Bolsonaro Placed a Losing Bet on Trump
波索納洛下注川普下錯了
原文：Foreign Policy
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/06/bolsonaro-losing-bet-trump-brazil-tariffs/
譯文：觀察者
https://www.guancha.cn/OliverStuenkel/2019_12_14_528374_s.shtml
Oliver Stuenkel
巴西瓦加斯基金會國際關係教授
Monday’s announcement of U.S. tariffs on Brazilian steel and aluminum
imports is yet one more reason China may be looking like a better partner.
美國週一宣布對巴西鋼鋁產品徵收關稅，使中國看起來像是巴西更好的伙伴。
U.S. President Donald Trump’s surprise announcement this week that he would
be imposing tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from Brazil is just the
latest in a series of disappointments for Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro,
who has staked a great deal on good relations with Trump. Beyond hurting
Bolsonaro’s reputation as having an in with the U.S. president, Trump’s
announcement will have significant effects on Brazil’s foreign policy and
trade relationships, regardless of whether the sanctions go through.
12月2日，美國總統川普出人意料地宣佈他將對進口自巴西的鋼鐵、鋁加征關稅。這讓原
本信心滿滿對川普押注的巴西總統雅伊爾‧波索納洛在連續失望之後再次失望。無論是否
進行制裁，川普宣佈加征關稅，不僅損害了親美的總統波索納洛的聲譽，而且極大影響了
巴西的外交政策和貿易關係。
As the most pro-American president in modern Brazilian history, Bolsonaro has
put establishing a strong alliance with the United States at the center of
his foreign policy from the start. On the campaign trail, the Brazilian
leader frequently promised to embrace Trump’s tough stance on China and even
visited Taiwan. Brazil’s Foreign Minister Ernesto Araújo famously described
Trump as “Western civilization’s Hail Mary pass” and publicly fretted
about the influence of “Maoist China” in Latin America. After Bolsonaro
took office in January, to show the country’s near-automatic alignment with
the United States, Brazil pulled out of the United Nations migration pact,
and it has otherwise been a fierce U.S. ally in multilateral forums,
radically breaking with Brazilian diplomatic tradition. Two months later, at
the White House, Bolsonaro said he was convinced Trump would win reelection.
作為巴西現代史上最親美的總統，波索納洛從一開始就把與美國建立牢固聯盟關係作為其
外交政策的重中之重。在競選過程中，他不斷承諾擁護川普對華強硬立場，甚至訪問了台
灣。為人所周知的是巴西外交部長埃內斯托‧阿勞霍把川普稱之為“西方民主的最後
一線希望”，而且公開表示他憂心於“毛主義的中國”對拉丁美洲的影響。波索納洛今年
1月上台之後，為了顯示同美國理所應當的盟友關係，巴西退出了聯合國《移民問題全球
契約》，在各類多邊論壇中始終自我展現為美國的堅定盟友，這些都與巴西的外交傳統背
道而馳。兩個月後，波索納洛訪美時表示他堅信川普會贏得連任。
But now all that effort seems for naught. After Trump’s tweets about the
tariffs, the Brazilian government struggled to adopt a cohesive response,
which suggests that it may not have had warning. Bolsonaro promised he would
speak to Paulo Guedes—Brazil’s minister of the economy, who had recently
met with U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross—and possibly call Trump to
ask him to revert the decision. Considering Trump’s negotiation style, there
is indeed a chance a deal may be announced, allowing both sides to declare
victory. Yet at least some damage has been done—and Bolsonaro is likely only
more aware of the dangers of depending too much on Trump.Bolsonaro is likely
only more aware of the dangers of depending too much on Trump.
現在看來，之前的努力似乎都打了水漂。在川普發完加征關稅的推文後，巴西政府勉強地
採取一致口徑回應美國。很明顯，巴西事先沒有得到美方的警告。波索納洛承諾將與剛剛
會見過美國商務部長威爾伯‧羅斯的巴西經濟部長保羅‧格德斯談話，並可能致電川普請
他改變主意。根據川普一貫的談判風格，確實有可能達成讓雙方能對外宣稱勝利的協議。
但目前兩國關係已受到一定傷害，波索納洛也會更加警惕過度依賴川普的風險。
To be sure, Bolsonaro’s strategy of aligning himself with Trump was always
unlikely to succeed, because it would be so difficult to provide tangible
benefits to the United States or key stakeholders in the Brazilian president’
s domestic coalition. For example, during their first meeting in Washington
in March, Trump was set to discuss two key geopolitical challenges for the
United States in the region: weakening Nicolas Maduro’s regime in Venezuela
and limiting Chinese influence in Latin America.
可以肯定的是，波索納洛站隊川普的策略不太可能取得成功，畢竟這很難為美國或者巴西
國內執政聯盟的關鍵利益攸關方提供實際的好處。比如今年3月波索納洛在華盛頓首次和
川普會見時，川普原計畫要和他討論美國在該地區的兩個重大地緣政治挑戰，一是削弱委
內瑞拉的尼古拉斯‧馬杜羅政權，二是限制中國在拉美的影響力。
The enthusiastically pro-Trump faction in the Brazilian administration—
including the president, his sons, and the foreign minister—promised results
on both counts, but these promises have been repeatedly publicly contradicted
by the government’s military faction, led by Vice President Hamilton Mourao.
Not only has the vice president ruled out any Brazilian support for a
potential U.S. military engagement in Venezuela, but he has also directly
contradicted his boss’s promise to move away from China and closer to the
United States. In March, Mourao blocked Bolsonaro’s controversial plan to
move the Brazilian Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, a move meant
to underline Brazil’s pro-Trump credentials. A month later, seeking to
balance the president’s pro-U.S. rhetoric, Mourao told Folha de Sao Paulo
that China was “not a threat, but a strategic partner.”
巴西政府的超級親美派——包括波索納洛本人和他的兒子，以及巴西外交部長——在以上
兩個方面都予以承諾，但以副總統漢密爾頓‧莫朗為首的巴西軍方勢力一再公開提出異議
。莫朗不但排除了巴西支持美方在委內瑞拉潛在軍事行動的可能性，而且直接與波索納洛
疏遠中國、親近美國的承諾唱對台戲。今年3月，莫朗阻止了波索納洛為凸顯親美立場而
將巴西駐以色列大使館從特拉維夫遷至耶路撒冷這項具有爭議的計畫。過了一個月，為了
平衡總統的親美言論，莫朗向《聖保羅頁報》表示，中國“不是威脅，而是戰略夥伴”。
At the same time, key factions in the Bolsonaro coalition saw their hopes
dashed that Trump would make any meaningful concessions to Brazil. Brazilian
farmers who had wanted a free trade agreement soon realized that Trump would
not allow them to directly compete with American farmers, a key constituency
for the U.S. president. The neoliberal faction of the Bolsonaro administration
—led by Guedes, the economy minister—was likewise disappointed that Trump
would not push harder for Brazil’s entry into the OECD, something seen as an
important seal of approval to attract more foreign investment. In a leaked
letter to OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría in August, the U.S. State
Department gave preference to Romania and Argentina’s accession, a move seen
as especially humiliating to a Brazilian audience given that Argentina’s
president-elect, Alberto Fernandez, would most likely care less about OECD
membership than Brazil’s Bolsonaro.
與此同時，波索納洛執政聯盟中的若干關鍵派系原本希望川普對巴西作出有意義的讓步，
結果希望破滅了。巴西農民本來還指望美國和巴西能達成自貿協定，但他們很快意識到川
普不會允許他們跟自己的關鍵票倉——美國農民直接競爭。波索納洛政府中以經濟部長保
羅‧蓋德斯為首的新自由主義派別也對川普感到失望，因為川普不會大力推動巴西加入經
濟合作與發展組織，而這被視為巴西吸引更多外商投資的重要資質認證。美國國務院今年
八月寫給經合組織秘書長安赫爾‧古里亞的信函被洩露，美國在其中對羅馬尼亞和阿根廷
加入該組織表示支持。巴西人認為他們受到了莫大的侮辱，因為比起巴西總統波索納洛，
阿根廷新任總統阿爾貝托‧費爾南德斯似乎沒有那麼在意是否加入經合組織。
Finally, after Bolsonaro agreed, in early September, to increase Brazil’s
tariff-free quota for ethanol imports, a move that directly benefited the
United States, the U.S. decision two months later not to lift a ban on
importing Brazilian beef strengthened the overall perception that Bolsonaro’
s bet on Trump hadn’t panned out. Trump’s decision to reinstate tariffs was
yet another humiliation for Brazil’s president.
波索納洛於9月初同意提高乙醇進口免稅配額，直接使美國受益。然而兩個月後，美國卻
決定不解除對巴西牛肉進口的禁令，使多數人意識到波索納洛在川普身上下的賭注並沒有
換來實惠。而川普恢復對巴西加征關稅的決定更是對巴西總統的又一次羞辱。
The president’s son Eduardo Bolsonaro’s promise, made after the election in
late 2018, that the United States would soon become Brazil’s most important
trading partner—a position China has held since 2009—thus quickly turned
out to be wishful thinking. It also ignored the fact that China’s and Brazil
’s economies are, in many ways, far more compatible than Brazil’s and the
United States’. China is already the destination of around 28 percent of
Brazilian exports—a percentage that is increasing rapidly. Less than half
that figure—13.1 percent—goes to the United States. Brazil’s economy
depends on exports of natural resources and agricultural products. Unlike the
United States, which enjoys sufficient domestic production, China will
continue looking toward Brazilian commodities to feed its industries and
population.
2018年底巴西大選結束後，總統兒子愛德華多‧波索納洛承諾美國將很快成為巴西最重要
的貿易合作夥伴——2009年至今一直是中國——現實很快證明這只是一廂情願。而且這種
說法也忽略了一個事實，那就是中國和巴西的經濟兼容性遠遠大於美國和巴西。目前，巴
西出口總量大約28%流向中國，這一數字還在不斷上升；巴西對美出口不足對華出口的一
半，僅佔出口總量的13.1%。巴西經濟依賴自然資源和農產品出口。中國對巴西工業、農
業大宗商品有長期需求，這一點不同於國內產量充足的美國。
China has been deepening its influence in Latin America’s largest economy
even as Bolsonaro has accused it of wanting to “buy Brazil.” And
ultimately, China, the first target of Trump’s trade war, may be the biggest
beneficiary of the president’s new salvo against Brazilian exports. Already,
Chinese President Xi Jinping has started seeking to convince Brazil’s
president that China is a far more reliable partner than the United States.
In November, Xi raised the number of Brazilian meat plants that are allowed
export to China. The same month, two Chinese state oil companies were the
only foreign bidders in an otherwise disappointing oil auction in Brazil. The
bids came after Bolsonaro personally invited the Chinese to bid during a
visit to Beijing in October.
儘管波索納洛曾指責中國要“買下巴西”，但中國對拉美最大經濟體的影響力有增無減。
作為川普發起貿易戰的頭號目標，中國可能最終成為美國總統打擊巴西出口的最大受益人
。目前，習近平主席已經開始讓巴西總統明白，中國是比美國可靠得多的合作夥伴。11月
，中國新增了一批獲得對華出口資質的巴西肉類工廠。同月，巴西石油項目進行招標，中
國國有石油企業（中石油和中海油）作為僅有的兩個外資投標方，讓此次競標免於難堪。
這次競標之前，波索納洛曾於10月訪問北京時親自邀請中方參與投標。
China has also voiced support for Brazilian foreign policy.China has also
voiced support for Brazilian foreign policy. In September, after Brazil found
itself the target of a storm of global criticism over fires in the Amazon, Qu
Yuhui, from the Chinese Embassy in Brasília, gave an interview to one of
Brazil’s largest newspapers and voiced support for the country’s
environmental policies, a gesture Bolsonaro thanked Xi for during November’s
BRICS Summit in Brasília. And in what observers saw as a swipe at Trump,
Brazil’s president agreed to the final BRICS Summit Declaration, which
includes an emphatic defense of multilateralism and the Paris agreement on
climate change, which Bolsonaro had initially promised to abandon.
外交政策方面，中國也發聲對巴西表示支持。9月因亞馬孫雨林遭遇大火，巴西成為全球
輿論的眾矢之的。中國駐巴西大使館外交官瞿瑜輝接受巴西《環球報》採訪時對該國的環
保政策予以肯定。11月巴西利亞舉辦金磚峰會時，波索納洛總統特地就此向習主席致謝。
金磚國家領導人在本屆峰會上發表了《巴西利亞宣言》，其中關於堅決擁護多邊主義和《
巴黎氣候變化協定》的內容最初並不受波索納洛支持，但他還是同意了最終的版本，這被
觀察人士視為波索納洛對川普的有力反擊。
Adopting rhetoric that would have been unthinkable during his first months in
office, when he was consistently critical of China, Bolsonaro recently said
that the two countries were “born to walk together” and that China was an “
ever greater part of Brazil’s future.” He even said Brazil would stay out
of the trade war between Washington and Beijing. With the United States
looking like a riskier bet, it is likely that Brazil-China ties will expand
further in the coming years.
在就任總統的頭幾個月裡，波索納洛不斷批評中國，但近來他話鋒突變，說中國和巴西是
“注定的同路人”，中國“對巴西的未來越來越重要”。他甚至表示，巴西在中美貿易戰
中不會選邊站隊。隨著下注美國越來越不靠譜，未來幾年中巴關係可能將取得更多進展。
All this will complicate Washington’s broader geopolitical ambitions to
reduce China’s influence in the region, particularly when it comes to the
pressure it exerts on Brazil’s government to exclude the Chinese
telecommunications giant Huawei from the 5G bidding process, set to take
place next year. Leading U.S. policymakers have frequently warned Brazil
against allowing the Chinese telecommunications company to build an
ultra-fast 5G cellular network there, even saying that the United States
would have to reassess how much intelligence it could share with Brazil if
Huawei won the bidding process.
這將給美國更宏大的地緣政治戰略帶來麻煩。美國意圖削弱中國在拉美地區的影響力，尤
其是通過向巴西政府施壓希望它把中國通訊巨頭華為排除在明年的5G網絡招投標之外。美
國高層決策者不斷警告巴西不要讓華為在當地建設超高速5G移動網絡；甚至表示，如果華
為在巴西中標，美國將重新評估與巴西的情報合作。
But, in no small part thanks to Trump’s recent announcement, Beijing is
quietly winning the geopolitical standoff between China and the United States
in Latin America.
但總而言之，很大程度上得益於川普近期宣佈加征關稅，中美兩國在拉美地區的地緣政治
對峙中，中國的勝算在悄然攀升。