How America Ends
美國如何終結? 人口結構變化觸發民主危機
A tectonic demographic shift is under way. Can the country hold together?
目前美國的人口結構轉變正在發生。美國人民能否共渡難關？
原文：The Atlantic https://tinyurl.com/v9tk5ea
作者： Yoni Appelbaum
譯文：法意
http://dy.163.com/v2/article/detail/F4JDVVC70514C2L0.html
[法意導言]美國總統大選在即，兩黨將進入新一輪的競爭。極具個人特色的川普總統上台
以來，美國社會已經見證許多前所未有的變革。川普主義以強勢的姿態為全世界帶來影響
。川普或共和黨是否能夠成功連任，這一問題決定著美國民主的走向。本文從美國社會人
口結構的轉變入手，結合美國兩黨政治角逐的史實，分析川普主義的利弊以及目前共和黨
所面臨的政治形勢，且指出美國中右翼力量對政治的選擇才是促進美國民主社會向前發展
的關鍵。本文為2019年12月發表在《大西洋月刊》（The Atlantic）上的專欄文章。作者
約尼·阿佩爾鮑姆（Yoni Appelbaum）是美國社會和文化歷史學家，今為《大西洋月刊》
的專欄作者，曾於哈佛大學教授歷史與文學。
Democracy depends on the consent of the losers. For most of the 20th century,
parties and candidates in the United States have competed in elections with
the understanding that electoral defeats are neither permanent nor
intolerable. The losers could accept the result, adjust their ideas and
coalitions, and move on to fight in the next election. Ideas and policies
would be contested, sometimes viciously, but however heated the rhetoric got,
defeat was not generally equated with political annihilation. The stakes
could feel high, but rarely existential. In recent years, however, beginning
before the election of Donald Trump and accelerating since, that has changed.
民主取決於敗者的妥協。二十世紀，美國政黨和總統候選人們清楚地知道，選舉失敗既不
是永恆的也不是不可容忍的。輸家承認失敗，調整計畫、重組聯盟，然後走向下一場選舉
。思想和政見會遭到反駁，也會遭遇惡毒的攻擊。但無論辯論有多激烈，失敗也並不總是
意味著政治上的毀滅。但是，近些年來，自唐納德·川普（Donald Trump）上台後，這樣
的情況已經改變了。
“Our radical Democrat opponents are driven by hatred, prejudice, and rage,”
Trump told the crowd at his reelection kickoff event in Orlando in June. “
They want to destroy you and they want to destroy our country as we know it.”
This is the core of the president’s pitch to his supporters: He is all that
stands between them and the abyss.
“那些激進的民主黨人被仇恨、偏見和憤怒教唆。”川普在6月於奧蘭多舉行的連任競選
活動中對群眾說，“他們想摧毀你們，他們想摧毀我們的國家。”這是川普向支持者宣傳
的核心觀點：他是阻止他們走向深淵的人。
In October, with the specter of impeachment looming, he fumed on Twitter, “
What is taking place is not an impeachment, it is a COUP, intended to take
away the Power of the People, their VOTE, their Freedoms, their Second
Amendment, Religion, Military, Border Wall, and their God-given rights as a
Citizen of The United States of America!” For good measure, he also quoted a
supporter’s dark prediction that impeachment “will cause a Civil War like
fracture in this Nation from which our Country will never heal.”
今年十月，川普面臨彈劾危機，他生氣地在推特上發言：“這不是一次彈劾，這是一場政
變，這些人想奪走人民的權力、選舉權、自由，破壞憲法第二修正案，他們想奪走人們的
宗教自由、圍牆、以及成為美利堅合眾國公民的神聖權利。”他還引用了一個支持者的陰
謀預言，稱彈劾“會導致美國內戰，國家將因此產生不可癒合的裂痕。”
Trump’s apocalyptic rhetoric matches the tenor of the times. The body
politic is more fractious than at any time in recent memory. Over the past 25
years, both red and blue areas have become more deeply hued, with Democrats
clustering in cities and suburbs and Republicans filling in rural areas and
exurbs. In Congress, where the two caucuses once overlapped ideologically,
the dividing aisle has turned into a chasm.
川普的這段話反映了時代的困境。民主政體比歷史上任何時候都要脆弱。過去二十五年裡
，紅藍派之間的對抗加劇，民主黨人主要聚集在城市和城郊，共和黨人者則佔據農村和周
邊郊區。國會裡，兩黨過去曾在意識形態上達成一致，如今業已被巨大鴻溝所隔絕。
As partisans have drifted apart geographically and ideologically, they’ve
become more hostile toward each other. In 1960, less than 5 percent of
Democrats and Republicans said they’d be unhappy if their children married
someone from the other party; today, 35 percent of Republicans and 45 percent
of Democrats would be, according to a recent Public Religion Research
Institute/Atlantic poll—far higher than the percentages that object to
marriages crossing the boundaries of race and religion. As hostility rises,
Americans’ trust in political institutions, and in one another, is
declining. A study released by the Pew Research Center in July found that
only about half of respondents believed their fellow citizens would accept
election results no matter who won. At the fringes, distrust has become
centrifugal: Right-wing activists in Texas and left-wing activists in
California have revived talk of secession.
隨著政客們在地理上與意識形態上逐漸分離，他們對彼此的敵意也與日俱增。1960年，不
到5%的民主黨人或共和黨人會因自己的子女與他黨人結婚而感到不快；如今，根據一項調
查，35%共和黨人及45%民主黨人會因此事生氣，這個數字甚至遠超對跨宗族和宗教結婚抱
有不滿的人。兩黨對抗的增加也導致美國民眾對政治制度的信任度下降。皮尤研究中心（
Pew Research Center）於七月公佈一份研究，稱只有一半受訪者認為人們並不排斥由兩
黨中的誰擔任總統。在一些邊緣選區，人們的不信任逐漸顯現：德克薩斯州的右翼分子和
加利福尼亞州的左翼分子又開始主張州獨立。
Recent research by political scientists at Vanderbilt University and other
institutions has found both Republicans and Democrats distressingly willing
to dehumanize members of the opposite party. “Partisans are willing to
explicitly state that members of the opposing party are like animals, that
they lack essential human traits,” the researchers found. The president
encourages and exploits such fears. This is a dangerous line to cross. As the
researchers write, “Dehumanization may loosen the moral restraints that
would normally prevent us from harming another human being.”
范德比爾特大學和其他機構的政治學家最近研究發現，“政客都稱對方黨派像動物一樣，
缺乏人性。”總統卻鼓勵甚至推動這樣的狀況發展。這是十分危險的，研究者說到，“這
容易導致道德約束力的下降，而道德約束是阻止人們傷害他人的防線。”
Outright political violence remains considerably rarer than in other periods
of partisan divide, including the late 1960s. But overheated rhetoric has
helped radicalize some individuals. Cesar Sayoc, who was arrested for
targeting multiple prominent Democrats with pipe bombs, was an avid Fox News
watcher; in court filings, his lawyers said he took inspiration from Trump’s
white-supremacist rhetoric. “It is impossible,” they wrote, “to separate
the political climate and [Sayoc’s] mental illness.” James Hodgkinson, who
shot at Republican lawmakers (and badly wounded Representative Steve Scalise)
at a baseball practice, was a member of the Facebook groups Terminate the
Republican Party and The Road to Hell Is Paved With Republicans. In other
instances, political protests have turned violent, most notably in
Charlottesville, Virginia, where a Unite the Right rally led to the murder of
a young woman. In Portland, Oregon, and elsewhere, the left-wing “antifa”
movement has clashed with police. The violence of extremist groups provides
ammunition to ideologues seeking to stoke fear of the other side.
如今，徹底的政治暴動仍比政黨分裂時期（包括二十世紀六十年代晚期）要少得多。但過
激的言論氛圍也使得某些人變得偏激。塞薩爾·薩約克因為用炸彈瞄準多個知名民主黨人
而被捕，他是個熱衷於福克斯新聞（Fox News）的人。在法庭文件中，他的律師表示，薩
約克從川普充滿白人至上意味的言論中獲得了行動的靈感。律師稱：“政治氣氛和（薩約
克的）精神疾病有密切關係。”此外，在某些地區，政治抗議已經轉變為政治暴力。在弗
吉尼亞州的夏洛茨維爾地區，那裡舉辦的一場“團結右翼”集會導致一名年輕婦女被謀殺
。這些極端主義團體的暴力行為讓他們的反對者有更多攻擊的話柄。
What has caused such rancor? The stresses of a globalizing, postindustrial
economy. Growing economic inequality. The hyperbolizing force of social
media. Geographic sorting. The demagogic provocations of the president
himself. As in Murder on the Orient Express, every suspect has had a hand in
the crime.
這些仇恨從何而來？是全球化、後工業時代經濟所帶來的壓力、經濟上的不平等、社交媒
體的渲染、地理上的分裂、以及總統本人的煽動。正如《東方快車謀殺案》中的情節那樣
，每一位嫌疑人都參與到犯罪中。
But the biggest driver might be demographic change. The United States is
undergoing a transition perhaps no rich and stable democracy has ever
experienced: Its historically dominant group is on its way to becoming a
political minority—and its minority groups are asserting their co-equal
rights and interests. If there are precedents for such a transition, they lie
here in the United States, where white Englishmen initially predominated, and
the boundaries of the dominant group have been under negotiation ever since.
Yet those precedents are hardly comforting. Many of these renegotiations
sparked political conflict or open violence, and few were as profound as the
one now under way.
但最大的推動力可能是人口變化。美國正在經歷一場發達穩定的民主國家從未經歷過的轉
變：歷史上佔主導的團體日益成為政治上的少數派，而曾經的少數派團體如今能夠捍衛自
己的平等權和利益。如果要尋找這種轉變的先例，可能要回溯美國歷史。當時，英國白人
最初佔據主導地位，而後主流團體不斷被重新定義。但這些先例最終都演變為政治暴力，
很少能如今日一樣影響深遠。
Within the living memory of most Americans, a majority of the country’s
residents were white Christians. That is no longer the case, and voters are
not insensate to the change—nearly a third of conservatives say they face “
a lot” of discrimination for their beliefs, as do more than half of white
evangelicals. But more epochal than the change that has already happened is
the change that is yet to come: Sometime in the next quarter century or so,
depending on immigration rates and the vagaries of ethnic and racial
identification, nonwhites will become a majority in the U.S. For some
Americans, that change will be cause for celebration; for others, it may pass
unnoticed. But the transition is already producing a sharp political
backlash, exploited and exacerbated by the president. In 2016, white
working-class voters who said that discrimination against whites is a serious
problem, or who said they felt like strangers in their own country, were
almost twice as likely to vote for Trump as those who did not. Two-thirds of
Trump voters agreed that “the 2016 election represented the last chance to
stop America’s decline.” In Trump, they’d found a defender.
許多美國人印象中，國家居民大多數是白人基督徒。但如今情況已不如昨，人們對這樣的
變化也並不敏感。將近三分之一的保守黨認為他們的信仰遭遇“許多”歧視，二分之一的
福音派教眾也有此感。但是，與已經發生的變化相比，尚未發生的變化更具有劃時代的意
義：在下一個二十五年，根據移民率以及民族和種族認同的變化，非白人將成為美國的多
數。對某些美國人而言，這是可喜的變化；而對另一些人來說，則不值得關注。但這樣的
轉變已經引起政治上的強烈反應，而總統則對此加以助推和利用。2016年，白人工人階級
選民認為，對白人的階級歧視是個嚴重的問題，這讓他們在最熟悉的國度反而成為陌生人
。這些人投票給川普的可能性是其他白人群體的兩倍之多。三分之二的川普支持者認為，
“2016年選舉是阻止美國衰退的最後機會”。他們認為川普是那個對的人。
In 2002, the political scientist Ruy Teixeira and the journalist John Judis
published a book, The Emerging Democratic Majority, which argued that
demographic changes—the browning of America, along with the movement of more
women, professionals, and young people into the Democratic fold—would soon
usher in a “new progressive era” that would relegate Republicans to
permanent minority political status. The book argued, somewhat triumphally,
that the new emerging majority was inexorable and inevitable. After Barack
Obama’s reelection, in 2012, Teixeira doubled down on the argument in The
Atlantic, writing, “The Democratic majority could be here to stay.” Two
years later, after the Democrats got thumped in the 2014 midterms, Judis
partially recanted, saying that the emerging Democratic majority had turned
out to be a mirage and that growing support for the GOP among the white
working class would give the Republicans a long-term advantage. The 2016
election seemed to confirm this.
2002年，政治科學家魯·特謝拉（Ruy Teixeira）和記者約翰·朱迪斯（John Judis）出
版書籍《新興的民主多數派》（The Emerging Democratic Majority）。書中談及，人口
變化是美國的褐變。更多女性、專業人士以及年輕人將加入民主黨，很快將迎來“新的發
展時代”，而共和黨將成為永久的政治少數派。此外，該書認為，新興的民主多數派是不
可阻擋的。2012年巴拉克·歐巴馬（Barack Obama）連任後，特謝拉在《大西洋月刊》發
表文章稱，“民主多數派將成為主流。”兩年後，民主黨在2014年中期選舉中受挫，朱迪
斯似乎有點退縮，稱新興民主多數派可能只是海市蜃樓，白人工人階級對共和黨的支持會
讓共和黨人長期佔據優勢。2016年選舉結果似乎證實了這一點。
But now many conservatives, surveying demographic trends, have concluded that
Teixeira wasn’t wrong—merely premature. They can see the GOP’s sinking
fortunes among younger voters, and feel the culture turning against them,
condemning them today for views that were commonplace only yesterday. They
are losing faith that they can win elections in the future. With this come
dark possibilities.
但許多保守派在調查人口變化趨勢時發現，特謝拉說的話沒錯，只是當時時機未熟。他們
可以看到共和黨在年輕選民中的頹勢，並感受到新的文化與他們背道而馳，並指責他們仍
然停留在過去。他們正在失去能夠在未來贏得選舉的信心，隨之而來的是暗淡無望。
The Republican Party has treated Trump’s tenure more as an interregnum than
a revival, a brief respite that can be used to slow its decline. Instead of
simply contesting elections, the GOP has redoubled its efforts to narrow the
electorate and raise the odds that it can win legislative majorities with a
minority of votes. In the first five years after conservative justices on the
Supreme Court gutted a key provision of the Voting Rights Act in 2013, 39
percent of the counties that the law had previously restrained reduced their
number of polling places. And while gerrymandering is a bipartisan sin, over
the past decade Republicans have indulged in it more heavily. In Wisconsin
last year, Democrats won 53 percent of the votes cast in state legislative
races, but just 36 percent of the seats. In Pennsylvania, Republicans tried
to impeach the state Supreme Court justices who had struck down a GOP attempt
to gerrymander congressional districts in that state. The Trump White House
has tried to suppress counts of immigrants for the 2020 census, to reduce
their voting power. All political parties maneuver for advantage, but only a
party that has concluded it cannot win the votes of large swaths of the
public will seek to deter them from casting those votes at all.
共和黨人將川普的當選視為一種過渡性的統治而非復興，這種短暫的喘息可以減緩國家的
衰退。共和黨人不只是簡單的參與選舉，他們努力縮小選民的範圍，提高以少數選票獲得
選舉勝利的可能。最高院的保守派法官於2013年將《選舉法》的關鍵條文無效化後，五年
裡39%的縣減少了投票站的數量（此前法律限制這樣的行為）。此外，儘管嫁禍對方是兩
黨都常用的手段，但過去十年裡共和黨人顯然更耽於此道。在威斯康星州，去年民主黨人
贏得州選舉53%的選票，卻只佔了36%的議會席位。賓夕法尼亞洲，共和黨人試圖彈劾州法
院的法官，因為這個法官阻止了共和黨人在國會選區賄賂選舉的企圖。川普和他的內閣試
圖壓縮2020年人口普查時移民的人數，削弱移民的選舉權。任何政黨都會追逐自身利益，
但只有認為自己無法在選舉中獲勝的政黨才會設法阻止選民投票。
The history of the United States is rich with examples of once-dominant
groups adjusting to the rise of formerly marginalized populations—sometimes
gracefully, more often bitterly, and occasionally violently. Partisan
coalitions in the United States are constantly reshuffling, realigning along
new axes. Once-rigid boundaries of faith, ethnicity, and class often prove
malleable. Issues gain salience or fade into irrelevance; yesterday’s rivals
become tomorrow’s allies.
一度佔優的群體不得不適應新生代，這在美國歷史上很常見。這個適應過程可能是體面的
，也可能是痛苦的，甚至是通過暴力實現的。美國政黨不斷改革，沿著新的宗旨不斷自我
調整。從前嚴守的信仰、倫理和階級邊界如今不斷被重塑。同一事物時而重要時而次要，
昔日的敵人成為明天的盟友。
But sometimes, that process of realignment breaks down. Instead of reaching
out and inviting new allies into its coalition, the political right hardens,
turning against the democratic processes it fears will subsume it. A
conservatism defined by ideas can hold its own against progressivism, winning
converts to its principles and evolving with each generation. A conservatism
defined by identity reduces the complex calculus of politics to a simple
arithmetic question—and at some point, the numbers no longer add up.
有時候，自我調整會被打斷。這時候，政黨非但不會迎接新盟友加入，甚至反對民主進程
。思想上的保守主義可以接納進步主義，並更新自身的規則，實現代際的發展。而身份上
的保守主義則只能將複雜的政治演算化為簡單的算術問題。
Trump has led his party to this dead end, and it may well cost him his chance
for reelection, presuming he is not removed through impeachment. But the
president’s defeat would likely only deepen the despair that fueled his
rise, confirming his supporters’ fear that the demographic tide has turned
against them. That fear is the single greatest threat facing American
democracy, the force that is already battering down precedents, leveling
norms, and demolishing guardrails. When a group that has traditionally
exercised power comes to believe that its eclipse is inevitable, and that the
destruction of all it holds dear will follow, it will fight to preserve what
it has—whatever the cost.
川普和他的政黨如今走進了死胡同，這可能導致他連任失敗（假設他沒有被彈劾）。但總
統的失敗只會加劇選民的絕望心態，讓支持者更加恐懼人口轉變會帶來不利影響。這樣的
恐懼是目前美國民主的最大威脅，美國民主正在違背先例，抬高社會標準，破壞“護欄”
。當曾經掌權的團體意識到自己將不可避免地被取代，手中的一切將要被摧毀，他們會付
出一切代價捍衛自己的權益。
Adam Przeworski, a political scientist who has studied struggling democracies
in Eastern Europe and Latin America, has argued that to survive, democratic
institutions “must give all the relevant political forces a chance to win
from time to time in the competition of interests and values.” But, he adds,
they also have to do something else, of equal importance: “They must make
even losing under democracy more attractive than a future under
non-democratic outcomes.” That conservatives—despite currently holding the
White House, the Senate, and many state governments—are losing faith in
their ability to win elections in the future bodes ill for the smooth
functioning of American democracy. That they believe these electoral losses
would lead to their destruction is even more worrying.
政治學家亞當·普熱沃斯基（Adam Przeworski）研究東歐以及拉美地區的民主實踐。他
認為民主制度如希望長久存在，“必須讓所有政治力量能夠在利益和價值的競爭中角逐掌
權的機會”。除此之外，民主制度也應當追求平等。“他們要讓失敗的民主看起來也比不
民主的未來更具有吸引力。”儘管保守派如今掌控著白宮，參議院和許多州政府的席位，
他們也在懷疑自己是否能贏得選舉。這預示著美國民主目前面臨的跌宕。保守派甚至認為
選舉失敗將帶來黨派的毀滅，這是更令人擔憂的。
We should be careful about overstating the dangers. It is not 1860 again in
the United States—it is not even 1850. But numerous examples from American
history—most notably the antebellum South—offer a cautionary tale about how
quickly a robust democracy can weaken when a large section of the population
becomes convinced that it cannot continue to win elections, and also that it
cannot afford to lose them.
我們要警惕是否誇大了事情的危險性。1860或1850年的狀況不會再重現，但美國歷史上有
諸多例子（其中最著名的是南北戰爭）警示我們，當佔主流的團體認為自己無法贏得選舉
且無法承受失敗的後果時，繁榮民主社會的蕭條只在頃刻之間。
The collapse of the mainstream Republican Party in the face of Trumpism is at
once a product of highly particular circumstances and a disturbing echo of
other events. In his recent study of the emergence of democracy in Western
Europe, the political scientist Daniel Ziblatt zeroes in on a decisive factor
distinguishing the states that achieved democratic stability from those that
fell prey to authoritarian impulses: The key variable was not the strength or
character of the political left, or of the forces pushing for greater
democratization, so much as the viability of the center-right. A strong
center-right party could wall off more extreme right-wing movements, shutting
out the radicals who attacked the political system itself.
面對川普主義，佔主流的共和黨的垮台既是現時美國社會狀況的產物，也有著過往事件殘
留的影響。政治學家丹尼爾·茲布拉特（Daniel Ziblatt）在他近來對西歐民主興起的研
究中討論了區分政治穩定的民主政體和威權國家的決定性因素：關鍵變量並不是左翼的權
力或人格，或者促進民主化的動力，而是中右翼的力量。一個強大的中右翼政黨可以阻止
激進的右翼運動，同時也將攻擊政體的激進分子攔在門外。
The left is by no means immune to authoritarian impulses; some of the worst
excesses of the 20th century were carried out by totalitarian left-wing
regimes. But right-wing parties are typically composed of people who have
enjoyed power and status within a society. They might include
disproportionate numbers of leaders—business magnates, military officers,
judges, governors—upon whose loyalty and support the government depends. If
groups that traditionally have enjoyed privileged positions see a future for
themselves in a more democratic society, Ziblatt finds, they will accede to
it. But if “conservative forces believe that electoral politics will
permanently exclude them from government, they are more likely to reject
democracy outright.”
左翼力量很容易淪為威權主義的工具。二十世紀那些最糟糕的運動都來自於極權左翼勢力
。但極右翼黨派是由掌握權力和社會地位的人組成的。他們中可能有商業領袖、軍官、法
官和政府官員，這些都是政府賴以生存的社會力量的代表。如果這些享受特權的群體在民
主社會中看到自己的未來發展機會，他們會支持這樣的社會發展。但“如果保守力量認為
選舉政治會奪走他們在政府的位置，那他們很可能會強烈抵制民主。”
Ziblatt points to Germany in the 1930s, the most catastrophic collapse of a
democracy in the 20th century, as evidence that the fate of democracy lies in
the hands of conservatives. Where the center-right flourishes, it can defend
the interests of its adherents, starving more radical movements of support.
In Germany, where center-right parties faltered, “not their strength, but
rather their weakness” became the driving force behind democracy’s collapse.
茲布拉特指出，20世紀30年代德國呈現出一個民主國家最災難性的崩潰——民主的命運掌
握在保守派手中。在那裡，中右翼蓬勃發展，捍衛其追隨者的利益，餓死更激進的運動。
在中右翼政黨搖搖欲墜的德國，“不是他們的強項，而是他們的弱點”成為民主崩潰的動
力。
Of course, the most catastrophic collapse of a democracy in the 19th century
took place right here in the United States, sparked by the anxieties of white
voters who feared the decline of their own power within a diversifying nation.
當然，19世紀最災難性的民主崩潰發生在美國，這是由白人選民的焦慮引發的，他們擔心
自己的權力在多元化的國家中下降。
The slaveholding South exercised disproportionate political power in the
early republic. America’s first dozen presidents—excepting only those named
Adams—were slaveholders. Twelve of the first 16 secretaries of state came
from slave states. The South initially dominated Congress as well, buoyed by
its ability to count three-fifths of the enslaved persons held as property
for the purposes of apportionment.
在早期的共和政體中，奴隸制南方掌控著不成比例的政治權力。美國的頭十幾位總統——
除了那些叫亞當斯的總統——是奴隸主。在最初的16位國務卿中，有12位來自奴隸國。南
方起初也是國會的主要成員，但它有能力將五分之三的被奴役者作為財產分配。
Politics in the early republic was factious and fractious, dominated by
crosscutting interests. But as Northern states formally abandoned slavery,
and then embraced westward expansion, tensions rose between the states that
exalted free labor and the ones whose fortunes were directly tied to slave
labor, bringing sectional conflict to the fore. By the mid-19th century,
demographics were clearly on the side of the free states, where the
population was rapidly expanding. Immigrants surged across the Atlantic,
finding jobs in Northern factories and settling on midwestern farms. By the
outbreak of the Civil War, the foreign-born would form 19 percent of the
population of the Northern states, but just 4 percent of the Southern
population.
在早期的共和國，政治是專橫的，而且是由交叉的利益支配。但當北方各州正式放棄奴隸
制，然後接受向西擴張時，那些崇尚自由勞動的州和那些命運與奴隸勞動直接相關的州之
間的緊張關係加劇，從而導致了地區衝突。到了19世紀中葉，人口統計顯然站在自由國家
一邊，那裡的人口正在迅速膨脹。移民湧過大西洋，在北方工廠找到工作，在中西部農場
定居。到內戰爆發時，外國出生的人佔北方各州人口的19%，但只佔南方人口的4%。
The new dynamic was first felt in the House of Representatives, the most
democratic institution of American government—and the Southern response was
a concerted effort to remove the topic of slavery from debate. In 1836,
Southern congressmen and their allies imposed a gag rule on the House,
barring consideration of petitions that so much as mentioned slavery, which
would stand for nine years. As the historian Joanne Freeman shows in her
recent book, The Field of Blood: Violence in Congress and the Road to Civil
War, slave-state representatives in Washington also turned to bullying,
brandishing weapons, challenging those who dared disparage the peculiar
institution to duels, or simply attacking them on the House floor with fists
or canes. In 1845, an antislavery speech delivered by Ohio’s Joshua Giddings
so upset Louisiana’s John Dawson that he cocked his pistol and announced
that he intended to kill his fellow congressman. In a scene more Sergio Leone
than Frank Capra, other representatives—at least four of them with guns of
their own—rushed to either side, in a tense standoff. By the late 1850s, the
threat of violence was so pervasive that members regularly entered the House
armed.
新的動力首先出現在眾議院這個美國政府最民主的機構，而南方的反應卻是一致地拒絕辯
論奴隸制的話題。1836年，南方國會議員及其盟友對眾議院實施了一項禁言規則，禁止審
議像提到奴隸制那樣嚴重的請願，這持續了九年。正如歷史學家喬安妮·弗裡曼在最近的
著作《血的領域：國會和南北戰爭之路中的暴力》中所展示的那樣，華盛頓的奴隸州代表
也轉向欺凌，揮舞武器，挑戰那些敢於貶低這一特殊制度的人，或者乾脆用拳頭或手杖在
眾議院地板上攻擊他們。1845年，俄亥俄州的喬舒亞·吉丁斯發表了一次反奴隸制的演講
，使路易斯安那州的約翰·道森心煩意亂，他舉起手槍，宣佈他打算殺死他的議員同胞。
在更像西部片而非勵志片的場景中，代表們