How liberalism became ‘the god that failed’ in eastern Europe
自由主義如何在東歐淪為“失敗的神”？
原文： The Guardian https://tinyurl.com/yxrw7b53
譯文：察網http://www.cwzg.cn/theory/201912/53600.html
作者：Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes
After communism fell, the promises of western liberalism to transform central
and eastern Europe were never fully realised – and now we are seeing the
backlash.
共產主義政權垮台之後，西方自由主義承諾的徹底改變中東歐的前景從未真正實現，現在
我們終於見證了人們對自由主義的強烈抵制。
In the spring of 1990, John Feffer, a 26-year-old American, spent several
months criss-crossing eastern Europe in hope of unlocking the mystery of its
post-communist future and writing a book about the historical transformation
unfolding before his eyes. He was no expert, so instead of testing theories,
he buttonholed as many people from as many walks of life as possible. The
contradictions he encountered were fascinating and puzzling. East Europeans
were optimistic but apprehensive. Many of those he interviewed at the time
expected to be living like Viennese or Londoners within five years, 10 years
at the most. But these hopes were mingled with anxiety and foreboding. As
Hungarian sociologist Elemér Hankiss observed: “People realised suddenly
that in the coming years, it would be decided who would be rich and who would
be poor; who would have power and who would not; who would be marginalised
and who would be at the centre. And who would be able to found dynasties and
whose children would suffer.”
1990年的春天，一位名叫26歲的美國人約翰‧費弗（John Feffer）花了幾個月時間來回
穿梭於東歐各國之間，試圖揭開後共產主義時代的秘密，並把他親眼所見的這一歷史轉變
記錄在他的書中。他並不是一位專家，所以他沒有採取理論研究的方法，而是在他步履所
及之處儘可能多地攔下行人並採訪他們。人們表達出的相互矛盾的態度既令人好奇又令人
困惑。東歐人對時局表示樂觀但又不無疑慮，許多採訪對象表示期待在5年，最多10年之
後過上像維也納人或倫敦人一樣的生活。但這種希望混雜著焦慮與不祥的預感。正如匈牙
利社會學家埃裡梅‧漢基斯所言：“人們突然發覺，幾年之後，貧富階層分化就將形成，
權力格局就將塵埃落定，邊緣與中心的界限就將變得明晰，權勢與弱勢的命運就將從此注
定。”
Feffer eventually published his book, but did not return to the countries
that had briefly captured his imagination. Then, 25 years later, he decided
to revisit the region and to seek out those with whom he had spoken in 1990.
This time round, eastern Europe was richer but roiled by resentment. The
capitalist future had arrived, but its benefits and burdens were unevenly,
even crassly distributed. After reminding us that “For the World War II
generation in eastern Europe, communism was the ‘god that failed’”, Feffer
writes that “For the current generation in the region, liberalism is the god
that failed.”
費弗後來出版了他的書，但他沒有再回到過那些曾經佔據他想像空間的國家。25年之後，
他決定重返那些國家並尋找那些他在1990年曾與之進行過對話的人。現在的東歐變得更富
裕了，卻充滿了憤恨情緒。資本主義的未來確已到來，但其收益與代價卻不對等，甚至存
在嚴重的偏離。他提醒我們，“對東歐國家經歷過二戰的那一代人而言，共產主義是一尊
‘失敗的神’”，他繼續寫道，“對東歐的當代人而言，失敗的神則變成了自由主義。”
The striving of ex-communist countries to emulate the west after 1989 has
been given an assortment of names – Americanisation, Europeanisation,
democratisation, liberalisation, enlargement, integration, harmonisation,
globalisation and so forth – but it has always signified modernisation by
imitation and integration by assimilation. After the communist collapse,
according to today’s central European populists, liberal democracy became a
new, inescapable orthodoxy. Their constant lament is that imitating the
values, attitudes, institutions and practices of the west became imperative
and obligatory.
這些前共產主義國家在1989年之後趕超西方的理想被賦予了一系列名字：美國化、歐洲化
、民主化、自由化、擴大化、一體化、和諧化、全球化等等。但這些詞彙總是透露出兩層
意思：通過模仿實現現代化，以及通過同化實現一體化。在共產主義政權垮台之後，用今
天的中歐民粹主義理論家的話來說，自由民主變成了一種全新的、不可迴避的正統。他們
總是在呼號模仿西方的價值觀、立場、制度與實踐是必不可少的。
Across central and eastern Europe, many of the democracies that emerged at
the end of the cold war have been transformed into conspiracy-minded
majoritarian regimes. In them, political opposition is demonised,
non-government media, civil society and independent courts are denuded of
their influence and sovereignty is defined by the leadership’s determination
to resist pressure to conform to western ideals of political pluralism,
government transparency and tolerance for strangers, dissidents and
minorities.
在中歐和東歐，許多建立於冷戰末期的民主政體已經蛻變為一種陰謀化的多數主義政權。
在這種政權體系之下，政治對立被妖魔化了，非政府的媒體、公民社會和獨立法院都失去
了各自的影響力，主權的定義也變成了領導層抵制壓力的決心，這些壓力來自於對西方理
念的遵循——政府多元主義，透明政府，以及對外國人、異見者和少數群體的包容。
No single factor can explain the simultaneous emergence of authoritarian
anti-liberalisms in so many differently situated countries in the second
decade of the 21st century. Yet resentment at liberal democracy’s canonical
status and the politics of imitation in general has played a decisive role.
This lack of alternatives, rather than the gravitational pull of an
authoritarian past or historically ingrained hostility to liberalism, is what
best explains the anti-western ethos dominating post-communist societies
today. The very conceit that “there is no other way” provided an
independent motive for the wave of populist xenophobia and reactionary
nativism that began in central and eastern Europe, and is now washing across
much of the world.
沒有任何一種單一因素可以解釋，為何在21世紀的第二個十年裡如此眾多不同地區的國家
會出現威權主義反自由主義浪潮。但人們對自由民主主義神聖地位以及政治上的全面模仿
的厭惡與反感是一個重要因素。替代方案的缺失最有力地解釋了如今反西方情緒席捲後共
產主義社會的原因，而非從過去的威權主義中開始的全面轉型，也非歷史上根深蒂固的對
自由主義的仇視。“別無他法”這一論斷所傳遞出的自負是當今起源於中東歐的民粹主義
排外情緒和反動本土主義浪潮的重要推手，現在這種浪潮正在橫掃全世界。
When the cold war ended, racing to join the west was the shared mission of
central and eastern Europeans. Indeed, becoming indistinguishably western was
arguably the principal aim of the revolutions of 1989. The enthusiastic
copying of western models, accompanied as it was by the evacuation of Soviet
troops from the region, was initially experienced as liberation. But after
two troubled decades, the downsides of this politics of imitation became too
obvious to deny. As resentment seethed, illiberal politicians rose in
popularity and, in Hungary and Poland, acceded to power.
冷戰結束時，爭相加入西方是中東歐國家的共同使命。事實上，變得與西方難以分辨正是
1989年革命的首要目標。伴隨著蘇聯軍隊撤出中東歐，對西方模式的熱切照搬起初看起來
像是解放。但在經歷了動盪的三十年後，這種模仿式政治的弊端暴露無遺。憤怒之火熊熊
燃燒，非自由主義政客開始獲得民眾支持，在匈牙利和波蘭，他們甚至已經開始掌權。
In the first years after 1989, liberalism was generally associated with the
ideals of individual opportunity, freedom to move and to travel, unpunished
dissent, access to justice and government responsiveness to public demands.
By 2010, the central and eastern European versions of liberalism had been
indelibly tainted by two decades of rising social inequality, pervasive
corruption and the morally arbitrary redistribution of public property into
the hands of small number of people. The economic crisis of 2008 had bred a
deep distrust of business elites and the casino capitalism that, writ large,
almost destroyed the world financial order.
1989年之後最初的幾年裡，自由主義就是個人機遇、遷徙和旅行自由、不受懲罰的異見、
獲得公正以及政府對公共需求的責任的同義詞。但在2010年時，20多年來不平等日益加劇
，腐敗深入社會機體，公共財富被少數人肆意侵吞，中東歐地區自由主義的願景已黯淡無
光。2008年經濟危機更是加深了人們對商務精英和幾乎摧毀世界金融秩序的賭場資本主義
的不信任感。
Liberalism’s reputation in the region never recovered from 2008. The
financial crisis greatly weakened the case, still being made by a handful of
western-trained economists, for continuing to imitate American-style
capitalism. Confidence that the political economy of the west was a model for
the future of mankind had been linked to the belief that western elites knew
what they were doing. Suddenly it was obvious that they did not. This is why
2008 had such a shattering ideological, not merely economic, effect.
自由主義在該地區的名聲從此一落千丈。金融危機惡化了局勢，一群西方訓練出來的、仍
在繼續模仿美式資本主義的經濟學家還在把局面變得更糟。西方政治經濟模式是人類未來
的這種自信，是建立在西方精英們理解自己行為的基礎上的。突然之間他們顯然開始無法
理解自己的行為了。所以2008年經濟危機不僅對經濟造成了重大影響，還對意識形態產生
了驚人的影響。
Another reason why central and eastern populists have got away with
exaggerating the dark sides of European liberalism is that the passage of
time has erased from the collective memory the even darker sides of European
illiberalism. Meanwhile, the ruling illiberal parties in central and eastern
Europe, such as the Civic Alliance (Fidesz) in Hungary and Law and Justice
party (PiS) in Poland, seek to discredit liberal principles and institutions
in order to deflect from legitimate charges of corruption and abuse of power.
To justify dismantling the independent press and judiciary, they claim that
they are defending the nation against “foreign-hearted” enemies.
中東歐民粹主義理論家們不再誇大歐洲自由主義黑暗面的另一個原因，是時間已經抹平了
人民對於歐洲非自由主義更加黑暗的一面的集體記憶。同時，中東歐地區掌權的非自由主
義政黨，例如匈牙利的公民聯盟（Civic Alliance, Fidesz）和波蘭的法律與正義黨（
PiS）試圖用抹黑自由主義理念和制度的方式來把人民的注意力從腐敗和權力濫用面臨的
指控上轉移開。為了給他們打壓獨立媒體和獨立司法的行為找藉口，他們辯稱這樣做是為
了保護國家免受“具有異心”的敵人的攻擊。
Yet focusing on the corruption and deviousness of illiberal governments in
the region will not help us understand the sources of popular support for
national populist parties. The origins of populism are undoubtedly complex.
But they partly lie in the humiliations associated with the uphill struggle
to become, at best, an inferior copy of a superior model. Discontent with the
“transition to democracy” in the post-communist years was also inflamed by
visiting foreign “evaluators” who had little grasp of local realities.
These experiences combined to produce a nativist reaction in the region, a
reassertion of “authentic” national traditions allegedly suffocated by
ill-fitting western forms. The post-national liberalism associated with EU
enlargement allowed aspiring populists to claim exclusive ownership of
national traditions and national identity.
但是僅僅關注這一地區非自由主義政府的腐敗與齷齪還不足以理解民眾支持民族民粹主義
政黨上台的原因。民粹主義的淵源無疑十分複雜。但其中的部分原因是這些國家努力地想
照搬一種更加優越的模式，卻最多只是拙劣的抄襲，最終引發了人民的羞辱感。他們對後
共產主義時代的“民主轉型”的不滿也由一群不瞭解當地情況的外國“評價人”所引發。
這些因素共同促成了該地區本土文化保護主義（也稱作本土主義）的形成，他們要復興被
弊病百出的西式文化所窒息的“純正的”民族傳統。與歐盟東擴相關的後民族主義時代的
自由主義，給了雄心勃勃的民粹主義者機會，宣稱他們對民族傳統和民族身份的排他性的
佔有。
This was the mainspring of the anti-liberal revolt in the region. But a
subsidiary factor was the unargued assumption that, after 1989, there were no
alternatives to liberal political and economic models. This presumption
spawned a contrarian desire to prove that there were, indeed, such
alternatives. Take Germany’s far-right populist party, Alternative für
Deutschland (AfD). As its name suggests, it was launched in response to
Angela Merkel’s offhand claim that her monetary policy was “alternativlos”
(“without alternative”). By describing the government’s proposal as the
only available option, she provoked an intense and implacable search for
alternatives. A similar backlash, provoked by the assumed normality of
post-nationalism, gave birth, in formerly communist countries, to an
anti-liberal, anti-globalist, anti-migrant and anti-EU revolt, exploited and
manipulated by populist demagogues who know how to demonise “inner enemies”
to mobilise public support.
這就是中東歐地區反自由主義運動的主要起因。但還有一個次要原因是1989年之後自由主
義政治經濟模式不存在替代品這一言之鑿鑿的論斷。這種論斷激發了證明替代模式存在的
反叛性情緒。以德國極右翼政黨德國選擇黨（AfD）為例。正如其名所示，該黨是為了回
應安哥拉‧默克爾漫不經心的所謂她的貨幣政策是“別無選擇”的說法。她將政府的議案
描述為唯一可行的做法激起了一股強烈的、堅決的尋找替代方案的情緒。相似的是，宣稱
後民族主義是普世的論斷在前共產主義國家同樣引發了反自由化、反全球化、反移民和反
歐盟運動，這些運動又被深諳妖魔化“內部敵人”，以俘獲民眾支持之道的民粹主義政客
所利用和操控了。
According to George Orwell, “All revolutions are failures, but they are not
all the same failure.” So, what kind of failure was the revolution of 1989,
given that its aim was western-style normality? To what extent was the
liberal revolution of 1989 responsible for the illiberal counter-revolution
unleashed two decades later?
喬治‧奧威爾曾說：“所有革命都是失敗的，但失敗的種類不同”。那麼1989年以西式普
世主義為目標的革命屬於哪種失敗？1989年革命又在多大程度上要為三十年後非自由主義
反革命運動負責？
The “velvet revolutions” that took place across central and eastern Europe
in 1989 were largely unmarred by the human suffering that is usually part of
root-and-branch political upheaval. Never before had so many deeply
entrenched regimes been simultaneously overthrown and replaced using
basically peaceable means. The left praised these velvet revolutions as
expressions of popular power. The right extolled them as both a triumph of
the free market over the command economy and the well-deserved victory of
free government over totalitarian dictatorship. American and pro-American
liberals, for their part, were proud to associate liberalism, routinely
ridiculed by leftist critics as an ideology geared towards maintaining the
status quo, with the romance of emancipating change. And, of course, these
largely nonviolent changes of regime in the east were vested with
world-historical significance since they marked the end of the cold war.
1989年發生在中東歐的“天鵝絨革命”中並未發生激烈政治動盪中通常伴隨的流血受傷事
件。之前從未有過根深蒂固的體制被以基本平和的手段推翻和替代的歷史。左翼讚揚天鵝
絨革命是“人民力量的展現”，右翼則歌頌其為自由市場對計畫經濟的勝利以及自由政府
對極權主義獨裁的勝利。美國和親美的自由派自豪地將自由主義和追求變革聯繫起來，而
自由主義一詞過去都被左翼批評為維持現狀的意識形態。自然而然地，這些發生在東歐的
、很大程度上是非暴力的政權更迭以其標誌著冷戰結束而被賦予了改變世界歷史的意義。
The non-violent nature of the revolutions of 1989 was not their only unique
feature. Given the prominent public role played at the time by creative
thinkers and savvy political activists such as Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia
and Adam Michnik in Poland, the events of 1989 are sometimes rem embered as
revolutions of the intellectuals. But what ensured that these revolutions
would remain “velvet” was a background hostility to utopias and political
experiments. Far from craving anything ingeniously new, the leading figures
in these revolutions aimed at overturning one system only in order to copy
another.
1989年革命的非暴力屬性並非其唯一的獨特性。像捷克斯洛伐克的維克拉夫‧哈維爾（
Vaclav Havel）、波蘭的亞當‧米基尼克（Adam Michnik）這樣有創見、有智慧的思想家
和政治活動家在1989年革命中扮演了重要的公共角色，因此這場革命有時也被稱為智者的
革命。但是確保這場革命保持“天鵝絨”的卻是從根本上敵視烏托邦和政治試驗的環境。
這場革命的領導人物並不渴望什麼全新的事物，他們的目標只是推翻現有體制然後去抄襲
另一種體制。
Germany’s foremost philosopher, Jürgen Habermas, warmly welcomed “the lack
of ideas that are either innovative or oriented towards the future” after
1989, since for him the central and eastern European revolutions were “
rectifying revolutions” or “catch-up revolutions”. Their goal was to
enable central and eastern European societies to gain what the western
Europeans already possessed.
德國最著名的哲學家尤爾根‧哈貝馬斯（Jürgen Habermas），熱切稱讚1989年之後“缺
乏創新或面向未來的思想”的狀況，因為對他而言中東歐革命是“修正式的革命”或“追
趕式的革命”。他們的目標是讓中東歐社會獲得西歐人已經擁有的東西。
Nor were central and eastern Europeans themselves, in 1989, dreaming of some
perfect world that had never existed. They were longing instead for a “
normal life” in a “normal country”. In the late 70s, when the German poet
Hans Magnus Enzensberger visited Hungary and spoke with some of the
best-known critics of the communist regime, what they told him was: “We are
not dissidents. We represent normality.” Michnik’s post-communist slogan
was “Liberty, Fraternity, Normality”. After decades of pretending to expect
a radiant future, the main goal of the dissidents was to live in the present
and to enjoy the pleasures of everyday life.
1989年，中東歐人民都沒有幻想過什麼從未存在過的完美世界。他們只是渴望在一個“正
常國家”過上“正常生活”。在70年代末，德國詩人漢斯‧馬格努斯‧恩岑斯貝格爾（
Hans Magnus Enzensberger）曾訪問匈牙利並與幾位最知名的抨擊共產主義的批評家進行
交談，他們告訴他：“我們不是異見者，我們代表正常狀態。”米基尼克的後共產主語宣
傳口號是“自由、博愛、常態”。這些異見者一直在假裝追求一個激進的未來，二十多年
後，他們的主要目標卻是活在當下、及時行樂。
Central European elites saw imitation of the west as a well-travelled pathway
to normality in this sense. But, encouraged by hopes of joining the EU, the
reformers underestimated the local impediments to liberalisation and
democratisation and overestimated the feasibility of importing fully
worked-out western models. The wave of anti-liberalism sweeping over central
Europe today reflects widespread popular resentment at the perceived slights
to national and personal dignity that this palpably sincere
reform-by-imitation project entailed.
在這個意義上，中歐的精英們將這種對西方的模仿視為通向正常化的捷徑。但是，改革者
們被加入歐盟的願景所蠱惑，他們低估了當地對自由化和民主化的抵制，也高估了輸入相
當成熟的西方模式的可行性。這場完全的抄襲式改革充滿了對國家和個人尊嚴的公然蔑視
，現在橫掃中歐的反自由主義浪潮反映了人們對於這種現狀的普遍反感。
In eastern and central Europe as a whole, euphoria at communism’s collapse
created the expectation that other radical improvements were in the offing.
Some thought it would suffice for communist officials to quit their posts in
order for central and eastern Europeans to wake up in different, freer, more
prosperous and, above all, more western countries. When rapid westernisation
did not magically materialise, an alternative solution began to gain favour.
Leaving with one’s family for the west became the preferred option.
在中東歐，對共產主義政權崩潰的讚美使得人們產生了一種其他徹底的進步也即將到來的
錯覺。有些人認為讓共產黨官員下台就可以在一夜之間讓中東歐人民生活在一個不同的、
更自由的、更繁榮的、更西化的國家。當西方化並未像魔法一般降臨時，一種替代性方案
逐漸獲得認可，那就是拖家帶口向西方移民。
Where once dissidents in countries such as Poland had associated emigration
to the west with treasonous capitulation and desertion, after 1989 that view
no longer made any sense. A revolution that defined its principal goal as
westernisation could offer no persuasive objections to westward emigration.
Why should a young Pole or Hungarian wait for his country to become one day
like Germany, when he can start working and raising a family in Germany
tomorrow? Democratic transitions in the region were basically a form of en
masse removal to the west, and so the choice was only to emigrate early and
individually or later and collectively.
曾經在波蘭這樣的國家移民西方等同於叛國、屈服和離棄，1989年之後這種看法便失去了
意義。一場將其目標定義為西方化的革命不可能再阻止人民向西移民。一個在現在的德國
可以養家餬口的青年波蘭人或匈牙利人，為什麼要等待他們的國家有一天變得像德國一樣
？中東歐地區的民主轉型基本上是一場大規模向西遷徙，所能做的選擇無非是早點移民還
是晚點移民，獨自移民還是集體移民。
Revolutions often force people to cross borders. After the French Revolution
in 1789, and again in 1917 after the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia, the
defeated enemies of the revolutions were the ones who left their countries.
After 1989, the winners of the velvet revolutions, not the losers, were the
ones who chose to decamp. Those most impatient to see their own countries
changed were also the ones most eager to plunge into the life of a free
citizenry, and were therefore the first to go to study, work and live in the
west.
革命通常會驅使人們跨越國境。1789年法國大革命之後，以及1917年布爾什維克奪權後，
革命中的失敗者都逃離了自己的國家。1989年天鵝絨革命之後，逃離的不是革命的失敗者
，而是勝利者。那些急不可耐地期盼自己國家發生改變的人正是最渴望融入自由公民生活
的人，因此也是第一批赴西方工作、留學和定居的人。
It is impossible to imagine that, after the victory of the Bolshevik
Revolution, Trotsky would have decided to enrol at Oxford to study. But this
is what the future Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban and many others did.
The revolutionaries of 1989 were strongly motivated to travel to the west in
order to observe up close how the kind of normal society they hoped to build
at home actually worked in practice.
我們幾乎不可能想像在布爾什維克革命勝利之後托洛茨基會決定去牛津大學留學，可這就
是後來出任匈牙利外交部長的維克多‧歐爾班（Viktor Orban）以及其他許多人的選擇。
1989年革命中的革命家們熱切盼望去西方旅行，以便近距離觀察他們渴望在自己國家建立
的正常社會到底是怎樣實際運作的。
The massive flow of population out of the region in the post-cold war period,
especially because so many young people were the ones voting with their feet,
had profound economic, political and psychological consequences. When a
doctor leaves the country, she takes with her all the resources that the
state has invested in her education and deprives her country of her talent
and ambition. The money that she would eventually send back to her family
could not possibly compensate for the loss of her personal participation in
the life of her native land.
後冷戰時代中東歐地區大規模的人口流出，尤其是那些用腳投票的年輕人，產生了深遠的
經濟、政治和心理影響。當一位博士離開其祖國時，他就帶走了他的祖國曾在其身上投入
的所有教育資源，也把他的才智和抱負帶出了祖國。他最終向其家人匯回的錢遠遠不能彌
補他缺席其在祖國的個人參與所造成的損失。
The exodus of young and well-educated people has also seriously, perhaps
fatally, damaged the chances of liberal parties to do well in elections.
Youth exit may also explain why, in many countries across the region, we find
beautiful EU-funded playgrounds with no kids to play in them. It is telling
that liberal parties perform best among voters who cast their ballots abroad.
In 2014, for example, Klaus Iohannis, a liberal-minded ethnic German, was
elected president of Romania because the 300,000 Romanians living overseas
voted massively in his favour. In a country where the majority of young
people yearn to leave, the very fact that you have remained, regardless of
how well you are doing, makes you feel like a loser.
年輕人和受過良好教育人群的大規模遷出，或許嚴重地而致命性地削弱了自由主義政黨在
選舉中取得高票數的可能性。年輕人的離開也許可以解釋為何在這一地區的許多國家我們
看不到有孩子在歐盟資助修建的操場上玩耍的場景。自由主義政黨在國外投票者中表現良
好這一現實便是生動寫照。例如在2014年，一位名叫克勞斯‧艾奧漢尼斯（Klaus
Iohannis）的持自由主義政見的德國人在30萬名移居國外的羅馬尼亞人的強烈支持下當選
為羅馬尼亞總統。在一個多數年輕人渴望離開的國家，只要你留在本國不走，無論你做的
有多好，都讓你感覺自己是個失敗者。
The issues of emigration and population loss bring us to the refugee crisis
that struck Europe in 2015–16. On 24 August 2015, Merkel, the German
chancellor, decided to admit hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees into
Germany. Only 10 days later, on 4 September, the Visegrad group – the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – declared that the EU’s quota
system for distributing refugees across Europe was “unacceptable”. Central
and east European governments were not buying Merkel’s humanitarian
rhetoric. “I think it is just bullshit,” commented Maria Schmidt, Viktor
Orban’s intellectual-in-chief.
移民與人口流失使我們想起2015-2016年困擾歐洲的難民問題。2015年8月24日，德國總理
默克爾決定接納數萬名敘利亞難民進入德國。僅僅10天之後的9月4日，捷克共和國、匈牙
利、波蘭、斯洛伐克在維謝格拉德（Visegrad，匈牙利小鎮）宣佈歐盟在歐洲各國對難民
實施的配額制是“不可接受的”。中東歐國家的政府對默克爾的人道主義說辭並不買賬。
“一派胡言”，維克多‧歐爾班（Viktor Orban）的首席智囊馬里亞‧施密特（Maria
Schmidt）評論道。
This was the moment when central Europe’s populists issued their declaration
of independence not only from Brussels but also, more dramatically, from
western liberalism and its ethos of openness to the world. Central Europe’s
fearmongering populists interpreted the refugee crisis as conclusive evidence
that liberalism weakened the capacity of nations to defend themselves in a
hostile world.
中歐民粹主義者們宣佈其不僅要脫離歐盟，甚至更要戲劇性地脫離西方自由主義及其向世
界開放的價值觀。這些善於製造恐慌的中東歐民粹主義政客們宣稱難民危機有力地證明了
自由主義動搖國家在動盪世界中的自衛能力。
The demographic panic that raged in central Europe from 2015 to 2018 is now
fading to a degree. We still need to ask in any case why it would find such
politically combustible material in central and eastern Europe, given that
virtually no immigrants actually arrived in these countries.
2015至2018年蔓延中歐的公眾恐慌目前已消退了大半，但我們仍需要追問為何這種情緒能
在中東歐地區找到如此具有政治破壞性的落腳點，即使難民們並未實際踏足這些國家。
The first reason, as mentioned, is emigration. Anxiety about immigration is
fomented by a fear that supposedly unassimilable foreigners will enter the
country, dilute national identity and weaken national cohesion. This fear, in
turn, is fuelled by a largely unspoken preoccupation with demographic
collapse. In the period 1989–2017, Latvia haemorrhaged 27% of its
population, Lithuania 22.5%, and Bulgaria almost 21%. In Romania, 3.4 million
people, a vast majority of them younger than 40, left the country after it
joined the EU in 2007. The combination of an ageing population, low birth
rates and an unending stream of emigration is arguably the source of
demographic panic in central and eastern Europe. More central and eastern
Europeans left their countries for western Europe as a result of the 2008-9
financial crises than all the refugees that came there as the result of the
war in Syria.
如上所述，第一個原因便是移民。許多人害怕無法融入當地的外國人將會進入國土，削弱
民族身份，動搖國家團結，這種恐懼進一步發酵了他們對移民的焦慮。一種對人口銳減的
無名的擔憂又反過來加劇了這種恐懼。1989年至2017年間，拉脫維亞的人口下降了27%，
立陶宛人口下降了22.5%，保加利亞人口則下降了21%。在羅馬尼亞，站到40歲以下人口的
大多數的340萬人年輕人在羅馬尼亞2007年加入歐盟後離開了祖國。人口老齡化、低生育
率和源源不斷的移民毫無疑問地引發了中東歐地區的人口恐慌。2008-2009年因金融危機
而離開中東歐國家的人數實際上多於因敘利亞戰爭而逃入該地區的難民數量。
The extent of post-1989 emigration from eastern and central Europe, awakening
fears of national disappearance, helps explain the deeply hostile reaction
across the region to the refugee crisis of 2015-16, even though very few
refugees have relocated to the countries of the region. We might even
hypothesise that anti-immigration politics in a region essentially without
immigrants is an example of what some psychologists call displacement – a
defence mechanism by which, in this case, minds unconsciously blot out a
wholly unacceptable threat and replace it with one still serious but
conceivably easier to manage. Hysteria about non-existent immigrants about to
overrun the country represents the substitution of an illusory danger
(immigration) for the real danger (depopulation and demographic collapse)
that cannot speak its name.
1989年革命之後中東歐地區大規模的移民引發了國家將會消失的恐懼，這就很好地解釋了
2015-2016年為何他們在並未有多少難民實際進入該地區時就對難民懷有如此深的敵意。
我們可以假設，該地區這種沒有難民的反難民政治實際上是心理學家所稱的一種心理現象
——替代。這是一種防禦機制，在難民的語境下，人們在心裡無意識地屏蔽掉了一個完全
不可接受的威脅並將其替代為一個依舊嚴重但更容易接受的威脅。對並不存在的難民將橫
行國家的歇斯底里的情緒表明一種幻想的危險（難民）代替了真正的、不可言說的危險（
人口銳減）。
Fear of diversity and fear of change, inflamed by the utopian project of
remaking whole societies along western lines, are thus important contributors
to eastern and central European populism. The trauma of people pouring out of
the region explains what might otherwise seem mysterious – the strong sense
of loss even in countries that have benefited handsomely from post-communist
political and economic change. Across Europe, analogously, the areas that
have suffered the greatest haemorrhaging of population in the last decades
are the ones most inclined to vote for far-right parties.
對多樣性和變化的恐懼，在以西方標準重塑社會的烏托邦工程的推動下，由此成為了中東
歐地區民粹主義的誘因。人口流出所帶來的創痛解釋了這些國家強烈的失落感，即使它們
曾經受益於後共產主義時代的政治經濟劇變。相似地，最近三十年裡飽受嚴重人口流失摧
殘的歐洲國家，也是最偏向極右翼政黨的國家。
Eastern European governments, haunted by the fear of demographic collapse,
are looking for reasons why their discontented citizens, especially their
youth, should hesitate to move to western Europe. Orban sometimes sounds as
if he would like to implement a closed-country policy with a ruthlessly
enforced veto on emigration as well as immigration. But since he has no way
of doing anything of the sort, he is reduced to pleading with young
Hungarians not to move away. How to convince young Hungarians that they will
not find a better homeland in the west, especially when Orban’s own policies
are destroying most chances for living rewarding and creative lives inside
the country?
被人口流失弄得焦頭爛額的東歐國家政府在竭力尋找理由勸阻心懷不滿的公民，特別是青
少年移民西歐。歐爾班有時候在暗示他可能會強行動用否決權來實施閉關鎖國政策，從而
阻止人們遷出和遷入。但他並沒有任何這樣的權力，只得哀求匈牙利青年人不要出走。可
是要怎樣才能勸說年輕人們去了西方也不會找到更好的國度呢？要知道他自己的政策可是
在摧毀民眾在本國國內過上幸福生活的機會啊！
Populists in Warsaw and Budapest seem to have turned the refugee crisis in
the west into a branding opportunity for the east. Citizens will stop leaving
for the west only if the west loses its allure. Dispraising the west and
declaring its institutions “not worth imitating” can be explained as
imaginary revenge born of resentment. But it has the collateral benefit of
serving the region’s number one policy priority, by helping discourage
emigration. Populists rail against the way western Europe has welcomed
Africans and Middle Easterners. But their real complaint is that western
members of the EU have opened their doors invitingly to central and eastern
Europeans themselves, potentially depriving the region of its most productive
citizens.
波蘭和匈牙利的民粹主義者們似乎將西方的難民危機看作是東方藉機進行自我宣傳的自會
。只有當西方失去其吸引力時公民們才會停止移民西方。批評西方並稱其制度為“不值得
模仿”可以解釋為是因憤恨而生的一種想像出來的復仇。但是這也給政府的頭號政策目標
帶來了附帶的收益，那就是遏制移民。民粹主義者們怒斥西歐人對待非洲人和中東人的方
式，但他們真正的訴求，是讓歐盟的西歐成員國們向他們自己這些中東歐人敞開大門，而
這有可能會將這一地區最有創造力的人群拒之門外。
This entire discussion brings us to a core idea of contemporary illiberalism.
Contrary to many contemporary theorists, populist rage is directed less at
multiculturalism than at individualism and cosmopolitanism. This is an
important point politically because, if accepted, it implies that populism
cannot be combatted by abandoning multiculturalism in the name of
individualism and cosmopolitanism. For the illiberal democrats of eastern and
central Europe, the gravest threat to the survival of the white Christian
majority in Europe is the incapacity of western societies to defend
themselves. They cannot defend themselves because the reigning individualism
and cosmopolitanism allegedly blinds them to the threats they face.
以上全部論述已逐漸接近當代非自由主義的核心主張。和許多當代理論家的見解不同，本
文主張民粹主義的憤怒主要不是指向文化多元主義的，而是更多地指向個人主義和普世主
義。這是一條重要的政治觀點，如果接受它的話，那麼這意味著打著個人主義和普世主義
的旗號來拋棄文化多元主義將起不到抑制民粹主義的作用。對中東歐的非自由主義民主黨
人來說，對佔據歐洲人主體的基督徒白人最嚴峻的威脅是西方社會無法有效保護自身。他
們無法保護自己是因為佔據統治地位的個人主義和普世主義將他們的雙眼矇蔽了，讓他們
看不見他們正面臨的威脅。
Illiberal democracy promises to open citizens’ eyes. If the liberal
consensus of the 1990s was about individual legal and constitutional rights,
the anti-liberal consensus today is that the rights of the threatened white
Christian majority are in mortal danger. To protect this besieged majority’s
fragile dominance from the insidious alliance of Brussels and Africa, the
argument goes, Europeans need to replace the watery individualism and
universalism foisted on them by liberals with a muscular identity politics or
group particularism of their own. This is the logic with which Orban and the
leader of PiS in Poland, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, have tried to inflame the inner
xenophobic nationalism of their countrymen.
非自由主義民主制則主張開啟民智。如果1990年自由主義的共識是個人的憲法和法律權利
，那麼今日反自由主義的共識則是處於危險之中的基督徒白人主體正面臨滅頂之災。這些
政黨主張，如果要將危如累卵的白人主體的統治從歐盟與非洲的卑鄙陰謀中解救出來，歐
洲人需要將自由主義強加給他們的羸弱的個人主義和普世主義，替換為強有力的身份政治
和他們自己的族群特殊論。這正是奧本和波蘭法律與正義黨（PiS）領袖加羅斯洛‧卡克
辛斯基（Jaroslaw Kaczynski）用來煽動國民的排外民族主義的邏輯。
The ultimate revenge of the central and eastern European populists against
western liberalism is not merely to reject the idea of imitating the west,
but to invert it. We are the real Europeans, Orban and Kaczynski repeatedly
claim, and if the west will save itself, it will have to imitate the east. As
Orban said in a speech in July 2017: “Twenty-seven years ago here in Central
Europe, we believed that Europe was our future; today we feel that we are the
future of Europe.”
中東歐民粹主義者對西方自由主義的終極報復並不僅僅是拒絕模仿西方，而是要把形勢逆
轉過來。歐爾班和卡克辛斯基反覆強調，他們才是真正的歐洲人，如果西歐想拯救自己就
必須模仿東歐。正如歐爾班在2017年7月的一次演講中所說：“在27年前的中歐，我們相
信歐洲是我們的未來，但現在我們認為我們才是歐洲的未來。”