Why Trump vs. Warren in 2020 Would Prove America Is in Decline
為什麼2020川普對華倫將証實美國的衰落
原文：Foreign Interests https://tinyurl.com/u42hxmb
By Robert D. Kaplan
譯文：觀察者
https://www.guancha.cn/LuoBoTe-D-KaPuLan/2019_12_17_528626_s.shtml
If a moderate cannot somehow prevail in the Democratic primaries, and
President Donald Trump faces Senator Elizabeth Warren in the November
election, then it will punctuate a process of slow and gradual American
decline that began in the middle Cold War years. For the first time in modern
memory, there would not be a candidate from the political center on any
ticket. But it is possible that we will face a choice between the vulgar,
populist right and the radical, populist left.
如果美國民主黨的溫和派不能以某種方式在初選中脫穎而出，明年11月的最終角逐在伊麗
莎白‧華倫參議員和唐納德‧川普總統之間展開，那麼美國自冷戰中期開始的逐步衰落過
程將被暴露在世人眼前。那將是美國現代記憶裡首次沒有中間派政治候選人的選舉，美國
民眾可能將被迫在粗鄙的民粹主義右派和激進的民粹主義左派之間進行選擇。
The fact that the center is having difficulty in the presidential race
represents the culmination of a tragic story with several facets.
美國中間派在總統競選中面臨困境這一事實，本身就是一個多面性的悲劇故事的高潮。
The steady adoption of a primary system to select party nominees in the 1970s
and 1980s was something that weakened the leverage of party bosses in
so-called smoke-filled rooms and played to the most partisan emotions of each
major party. For decades the bosses had selected safe, moderate candidates:
not always inspiring but usually responsible. It was the bosses who
essentially gave us Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, and so on. Eisenhower
was scouted by the bosses of the Republican party while he was still in
uniform. The system we have today might never have selected him. Though an
exceptional analyst, organization man, and war hero, Ike wasn’t especially
charismatic. Neither was he an especially compelling speaker or photogenic.
上世紀七八十年代，美國總統黨內初選制度逐漸穩固下來，削弱了黨魁們在所謂“煙霧繚
繞的房間（譯註：美國政治行話，指幕後權勢者邊抽雪茄邊進行政治決策的秘密集會）”
裡的影響力，且迎合了各黨中派別情緒最濃重的人。前幾十年裡，黨魁們選擇的一向是穩
妥、溫和的候選人，儘管他們不一定有鼓舞力，但通常是負責任的。可以說杜魯門、艾森
豪威爾等總統都是黨魁幕後商議的結果。艾森豪威爾還在軍隊的時候就被共和黨黨魁發掘
了。放在今天的選舉制度裡，他恐怕永遠出不了頭。儘管他是一位傑出的分析師、組織人
（譯註：指一切以組織為重、失去個人身份的人）和戰爭英雄，但他並不是很有個人魅力
，演講談不上有說服力，拍照也不是很上鏡。
Smoke-filled rooms may sound squalid, but they fulfilled the spirit of the
Founders of the American Revolution, specifically James Madison, who
preferred a republic; not a democracy. In a republic, the masses rule only
indirectly, through an elite that they can change every few years. Democracy
means more direct rule, given to rage and passions, nowadays amplified by
social media. Here is where the filter of the party bosses and the discipline
of the print-and-typewriter age – which encouraged complex, analytical
thinking from media organs dedicated to centrist objectivity – conveniently
merged to guide us through the Cold War and keep us a republic.
煙霧繚繞的房間”聽起來有些污濁，但它最符合美國國父們的精神——特別是詹姆斯‧麥
迪遜——他更希望美國實行共和制而不是民主制。在共和制下，民眾對國家的統治是間接
的，必須借助他們幾年才能更換一次的精英階層。民主制則意味著民眾可以更直接地統治
國家，他們慣常受到狂熱和激情的左右，而今天的社交媒體恰恰又放大了這種效應。正是
在這些煙霧繚繞的房間裡，黨魁的暗箱操作和媒體的行業準則（媒體機構儘量秉持中立、
追求客觀，綜合地考慮問題）合宜地融合的在一起，引導美國走過了冷戰並保存了其共和
制。
Now think of our post–Cold War presidents chosen under different
circumstances: Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump.
Compare them against Truman’s shepherding of the Marshall Plan; of Eisenhower
’s avoidance of a hot war with China and the Soviet Union, despite much of
the advice he was getting; of Kennedy’s handling of the Cuban Missile
Crisis; of Johnson’s Civil Rights Bill; of the elder Bush’s elegant
restraint in the face of Soviet collapse and respect for limits in the case
of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and you’ll see what I mean. Of course,
President Lyndon Johnson’s tragic decisions on Vietnam were an exception –
and I’ll get to that.
回想冷戰結束後在不同環境下選出的總統：柯林頓、小布希、歐巴馬和川普。再拿他們跟
當年引領馬歇爾計畫的杜魯門、力排眾議避免與中蘇正面交戰的艾森豪威爾、處理古巴導
彈危機的甘迺迪，簽署民權法案的詹森，蘇聯解體後仍能在海灣戰爭中保持克制、把握限
度的老布希進行比較，你就會明白我的意思。當然，詹森關於越南戰爭的悲劇性決定是個
例外，這一點我下文會提到。
Had the party bosses been in charge of the 2016 nominating process, and were
the print-and-typewriter age still regnant, Governor Jeb Bush would likely be
president, having narrowly defeated Senator Hillary Clinton, a candidate with
more negatives than himself. He would have surrounded himself with first-rate
foreign policy advisers from the Republican establishment: Richard Haass,
Robert Zoellick, Meghan O’Sullivan, and so forth. He would have governed
more like his father than his brother. Things would be so dull. So low
energy! Yet, America, its alliances, and its posture in the world would be
infinitely sturdier and wiser. Trump is where direct, mass democracy and the
wonders of the digital-video age have led us. And these same factors may yet
offer a Democratic opponent who threatens an economic and social upheaval to
match Trump’s upheaval in manners and decency. The Founders would be
horrified of how we have in spirit, stopped being a republic and have become
a democracy. Someone like Jeb Bush was meant to govern the former.
假設2016年大選提名程序仍然由黨魁操控，假設我們仍然處於印刷媒體時代，那麼傑布‧
布希州長可能以微弱優勢擊敗負面新聞更多的希拉里‧柯林頓參議員成為總統。這樣一來
，他將被共和黨建制派一流的外交政策顧問團簇：理查德‧哈斯、羅伯特‧佐利克、梅根
‧奧沙利文等（譯註：以上分別是美國外交關係委員會主席、世界銀行前行長、原美國總
統國家安全顧問）。他的執政方式會更像父親老布希而不是兄長小布希。他掌權後故事將
變得乏味。他確實不是個能量很足的人，但美國社會、同盟體系以及世界地位都將比當下
牢固得多，行為比當下明智得多。川普是大眾直接民主和數碼視頻時代新生事物共同催化
的產物。同樣的因素可能會催生一個民主黨選手，在經濟和社會層面引發激變，“媲美”
川普在言行和作風上的失范。美國的國父們可能會震驚於我們在本質上怎麼從共和制變成
了民主制。像傑布‧布希這樣的人原本是要統治一個共和制國家的。
The crumbling began after World War II, a war that however ghastly was very
good for America. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was still having
difficulties mastering the solution to the Great Depression when the buildup
to war jumped-started the American economy. When the war ended in 1945, the
infrastructure of every major industrial economy in the world – save for
that of the United States – had been devastated by aerial bombardment and
ground fighting. It gave us an immeasurable advantage that would last for
decades. The economic and social dynamism created by the war led to the G. I.
Bill, the subsequent equalizing miracle of the suburbs, and consequently a
new and vast middle class. Civil Rights, the erosion of casual anti-Semitism,
and the Space program were all ultimately offshoots of the economic energy
and social changes unleashed by the war effort.
無論第二次世界大戰是多麼可怕，對美國來說都是非常有益的。美國政治的蛻化是從二戰
之後開始的。在富蘭克林‧羅斯福總統還未徹底帶美國走出大蕭條的時候，備戰建設給美
國經濟帶來了快速啟動作用。1945年戰爭結束時，空中轟炸和地面戰鬥摧毀了世界上除美
國之外所有工業國家的基礎設施。它賦予了美國無法估量的優勢，這種優勢可以持續數十
年。戰爭帶來的經濟社會活力，帶來了《退伍軍人權利法案》，創造了郊區財富平均的奇
蹟，也產生了新的廣大中產階級。公民權利、反猶主義的式微，以及太空計畫，最終都可
以視為戰時奮鬥釋放出來的經濟活力和社會變革的衍生品。
Vietnam broke the spell. Until Vietnam, Americans had implicit faith in
government and its decision-making processes. After all, the government had
led us through World War II, created prosperity, and put men in space. But
Vietnam fortified the intellectual Left and the elite media establishment as
we know them today, giving them unlimited oxygen that would last for decades;
with a second booster-injection provided by the debacle of the Iraq War,
which the media and the intellectuals ably reported and commented upon. The
country would never again be the same, and never as united as it used to be.
越南打破了這個魔咒。越戰之前，美國人對政府和政府決策流程還是有一些信心的。畢竟
，政府帶領我們度過了第二次世界大戰，創造了繁榮，還把人類帶入了太空。但越戰使左
派知識分子和建制派媒體得勢，給予了他們可以高談闊論數十載的無限談資。伊拉克戰爭
的重大損失更是給了這些媒體和知識分子又一波讓他們可以評頭品足的談資。美國已今非
昔比，也不再會像以前那樣團結了。
The Cold War, being a tailpiece of World War II, had provided a large measure
of political discipline, though, extending the period of American greatness,
however, shaken the country was because of Vietnam. Had we still been
immersed in the Cold War during the election campaign of 2000, and had we
still been a republic with party bosses choosing the nominees, the Republican
elders might have gathered to gently tell the elder Bush that his son George
W. was not quite ready for high office yet, and needed more time and
experience: as a cabinet secretary, perhaps. But with two superpowers no
longer facing off against the backdrop of nuclear Armageddon, all such
discipline and common sense were lost. Because there was less to fear, almost
anyone could now become president.
作為第二次世界大戰的延續，冷戰使美國政治保持了嚴明紀律。儘管它延長了美國的偉大
時期，但越戰也動搖了其國本。如果我們在2000年大選時仍沉浸在冷戰中，如果我們仍然
是由黨魁提名候選人的共和制，那麼共和黨的長老們可能會聚首並委婉地告訴老布希，他
的兒子小布希並未完全作好出任總統的準備，他還需要更多的時間，積累更多經驗，比如
先擔任內閣秘書之類。但隨著兩個超級大國不再處於隨時觸發核末日的對峙狀態，所有這
些紀律和常識都消失了。需要擔心的因素少了，現在幾乎任何人都可以當總統。
And without the vigilance demanded by the Cold War, extreme partisanship that
undermines foreign policy carried fewer consequences. Politics no longer
stopped at the water’s edge because the perception was it didn’t need to:
for the world across the oceans appeared less dangerous than before 1989.
Thus, the end of the Cold War heralded a hyper-partisan age in national
politics.
由於不再需要像冷戰時期那樣保持警惕，極端黨爭儘管不利於美國外交，但似乎也不大要
緊。美國國內政治不再“適可而止”，因為人們覺得美國不再需要一致對外了：畢竟大洋
對面的世界看上去比1989年以前危險性更低。因此，冷戰的結束預示著美國國家政治進入
黨派激化時代。
Of course, many of these trends overlapped and there were always exceptions:
the elder Bush made it through the primaries, a system newly strengthened by
1988, and John F. Kennedy was pitch-perfect for an electronic media age.
Jimmy Carter was not an especially good Cold War president and Barack Obama
was not an especially bad post–Cold War one. But while the details do not
all fit neatly together, the underlying trend, like the brooding rhythm of a
symphony, is clear.
當然，這些趨勢中有許多是相互重疊的，而且總是有例外：老布希通過了總統初選（這種
選舉度制在1988年再次得到加強）；約翰‧甘迺迪是電子媒體時代的最佳人選。吉米‧卡
特不是一個很好的冷戰總統，而巴拉克‧歐巴馬也不是後冷戰時期特別糟糕的一任總統。
儘管所有細節不可能同時滿足，但潛在的趨勢如同交響曲反覆徘徊的節奏一般顯而易見。
Finally, we have had economic and technological changes around the world, as
the infrastructure of all the major World War II powers recovered and
globalization took root: severing American political unity and destroying the
center in the process. The American middle class was fundamentally weakened,
peoples’ lives became more precarious, even as a stylish, global elite
located on the two coasts - and much less emotionally loyal to their
compatriots in the Heartland - took root and oriented itself to other
culturally sophisticated and high-income earners in Europe and Asia. In a
crucial psychological sense, America lost its previously loyal establishment,
which now lives a global lifestyle, whether its members admit it or not.
最後，隨著第二次世界大戰所有大國的基礎設施逐步恢復、全球化落地生根，我們見證了
全球範圍內發生的經濟和技術變革，它們動搖了美國的政治統一，並逐漸破壞了中間派。
美國的中產階級從根本上被削弱，人民的生活變得更加岌岌可危。美國東西海岸那些風度
翩翩的國際化精英更傾向於靠攏文化層次、收入水平與自己相近的歐亞精英，在情感上大
大疏遠本國內陸同胞。從一種至關重要的心理層面上說，美國社會的中堅力量不再像過去
那樣忠誠，不管他們承不承認，他們的生活方式是全球化的。
And with the elite establishment in the process of deserting its own country,
nationalism and patriotism—which used to fit perfectly with liberalism—have
been handed over to crude populists, many of whom in spirit constitute a
lumpen proletariat. The 2020 election may yet threaten a choice between one
crude populist and another.
精英群體在逐漸拋棄自己的國家，曾經與自由主義相得益彰的民族主義和愛國主義也被移
交給了粗俗的民粹主義者，他們大多數人在精神上就是流氓無產階級。這樣一來， 2020
年的大選可能面臨著在兩個粗鄙的民粹主義者之間做出選擇。
An age of decline constitutes a golden age for the media, which thrives and
builds careers on crises. Vietnam, Watergate, Iraq, and now the stark
weakening of the moderate center have constituted great boons to journalists’
careers. Journalists are merely doing their jobs conscientiously. But their
very fame and productivity are inversely related to the health and happiness
of the nation.
對於媒體而言，衰落時代就是黃金時代，他們就是靠危機發家致富的。越戰、水門事件、
伊拉克戰爭，到如今中間溫和派的徹底沒落，成就了一批又一批記者。當然，這些記者也
只是憑著良心在做本職工作。但他們的名氣和成果是和國家的繁榮程度、幸福指數呈反比
的。
World War II saved us because mass societies handle total wars well; just as
they do small expeditionary warfare. It is middle-sized wars—Korea, Vietnam,
and Iraq—which involve death on a significant scale, but do not engage the
nation beyond military families, that mass societies handle less well. Heaven
forbid there should ever again be a total war! But unless a moderate with
real credibility can carry the day for the Democrats, only something
extraordinarily fundamental can reverse our direction: on-going now for over
half a century.
如同處理小規模遠征戰一樣，大眾社會能夠很好地處理全面戰爭，因此第二次世界大戰拯
救了我們。但對於死亡人數規模較大、不牽涉美國本土的普通家庭的中等規模戰爭，如朝
鮮戰爭、越南戰爭和伊拉克戰爭，大眾社會就處理得欠妥。老天保佑，千萬別再打全面戰
爭！但除非有真正靠譜的溫和派領導民主黨，否則只有非常根本性的大變局才足以扭轉美
國半個多世紀以來的方向。