE0c
美國總統川普疑似施壓烏克蘭總統哲連斯基，要求調查2020年總統大選可能對手拜登的兒
子，掀起「烏克蘭門」風暴，更讓民主黨掌控的聯邦眾議院啟動彈劾調查。代理國家情報
總監馬奎爾26日出席眾議院情報委員會聽證會，但對於川普是否濫權，以及利用特權隱瞞
通話內容，馬奎爾均未正面回應，但坦言引發風暴的揭密者「做了對的事」，他提出的控
告「史無前例」。
眾院聽證會召開前 控訴內容先公布
馬奎爾（Joseph Maguire）直言，出席聽證會讓他很不自在，「我沒有要求要出席」，並
稱會出席是來自川普的要求，同時否認請辭傳聞，被問到川普是否想知道是誰提出控告，
馬奎爾明確回答：「沒有。」這場聽證會在美國東岸時間26日上午9時舉行，馬奎爾隨後
會與聯邦參議院情報委員會進行閉門會談。
https://i.imgur.com/tszLNNF.jpg
烏克蘭門醜聞：美國代理國家情報總監馬奎爾出席聯邦眾議院情報委員會聽證會（AP）
而在聽證會開始前，眾院情報委員會釋出已解密的控訴內容，直指川普私人律師、前紐約
市長朱利安尼（Rudolph W. Giuliani）是此事件的主要推手，司法部長巴爾（William
P. Barr）「顯然也參與其中」。眾院情報委員會主席席夫（Adam B. Schiff）說，會盡
全力保護提出控告的情報官員，避免此人遭到報復。
https://i.imgur.com/xw0RW7B.jpg
烏克蘭門醜聞：美國聯邦眾議院情報委員會主席席夫（AP）
朱利安尼、巴爾涉案 白宮「極力妨礙」別人知
《華盛頓郵報》18日揭露，美國情報人員透過「揭密者控告」（whistleblower
complaint）管道提出控告，指出川普與「某外國領導人」通電話時，做出極不恰當的「
承諾」，而《華盛頓郵報》與《紐約時報》深入挖掘，鎖定7月25日川普與哲連斯基（
Volodymyr Zelensky）的通話，川普疑似拿援助威脅，要求哲連斯基調查拜登（Joe
Biden）次子杭特（Hunter Biden）是否涉貪。
控告內容指出，白宮官員「極力妨礙」川普與哲連斯基的對話內容被別人知道，並稱川普
濫用人事權，且顧慮到政治敏感資訊，川普與外國領導人通話紀錄被重置「並非首次」。
此外，控訴者直言，「他（川普）對烏克蘭總統（哲連斯基）施壓，以達到2020年贏得連
任的目的」，此舉不僅是一連串濫權行為，還把「國家安全置於風險之中」。
https://i.imgur.com/XLXvpP9.jpg
烏克蘭門醜聞：美國代理國家情報總監馬奎爾出席聯邦眾議院情報委員會聽證會（AP）
否認洩露給媒體 相信情報員照規則辦事
「我沒有黨派，也不是政客」，馬奎爾宣誓後，強調自己的效忠對象是美國憲法，並坦言
這次的揭密者控告「史無前例」。對於被指沒有立即處理情報人員的控訴，馬奎爾回應，
白宮官員告訴他通話內容受到行政特權（executive privilege）保護，強調對督察和控
訴者「誠實辦事」且「遵照規章」進行深具信心。
被問及此控訴是否意味川普濫權，馬奎爾閃避不答，僅稱「無法由我評斷」。對於控訴者
被川普指控是「政治駭客」，馬奎爾沒有正面回應，但認為控訴者「做對了事」。努恩斯
則追問為何媒體得知此事，馬奎爾否認情報單位把消息洩露給媒體，並微笑表示：「我領
導情報單位，我們知道如何保守秘密。」不過他證實，有10多人聽過川普與哲連斯基的對
話內容，這讓民主黨有線索展開調查。
https://i.imgur.com/DxHffpL.jpg
烏克蘭門醜聞：美國聯邦眾議院情報委員會副主席努恩斯（AP）
同意控訴者接受國會聽證 共和黨批陰謀論
馬奎爾不回應是否有與川普討論此事，表示若公開他與川普之間的對話，「會摧毀我在情
報業務上與川普的關係」。他亦稱，白宮並未指示，他與川普之間的對話受制行政特權。
當被問及控訴者能否在受保護的情況下出席國會聽證會，馬奎爾表示正在盡量安排，而席
夫則問，若情勢更加明確，控訴者能否接受聽證會問話，馬奎爾回道：「可以。」
https://i.imgur.com/w4E51Nj.jpg
席夫痛批，川普「背叛」就任總統的誓言，還對國家安全造成威脅，並指責8月才代理國
家情報總監（DNI）職務的馬奎爾，這幾個月的作為相當「令人困惑」，甚至沒有立即提
交情報人員的控訴，也沒有找疑似牽涉其中的巴爾問話。共和黨籍的眾院情報委員會副主
席努恩斯（Devin Nunes）則說，這是針對川普發動的「資訊戰」。
https://i.imgur.com/dKqG90f.jpg
努恩斯還稱，媒體試圖利用陰謀論來罷黜川普，同黨的35歲紐約州聯邦眾議員史蒂芬尼克
（Elise Stefanik）批評席夫，在聽證會開場聲明中製造川普與哲連斯基的「假對話」。
不過同是共和黨籍的德州聯邦眾議員賀德（Will Hurd）坦言，這起控訴「令人關切」；
同黨俄亥俄州聯邦眾議員藤諾（Mike Turner）也說：「我想告訴總統......這對話內容
不OK。」
───────────────────────────────────────
讓民主黨扣下彈劾調查扳機的機密文件：「烏克蘭門」揭密者的9頁檢舉函，到底說了什
麼？
https://www.storm.mg/article/1762162
李忠謙 2019-09-27 15:11
https://i.imgur.com/napBcqy.jpg
美國總統川普再度陷入勾結外國、影響大選爭議（美聯社）
攸關美國總統川普是否會被彈劾的「烏克蘭門」不斷延燒，代理國家情報總監馬奎爾26日
出席眾院聽證會，而踢爆「烏克蘭門」的「揭密者檢舉」原件也在會前由眾議院情報委員
會公布。外界終於能從這份解密文件中，一窺無法坐視川普醜行的情報人員，到底向上司
舉報了什麼？
這份「揭密者檢舉」於今年8月12日提出，共有9頁內容，當時也被列為密件。眾院情報委
員會將其公布在網路上，因此所有人都能輕易閱讀全文。如同先前美國媒體所揭露的，這
位迄今不知姓名身份的情報人員，認為川普利用總統職權，要求外國領導人干預2020美國
總統大選，他認為這除了傷害美國國安，也構成了情節嚴重的總統濫權。
1.白宮試圖隱匿通話紀錄
吹哨者表示，在防止官員審視川普與烏克蘭總統哲連斯基（Volodymyr Zelensky）7月25
日的通話紀錄時，白宮顯然逾越了正常程序的範圍—不過由於各界壓力，這份紀錄已在25
日由白宮公諸於世。
吹哨者在「揭密者檢舉」（whistleblower complaint）的檢舉函中表示，無法檢視通話
紀錄的官員們對他表示，他們被告知所有通話紀錄都已經被「封鎖」，尤其是逐字通話紀
錄。好幾位白宮官員都告訴吹哨者，由白宮戰情室所製作的川普與哲連斯基的這份通話紀
錄，被例外存放在直接由國家安全會議（National Security Council）高階主管所管理
、專門用於處理高階情報的不聯網電腦裡。
https://i.imgur.com/ofBqOs8.jpg
美國總統川普被爆出「烏克蘭門」，疑似濫用職權向烏克蘭總統施壓，以便打擊民主黨總
統參選人、前副總統拜登。（AP）
吹哨者說，這種做法被白宮官員認為根本是濫用體制，因為把川普的對話紀錄鎖在這種地
方，完全只是為了保護私人政治利益，而非敏感的重要國安資訊。檢舉函的這一點也讓25
日公布通話紀錄，並且宣稱「並未涉敏感國安資訊」的白宮相當難堪—既然沒有不可告人
之處，為何又要將其隱匿。吹哨者還指出，官員們表示這種作法在川普政府並非新鮮事，
還有其他資料也被如此處理。
2.川普把見面機會當成獎賞
「烏克蘭門」的關鍵之一，在於川普是否將應該交給烏克蘭的美援當成施壓工具，迫使烏
克蘭調查拜登父子（Joe and Hunter Biden）的貪腐醜聞。不過吹哨者的檢舉函對於這一
點並未深談，這名告密的情報人員認為，難以證實烏克蘭總統是否知道美援被扣住。
吹哨者真正在檢舉函中指出的，是官員們相信川普將他與哲連斯基的會晤當成獎賞（據稱
烏克蘭總統非常想跟川普見面），只要對方能夠跟他合作。好幾位美國官員也跟這名吹哨
者說，烏克蘭高層當時收到的訊息是，只要哲連斯基願意在烏克蘭前檢察總長盧岑科（
Yuriy Lutsenko）與川普私人律師朱利安尼（Rudolph Giuliani）關注的事項上與美國合
作，美烏領袖會談就可以成事。
吹哨者坦承，他不知道「誰什麼時候傳遞了這個訊息給烏克蘭高層」。但他也表示，副總
統彭斯（Mike Pence）取消了烏克蘭的訪問行程，就是出於相同的理由。「美國官員在5
月14日前後告訴我，川普本來要參加哲連斯基5月20日的就職典禮，但川普後來下令彭斯
全部取消，改由能源部長率團參加。」
告密者說川普取消訪烏的這個決定，更讓官員們認定在哲連斯基在總統職位上「做出正確
選擇」之前，川普都不會跟他碰面。《華盛頓郵報》先前曾經指出，川普一直不願意與哲
連斯基會晤，直到7月25日兩人通話，哲連斯基表示他會調查川普想要他調查的事之後，
川普才表態兩人將會在華府見面。
3.兩名大使職司損害控管
吹哨者表示，負責對烏克蘭談判的美國特使沃爾克（Kurt Volker）與美國駐歐盟大使桑
德蘭（Gordon Sondland），都試圖減輕川普相關舉動所造成的潛在損害。多名美國官員
對他表示，沃爾克與桑德蘭都曾對烏克蘭高層提出建議，如何「解決」川普總統對哲連斯
基所提出的要求。
吹哨者說，沃爾克與桑德蘭等國務院官員都跟朱利安尼進行過談話，討論如何在美國國安
層面「控管損害」。沃爾克與桑德蘭也在這段期間與烏克蘭新政府的官員碰面，除了討論
政策問題，也試圖協助烏克蘭領導人理解與回應他們從不同管道接受到的訊息，其中也包
括朱利安尼。
4.今年7月25日的那通電話
無論是白宮官員或者共和黨籍的眾議員，目前都已經開始攻擊這名吹哨者的可信度。因為
他們注意到這名吹哨者的所有資訊來源，幾乎都是來自美國政府官員的二手轉述。但是在
白宮25日公布川普與哲連斯基的通話紀錄後，若跟檢舉函中對這通電話的描述相比，又是
如此準確。
https://i.imgur.com/ngjS1nu.jpg
2010年1月，美國時任總統歐巴馬（左）、時任副總統拜登（中）、拜登次子杭特（右）
（美聯社）
吹哨者在這份8月12日（白宮公佈通話紀錄近6周之前）提交的檢舉函中表示，官員們轉述
的川普施壓事項包括：
＋對前副總統拜登（Joseph Biden）與其子杭特（Hunter Biden）在烏克蘭的活動進行調
查—這也是白宮官員認為總統濫權、謀求私利的關鍵所在
＋對於俄羅斯干預2016美國總統大選的一起陰謀論，認為其實根本就是美國民主黨全國委
員會（DNC）自導自演。川普希望烏克蘭協助找出當年由DNC與資安公司CrowdStrike所使
用的一台伺服器，因為據傳當初的網路干預就是源自烏克蘭
＋川普希望哲連斯基可以跟他所指定的兩位個人特使—他的私人律師朱利安尼與美國司法
部長巴爾（William Barr）見面或談話，以便討論「合作事宜」
＋川普在通話時表達了對烏克蘭前檢察總長盧岑科（Yuriy Lutsenko）的支持（我聽說你
有一個非常棒的檢察官被撤職了，這件事真的不公平），而且當時這位徹查拜登家族貪腐
事證的檢察官也參與了通話。此外，川普在電話裡只提到了兩次調查
5.除了川普，許多官員顯然也陷入麻煩
吹哨者在8月的這份檢舉函中表示，過去4個月有好幾位美國官員對他揭露與上述指控有關
的事實。而且這些官員所講述的內容彼此融貫，與已經公開的各種私人陳述也相互一致。
吹哨者指出，大概有12名白宮官員聽過川普與哲連斯基的通話，但他們都設法讓這份通話
紀錄保持秘而不宣，當然還有川普想將兩人會晤當成「合作獎賞」一事。
如果這一切被認定非法，那麼出問題的不只是川普，還包括這些知情又協助隱匿的官員，
都是共謀。除了直接聽過電話的官員，還有那些協助控管損害、協助烏克蘭理解與執行川
普要求的人。這意味著在對川普進行彈劾調查時，眾院需要傳喚聽證的潛在證人恐怕至少
會有好幾十個。
https://i.imgur.com/pgWxmBB.jpg
川普私人律師朱利安尼。（AP）
附註：揭密者檢舉函件原文
(下列是第一至第七頁的部分，包括腳註)
UNCLASSIFIED
August 12, 2019
The Honorable Richard Burr
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
The Honorable Adam Schiff
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
United States House of Representatives
Dear Chairman Burr and Chairman Schiff:
I am reporting an "urgent concern" in accordance with the procedures outlined
in 50 U.S.C. s. 3033(k)(5)(A). This letter is UNCLASSIFIED when separated from
the attachment.
In the course of my official duties, I have received information from
multiple U.S. Government officials that the President of the United States is
using the power of his office to solicit interference from a foreign country
in the 2020 U.S. election. This interference includes, among other things,
pressuring a foreign country to investigate one of the President’s main
domestic political rivals. The President’s personal lawyer, Mr. Rudolph
Giuliani, is a central figure in this effort. Attorney General Barr appears
to be involved as well.
Over the past four months, more than half a dozen U.S. officials have
informed me of various facts related to this effort. The information provided
herein was relayed to me in the course of official interagency business. It
is routine for U.S. officials with responsibility for a particular regional
or functional portfolio to share such information with one another in order
to inform policymaking and analysis.
I was not a direct witness to most of the events described. However, I found
my colleagues' accounts of these events to be credible because, in almost all
cases, multiple officials recounted fact patterns that were consistent with
one another. In addition, a variety of information consistent with these pri-
vate accounts has been reported publicly.
I am deeply concerned that the actions described below constitute “a serious
or flagrant problem, abuse, or violation of law or Executive Order” that “
does not include differences of opinions concerning public policy matters,”
consistent with the definition of an "urgent concern" in 50 U.S.C. s.3033(k)
(5)(G). I am therefore fulfilling my duty to report this information, through
proper legal channels, to the relevant authorities.
I am also concerned that these actions pose risks to U.S. national security
and undermine the U.S. Government’s efforts to deter and counter foreign
interference in U.S. elections.
To the best of my knowledge, the entirety of this statement is unclassified
when separated from the classified enclosure. I have endeavored to apply the
classification standards outlined in Executive Order (EO) 13526 and to
separate out information that I know or have reason to believe is classified
for national security purposes.(1)
If a classification marking is applied retroactively, I believe it is
incumbent upon the classifying authority to explain why such a marking was
applied, and to which specific information it pertains.
I. The 25 July Presidential phone call
Early in the morning of 25 July, the President spoke by telephone with
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. I do not know which side initiated
the call. This was the first publicly acknowledged call between the two
leaders since a brief congratulatory call after Mr. Zelenskyy won the
presidency on 21 April.
Multiple White House officials with direct knowledge of the call informed me
that, after an initial exchange of pleasantries, the President used the
remainder of the call to advance his personal interests. Namely, he sought to
pressure the Ukrainian leader to take actions to help the President’s 2020
reelection bid. According to the White House officials who had direct
knowledge of the call, the President pressured Mr. Zelenskyy to, inter alia:
- initiate or continue an investigation(2) into the activities of former Vice
President Joseph Biden and his son, Hunter Biden;
- assist in purportedly uncovering that allegations of Russian interference
in the 2016 U.S. presidential election originated in Ukraine, with a specific
request that the Ukrainian leader locate and turn over servers used by the
Democratic National Committee (DNC) and examined by the U.S. cyber security
firm Crowdstrike(3);, which initially reported that Russian hackers had
penetrated the DNC’s networks in 2016; and
- meet or speak with two people the President named explicitly as his
personal envoys on these matters, Mr. Giuliani and Attorney General Barr, to
whom the President referred multiple times in tandem.
The President also praised Ukraine’s Prosecutor General, Mr. Yuriy Lutsenko,
and suggested that Mr. Zelenskyy might want to keep him in his position.
(Note: Starting in March 2019, Mr. Lutsenko made a series of public
allegations—many of which he later walked back-about the Biden family’s
activities in Ukraine, Ukrainian officials’ purported involvement in the
2016 U.S. election, and the activities of the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv. See Part
IV for additional context.)
The White House officials who told me this information were deeply disturbed
by what had transpired in the phone call. They told me that there was already
a “discussion ongoing” with White House lawyers about how to treat the call
because of the likelihood, in the officials’ retelling, that they had
witnessed the President abuse his office for personal gain.
The Ukrainian side was the first to publicly acknowledge the phone call. On
the evening of 25 July, a readout was posted on the website of the Ukrainian
President that contained the following line (translation from original
Russian-language readout):
- “Donald Trump expressed his conviction that the new Ukrainian government
will be able to quickly improve Ukraine's image and complete the investigation
of corruption cases that have held back cooperation between Ukraine and the
United States.”
Aside from the above-mentioned “cases” purportedly dealing with the Biden
family and the 2016 U.S. election, I was told by White House officials that
no other “cases” were discussed.
Based on my understanding, there were approximately a dozen White House
officials who listened to the call — a mixture of policy officials and duty
officers in the White House Situation Room, as is customary. The officials I
spoke with told me that participation in the call had not been restricted in
advance because everyone expected it would be a “routine” call with a
foreign leader. I do not know whether anyone was physically present with the
President during the call.
- In addition to White House personnel, I was told that a State Department
official, Mr. T. Ulrich Brechbuhl, also listened in on the call.
- I was not the only non-White House official to receive a readout of the
call. Based on my understanding, multiple State Department and Intelligence
Community officials were also briefed on the contents of the call as outlined
above.
II. Efforts to restrict access to records related to the call
In the days following the phone call, I learned from multiple U.S. officials
that senior White House officials had intervened to “lock down” all records
of the phone call, especially the official word-for-word transcript of the
call that was produced—as is customary-by the White House Situation Room.
This set of actions underscored to me that White House officials understood
the gravity of what had transpired in the call.
- White House officials told me that they were “directed” by White House
lawyers to remove the electronic transcript from the computer system in which
such transcripts are typically stored for coordination, finalization, and
distribution to Cabinet-level officials.
- Instead, the transcript was loaded into a separate electronic system that
is otherwise used to store and handle classified information of an especially
sensitive nature. One White House official described this act as an abuse of
this electronic system because the call did not contain anything remotely
sensitive from a national security perspective.
I do not know whether similar measures were taken to restrict access to other
records of the call, such as contemporaneous handwritten notes taken by those
who listened in.
III. Ongoing concerns
On 26 July, a day after the call, U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine
Negotiations Kurt Volker visited Kyiv and met with President Zelenskyy and a
variety of Ukrainian political figures. Ambassador Volker was accompanied in
his meetings by U.S. Ambassador to the European Union Gordon Sondland. Based
on multiple readouts of these meetings recounted to me by various U.S.
officials, Ambassadors Volker and Sondland reportedly provided advice to the
Ukrainian leadership about how to “navigate” the demands that the President
had made of Mr. Zelenskyy.
I also learned from multiple U.S. officials that, on or about 2 August, Mr.
Giuliani reportedly traveled to Madrid to meet with one of President Zelen-
skyy's advisers, Andriy Yermak. The U.S. officials characterized this meeting,
which was not reported publicly at the time, as a “direct follow-up” to the
President’s call with Mr. Zelenskyy about the “cases” they had discussed.
- Separately, multiple U.S. officials told me that Mr. Giuliani had reportedly
privately reached out to a variety of other Zelenskyy advisers, including
Chief of Staff Andriy Bohdan and Acting Chairman of the Security Service of
Ukraine Ivan Bakanov.(4);
- I do not know whether those officials met or spoke with Mr. Giuliani, but I
was told separately by multiple U.S. officials that Mr. Yermak and Mr.
Bakanov intended to travel to Washington in mid-August.
On 9 August, the President told reporters: “I think [President Zelenskyy] is
going to make a deal with President Putin, and he will be invited to the
White House. And we look forward to seeing him. He’s already been invited to
the White House, and he wants to come. And I think he will. He’s a very
reasonable guy. He wants to see peace in Ukraine, and I think he will be
coming very soon, actually.”
IV. Circumstances leading up to the 25 July Presidential phone call
Beginning in late March 2019, a series of articles appeared in an online
publication called The Hill. In these articles, several Ukrainian officials
— most notably, Prosecutor General Yuriy Lutsenko — made a series of
allegations against other Ukrainian officials and current and former U.S.
officials. Mr. Lutsenko and his colleagues alleged, inter alia:
- that they possessed evidence that Ukrainian officials — namely, Head of
the National Anticorruption Bureau of Ukraine Artem Sytnyk and Member of
Parliament Serhiy Leshchenko — had “interfered” in the 2016 U.S.
presidential election, allegedly in collaboration with the DNC and the U.S.
Embassy in Kyiv,(5)
- that the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv — specifically, U.S. Ambassador Marie
Yovanovitch, who had criticized Mr. Lutsenko’s organization for its poor
record on fighting corruption — had allegedly obstructed Ukrainian law
enforcement agencies’ pursuit of corruption cases, including by providing a
“do not prosecute” list, and had blocked Ukrainian prosecutors from
traveling to the United States expressly to prevent them from delivering
their “evidence” about the 2016 U.S. election;(6); and
- that former Vice President Biden had pressured former Ukrainian President
Petro Poroshenko in 2016 to fire then Ukrainian Prosecutor General Viktor
Shokin in order to quash a purported criminal probe into Burisma Holdings, a
Ukrainian energy company on whose board the former Vice President’s son,
Hunter, sat.(7)
In several public comments,(8); Mr. Lutsenko also stated that he wished to
communicate directly with Attorney General Barr on these matters.(9); The
allegations by Mr. Lutsenko came on the eve of the first round of Ukraine's
presidential election on 31 March. By that time, Mr. Lutsenko's political
patron, President Poroshenko, was trailing Mr. Zelenskyy in the polls and
appeared likely to be defeated. Mr. Zelenskyy had made known his desire to
replace Mr. Lutsenko as Prosecutor General.4 On 21 April, Mr. Poroshenko lost
the runoff to Mr. Zelenskyy by a landslide. See Enclosure for additional
information.
- It was also publicly reported that Mr. Giuliani had met on at least two
occasions with Mr. Lutsenko: once in New York in late January and again in
Warsaw in mid-February. In addition, it was publicly reported that Mr.
Giuliani had spoken in late 2018 to former Prosecutor General Shokin, in a
Skype call arranged by two associates of Mr. Giuliani.(10);
- On 25 April in an interview with Fox News, the President called Mr. Lutsen-
ko's claims "big" and "incredible" and stated that the Attorney General "would
want to see this."
On or about 29 April, I learned from U.S. officials with direct knowledge of
the situation that Ambassador Yovanovitch had been suddenly recalled to
Washington by senior State Department officials for “consultations” and
would most likely be removed from her position.
- Around the same time, I also learned from a U.S. official that "associates"
of Mr. Giuliani were trying to make contact with the incoming Zelenskyy
team.(11)
- On 6 May, the State Department announced that Ambassador Yovanovitch would
be ending her assignment in Kyiv “as planned.”
- However, several U.S. officials told me that, in fact, her tour was
curtailed because of pressure stemming from Mr. Lutsenko’s allegations. Mr.
Giuliani subsequently stated in an interview with a Ukrainian journalist
published on 14 May that Ambassador Yovanovitch was “removed…because she
was part of the efforts against the President.”
On 9 May, The New York Times reported that Mr. Giuliani planned to travel to
Ukraine to press the Ukrainian government to pursue investigations that would
help the President in his 2020 reelection bid.
- In his multitude of public statements leading up to and in the wake of the
publication of this article, Mr. Giuliani confirmed that he was focused on
encouraging Ukrainian authorities to pursue investigations into alleged
Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election and alleged wrongdoing by
the Biden family.(12);
- On the afternoon of 10 May, the President stated in an interview with
Politico that he planned to speak with Mr. Giuliani about the trip.
- A few hours later, Mr. Giuliani publicly canceled his trip, claiming that
Mr. Zelenskyy was “surrounded by enemies of the [U.S.] President…and of the
United States.”
On 11 May, Mr. Lutsenko met for two hours with President-elect Zelenskyy,
according to a public account given several days later by Mr. Lutsenko. Mr.
Lutsenko publicly stated that he had told Mr. Zelenskyy that he wished to
remain as Prosecutor General.
Starting in mid-May, I heard from multiple U.S. officials that they were
deeply concerned by what they viewed as Mr. Giuliani’s circumvention of
national security decisionmaking processes to engage with Ukrainian officials
and relay messages back and forth between Kyiv and the President. These
officials also told me:
- that State Department officials, including Ambassadors Volker and Sondland,
had spoken with Mr. Giuliani in an attempt to “contain the damage” to U.S.
national security; and
- that Ambassadors Volker and Sondland during this time period met with
members of the new Ukrainian administration and, in addition to discussing
policy matters, sought to help Ukrainian leaders understand and respond to
the differing messages they were receiving from official U.S. channels on the
one hand, and from Mr. Giuliani on the other.
During this same timeframe, multiple U.S. officials told me that the Ukrainian
leadership was led to believe that a meeting or phone call between the Presi-
dent and President Zelenskyy would depend on whether Zelenskyy showed willing-
ness to “play ball” on the issues that had been publicly aired by Mr. Lut-
senko and Mr. Giuliani.
(Note: This was the general understanding of the state of affairs as conveyed
to me by U.S. officials from late May into early July. I do not know who deli-
vered this message to the Ukrainian leadership, or when.)
See Enclosure for additional information.
Shortly after President Zelenskyy’s inauguration, it was publicly reported
that Mr. Giuliani met with two other Ukrainian officials: Ukraine’s Special
Anticorruption Prosecutor, Mr. Nazar Kholodnytskyy, and a former Ukrainian
diplomat named Andriy Telizhenko. Both Mr. Kholodnytskyy and Mr. Telizhenko
are allies of Mr. Lutsenko and made similar allegations in the above-mentioned
series of articles in The Hill.
On 13 June, the President told ABC’s George Stephanopoulos that he would
accept damaging information on his political rivals from a foreign government.
On 21 June, Mr. Giuliani tweeted: “New Pres of Ukraine still silent on
investigation of Ukrainian interference in 2016 and alleged Biden bribery of
Poroshenko. Time for leadership and investigate both if you want to purge how
Ukraine was abused by Hillary and Clinton people.”
In mid-July, I learned of a sudden change of policy with respect to U.S.
assistance for Ukraine. See Enclosure for additional information.
Footnotes:
1. Apart from the information in the Enclosure, it is my belief that none of
the information contained herein meets the definition of “classified
information” outlined in EO 13526, Part 1, Section 1.1. There is ample
open-source information about the efforts I describe below, including
statements by the President and Mr. Giuliani. In addition, based on my
personal observations, there is discretion with respect to the classification
of private comments by or instructions from the President, including his
communications with foreign leaders; information that is not related to U.S.
foreign policy or national security—such as the information contained in
this document, when separated from the Enclosure-is generally treated as
unclassified. I also believe that applying a classification marking to this
information would violate EO 13526, Part 1, Section 1.7, which states: “In
no case shall information be classified, continue to be maintained as
classified, or fail to be declassified in order to: (1) conceal violations of
law, inefficiency, or administrative error; [or] (2) prevent embarrassment to
a person, organization, or agency.”
2. It is unclear whether such a Ukrainian investigation exists. See Footnote
#7 for additional information.
3. I do not know why the President associates these servers with Ukraine.
(See, for example, his comments to Fox News on 20 July: “And Ukraine. Take a
look at Ukraine. How come the FBI didn’t take this server? Podesta told them
to get out. He said, get out. So, how come the FBI didn’t take the server
from the DNC?”)
4. In a report published by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting
Project (OCCRP) on 22 July, two associates of Mr. Giuliani reportedly
traveled to Kyiv in May 2019, and met with Mr. Bakanov and another close
Zelenskyy adviser, Mr. Serhiy Shefir.
5. Mr. Sytnyk and Mr. Leshchenko are two of Mr. Lutsenko’s main domestic
rivals. Mr. Lutsenko has no legal training and has been widely criticized in
Ukraine for politicizing criminal probes and using his tenure as Prosecutor
General to protect corrupt Ukrainian officials. He has publicly feuded with
Mr. Sytnyk, who heads Ukraine’s only competent anticorruption body, and with
Mr. Leshchenko, a former investigative journalist who has repeatedly
criticized Mr. Lutsenko’s record. In December 2018, a Ukrainian court upheld
a complaint by a Member of Parliament, Mr. Boryslav Rozenblat, who alleged
that Mr. Sytnyk and Mr. Leshchenko had “interfered” in the 2016 U.S.
election by publicizing a document detailing corrupt payments made by former
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych before his ouster in 2014. Mr.
Rozenblat had originally filed the motion in late 2017 after attempting to
flee Ukraine amid an investigation into his taking of a large bribe. On 16
July 2019, Mr. Leshchenko publicly stated that a Ukrainian court had
overturned the lower court’s decision.
6. Mr. Lutsenko later told Ukrainian news outlet The Babel on 17 April that
Ambassador Yovanovitch had never provided such a list, and that he was, in
fact, the one who requested such a list.
7. Mr. Lutsenko later told Bloomberg on 16 May that former Vice President
Biden and his son were not subject to any current Ukrainian investigations,
and that he had no evidence against them. Other senior Ukrainian officials
also contested his original allegations; one former senior Ukrainian
prosecutor told Bloomberg on 7 May that Mr. Shokin in fact was not
investigating Burisma at the time of his removal in 2016.
8. See, for example, Mr. Lutsenko’s comments to The Hill on 1 and 7 April
and his interview with The Babel on 17 April, in which he stated that he had
spoken with Mr. Giuliani about arranging contact with Attorney General Barr.
9. In May, Attorney General Barr announced that he was initiating a probe
into the origins” of the Russia investigation. According to the
above-referenced OCCRP report (22 July), two associates of Mr. Giuliani
claimed to be working with Ukrainian officials to uncover information that
would become part of this inquiry. In an interview with Fox News on 8 August,
Mr. Giuliani claimed that Mr. John Durham, whom Attorney General Barr
designated to lead this probe, was “spending a lot of time in Europe”
because he was “investigating Ukraine.” I do not know the extent to which,
if at all, Mr. Giuliani is directly coordinating his efforts on Ukraine with
Attorney General Barr or Mr. Durham.
10. See, for example, the above-referenced articles in Bloomberg (16 May) and
OCCRP (22 July).
11. I do not know whether these associates of Mr. Giuliani were the same
individuals named in the 22 July report by OCCRP, referenced above.
12. See, for example, Mr. Giuliani’s appearance on Fox News on 6 April and
his tweets on 23 April and 10 May. In his interview with The New York Times,
Mr. Giuliani stated that the President “basically knows what I’m doing,
sure, as his lawyer.” Mr. Giuliani also stated: “We’re not meddling in an
election, we’re meddling in an investigation, which we have a right to do…
There’s nothing illegal about it… Somebody could say it’s improper. And
this isn’t foreign policy – I’m asking them to do an investigation that
they’re doing already and that other people are telling them to stop. And I’
m going to give them reasons why they shouldn’t stop it because that
information will be very, very helpful to my client, and may turn out to be
helpful to my government.”
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