Competition Without Catastrophe
How America Can Both Challenge and Coexist With China
美中兩國該怎樣在競爭中和平共存
原文：Foreign Affairs
https://tinyurl.com/yxgkczq9
By Kurt M. Campbell and Jake Sullivan
譯文：觀察者
https://www.guancha.cn/KeTe-KanBeiEr/2019_12_03_527132_s.shtml
The United States is in the midst of the most consequential rethinking of its
foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Although Washington remains
bitterly divided on most issues, there is a growing consensus that the era of
engagement with China has come to an unceremonious close. The debate now is
over what comes next.
美國正處於自冷戰結束以來須對美國外交政策進行重新思考的最為關鍵的時刻。雖然華盛
頓在大多數議題上都出現了嚴重的意見分歧，不過一項共識正在逐漸形成：與中國進行戰
略接觸的時代應該結束了。如今辯論的焦點在於：美國今後該如何處理與中國之間的關係
呢？
Like many debates throughout the history of U.S. foreign policy, this one has
elements of both productive innovation and destructive demagoguery. Most
observers can agree that, as the Trump administration’s National Security
Strategy put it in 2018, “strategic competition” should animate the United
States’ approach to Beijing going forward. But foreign policy frameworks
beginning with the word “strategic” often raise more questions than they
answer. “Strategic patience” reflects uncertainty about what to do and
when. “Strategic ambiguity” reflects uncertainty about what to signal. And
in this case, “strategic competition” reflects uncertainty about what that
competition is over and what it means to win.
與美國外交史上發生的許多辯論一樣，人們在這一辯論中的發言既包含建設性創新的內容
，也包含破壞性煽動的內容。不過多數觀察家應該都會同意，今後美國對華戰略所遵循的
路線將會是“戰略競爭”，川普政府在2018年發佈的《國家安全戰略報告》中也是這樣表
述的。不過，以“戰略”作為修飾語的外交政策框架所製造的問題通常來說比解決的問題
還要多：“戰略耐心”反映了行動時機和行動內容的不確定性；“戰略模糊”則意味著該
發出什麼信號是不確定的。那麼“戰略競爭”呢？這個表述其實反映了競爭領域的模糊性
，而且在競爭中取勝的標準也是不確定的。
The rapid coalescence of a new consensus has left these essential questions
about U.S.-Chinese competition unanswered. What, exactly, is the United
States competing for? And what might a plausible desired outcome of this
competition look like? A failure to connect competitive means to clear ends
will allow U.S. policy to drift toward competition for competition’s sake
and then fall into a dangerous cycle of confrontation.
然而，由於人們急於開啟與中國進行“戰略競爭”的新時代，目前還沒有人為與美中競爭
有關的此類重要問題提供明確答案。美國到底為了什麼與中國競爭？通過競爭，美國希望
實現怎樣的具有現實意義的目標？競爭手段是為實現競爭目標服務的，如果不能明確與中
國進行“戰略競爭”的最終目標，那麼美國將陷入為了競爭而競爭的怪圈，與中國發生衝
突的危險也將大大增加。
U.S. policymakers and analysts have mostly, and rightly, discarded some of
the more optimistic assumptions that underpinned the four-decade-long
strategy of diplomatic and economic engagement with China (which one of us,
Kurt Campbell, detailed in these pages last year, writing with Ely Ratner).
But in the rush to embrace competition, policymakers may be substituting a
new variety of wishful thinking for the old. The basic mistake of engagement
was to assume that it could bring about fundamental changes to China’s
political system, economy, and foreign policy. Washington risks making a
similar mistake today, by assuming that competition can succeed in
transforming China where engagement failed—this time forcing capitulation or
even collapse.
美國決策者和分析人士曾樂觀地奉行與中國的外交接觸和經濟接觸戰略，如今他們中的大
多數人已經放棄了這種樂觀心態。不過在轉向新的“戰略競爭”路線時，美國的決策者們
也許只是用一套新的自以為是的觀點取代了一套舊的自以為是的觀點。接觸戰略的錯誤在
於，我們曾認為在與美國進行外交和經濟接觸的過程中，中國的政治制度、經濟制度和對
外政策將發生根本性變化。如今轉向“戰略競爭”路線的華盛頓很可能犯了類似的錯誤，
他們以為中國將在與美國的戰略競爭中發生另一種根本性變化——屈服或崩潰。
Despite the many divides between the two countries, each will need to be
prepared to live with the other as a major power. The starting point for the
right U.S. approach must be humility about the capacity of decisions made in
Washington to determine the direction of long-term developments in Beijing.
Rather than relying on assumptions about China’s trajectory, American
strategy should be durable whatever the future brings for the Chinese system.
It should seek to achieve not a definitive end state akin to the Cold War’s
ultimate conclusion but a steady state of clear-eyed coexistence on terms
favorable to U.S. interests and values.
雖然美中兩國之間存在諸多分歧，不過雙方都需要接受對方是大國這個事實並為兩個大國
彼此長期和平共存的局面做好準備。美國在處理對華關係時首先應該對自己影響北京長期
發展方向的能力做出謙遜的評估。美國的對華戰略不應過於依賴對中國未來發展路徑的判
斷，無論中國的體制如何演進，美國的對華戰略應該是穩定持久的。美國的戰略目標不應
是尋求實現類似蘇聯解體那樣的終極確定狀態，而應是尋求實現有利於美國利益和美國價
值觀的、在清晰的戰略思維作用下形成的兩國穩定共存的狀態。
Such coexistence would involve elements of competition and cooperation, with
the United States’ competitive efforts geared toward securing those
favorable terms. This might mean considerable friction in the near term as
U.S. policy moves beyond engagement—whereas in the past, the avoidance of
friction, in the service of positive ties, was an objective unto itself.
Going forward, China policy must be about more than the kind of relationship
the United States wants to have; it must also be about the kinds of interests
the United States wants to secure. The steady state Washington should pursue
is rightly about both: a set of conditions necessary for preventing a
dangerous escalatory spiral, even as competition continues.
在這種共存狀態中既有競爭也有合作，而美國在競爭中應努力確保自己的利益和價值觀得
到維護。隨著美國逐漸放棄對華接觸戰略，這種對自身利益的維護也許意味著近期將發生
一些摩擦。在戰略接觸時代，為了與中國建立積極的關係，避免發生摩擦本身曾被列為一
個目標。展望未來，美國的對華政策絕不能只是著眼於美國想要何種美中關係，美國的對
華政策還應著眼於自己想要獲得哪些利益。美國所尋求的穩定狀態應確保兩國在競爭的同
時還要避免陷入緊張關係升級的危險當中。
U.S. policymakers should not dismiss this objective as out of reach. It is
true, of course, that China will have a say in whether this outcome is
possible. Vigilance will thus need to remain a watchword in U.S.-Chinese
relations in the period ahead. Although coexistence offers the best chance to
protect U.S. interests and prevent inevitable tension from turning into
outright confrontation, it does not mean the end of competition or surrender
on issues of fundamental importance. Instead, coexistence means accepting
competition as a condition to be managed rather than a problem to be solved.
美國的決策者不應認為這個目標難以企及而不予考慮。這個目標能否實現當然不僅取決於
美國自身，中國也將扮演它的角色。因此在未來的美中互動過程中，“保持警惕”（
vigilance）將是一種長期性的要求。雖然和平共存能夠讓美國獲得維護自身利益的最佳
機會，防止難以避免的緊張關係惡化到直接衝突的境地，不過這種和平共存並不意味著競
爭的偃旗息鼓，也不意味著我們在重大問題上向中方做出讓步。相反，和平共存意味著我
們要接受“把競爭看作一種需要管控的狀態而非需要解決的問題”這一觀點。
COLD WAR LESSONS, NOT COLD WAR LOGIC
接受冷戰教訓、拒絕冷戰邏輯
Given the current hazy discourse on competition, there is an understandable
temptation to reach back to the only great-power competition Americans
remember to make sense of the present one: the Cold War. The analogy has
intuitive appeal. Like the Soviet Union, China is a continent-sized
competitor with a repressive political system and big ambitions. The
challenge it poses is global and lasting, and meeting that challenge will
require the kind of domestic mobilization that the United States pursued in
the 1950s and 1960s.
由於美國在“戰略競爭”問題上並沒有給出清晰的表述，人們在面對當前與中國之間的競
爭時往往會傾向於參考美國歷史上唯一一次大國競爭——冷戰，這是可以理解的。從直覺
角度來說，人們把兩場競爭做這樣的類比並非沒有道理。與前蘇聯相似，中國也是一個大
陸級別的競爭對手，施行一黨執政體制，而且極具雄心。中國向我們發出的挑戰具有全球
性而且這一挑戰將長期存在。要應對中國的挑戰，我們需要展現上世紀50年代和60年代的
國家動員能力。
But the analogy is ill fitting. China today is a peer competitor that is more
formidable economically, more sophisticated diplomatically, and more flexible
ideologically than the Soviet Union ever was. And unlike the Soviet Union,
China is deeply integrated into the world and intertwined with the U.S.
economy. The Cold War truly was an existential struggle. The U.S. strategy of
containment was built on the prediction that the Soviet Union would one day
crumble under its own weight—that it contained “the seeds of its own decay,
” as George Kennan, the diplomat who first laid out the strategy, declared
with conviction.
即便如此，把中國比作前蘇聯仍然是錯誤的。如今的中國是與美國勢均力敵的對手，比起
當年的蘇聯，中國在經濟上更加強大、外交上更加老練、意識形態上也更加靈活。此外，
與前蘇聯不同的是，中國已經深深融入世界，中國經濟已經與美國經濟緊密交織在一起。
冷戰的確是一場關乎美國生死存亡的鬥爭。美國當初之所以對蘇聯奉行遏制戰略是基於一
種預判：蘇聯終有一天會不堪重負自行崩潰。正如提出對蘇遏制戰略的喬治·凱南（
George Kennan，1904-2005，美國外交家和歷史學家。結束職業外交生涯後，喬治·凱南
在普林斯頓大學任教，出版了17本著作，其中兩部獲得普利策獎）所堅稱的：蘇聯的體制
已經種下了“導致其自身衰敗的種子”。
No such prediction holds today; it would be misguided to build a
neo-containment policy on the premise that the current Chinese state will
eventually collapse, or with that as the objective. Despite China’s many
demographic, economic, and environmental challenges, the Chinese Communist
Party has displayed a remarkable ability to adapt to circumstances, often
brutally so. Its fusion of mass surveillance and artificial intelligence,
meanwhile, is enabling a more effective digital authoritarianism—one that
makes the collective action necessary for reform or revolution hard to
contemplate, let alone organize. China may well encounter serious internal
problems, but an expectation of collapse cannot form the basis of a prudent
strategy. Even if the state does collapse, it is likely to be the result of
internal dynamics rather than U.S. pressure.
我們在今天已經無法對中國做出此類預判。我們若以為中國最終會自行崩潰或將此作為目
標來制定新的遏制戰略，那麼美國將誤入歧途。儘管中國面臨著人口、經濟和環境等方面
的諸多挑戰，但中共面對新形勢已經表現出了非凡的與時俱進能力。中國也許會在國內問
題上陷入嚴重困境，然而一項嚴謹的戰略不應建立在對競爭對手自行崩潰的期待之上。即
便中國在某一天崩潰，那也是它未能解決國內問題所致，而非美國施壓的結果。
The Cold War analogy at once exaggerates the existential threat posed by
China and discounts the strengths Beijing brings to long-term competition
with the United States. Although the risk of conflict in Asia’s hot spots is
serious, it is by no means as high, nor is the threat of nuclear escalation
as great, as it was in Cold War Europe. The kind of nuclear brinkmanship that
took place over Berlin and Cuba has no corollary in U.S.-Chinese ties. Nor
has U.S.-Chinese competition plunged the world into proxy wars or created
rival blocs of ideologically aligned states preparing for armed struggle.
把中國與前蘇聯進行類比，誇大了中國為我們帶來的生存威脅，卻低估了中國與我們進行
長期競爭的能力。雖然亞洲熱點地區有爆發衝突的風險，但這種風險並沒有高到冷戰時期
歐洲那種程度，衝突升級為核戰的威脅也沒有冷戰時期歐洲那麼嚴峻。美中之間也不存在
當年發生在柏林和古巴的那種核邊緣試探。此外，美中競爭既沒有把世界拖入代理人戰爭
，也沒有讓各國根據意識形態分裂為兩個進行軍事對抗的陣營。
Despite the diminished danger, however, China represents a far more
challenging competitor. In the last century, no other U.S. adversary,
including the Soviet Union, ever reached 60 percent of U.S. GDP. China passed
that threshold in 2014; in purchasing-power terms, its GDP is already 25
percent greater than that of the United States. China is the emerging global
leader in several economic sectors, and its economy is more diversified,
flexible, and sophisticated than the Soviet Union’s ever was.
雖然爆發戰爭的風險較小，不過中國的確是一個非常難以對付的國家。在20世紀，美國的
競爭對手（包括前蘇聯在內）的GDP無一達到美國的60%，而中國已於2014年跨過了這個關
口。如果按照購買力平價計算，中國的GDP如今已經是美國的125%。中國已經在若干經濟
領域成為全球領軍者。與前蘇聯相比，中國經濟更多元、更成熟而且更具韌性。
Beijing is also better at converting its country’s economic heft into
strategic influence. Whereas the Soviet Union was hamstrung by a closed
economy, China has embraced globalization to become the top trading partner
for more than two-thirds of the world’s nations. The kinds of economic,
people-to-people, and technological linkages that were lacking in the
militarized U.S.-Soviet conflict define China’s relationship with the United
States and the wider world. As a global economic actor, China is central to
the prosperity of American allies and partners; its students and tourists
flow through global universities and cities; its factories are the forge for
much of the world’s advanced technology. This thick web of ties makes it
difficult to even start to determine which countries are aligned with the
United States and which are aligned with China. Ecuador and Ethiopia might
look to Beijing for investment or for surveillance technologies, but they
hardly see these purchases as part of a conscious turn away from the United
States.
此外，北京還更善於把自己的經濟實力轉化為戰略影響力。與前蘇聯封閉而虛弱的經濟不
同，中國積極擁抱全球化，如今中國已經是超過全球三分之二國家的最大貿易夥伴。經濟
活動、人員往來和技術聯繫定義了中國與美國甚至與全世界之間的關係，而這些元素在軍
事色彩濃厚的美蘇關係中是缺乏的。作為全球經濟的重要參與者，中國對我們的盟國和夥
伴國家的繁榮發揮著重要作用——中國留學生已遍佈全球各所大學的校園，中國遊客已充
斥全球各大城市的景點，中國工廠已成為全世界大量高科技產品的製造中心。在各國與中
國進行如此密切交往的情況下，哪些國家與美國站在一起、哪些國家與中國站在一起已經
難以確定。厄瓜多爾和埃塞俄比亞也許期待來自中國的投資或希望獲得中國的技術，然而
這兩個國家不太可能將疏遠美國視為一個嚴肅的選項。
Even as China emerges as a more formidable competitor than the Soviet Union,
it has also become an essential U.S. partner. Global problems that are
difficult enough to solve even when the United States and China work together
will be impossible to solve if they fail to do so—climate change foremost
among them, given that the United States and China are the two biggest
polluters. A host of other transnational challenges—economic crises, nuclear
proliferation, global pandemics—also demand some degree of joint effort.
This imperative for cooperation has little parallel in the Cold War.
雖然中國是比前蘇聯更難對付的競爭對手，但中國同時也是美國重要的合作夥伴。一些全
球性問題即便在美中聯手的情況下解決起來也非常困難，如果美中無法實現合作，問題獲
得解決的可能性便不存在了。鑑於美中兩國是全球最大的溫室氣體排放國，氣候變化是其
中最典型的一個例子。此外，經濟危機、核擴散、流行性疾病等大量跨國問題也需要美中
兩國展開合作才有望獲得解決。然而在冷戰時期，並不存在像今天這麼多的問題需要美蘇
之間展開合作。
While the notion of a new Cold War has brought calls for an updated version
of containment, resistance to such thinking has come from advocates of an
accommodative “grand bargain” with China. Such a bargain would go well
beyond the terms of U.S.-Soviet détente: in this scenario, the United States
would effectively concede to China a sphere of influence in Asia. Proponents
defend this concession as necessary given the United States’ domestic
headwinds and relative decline. This position is sold as realistic, but it is
no more tenable than containment. Ceding the world’s most dynamic region to
China would do long-term harm to American workers and businesses. It would
damage American allies and values by turning sovereign partners into
bargaining chips. A grand bargain would also require stark and permanent U.S.
concessions, such as the abrogation of U.S. alliances or even of the right to
operate in the western Pacific, for speculative promises. Not only are these
costs unacceptable; a grand bargain would also be unenforceable. A rising
China would likely violate the agreement when its preferences and power
changed.
一些人提出了“新冷戰”的概念，這一概念意味著美國須對中國進行遏制；而另一些反對
遏制戰略的人提出了“大交易”（grand bargain）的概念，他們認為美國應與時俱進並
與中國達成交易。這裡所說的“交易”不僅意味著我們與中國之間會實現美蘇之間曾出現
的那種關係緩和，它還有更進一步的含義：在達成“大交易”之後，美國將在亞洲向中國
做出讓步，承認中國在該地區的影響力。持這種態度的人認為讓步是必要的，因為美國國
內問題重重而且美國已陷入相對衰落的狀態。他們認為“大交易”是一種務實的選擇，不
過在我看來，“大交易”並不比遏制戰略更加可行。亞洲是當今全球最具活力的地區，將
這一地區的主導權讓給中國會對美國工人和商界造成長期損害。此外，這樣做還將傷害我
們的盟友和價值觀，我們在亞洲主權獨立的夥伴將淪為交易籌碼。當我們與中國達成“大
交易”之後，我們還可能做出根本的永久性讓步，美國在亞洲的聯盟體系將走向終結，我
們在西太平洋地區行動的權利也將被放棄。這一切對美國來說都是不可接受的，而且“大
交易”也是無法真正落實的：中國是一個崛起中的國家，當中國的實力進一步增強或想法
發生改變時，它可能違反與美國所達成的“大交易”條款。
Advocates of neo-containment tend to see any call for managed coexistence as
an argument for a version of the grand bargain; advocates of a grand bargain
tend to see any suggestion of sustained competition as a case for a version
of containment. That divide obscures a course between these extremes—one
that is not premised on Chinese capitulation or on U.S.-Chinese condominium.
遏制戰略的支持者們傾向於把那些主張“管控競爭以實現美中和平共存”的人視為“大交
易”概念的支持者，而“大交易”概念的支持者們則傾向於把那些主張“美中可持續競爭
”的人視為遏制戰略的支持者。這意味著，人們並沒有意識到在遏制戰略和“大交易”兩
種極端觀點之間其實還存在一條中間路線，這條路線並不是建立在中國向美國屈服（遏制
戰略希望收穫的結果）或美中共治世界（“大交易”所主張的觀點）的基礎之上的。
Instead, the goal should be to establish favorable terms of coexistence with
Beijing in four key competitive domains—military, economic, political, and
global governance—thereby securing U.S. interests without triggering the
kind of threat perceptions that characterized the U.S.-Soviet rivalry.
Washington should heed the lessons of the Cold War while rejecting the idea
that its logic still applies.
與上述兩種極端觀點不同，中間路線的目標是：華盛頓在軍事、經濟、政治和全球治理四
個領域實現與北京的和平共存，並致力於確保和平共存的規則框架有利於維護美方利益、
確保美中兩國不會在和平共存狀態中感受到冷戰時期美蘇兩國曾感受到的那種威脅。華盛
頓應該汲取冷戰教訓，不要誤以為美蘇冷戰邏輯在當今的美中關係中仍然有效。
TOWARD SUSTAINABLE DETERRENCE
打造可持續威懾能力
In contrast to the military competition of the Cold War, which was a truly
global struggle, the dangers for Washington and Beijing are likely to be
confined to the Indo-Pacific. Even so, the region features at least four
potential hot spots: the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Taiwan
Strait, and the Korean Peninsula. Neither side wishes for conflict, but
tensions are rising as both invest in offensive capabilities, boost their
military presence in the region, and operate in ever-closer proximity.
Washington fears that China is trying to push U.S. forces out of the western
Pacific, and Beijing fears that the United States is trying to hem it in.
Given China’s harassment of U.S. aircraft and naval vessels, minor incidents
risk escalating into major military confrontations; Admiral Wu Shengli, the
former naval commander of the People’s Liberation Army, has warned that any
such incident “could spark war.”
與冷戰時期美蘇之間全球性的軍事對抗相比，華盛頓與北京之間僅在印太地區有發生衝突
的風險，其中有四個熱點：南海、東海、台灣海峽和朝鮮半島。美中都不希望發生衝突，
不過隨著雙方增加在該地區的軍事存在，隨著雙方在攻擊性軍事力量方面大筆投資以及兩
軍近距離相遇事件的不斷發生，該地區的局勢正日趨緊張。華盛頓擔心北京會把美軍的勢
力從西太平洋地區驅逐出去，而北京則擔心華盛頓正在試圖包圍自己。考慮到美國海軍和
空軍在南海行使航行自由權利時曾多次遭到中國軍隊的干擾，一些程度較低的摩擦升級為
大規模軍事衝突的風險是存在的。中國人民解放軍海軍前司令員吳勝利上將曾發出警告稱
，任何此類事件都“可能引發戰爭”。
But coexistence in the Indo-Pacific by both militaries should not be
dismissed as impossible. The United States must accept that military primacy
will be difficult to restore, given the reach of China’s weapons, and
instead focus on deterring China from interfering with its freedom of
maneuver and from physically coercing U.S. allies and partners. Beijing will
have to accept that the United States will remain a resident power in the
region, with a major military presence, naval operations in its major
waterways, and a network of alliances and partnerships.
然而，美中兩軍在印太地區實現和平共存並非沒有可能。美國必須接受一個事實：考慮到
中國軍事力量投射的範圍，美國已經無法恢復此前在該地區軍事上的絕對主導地位。美國
應該集中力量實現以下目標：對中國形成威懾，使其不能壓縮美國在該地區的迴旋空間，
使其不能用軍事手段脅迫美國盟友和夥伴國家。中國也必須接受一個事實：美國作為一個
大國將繼續維持自己在該地區的軍事存在，美國海軍將繼續在該地區的主要水道執行任務
，美國將繼續在該地區維持自己的聯盟體系和夥伴關係。
Taiwan and the South China Sea are likely to present the most significant
challenges to this overall approach. A military provocation or
misunderstanding in either case could easily trigger a larger conflagration,
with devastating consequences, and this risk must increasingly animate the
thinking of senior leaders in both Washington and Beijing.
台灣問題和南海問題很可能對上述設想構成嚴重的挑戰。無論在台灣還是在南海，軍事挑
釁或誤判很可能引發大規模衝突並造成毀滅性影響，華盛頓和北京的決策者們應對此予以
更高的關注。
On Taiwan, a tacit commitment not to unilaterally alter the status quo is
perhaps the best that can be hoped for given the historical complexities
involved. Yet Taiwan is not only a potential flash point; it is also the
greatest unclaimed success in the history of U.S.-Chinese relations. The
island has grown, prospered, and democratized in the ambiguous space between
the United States and China as a result of the flexible and nuanced approach
generally adopted by both sides. In this way, the diplomacy surrounding
Taiwan could serve as a model for the increasingly challenging diplomacy
between Washington and Beijing on a variety of other issues, which are
similarly likely to include intense engagement, mutual vigilance and a degree
of distrust, and a measure of patience and necessary restraint. Meanwhile, in
the South China Sea, Beijing’s understanding that threats to freedom of
navigation could have devastating consequences for China’s own economy might
help—when combined with U.S. deterrence—modulate its more nationalist
sentiments.
在台灣問題上，考慮到其複雜的歷史背景，各方都默契地不單方面改變現狀也許是我們能
想到的最好結果。台灣不僅是一個潛在的衝突點，它還可以被看作是美國和中國在兩國關
係歷史上所取得的最大成就。美中雙方以細膩而有彈性的手段在台灣問題上製造了一個模
糊的空間，這座小島就在這一模糊空間裡實現了發展和民主化。華盛頓和北京之間仍然存
在很多問題，雙方在那些問題上難免互相警惕和不信任，但也需要進行密切的接觸、保持
必要的克制和耐心，而雙方在處理台灣問題時所展現的外交技巧能夠為那些問題的解決提
供參考。在南海問題上，若北京能意識到航行自由受到威脅會對其自身的經濟造成毀滅性
影響，再輔以美國的威懾，那麼中國國內民族主義情緒高漲的勢頭便能夠得到控制。
To achieve such coexistence, Washington will need to enhance both
U.S.-Chinese crisis management and its own capacity for deterrence. Even as
Cold War adversaries, the United States and the Soviet Union worked
concertedly to reduce the risk that an accidental collision would escalate to
nuclear war; they set up military hot lines, established codes of conduct,
and signed arms control agreements. The United States and China lack similar
instruments to manage crises at a time when new domains of potential
conflict, such as space and cyber- space, have increased the risk of
escalation.
為了實現美中和平共存的局面，華盛頓需要加強美中危機管理機制並增強自身對中國的威
懾能力。作為冷戰對手，美國和前蘇聯曾為了避免偶發衝突升級為核戰爭採取了很多措施
，雙方建立了軍事熱線、制定了兩軍行動守則並簽署了軍控協議。在潛在衝突點已經擴展
到外太空和網絡空間的今天，美中之間卻缺乏類似的危機管理機制。
In every military domain, the two countries need agreements that are at least
as formal and detailed as the U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement, a 1972
deal that established a set of specific rules aimed at avoiding maritime
misunderstandings. The United States and China also need more communication
channels and mechanisms to avoid conflict—especially in the South China Sea—
to allow each side to quickly clarify the other’s intentions during an
incident. The bilateral military relationship should no longer be held
hostage to political disagreements, and senior military officials on both
sides should engage in more frequent and substantive discussions to build
personal ties as well as understandings of each side’s operations.
Historically, progress on some of these efforts, especially crisis
communication, has proved difficult: Chinese leaders fear that crisis
communication could embolden the United States to act with impunity and would
require devolving too much authority to senior military officers in the
field. But these worries may be easing, given China’s growing power and
military reforms.
美蘇兩國1972年簽署的《防止海上事件協定》為避免兩國海軍發生誤判制定了詳細的行為
準則，如今美中兩國在每一個軍事領域都有必要簽署那樣的一份正式而詳細的協定。為避
免衝突（尤其是發生在南海地區的衝突），美中兩國還需要建立更多的溝通管道和溝通機
制，以便讓其中一方能夠在相遇事件中快速知曉對方的動機。美中兩國在政治上的分歧不
應再繼續綁架兩軍關係。雙方的高級將領應該進行更密切的實質性接觸，以便雙方建立個
人關係並對對方的行動有更多瞭解。從歷史上來看，在危機溝通方面取得進展並非易事：
中方也許擔心危機溝通機制的存在會讓美軍因不必擔心承擔後果而在行動時變得更加無所
忌憚，不過隨著中國實力的增長和軍事改革的推進，中方的憂慮將有所緩解。
Effective U.S. strategy in this domain requires not just reducing the risk of
unintentional conflict but also deterring intentional conflict. Beijing
cannot be allowed to use the threat of force to pursue a fait accompli in
territorial disputes. Yet managing this risk does not require U.S. military
primacy within the region. As the former Trump administration defense
official Elbridge Colby has argued, “deterrence without dominance—even
against a very great and fearsome opponent—is possible.”
一項有效的對華戰略不僅要求美國降低爆發非故意衝突的風險，而且還要求美國對故意衝
突的爆發形成威懾。華盛頓不應允許北京在領土爭端中通過對他國進行武力威脅來製造既
成事實。然而，對風險進行管控並不需要美軍在該地區掌握主導地位。正如川普政府前防
務官員柯伯吉（Elbridge Colby）所言：“即便我們面對的是一個非常強大、令人懼怕的
對手，在不佔據軍事主導地位的情況下對其形成威懾仍然是可能的”。
To ensure deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, Washington should reorient its
investments away from expensive and vulnerable platforms, such as aircraft
carriers, and toward cheaper asymmetric capabilities designed to discourage
Chinese adventurism without spending vast sums. This calls for taking a page
from Beijing’s own playbook. Just as China has relied on relatively cheap
antiship cruise and ballistic missiles, the United States should embrace
long-range unmanned carrier-based strike aircraft, unmanned underwater
vehicles, guided missile submarines, and high-speed strike weapons. All these
weapons could protect U.S. and allied interests, even as they dent China’s
confidence that its offensive operations will succeed and reduce the risk of
collision and miscalculation. The United States should also diversify some
of its military presence toward Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, making
use of access agreements rather than permanent basing when necessary. This
would place some U.S. forces beyond China’s precision-strike complex,
preserving their ability to promptly address crises. It would also
preposition them to address a wide range of contingencies beyond conflicts
involving China, including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and
antipiracy missions.
若要美軍成為一支在印太地區有威懾力的軍隊，華盛頓應該調整在軍事裝備方面的開支，
把資金從那些昂貴的、易受攻擊的作戰平台（如航母）轉移到更加便宜的不對稱戰力的打
造上，用較低的成本來挫敗中國人的冒險主義。這意味著我們要向北京的一些做法學習。
正如中國通過相對廉價的反艦巡航導彈和彈道導彈來應對美軍一樣，美國應該更重視遠程
無人艦載機、無人潛航器、導彈潛艇以及高速攻擊武器的作用。所有上述武器都能夠保護
美國及盟友的利益，這些武器在打擊中國人認為自己必勝的自信心的同時，還能夠降低發
生誤判的風險和爆發衝突的風險。此外，美國還應該使自己在東南亞和印度洋地區的軍事
存在更加多元化，在必要時用基於協議的軍事介入來取代永久性駐軍。這將讓部分美國軍
事力量擺脫中國的精確打擊魔咒，讓他們能夠保存快速處理危機的能力。而且除了應對與
中國之間的衝突之外，他們還可以遂行更大範圍的軍事任務，包括人道主義救援、救災和
反海盜行動等。
ESTABLISHING RECIPROCITY
構建對等的美中關係
Unlike the Soviet Union, which focused its resources on military power, China
views geoeconomics as the primary arena of competition. With an eye toward
the future, it has invested heavily in emerging industries and technologies,
including artificial intelligence, robotics, advanced manufacturing, and
biotechnology. China seeks dominance in these fields in part by denying
Western companies reciprocal treatment. The United States granted China
permanent normal trade relations, supported its entry into the World Trade
Organization, and has generally maintained one of the world’s most open
markets. But through a combination of industrial policy, protectionism, and
outright theft, China has put in place a range of formal and informal
barriers to its markets and has exploited American openness.
與把資源集中於軍力建設的前蘇聯不同，中國把經濟視為國家競爭的主戰場。頗有前瞻性
的中國政府已經在人工智能、機器人、先進製造技術和生物技術等新興技術領域進行了大
量投資。不過，中國在尋求獲得上述技術領域主導地位的過程中並不希望給予西方公司對
等待遇。中國已經通過產業政策、保護主義等方式構築了一系列正式和非正式的市場壁壘
並利用了美國市場的開放性。
This structural imbalance has eroded support for stable U.S.-Chinese economic
ties, and the relationship faces a heightened risk of rupture even if Xi and
U.S. President Donald Trump are able to reach a near-term trade truce. Many
in the American business community are no longer willing to tolerate China’s
unfair practices, which include employing state hackers to steal intellectual
property, forcing foreign companies to localize their operations and engage
in joint ventures, subsidizing state champions, and otherwise discriminating
against foreign companies.
這種結構性失衡已經對美中經濟關係的穩定造成了侵蝕，即便兩國領導人能夠在近期達成
貿易戰停戰協定，兩國經濟關係仍然面臨很高的破裂風險。美國工商界中的許多人不願意
再容忍中國的不公平做法，包括僱用國家黑客竊取知識產權，迫使外國公司將其業務本地
化並從事合資經營，補貼國家擁護者，以及以其他方式歧視外國公司。
Alleviating these growing frictions while protecting American workers and
innovation will require making China’s full access to major markets around
the world contingent on its willingness to adopt economic reforms at home.
Washington, for its part, will have to invest in the core sources of American
economic strength, build a united front of like-minded partners to help
establish reciprocity, and safeguard its technological leadership while
avoiding self-inflicted wounds.
若希望緩解日益緊張的局勢、保護美國工人和創新成果，我們就需要讓北京知道，只有北
京願意在國內進行經濟改革，中國產品才能進入全球其他主要市場。而華盛頓自身也需要
對構成美國經濟優勢的那些核心產業進行投資，與具有相似價值觀的夥伴國家構建聯合戰
線並在避免傷害到自身的前提下捍衛美國在科技領域的全球領導地位。
The most decisive factor in the economic competition with China is U.S.
domestic policy. The notion of a new “Sputnik moment”—one that galvanizes
public research as powerfully as seeing the Soviet Union launch the world’s
first satellite did—may be overstating the point, but government does have a
role to play in advancing American economic and technological leadership. Yet
the United States has turned away from precisely the kinds of ambitious
public investments it made during that period—such as the Interstate Highway
System championed by President Dwight Eisenhower and the basic research
initiatives pushed by the scientist Vannevar Bush—even as it faces a more
challenging economic competitor. Washington must dramatically increase funds
for basic science research and invest in clean energy, biotechnology,
artificial intelligence, and computing power. At the same time, the federal
government should scale up its investments in education at all levels and in
infrastructure, and it should adopt immigration policies that continue to
enhance the United States’ demographic and skills advantage. Calling for a
tougher line on China while starving public investments is self-defeating;
describing these investments as “socialist,” given the competition, is
especially ironic. Indeed, such strange ideological bedfellows as Senator
Elizabeth Warren, Democrat of Massachusetts, and Senator Marco Rubio,
Republican of Florida, are making a convincing case for a new U.S. industrial
policy.
在與中國競爭的過程中，對美國取勝最具決定意義的因素是我們在國內所採取的政策。用
“斯普特尼克時刻”對當下的情況進行描述也許顯得過於誇張，不過政府的確需要為捍衛
美國在全球的經濟和科技主導地位發揮作用。上世紀50年代，艾森豪威爾總統曾倡導修建
州際高速公路系統；范內瓦·布什（Vannevar Bush）作為一位科學家也提出了諸多基礎
科學研究倡議，然而如今面臨強大經濟競爭對手的美國卻已經不再進行雄心勃勃的公共投
資。華盛頓必須在清潔能源、生物技術、人工智能和超級計算機等基礎科學領域大幅增加
投資。與此同時，聯邦政府還應該在各級教育領域增加撥款並翻新基礎設施，我們的移民
政策應有利於美國繼續鞏固自身的人口優勢和由此帶來的知識技能優勢。在對中國展現更
加強硬立場的同時，美國不應減少對公共領域的投資。我們正面臨來自中國的競爭，一些
人認為對公共領域的投資具有“社會主義”色彩，這是非常荒唐的。來自馬薩諸塞州的民
主黨參議員伊麗莎白·沃倫（Elizabeth Warren）和來自佛羅里達州的共和黨參議員馬爾
科·盧比奧（Marco Rubio）是一對怪異的意識形態夥伴，他們的存在告訴我們：美國需
要新的產業政策。
On top of this domestic foundation, Washington should work with like-minded
nations to define a new set of standards on issues that the World Trade
Organization does not currently address, from state-owned enterprises to
indigenous innovation policies to digital trade. Ideally, these standards
would connect Asia and Europe. To this end, the United States should consider
starting a rules-setting initiative of market democracies layered over the
WTO system, which would fill these gaps. The logic is straightforward. If
China hopes to enjoy equal access to this new economic community, its own
economic and regulatory frameworks must meet the same standards. The combined
gravitational pull of this community would present China with a choice:
either curb its free-riding and start complying with trade rules, or accept
less favorable terms from more than half of the global economy. If Beijing
chooses to hold to the line that the necessary reforms amount to economic
regime change, it can certainly do so, but the world would be well within its
rights to offer China reciprocal treatment. In some cases, Washington may
still need to impose reciprocal measures on China unilaterally, by treating
its exports and investments the same way Beijing handles U.S. exports and
investments. These efforts will be challenging and costly, which is precisely
why the Trump administration’s decision to pick trade fights with U.S.
allies rather than rally them to a common position vis-à-vis China is such a
waste of American leverage.
在穩固國內基礎的同時，華盛頓還應與具有相似價值觀的夥伴國家展開合作，共同為國有
企業、本土創新政策以及數字貿易等WTO規則目前尚未觸及的領域制定標準。在理想的情
況下，我們所制定的標準將通行於亞洲和歐洲。為了實現這個目標，美國應該在WTO體系
內部向奉行市場經濟的民主國家就標準制定發起一項倡議，這樣我們就可以填補上述標準
空缺。美國這樣做的邏輯是非常清晰的：如果中國今後希望享有進入該經濟體系的平等權
利，那麼中國就必須讓自己的經濟和監管框架符合我們所制定的標準。美國與各夥伴國家
所構築的經濟體系將具有強大能量，中國將在其作用下不得不做出選擇：要麼對搭便車的
行為進行自我約束並遵守各國所制定的貿易規則，要麼直接面對佔全球近半經濟總量的各
國給出的不那麼優惠的貿易條件。北京當然有權利堅持“進行經濟改革將變更其經濟制度
”的觀點，可是其他國家也有權利對北京採取相應措施。在一些情況下，華盛頓有必要在
貿易和投資領域對中國採取對等措施，然而美國這樣做是有代價的，這也是我一直以來堅
持以下觀點的原因：川普政府挑起與盟友的貿易摩擦卻沒有與盟友們聯合起來共同對付中
國的做法是在浪費美國手中的牌。
The United States will also have to safeguard its technological advantages in
the face of China’s intellectual property theft, targeted industrial
policies, and commingling of its economic and security sectors. Doing so will
require some enhanced restrictions on the flow of technology investment and
trade in both directions, but these efforts should be pursued selectively
rather than wholesale, imposing curbs on technologies that are critical to
national security and human rights and allowing regular trade and investment
to continue for those that are not. Even these targeted restrictions must be
undertaken in consultation with industry and other governments; failing to do
so could Balkanize the global technology ecosystem by impeding flows of
knowledge and talent. Such a development would neutralize a key U.S.
competitive advantage relative to China: an open economy that can source the
best global talent and synthesize the biggest breakthroughs from around the
world. Meanwhile, overreach on technology restrictions could drive other
countries toward China, especially since China is already the largest trading
partner for most.
中國公司在從美國的知識產權中獲利，中國制定了目標明確的產業政策，中國在推進軍地
融合，在這種情況下，美國必須在中國面前確保自己的技術優勢。這就要求美國對兩國在
科技領域的雙向投資和貿易活動加強控制，這種控制不應是全面的，而應是有選擇性的。
美國應該對那些與國家安全和人權有關的技術加強控制，而與這兩者無關的貿易和投資活
動不應受到影響。即便這種控制是有選擇性的，在實施前，美方也必須與產業界和其他國
家的政府進行充分的溝通，否則全球技術生態將因知識和人才流動受阻而變得碎片化。如
此一來，美國相對於中國的一項關鍵競爭優勢——開放——將被削弱。長期以來，美國開
放的經濟體系能夠吸引來自全球各地的人才並能夠把全世界的科技創新為美國所用。此外
，對技術領域的過度控制還將把其他國家推向中國的懷抱，考慮到中國已經是全球大多數
國家最大的貿易夥伴這一事實，美國更應該把握好施加控制的範圍。
In this respect, the Trump administration’s loud and largely unilateral
campaign against the participation of the Chinese company Huawei in the
development of 5G infrastructure may provide a cautionary lesson. Had the
administration coordinated with allies and partners in advance and tried some
creative policymaking—for example, establishing a multilateral lending
initiative to subsidize the purchase of alternatives to Huawei’s equipment—
it might have had more success in convincing states to consider other
vendors. It then might have been able to make the most of the two-year delay
Huawei now faces in rolling out 5G following its placement on the U.S.
Department of Commerce’s list of entities that cannot be supplied with
American technology. Future efforts to restrict trade with China in the
technology sector will require careful deliberation, advance planning, and
multilateral support if they are to be successful; otherwise, they will risk
undermining U.S. innovation.
從這一角度來看，川普政府針對參與各國5G網絡建設的中國華為公司展開的過於高調的單
方面攻擊為我們提供了值得汲取的教訓。如果川普政府能夠事先與各盟友和夥伴國家協調
立場並制定一些有創造性的政策（如提出多邊借貸倡議幫助各國為通信運營商購買華為設
備的替代品提供補貼），那麼美國在說服各國購買其他通信設備製造商的產品時就會有更
高勝算。如今華為已被列入美國商務部的實體清單，禁止華為設備將導致歐洲5G服務的推
出被推遲兩年，若川普政府能夠做到上面所提到的事情，那麼美國就可以對這兩年時間加
以充分利用。若要對美中在科技領域的貿易和投資活動加強控制並取得成功，川普政府就
必須仔細權衡、制定有前瞻性的計畫並在多邊框架內獲得支持，否則美國自身的創新能力
將很可能受到傷害。
PRO-DEMOCRACY, NOT ANTI-CHINA
推進民主而不是反華
U.S.-Chinese economic and technological competition suggests an emerging
contest of models. But unlike the Cold War, with its sharp ideological divide
between two rival blocs, the lines of demarcation are fuzzier here. Although
neither Washington nor Beijing is engaging in the kind of proselytizing
characteristic of the Cold War, China may ultimately present a stronger
ideological challenge than the Soviet Union did, even if it does not
explicitly seek to export its system. If the international order is a
reflection of its most powerful states, then China’s rise to superpower
status will exert a pull toward autocracy. China’s fusion of authoritarian
capitalism and digital surveillance may prove more durable and attractive
than Marxism, and its support for autocrats and democratic backsliders will
challenge American values and provide China cover for its own egregious
practices, including the detention of more than one million ethnic Uighurs in
northwestern China. Some may question whether the erosion of democratic
governance across the world matters for U.S. interests; it does. Democratic
governments are more likely to align with American values, pursue good
governance, treat their people well, and respect other open societies, and
all of this tends to make them more trustworthy and transparent and, in turn,
better economic and security partners.
美中在經濟和科技領域的競爭意味著兩國正陷入一場模式之爭。不過與冷戰時代美蘇兩國
之間激烈的意識形態對抗不同，如今美中之間在意識形態領域的界限卻是相對模糊的。無
論華盛頓還是北京都無意像冷戰中的美蘇那樣在與對方接觸的過程中試圖改變對方。即便
中國並不尋求輸出自己的模式，這個國家最終還是會成為一個比前蘇聯更難對付的意識形
態對手。如果說國際秩序在某種程度上可以反映這個世界上最為強大的國家的制度特徵的
話，那麼中國崛起為超級大國必將給國際秩序籠罩上一層其自身的色彩。一些人也許會有
疑問，西方民主制度在全世界受到侵蝕是否會對美國自身的利益造成損害呢？答案是肯定
的。民主國家更有可能與接受美國的價值觀，更有可能追求良好的國家治理，更有可能善
待自己的人民，也更有可能尊重其他開放的社會，所有這一切都會讓他們更透明、更值得
信賴，他們會成為美國更好的經濟合作夥伴和安全合作夥伴。
Washington can best establish favorable terms of coexistence with China in
the political realm by focusing on advancing the appeal of these values for
their own sake, not to score points in the context of U.S.-Chinese
competition. As China’s presence around the world grows, the United States
should avoid a tendency that was all too common during the Cold War: to see
third countries only in terms of their relationship to a rival government.
Some of the Trump administration’s policies—such as invoking the Monroe
Doctrine in Latin America and delivering an address on Africa that is largely
about countering China—echo this old approach. A tack that intentionally
engages states on their own terms would do more to advance American interests
and values than knee-jerk responses to Chinese initiatives that leave states
feeling that Washington cares about them only as battlegrounds in its
competition with Beijing.
為了在與中國實現和平共存的過程中建立有利於美方的規則框架，華盛頓不應僅僅關注自
己在美中競爭中得分多少，而是更應關注上面提到的價值觀本身。隨著中國在全球影響力
的增長，美國應避免冷戰時期的慣常做法（即根據一個國家與蘇聯的關係來制定對該國的
政策）。然而，川普政府的一些做法（諸如在拉美地區推行門羅主義或者在非洲發表針對
中國的言論）正是反映了美國的上述冷戰舊習。美國應根據每個國家的不同情況與其打交
道，這將更有利於維護美國的國家利益和價值觀；美國不應根據一個國家對中國倡議的反
應來制定對該國的政策，這將給各國留下一個印象：華盛頓僅僅把他們視為自己與北京競
爭時使用的戰場。
China’s Belt and Road Initiative offers the most obvious opportunity to
apply this principle in practice. Rather than fight China at every turn—on
every port, bridge, and rail line—the United States and its partners should
make their own affirmative pitch to countries about the kinds of
high-quality, high-standard investments that will best serve progress.
Supporting investments not because they are anti-Chinese but because they are
pro-growth, pro-sustainability, and pro-freedom will be much more effective
over the long term—especially because China’s state-led investments have
provoked a degree of backlash in countries over cost overruns, no-bid
contracts, corruption, environmental degradation, and poor working conditions.
中國提出了“一帶一路”倡議，很顯然這是美國實踐上述原則的好機會。美國不應在每一
個港口項目、每一個橋樑項目或每一個鐵路項目上與中國博弈，美國及其夥伴國家應該向
各國闡明：只有高品質、高標準的投資才能更好地促進各國的發展。我們不應只因某項投
資對中國不利就對其提供支持，我們之所以對一項投資提供支持應該是因為它有利於維護
自由、促進經濟增長和社會的可持續發展，這樣做更具長遠眼光-尤其是因為中國的國家
主導投資激起了一些國家的強烈反對成本超支，無報價合同，腐敗，環境惡化和惡劣的工
作條件。
In this light, the best defense of democracy is to stress the values that are
essential to good governance, especially transparency and accountability, and
to support civil society, independent media, and the free flow of
information. Together, these steps could lower the risk of democratic
backsliding, improve lives in the developing world, and reduce Chinese
influence. This course of action will require an injection of multilateral
funding from the United States and its allies and partners that can give
countries genuine alternatives. But it will require something more
fundamental, too: the United States needs to have greater confidence in the
belief that investing in human capital and good governance will work out
better over the long run than China’s extractive approach.
從這一角度來看，良好的國家治理（尤其是政府問責機制和施政透明度）、公民社會、獨
立媒體以及信息的自由傳播是我們應該著重堅持的價值觀，這是對民主制度最好的維護。
這將降低民主倒退的風險、改善發展中國家民眾的生活並削弱中國的影響力。美國及其盟
國和夥伴國家應為此建立一個多邊的基金，世界各國將因此獲得中國倡議之外一個真正的
替代方案。不過，我們還需要從更根本的層面做出改變：美國應該對良好的國家治理和投
資人力資本有更堅定的信心，堅信這一路徑從長遠來看會比中國方案更有利於各國的發展
。
Focusing on principles rather than scorekeeping will also be essential for
setting norms for new technologies that raise hard questions about human
ethics. From artificial intelligence to biotechnology, autonomous weapons to
gene-edited humans, there will be a crucial struggle in the years ahead to
define appropriate conduct and then pressure laggards to get in line.
Washington should start shaping the parameters of these debates without
further delay. Finally, coexistence with China does not, and cannot, preclude
the United States from speaking out against China’s egregious and inhumane
treatment of its own citizens and the arbitrary detention of foreign
nongovernmental organization workers. The West’s relative silence on Beijing
’s internment of Uighurs has left a moral stain, and so the United States
and its partners should mobilize international pressure to demand neutral
third-party access to those who are detained and the sanctioning of the
individuals and companies that are complicit in the detention. China may well
threaten that such pressure will destabilize ties. Yet Washington should make
speaking out on human rights abuses a predictable and routine part of the
relationship.
新技術已經在人類倫理方面向我們提出了嚴峻課題。我們應堅持原則而不是僅在意一時的
得分多少，這對美國在新技術領域制定規則至關重要。從人工智能到生物技術，從自主武
器到人類基因編輯，在為上述新技術領域制定行為規則時，我們將在未來幾年裡面臨激烈
的鬥爭，而且在取勝後我們還需要對不遵守規則的參與方施加壓力以進行規管。華盛頓不
應再浪費時間，我們必須盡快啟動規則的制定工作。最後，與中國共存不會也不能阻止美
國大聲疾呼反對中國對本國公民的殘酷和不人道待遇以及對外國非政府組織工人的任意拘
留。西方對北京維吾爾人被拘禁的相對沉默已經留下了道德上的污點，因此美國及其夥伴
應動員國際壓力，要求中立的第三方進入被拘留者的行列，並要求制裁同謀的個人和公司
。中國很可能警告施壓將破壞兩國關係的穩定。但是華盛頓應該使對侵犯人權的批評成為
雙邊關係中常規可預測一部分。
SEQUENCING COMPETITION AND COOPERATION
競爭與合作
It is often taken as an article of faith that as the U.S.-Chinese
relationship becomes more competitive, the space for cooperation will shrink,
if not disappear. But even as adversaries, the United States and the Soviet
Union found ways to cooperate on a number of issues, including space
exploration, contagious diseases, the environment, and the global commons.
The need for cooperation between Washington and Beijing is far more acute,
given the nature of contemporary challenges. Leaders in both countries should
consider cooperation on such transnational challenges not as a concession by
one party but as an essential need for both.
人們一般認為，隨著美中關係中競爭的火藥味越來越濃，合作的空間即便不消失也將受到
嚴重擠壓。然而冷戰時期的美蘇兩國即便作為宿敵也曾在太空探索、傳染性疾病防治、環
境保護等很多領域裡展開合作。鑑於當今人類所面臨的嚴峻挑戰，與冷戰時代相比，如今
華盛頓和北京更加迫切地需要合作。兩國領導人應該將諸多跨國性問題納入合作框架，這
不是其中一方讓步與否的問題，合作是雙方的共同需要。
To get the balance between cooperation and competition right, Washington has
to consider the sequencing of each. The United States has historically sought
to cooperate first and compete second with China. Beijing, meanwhile, has
become quite comfortable competing first and cooperating second, linking—
either explicitly or implicitly—offers of cooperation to U.S. concessions in
areas of strategic interest.
若要在合作與競爭中間找到合適的平衡點，華盛頓必須為何者為主、何者為輔作出安排。
從歷史上看，美國一直力求與中國合作，其次才是競爭。同時，北京已經變得相當習慣於
首先競爭，然後進行合作，將合作提議與戰略利益領域的美國特許權（無論是明示還是暗
含的）聯繫起來。
Going forward, Washington should avoid becoming an eager suitor on
transnational challenges. Eagerness can actually limit the scope for
cooperation by making it a bargaining chip. Although it may seem
counterintuitive, competition is likely essential to effective cooperation
with Beijing. In the zero-sum strategic mindset of many Chinese officials,
perceptions of U.S. power and resolve matter enormously, and the Chinese
bureaucracy has long focused on shifts in both. Given this sensitivity, it
can be as important for Washington to demonstrate an ability to stand firm,
and even to impose costs, as it is for it to speak earnestly about finding
common cause. The best approach, then, will be to lead with competition,
follow with offers of cooperation, and refuse to negotiate any linkages
between Chinese assistance on global challenges and concessions on U.S.
interests.
展望未來，華盛頓應避免在解決諸多跨國性問題時過於主動地向中方尋求合作。美方態度
過於主動將給予中方討價還價的籌碼，事實上這反而會給雙方的合作範圍造成限制。雖然
聽起來有些與直覺不符，競爭卻是實現與北京合作的必要之舉。許多信奉零和戰略思維的
中國人一直很重視研究美國的實力和決心，而中國一直以來也很關注如何對這兩者施加影
響。鑑於這個問題的敏感性，華盛頓應該在北京面前展現自己堅定的立場，甚至讓北京付
出一定代價。這樣做非常重要，甚至與以懇切的態度尋求與北京展開合作同樣重要。因此
，最佳的戰略是以競爭為主導，輔之以合作意願。美國不應為了爭取中國在一些全球性問
題上的協作而在國家利益上作出讓步。
BEYOND THE BILATERAL
超越美中雙邊關係的更大視野
There is one other lesson of the Cold War that U.S. policymakers should keep
top of mind: that one of the United States’ greatest strengths in its
competition with China has less to do with the two countries than with
everyone else. The combined weight of U.S. allies and partners can shape China
’s choices across all domains—but only if Washington deepens all those
relationships and works to tie them together. Although much of the discussion
on U.S.-Chinese competition focuses on its bilateral dimension, the United
States will ultimately need to embed its China strategy in a dense network of
relationships and institutions in Asia and the rest of the world.
美國決策者可以從冷戰中汲取許多經驗教訓，應該被牢記的一點是：美國在與中國競爭時
的一項最大優勢並非限於美中雙邊範疇，而是超越了這個範疇。美國與盟友和夥伴國家所
形成的合力能夠在所有領域對中國的行為施加影響，這意味著華盛頓必須深化與盟友和夥
伴國家之間的關係並把所有這些關係編織在一起。雖然涉及美中競爭的許多討論都落入雙
邊範疇，然而美國最終還是需要將對華戰略融入到自己在亞洲及全世界打造的綿密的關係
網絡和機制網絡中。
This is a lesson that the Trump administration would do well to remember.
Instead of harnessing these enduring advantages, it has alienated many of the
United States’ traditional friends—with tariffs, demands of payment for
military bases, and much more—and abandoned or undermined key institutions
and agreements. Many international organizations, from the UN and the World
Bank to the World Trade Organization, are institutions that the United States
helped design and lead and that have established widely accepted rules of the
road on such issues as freedom of navigation, transparency, dispute
resolution, and trade. Retreating from these institutions provides short-term
leeway and flexibility at the cost of long-term U.S. influence and allows
Beijing to reshape norms and expand its own influence within those
organizations.
川普政府最好能記住這一點。川普並未充分利用美國的上述長期優勢，他反而通過軍事基
地經費分擔比例、關稅等問題讓很多傳統盟友越來越疏遠美國，更加惡劣的是，他還放棄
或削弱了許多美國參與其中的國際機制和國際協議。從聯合國到世界銀行再到世界貿易組
織，許多國際機構都是美國參與設計並主導的，這些國際機構在航行自由、軍事透明、爭
端解決、貿易政策等領域制定了廣為世界各國所接受的原則。從上述機構中抽身離開也許
能讓美國獲得短期的迴旋空間和政策靈活性，但代價是美國的長期影響力將遭到削弱，而
北京也將藉機在上述機構中重塑各種原則和規範並擴張自己的影響力。
The United States needs to get back to seeing alliances as assets to be
invested in rather than costs to be cut. In the absence of any meaningful
capacity to build its own network of capable allies, Beijing would like
nothing more than for the United States to squander this long-term advantage.
Establishing clear-eyed coexistence wit