Why Is the United States So Bad at Foreign Policy?
為什麼美國外交政策如此糟糕？
原文：Foreign Policy https://tinyurl.com/wdfgotd
STEPHEN M. WALT
哈佛大學國際關係教授
In my last column, I described the “brain-dead” qualities of the Trump
administration’s approach to the Middle East and especially Iran. In
particular, I stressed that the administration had no real strategy—if by
that term one means a set of clear objectives, combined with a coherent plan
of action to achieve them that takes the anticipated reactions of others into
account.
在我的上一專欄中，我描述了川普政府對中東，尤其是伊朗採取行動的“腦殘”特質。我
特別強調，政府沒有真正的戰略。戰略在這裡指的是一個明確的目標，再加上為實現這些
目標而製定的一致行動計劃，其中包括要考慮到其他人的預期反應。
What we have instead is brute force coercion, divorced from clear objectives
and implemented by an ignorant president with poor impulse control. After
nearly three years in office, President Donald Trump has managed to increase
the risk of war, push Iran to gradually restart its nuclear program, provoke
Iraq into asking the United States to prepare to leave, raise serious doubts
about U.S. judgment and reliability, alarm allies in Europe, and make Russia
and China look like fonts of wisdom and order. The Trump administration has
made it clear that it thinks assassinating foreign officials is a legitimate
tool of foreign policy and that war criminals should be lionized, a move that
nasty governments are likely to welcome and imitate.
相反，我們所採用的是暴力高壓的手段，與明確的目標背道而馳，並由衝動、控制力薄弱
且無知總統批准實施。任職近三年後，川普成功地增大了戰爭風險，推動伊朗逐步重啟核
計畫，促使伊拉克要求美國準備撤軍，讓世界對美國的判斷力和可靠性提出了嚴重懷疑，
且令歐洲盟友感到驚恐，使俄羅斯和中國看起來更代表智慧和秩序。川普政府已經明確表
川普政府已經明確表示，它認為暗殺外國官員是外交政策的合法工具，應該讓戰爭罪犯更
出名，這一舉動可能讓那些令人討厭的國家也因此而模仿。
Unfortunately, this strategic myopia goes well beyond the Middle East.
遺憾的是，這種戰略上的短視遠遠不止於中東。
Take, for example, the far more important issue of China. To its credit, the
Trump administration recognizes that China is the only possible peer
competitor that the United States is likely to face for many decades. This
realization is no great feat of genius, however. Reasonable people can
disagree about the magnitude of the China challenge, but only a blind person
could miss the worrisome implications of China’s rise.
以中國這個更為重要的議題為例。值得讚揚的是，川普政府認識到中國是美國數十年來可
能面臨的唯一競爭者。然而，這種認識並不是什麼天才的洞見。任何理性人都可以對中國
造成的挑戰持不同意見，但只有盲人才會錯過中國崛起帶來的令美國人擔憂的影響。
If you thought strategically, you’d start looking for ways to limit Chinese
influence at the least cost and risk to the United States itself. You’d
understand that the United States cannot halt or reverse Chinese economic
growth (and certainly not without hurting itself), but you’d work hard to
keep as many countries as possible on its side on the issues that matter,
including advanced technology. In fact, you’d get serious about trying to
prevent China from achieving a dominant position in potentially game-changing
technologies like quantum computing and artificial intelligence. You’d be
focused laserlike on maintaining a solid diplomatic position in Asia, and
over time, you’d be looking for ways to drive a wedge between China and
Russia, too. And you’d try hard not to get distracted by secondary issues
and waste time, attention, political capital, or resources on them.
如果你從戰略上考慮，你就會開始尋找方法，以最小的成本和風險，限制中國對美國自身
的影響。你會明白，美國不能阻止或逆轉中國的經濟增長（除非同時傷害自己），但你會
努力讓儘可能多的國家在重要問題上站在自己這一邊，其中包括先進技術。事實上，你會
認真地試圖阻止中國在諸如量子計算和人工智能等可能改變遊戲規則的技術中取得主導地
位。你會專注於在亞洲保持穩固的外交地位，隨著時間的推移，你也會尋找在中國和俄羅
斯之間製造隔閡的方法。你會努力避免被次要問題分心，浪費時間、注意力、政治資本或
資源。
What has the United States done instead?
美國做了什麼呢？
For starters, Trump abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a slap in the
face to the 11 Asia-Pacific countries that had worked hard to reach an
agreement that would have provided some modest economic benefits and kept
them more closely linked to the U.S. economy. Then Trump launched his own
trade war with China. But instead of lining up other key economic powers, he
threatened or waged trade wars with most of them, too. Instead of presenting
China with a united front, the United States has been facing China more or
less alone, with substantially reduced leverage. The predictable result: a
face-saving trade compromise that rolls back the clock and no progress on the
real bones of contention with Beijing.
首先，川普放棄了跨太平洋夥伴關係 (TPP)，這是搧了11個努力達成協議的亞太國家一記
耳光。這些國家本來可以提供適度的經濟利益，並與美國經濟保持更緊密的聯繫。然後川
普與中國展開了自己的貿易戰。但他並未與其他關鍵經濟大國結盟，反而是威脅或與其中
大多數國家發動貿易戰。美國並沒有向中國展示統一戰線，而是或多或少地獨自面對中國
，大大降低了槓桿。可預見的結果是：一個滿足面子的貿易妥協，拖延了一些時間，但在
與北京的真正競爭中沒有進展。
Next, Trump began his reality show approach to North Korea: at first
threatening “fire and fury” and then getting bamboozled by Kim Jong Un’s
empty promises at their initial meeting. The result: no breakthrough in U.S.
relations with North Korea, no halt to its nuclear program, and, across Asia,
diminished confidence in U.S. judgment.
接下來，川普開始了他對朝鮮的真人秀方式：起初威脅“怒火加交”，然後在第一次會議
上被金正恩的空洞承諾所迷惑。結果是：美國與朝鮮的關係沒有取得突破，朝鮮的核計畫
沒有停止，亞洲各國對美國的判斷力失去信心。
Meanwhile, Trump has spent most of the past three years gratuitously
insulting key U.S. allies in Europe and threatening to pull the country out
of NATO. Surprise, surprise: When U.S. officials then tried to convince
America’s allies not to buy Chinese technology—and especially Huawei 5G
digital equipment—they got the brushoff from governments that were now in no
mood to do Trump any favors. Chinese diplomats seeking to preserve Huawei’s
position have been quick to take advantage of Trump’s repeated blunders,
telling European officials that they are more committed to multilateralism
and technological openness than the United States is and highlighting their
support for the Paris climate agreement (another deal that Trump foolishly
abandoned). According to Julianne Smith of the German Marshall Fund of the
United States: “The Chinese have started brazenly claiming that it is China,
not the United States, that shares more values with Europe. [They] also
frequently remind European audiences that unlike the United States, China
believes in climate change and multilateralism, a message that is especially
powerful in a place like Germany.”
與此同時，川普在過去三年的大部分時間裡毫無理由地侮辱了美國在歐洲的主要盟友，並
威脅要退出北約。令人驚訝的是：當美國官員試圖說服美國的盟友不要購買中國的技術，
特別是華為的5G數字設備時，他們遭到了該政府的抵制，這些政府現在沒有心情幫川普任
何忙。尋求保住華為地位的中國外交官迅速利用川普的一再失誤，告訴歐洲官員他們比美
國更致力於多邊主義和技術開放，並強調他們支持巴黎氣候協議（這是被川普愚蠢放棄的
另一項協議）。據美國的德國馬歇爾基金會的朱莉安·史密斯說：“中國人開始毫不掩飾
地宣稱與歐洲分享更多價值的是中國，而不是美國。（他們）還經常提醒歐洲聽眾，中國
與美國不同，相信氣候變化和多邊主義，這一信息在德國這樣的地方尤其有說服力。”
Now consider this: At a moment when the U.S. State Department is in free
fall, China is upping its game. China now has more embassies, consulates, and
other diplomatic posts than the United States does and in an era where the
future alignment of a number of important countries could be up for grabs.
According to former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State William Burns: “We’ve
entered an era in which diplomacy matters more than ever, on an intensely
competitive international landscape. … China realizes that and is rapidly
expanding its diplomatic capacity. The U.S., by contrast, seems intent on
unilateral diplomatic disarmament.” As I’ve noted before, any hope of
balancing China in Asia requires the United States to preserve solid ties to
an unwieldy coalition of Asian states, and that will require knowledgeable,
sophisticated, patient, and dedicated diplomacy as least as much as credible
military forces.
現在考慮一下：在美國國務院處於自由落體狀態時，中國正在提升自己的博奕地位。中國
現在擁有比美國更多的大使館、領事館和其他外交職位，不久的未來，一些重要國家的結
盟可能會被搶佔。據美國前副國務卿威廉·伯恩斯說：“我們已經進入了一個外交比以往
任何時候都更重要的時代，在激烈競爭的國際格局中。中國認識到這一點，並正在迅速擴
大其外交能力。相比之下，美國似乎有意進行單方面的外交撤守。”正如我之前所指出的
那樣，任何想要平衡中國在亞洲的實力的想法，都需要美國與一個龐大的亞洲國家聯盟保
持牢固的聯繫，而這將需要知識淵博、老練、耐心和專注的外交，至少需要可信的軍事力
量。
Lastly, instead of conducting a measured and gradual disengagement from the
Middle East, and returning to the balance-of-power approach that the United
States employed successfully from World War II to the end of the Cold War,
Trump has allowed local client states, wealthy donors, and hawkish advisors
to drag him back into a pointless confrontation with Iran. One can only
imagine the knowing smiles of foreign-policy mavens in Beijing as they watch
the United States stumble toward yet another quagmire of its own making.
最後，川普沒有進行有節制的逐步脫離中東，並回到美國從二戰到冷戰結束間成功採用的
權力平衡方針，反而是讓當地附庸國、富有的捐助者和鷹派顧問將他拖回到與伊朗毫無意
義的對抗中。人們只能想像當看到美國陷入另一個自己製造的泥潭時，北京外交政策專家
們會露出怎樣的微笑。
In short, despite recognizing that the China challenge was the most important
item on America’s foreign-policy agenda—with the possible exception of
climate change itself—Trump and company have pursued a series of policies
that almost seem tailor-made to give China as many advantages as possible.
簡言之，儘管認識到中國的挑戰是美國外交政策議程上除了氣候變化最重要的項目，川普
團隊仍然採取了一系列政策，這些政策似乎都是為了給中國儘可能多的優勢而量身定做的
。
But that’s not the bad news. Though the Trump administration may have taken
the “no strategy” approach to a new level, this problem has been apparent
for some time. Bill Clinton thought the United States could expand NATO
eastward, contain Iraq and Iran simultaneously, bring China into the World
Trade Organization prematurely, and promote hyperglobalization with abandon
yet never face serious negative consequences. George W. Bush believed ending
tyranny and evil forever should be the central goal of U.S. foreign policy
and thought the U.S. military could quickly transform the Middle East into a
sea of pro-American democracies. Clinton was luckier than Bush, insofar as
the negative consequences of his actions did not emerge until after he had
left office, but neither president’s actions left the United States in a
stronger global position.
但這早已不是新聞。儘管川普政府可能已經將“無戰略”方針提高到了一個新的水平，這
一問題已經出現了一段時間。比爾·柯林頓認為美國可以向東擴張北約，同時遏制伊拉克
和伊朗，過早地將中國納入世界貿易組織，並促進過度全球化，但永遠不會面臨嚴重的負
面後果。喬治·W·布希認為，永久地消滅暴政和邪惡應該是美國外交政策的中心目標，
並認為美軍可以迅速把中東變成一片親美民主的海洋。柯林頓比布希更幸運，因為他的行
為的負面後果直到卸任後才出現，但兩位總統的行為都沒有讓美國處於更強大的全球地位
。
Barack Obama had a more realistic view of U.S. power and placed more weight
on diplomacy, but he did little to reduce America’s military involvement
overseas and fully backed the energetic use of U.S. military power. Obama
sent more troops to Afghanistan in 2009, supported regime change in Libya and
Syria, and expanded targeted killings of suspected terrorists with drones or
special operations forces. His administration failed to anticipate Russia’s
reaction to Western efforts to bring Ukraine closer to the European Union and
NATO, and he proved unable to unite the country behind his approach to
climate change or Iran. Nor should we forget that in his last year in office,
the U.S. military dropped more than 26,000 bombs in seven different countries.
巴拉克·歐巴馬對於美國的實力有著更為現實的看法，並且在外交上更加重視，但他在減
少美國在海外的軍事介入方面做得很少，完全支持大力使用美國的軍事實力。歐巴馬2009
年向阿富汗增派部隊，支持利比亞和敘利亞政權更迭，並擴大使用無人機或特種作戰部隊
定點清除恐怖嫌疑人。他的政府沒能預料到俄羅斯對西方將烏克蘭拉向歐盟和北約時的反
應，而且事實證明他無法讓國家團結起來支持他的氣候變化方針或對伊朗協議。我們也不
應該忘記，在他上任的最後一年，美軍在七個不同的國家投下了超過2.6萬枚炸彈。
What’s going on here? When did the United States get so bad at strategy?
Foreign policy is a challenging enterprise where uncertainties are rife and
mistakes are sometimes inevitable. But an inability to think strategically isn
’t hard-wired into American DNA. The Truman administration faced enormous
challenges in the aftermath of World War II, but it came up with containment,
the Marshall Plan, NATO, a set of bilateral alliances in Asia, and a set of
economic institutions that served the United States and its allies well for
decades. Similarly, the first Bush administration (1989-1993) managed the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the peaceful reunification of Germany, and the
first Gulf War with considerable subtlety, expertise, and restraint. Neither
administration was perfect, but their handling of complex and novel
circumstances showed a sure grasp of what was most important and the ability
to elicit the responses they wanted from both allies and adversaries. In
other words, they were good at strategy.
這是怎麼回事？美國什麼時候變得如此不善於制訂戰略？外交政策是一項具有挑戰性的事
業，其中充滿了不確定性，有時錯誤是不可避免的。美國並非從來沒有過戰略性思考。杜
魯門政府在二戰結束後面臨巨大挑戰，但該政府推出了在數十年裡造福美國及其盟友的遏
制政策、馬歇爾計畫、北約、在亞洲的一系列雙邊聯盟以及一系列經濟機構。同樣，老布
希政府以相當微妙、專業和克制的手法操控了蘇聯的解體、德國的和平統一和第一次海灣
戰爭。這兩個政府都不完美，但他們對複雜而新穎的環境的處理表明，他們確實掌握了什
麼是最重要的，並有能力從盟友和對手那裡得到他們想要的反應。換句話說，他們擅長戰
略。
Paradoxically, part of the problem today is the remarkable position of
primacy that the United States has enjoyed ever since the Cold War ended.
Because the United States is so powerful, wealthy, and secure, it is mostly
insulated from the consequences of its own actions. When it makes mistakes,
most of the costs are borne by others, and it hasn’t faced a peer competitor
that might be quick to take advantage of mistakes. The Iraq and Afghanistan
wars may ultimately cost more than $6 trillion and thousands of soldiers’
lives, but the lack of a draft limits public concerns about casualties, and
the United States is paying for all of these wars by borrowing the money
abroad, running up bigger deficits, and sticking future generations with the
bill.
矛盾的是，今天的問題之一是美國自冷戰結束以來一直享有的顯著首要地位。因為美國如
此強大、富有和安全，所以基本不受自身行為後果的影響。美國犯錯的時候，付出大部分
代價的是其他國家，美國尚未遇到一個可以迅速利用錯誤的勢均力敵的競爭對手。伊拉克
和阿富汗戰爭最終可能造成6兆美元以上的損失，以及成千上萬的士兵生命，但志願兵制
限制了公眾對傷亡的擔憂。美國正在通過向國外借錢、增加更大的赤字以及讓子孫後代還
錢，來為所有這些戰爭買單。
This situation helps explain why few Americans are interested in what is
happening overseas or what the U.S. government is doing about it. According
to Diane Hessen, who has been conducting in-depth interviews with a panel of
500 Americans since 2016, “most voters don’t care much [about foreign
policy], and that’s a problem.” Other recent surveys have asked Americans
to list their top priorities, and foreign policy doesn’t even make the top
10. When most Americans can’t tell the difference between success and failure
—at least in terms of immediate, tangible consequences—then policymakers
will be under less pressure to come up with strategies that actually work and
posturing will take precedence over actual performance.
這種情況有助於解釋為什麼很少有美國人對海外發生的事情或者美國政府對此做了什麼感
興趣。據2016年以來對一個由500名美國人組成的小組進行深入訪談的戴安·海森說，“
大多數選民不太在乎（外交政策），這是個問題。”最近有調查要求美國人列出他們的首
要任務，外交政策甚至不能進入前10名。當大多數美國人無法分辨成功和失敗之間的區別
時——即使只考慮立即而實際的後果——那麼決策者就沒有壓力來制定出真正奏效的策略
，追求故作姿態將優先於實際表現。
And then there’s hubris. Americans have always seen themselves as a model
for others, and victory in the Cold War reinforced the belief that the United
States had the magic formula for success in the modern world. Moreover, they
also believed that almost everyone else around the world realized this and
couldn’t wait to follow their lead, join a U.S.-led world order, and
gradually become just like them. Convinced the tides of history were flowing
their way, U.S. leaders believed they were pushing on an open door. Who needs
a coherent, sophisticated, and carefully designed strategy when powerful
global trends were already pushing the world in the direction they wanted?
還有就是傲慢自大。美國人始終自視為他人的楷模，冷戰的勝利更堅定了美國擁有現代世
界神奇成功公式的信念。他們還認為，世界各地所有人都迫不及待地要效仿他們，加入美
國領導的世界秩序，並且逐漸變得跟他們一樣。美國領導人堅信他們符合歷史潮流，認為
他們正在推動一扇敞開的大門。當強大的全球趨勢已經在推動世界朝著他們希望的方向前
進時，誰還需要一項連貫、複雜和精心設計的戰略？
Moreover, as Paul Pillar explains in his important book Why America
Misunderstands the World, the United States’ unusual historical experience,
geographic isolation, large domestic market, and general ignorance has
weakened its ability to fashion viable foreign-policy strategies. Devising an
effective foreign-policy strategy requires anticipating how others are likely
to react, but government officials—let alone the public at large—frequently
know very little about the countries whose actions they are trying to
influence. In addition, the enduring myth of the “melting pot”—which
portrays immigrants to the United States as readily embracing a new American
identity and merging seamlessly into the fabric of U.S. society—leads the
country to discount the power of nationalism, ethnicity, and other enduring
sources of local identity, which in turn leads it to underestimating the
difficulty of state- or nation-building in diverse societies. Certain of its
own rectitude and noble intentions, the United States is equally slow to
recognize that other societies might have valid reasons to question its
motives or to see it as dangerous. Taken together, these blind spots are a
serious obstacle to the development of effective foreign-policy strategy,
especially toward parts of the world whose historical experiences and
cultural elements are dramatically different from its own.
此外，正如保羅·皮勒在其重要著作《為什麼美國誤解世界中》所解釋的那樣，美國不尋
常的歷史經驗、地理上的孤立、龐大的國內市場和普遍的無知削弱了其制定可行外交政策
戰略的能力。制定有效的外交政策戰略需要預見到其他國家可能會做出何種反應，但政府
官員——更不用說廣大公眾了——對於他們試圖影響哪些國家的行動知之甚少。此外，“
熔爐”的持久神話——將移民描繪成欣然接受新的美國身份並無縫地融入美國社會的結構
——導致該國低估了民族主義、種族和其他持久的地方身份來源的力量，這反過來又導致
它低估了在不同社會中建立國家的困難。同樣地，由於某些自以為的正直高尚，美國拒絕
承認其他社會也有正當的理由質疑其動機或認為其危險。綜合起來，這些盲點嚴重阻礙了
有效的外交政策戰略的發展，特別是對那些歷史經驗和文化元素與自身截然不同的地區。
Key features of the U.S. democratic system also make it harder to devise and
implement a coherent foreign and national security policy, especially when
there is no clear and present danger to focus the mind and impose discipline
on foreign-policy debates. When most of the public is indifferent, the policy
process is more easily captured by domestic and foreign lobbies, especially
in an era when money plays such a central role in politics. Instead of a
genuine marketplace of ideas where competing policy prescriptions are
carefully and honestly debated, foreign policy becomes an arena dominated by
the loudest and best-funded voices or the preferences of a small set of
wealthy donors. And as I’ve noted before, the United States is probably more
vulnerable to foreign influence than any great power in modern history. If a
bunch of these special interest groups get at least some of what they want
(e.g., a bigger defense budget, more attention to human rights, rejection of
climate change agreements, unconditional support for certain client states,
etc.), the ability to develop an overall strategy to benefit the nation as a
whole will erode. At best, the United States ends up overcommitted; at worst,
it ends up pursuing policies that are mutually contradictory and therefore
self-defeating.
美國民主制度的特點也加大了制訂和實施連貫外交與國安政策的難度，特別是在沒有當下
而明確的危險來集中注意力並有紀律地辯論外交政策的情況下。當大多數公眾漠不關心時
，政策流程更容易被國內外遊說集團掌控，在金錢政治掛帥的時代尤其如此。外交政策已
不是一個認真、誠實地辯論，相互競爭政策處方的真正思想市場，而是一個由最大聲、最
多錢支持的聲音或被一小撮富豪的喜好所主宰的競技場。正如我之前指出，美國可能比現
代史上的任何大國都更容易受到外國影響。如果這些特殊利益集團至少得到了他們想要的
一部分（例如，更大的國防預算，更多地關注人權，拒絕氣候變化協議，無條件支持某些
附庸國家等），制定有利於整個國家總體戰略的能力將受到侵蝕。最好的結果是美國無法
兌現承諾；最壞的情況是，它最終會推行相互矛盾從而弄巧成拙的政策。
Ideally, the institutions responsible for devising and conducting foreign
policy would also learn from experience over time. But as I’ve explored at
length elsewhere, there is little accountability in today’s foreign-policy
establishment. Bad ideas survive no matter how often they are disproved, and
people who get things wrong repeatedly routinely fail upward, while those who
get things right are often marginalized. Consider that the individuals and/or
groups that conceived, sold, and bungled the Iraq War remain respected
figures today, and some are considered eligible for future service. Consider
that the op-ed pages of the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, and
Washington Post actually increased the number of regular columnists who
supported that war yet still do not feature anyone who correctly anticipated
that it would be a disaster. If those who devise bad strategies pay no price
and those who propose better alternatives go unrecognized, why should anyone
expect the country to do better?
理想的情況是，負責制定和執行外交政策的機構也會隨著時間的推移吸取經驗。但正如我
在其他地方詳細探討的那樣，今天的外交政策體系中幾乎沒有問責制。糟糕的想法無論多
麼頻繁地被駁倒，都會存活下來，而那些把事情搞錯的人一再地失敗，那些把事情搞好的
人往往被邊緣化。考慮到那些構思、兜售和搞砸伊拉克戰爭的個人或團體今天仍然是受人
尊敬的人物，有些人甚至被認為有資格在未來進政府當官。想想看，《華爾街日報》、《
紐約時報》和《華盛頓郵報》的專欄文章實際上增加了支持這場戰爭的定期專欄作家的數
量，但仍然沒有任何人正確地預見到這將是一場災難。如果那些制定壞戰略的人不會付出
任何代價，而那些提出更好的替代方案的人卻得不到承認，那麼為什麼我們應該期待國家
做得更好呢？
One is tempted to see these various failures as an inevitable consequence of
America’s gradual transformation from a republic into a global empire, a
powerful country that cannot stop interfering all over the world. The
Founding Fathers warned that a republic could not engage in more or less
constant warfare without becoming corrupted, and they were right. Five-star
general and former President Dwight D. Eisenhower understood it, too. To wage
war constantly requires powerful national security institutions, ever greater
government secrecy, and the gradual expansion of executive power. Checks and
balances erode, violations of domestic and international law are winked at,
the media becomes partly co-opted and complicit, dissidents are silenced or
marginalized, and presidents and their minions find it easier and easier to
lie to retain popularity or win support for the policies they favor. Once
public discourse is debased and unmoored from the real world, coming up with
strategies that will actually work in that world becomes nearly impossible.
有人把這些各種各樣的失敗，看作是美國從一個共和國逐漸轉變為一個全球帝國的必然結
果，一個無法停止在世界各地干涉的強大國家。開國元勛們警告說，一個共和國不可能在
不腐敗的情況下進行持續不斷的戰爭，他們是對的。五星上將和前總統艾森豪威爾也明白
這一點。要不斷發動戰爭，就需要強大的國家安全機構、越來越大的政府保密以及行政權
力的逐步擴大。制衡機制受到侵蝕，違反國內和國際法的行為被矇蔽，部分媒體成為同謀
，持不同政見者被壓制或邊緣化，總統及其下屬發現愈來愈容易用謊言來保持聲望，或贏
得對他們政策的支持。一旦公共討論被貶低並脫離了現實世界，人們不可能提出在這個世
界上真正起作用的策略。
As I said in my previous column, we have reached a point where foreign and
national security policy in the United States is more like performance art.
The results of U.S. actions don’t really matter—save to the soldiers,
sailors, aircrews, and diplomats it tasks with carrying them out. The only
thing U.S. leaders care about is how it plays on TV, on Twitter, or among an
electorate more interested in being entertained than enlightened or ably led.
Because the United States is still so powerful and secure, it can probably go
on this way for quite some time. Probably. But it can’t do so forever, and
it will continue to miss opportunities to make itself safer, more prosperous,
and to build a society that lives up to its nobler ideals.
正如我在上一篇專欄文章中所說，以現在的處境，美國的外交和國家安全政策更像是行為
藝術——把它的任務留給士兵、水手、空勤人員和外交官。美國領導人唯一關心的就是他
在電視上、推特上、在追求娛樂而不是出色領導的選民心中效果如何。由於美國仍然如此
強大且安全，它很可能還可以這樣保持相當一段時間。但美國不可能永遠這樣，美國將繼
續錯失使自己變得更安全、更繁榮，並建立一個理想社會的良機。