by buffett
HOW TO BECOME A BETTER INVESTOR
如何成為一位優秀的投資人
General
總論
If we were to do it over again, we’d do it pretty much the same way. The
world hasn’t changed that much. We’d read everything in sight about
businesses and industries we think we’d understand. And, working with far
less capital, our investment universe would be far broader than it is
currently.
如果我們可以重頭再來一次，我們可能還是會這樣做，世界並沒有多大的改變，我們會大
量閱讀那些我們能夠了解的企業與產業資訊，而如果可運用的資金規模較小的話，我們可
以投資的世界將比現在寬廣許多。
There’s nothing different, in my view, about analyzing securities today vs.
50 years ago.
我個人認為現在的我在分析股票的看法，與50年前沒有任何改變。
Ongoing Learning
持續學習
I haven’t been continually learning the basic principles [of sound
investing], which are still Ben Graham’s. They were affected in a
significant way by Charlie and Phil Fisher in terms of looking at better
businesses. And I’ve learned more about how businesses operate over time.
基本的投資原則數十年如一日，還是葛拉罕那一套，後來受到查理跟費雪的影響，在看待
優質企業的方面做了一些修正，當然這些年來我也學習到許多企業經營管理之道。
You need an intellectual framework, which you can get mostly from The
Intelligent Investor. Then, think about businesses you can get your mind
around if you really work at it. Then, you will do well if you have the right
temperament.
你必須擁有一套健全的知識網絡，這部份的觀念你絕對可以從智慧型投資人一書中獲得，
然而看看周遭那些你可以接觸到的任何企業，我相信如果有正確的心態，你一定可以表現
的很好。
Munger: I’ve watched Warren for decades. Warren has learned a lot. He can
pooh pooh investing in PetroChina, but he’s learned, which has allowed him
to [expand his circle of competence so he could invest in something like
PetroChina].
曼格：我觀察巴菲特已經有好幾十年了，他確實學到很多，過去他可能不會投資中國石油
，但他確實做了改變，使得他能夠跨越原先的能力範圍投資像中國石油這樣的公司。
If you don’t keep learning, other people will pass you by.
如果你不能持續的學習，別人很可能就會趕上你。
Temperament alone won’t do it – you need a lot of curiosity for a long,
long time.
光是氣質還無法做到，你還必須一直保好奇心，我說的是一直。
Filter Out the Noise
過濾雜音
Munger: Part of [having uncommon sense] is being about to tune out folly, as
opposed to recognizing wisdom. If you bat away many things, you don’t
clutter yourself.
曼格：擁有不凡的見識必須避免愚昧的行為，唯有摒除繁雜事物，你才不會把自己搞得太
複雜。
Buffett: People get frustrated because they start to pitch something to us
and when they get halfway through the first sentence, we say we’re not
interested. We don’t waste a lot of time on bad ideas.
巴菲特：有些人可能會覺得很沮喪，因為當他們準備跟我們講一些事時，話才說到一半，
我們馬上表明沒有興趣，對於那些沒意思的想法，我們不願浪費任何的時間。
When humans compete against computers in chess, how can human compete? The
human eliminates 99% of possibilities without even thinking about it – they
get right down to few possibilities that have any chance of success. They get
rid of the nonsense.
人類如何能夠與電腦比賽下棋呢?? 人類會直接消去99%的情況，只考慮那些有可能成功的
情況，他們不會去理那些不可能的機會。
When people call you with bad idea, don’t be polite and waste 10 minutes.
當別人打電話告訴你一些有的沒有的，別客氣，不要跟他浪費一分一秒的時間。
Thinking About Risk
論風險
We think the best way to minimize risk is to think. Our default is [to have
our capital] in short-term instruments and only do something when it makes
sense.
我們認為降低風險最好的方式就是思考，若沒有其他用途，我們資金設定的去處就是短期
票券，除非謀定，否則我們不輕舉妄動。
The Importance of the Right Temperament
心態正確的重要性
Munger: We read a lot. I don’t know anyone who’s wise who doesn’t read a
lot. But that’s not enough: You have to have a temperament to grab ideas and
do sensible things. Most people don’t grab the right ideas or don’t know
what to do with them.
曼格：我們經營閱讀，我沒有聽過有那位智者不經營閱讀的，當然光這樣還不夠，你必須
能夠抓住想法然而做出有意義的事，大部分的人都無法找到正確的想法或是不知道如何去
執行。
Buffett: The key is to have a “money mind,” which is not IQ, and then you
have to have the right temperament. If you can’t control yourself, you’re
going to have disasters. Charlie and I have seen it. The whole world in the
late 1990s went a little mad in terms of investments. How could that happen?
Don’t people learn? What we learn from history is that people don’t learn
from history.
巴菲特：主要的關鍵是賺錢的頭腦而不是IQ，然後你還要擁有正確的心態，如果你無法控
制自己，麻煩就會上門，查理跟我都曾目睹，1990年代全球都曾陷入投資的狂熱，它到底
是如何發生的? 難道人們不能記取教訓，我們從歷史學到的教訓就是人們從來不能從歷史
記取教訓。
Diversification
多角化分散風險
You’ll occasionally see something that so obvious that you’ll load up on
it, like junk bonds in 2002 or Berkshire Hathaway many years ago. If you
think you’ll see an opportunity every week, you’re going to lose a lot of
money.
有時你會發現一些好東西，那時你就會一口氣買個夠，就像是2002年的垃圾債券或是許多
年以前的Berkshire，如果你發現每個禮拜都有好機會出現，那你可能馬上就會有大麻煩
出現。
Munger: The idea of excessive diversification is madness.
曼格：過度地強調多角化實在是很荒謬。
Asset Allocation
資產配置
We don’t hold any committee meetings. The business of saying you should have
50% in stocks, 30% in bonds…it’s nonsense.
我們沒有什麼投資委員會，有些企業要求資產配置必須有50%的股票、30%的債券等等，實
在是有夠無聊。
The idea of recommending that assets should be split 60/40 [between stocks
and bonds], and then have a big announcement that you’re moving to 65/35 is
pure nonsense. It just doesn’t make any sense.
至於建議資產應該分成60/40(股票及債券)，然後又大舉宣稱比例要調整為65/35的做法更
是無聊透頂，這實在是沒有什麼意義。
Valuation Matters
評價
If you pay way too much for a business, you’ll get a poor return on what you
paid, even if the return on tangible equity is very good.
如果你買貴了，那麼你的投資報酬率將會因此大受影響，即使這家企業本身的資產報酬率
極高也沒有用。
Avoid Leverage
避免舉債
The most dramatic way we protect ourselves is we don’t use leverage. We
believe almost anything can happen in financial markets. The only way smart
people can get clobbered is [if they use] leverage. If you can hold them [the
positions you own during a crisis], then you’re OK. But even smart people
can get clobbered with leverage – it’s the one thing that can prevent you
from playing out your hand.
保護我們自己最好的方式就是不使用財務槓桿，我們認為金融市場什麼事都可能發生，而
聰明人被逮到的唯一可能就是使用槓桿，如果你在危機發生時可以控制住，那麼你就過關
，但即使是最聰明的傢伙也有可能因為使用槓桿而突鎚，避免舉債是讓事情失控的最好方
式。
Weathering Financial Cataclysms
渡過金融危機
Absent leverage or just going crazy on valuation, the financial cataclysms won
’t do you in. And if you have any more money, you buy.
沒有使用槓桿或是評價發生重大失誤，金融危機都拿你沒有辦法，而如果你手上有多餘的
閒錢，就可多買一些。
Berkshire is in an extraordinary position to weather any financial cataclysm.
While we don’t go around like an undertaker, hoping for a plague, we would
benefit [in such a situation] and have done so in the past. We’ve never
gotten hurt in the past 30-40 years by what’s going on in the world around
us.
Berkshire早已做好準備以渡過任何金融危機，雖然我們不是殯葬業者，整天期盼瘟疫發
生，但不可否認過去我們確實因此受惠，過去的3、40年間，我們從來沒有因為周遭的巨
變而受到傷害。
Spotting Crooked Managements
辨別不正派的經營階層
Munger: Bernie Ebbers and Ken Lay were caricatures – they were easy to spot.
They were almost psychopaths. But it’s much harder to spot problems at
companies like Royal Dutch [Shell].
曼格：Bernie Ebbers及Ken Lay都是跳樑小丑，他們很容易被發現，他們近乎是變態，相
較之下，人們就很難發覺像荷蘭皇家(殼牌)這類公司的問題。
Buffett: [Throwing up his hands] Charlie and I would not have spotted the
problems at Royal Dutch.
巴菲特：(舉起他的手)查理跟我還沒有發現荷蘭皇家的問題。
Munger: But we don’t learn because I’d still expect that Exxon’s figures
are fair.
曼格：但我們之所以沒學到是因為我還是認為艾克森的數字尚稱公允。
Buffett: In the late 1990s, one business leader after another was cutting
corners. They sink faster to a lower prevailing morality than rise to a
higher prevailing morality, but they still generally follow the crowd.
巴菲特：在1990年代後期，企業領袖相繼走捷徑，他們向下沈淪的速度相當驚人，但他們
還不致於脫軌太多。
Munger: I want to make an apology. Last night, referring to some of our
modern business tycoons – specifically, Armand Hammer – I said that when
they’re talking, they’re lying, and when they’re quiet, they’re stealing.
This wasn’t my witticism; it was used [long ago] to describe the robber
barons.
曼格：我想先向各位倒個歉，昨天晚上 (他指的是某些有名的企業大亨，特別是Armand
Hammer) ，我說他們不但睜眼說瞎話，又五鬼搬運，我並不是在開玩笑，古時候人們稱這
種行為叫做貴族強盜。
Forecasts
預測
Munger: People have always had this craving to have someone tell them the
future. Long ago, kings would hire people to read sheep guts. There’s always
been a market for people who pretend to know the future. Listening to today’
s forecasters is just as crazy as when the king hired the guy to look at the
sheep guts. It happens over and over and over.
曼格：人們總是渴望有人可以告訴他們未來，古時候，國王會請專人來判讀動物內臟，總
是會有人跳出來自稱知道未來，聽信今天的股票分析師分析未來，就好像古代的君王聘請
專人判讀動物內臟一樣荒謬，歷史總是一再地重演。
Thinking About Growth Rates When Estimating Valuation
在估算價值時，想到成長率
When the [long-term] growth rate is higher than the discount rate, then
[mathematically] the value is infinity. This is the St. Petersburg Paradox,
written about by Durant 30 years ago.
當長期成長率高過折現率，則理論上價值將無限大，這是著名的聖彼得堡詭論，由Durant
在30年前所提出。
Some managements think this [that the value of their company is infinite]. It
gets very dangerous to assume high growth rates to infinity – that’s where
people get into a lot of trouble. The idea of projecting extremely high
growth rates for a long period of time has cost investors an awful lot of
money. Go look at top companies 50 years ago: how many have grown at 10% for
a long time? And [those that have grown] 15% is very rarified.
某些經營階層真的認為自己所經營的公司其價值無限大，事實上這樣的舉動相當危險，人
們往往因此惹上不小的麻煩，預期公司將可以一直以很高的成長率的這種想法，一再讓股
東與投資人損失大筆的金錢，看看50年前全美最頂尖的那些公司，有哪一家到現在還可以
穩定地維持10%的成長，更不要說15%了。
Charlie and I are rarely willing to project high growth rates. Maybe we’re
wrong sometimes and that costs us, but we like to be conservative.
查理跟我很少會用高成長率來預估一家公司，或許有時我們真的看走眼而失去一些機會，
但我們寧願選擇保守一點。
Munger: If your growth rate is so high that you conclude the business has an
infinite valuation, you have to use more realistic numbers. What else could
anyone do?
曼格：如果你因為設定過高的成長率而使得企業評估的價值變成無限大時，我想你必須換
一個更實際的數字，否則別人也無能為力?
Avoid Bad Businesses
規避不良的企業
In the textile industry, we always had new machinery that held the promise of
increasing our profit, but it never did because everyone else bought the same
machinery. It was sort of like being in a crowd, and everyone stands on
tip-toes – your view doesn’t improve, but your legs hurt.
在紡織業界，我們總是能找到一些號稱能夠增加我們獲利的新機器，但結果往往令人大失
所望，原因在於別人也同樣買了這些新機器，這就好像是在擁擠的人群中，每個人顛腳的
結果，不但大家看不到更遠，反而是全部腳酸。
Thinking About Regulatory Risk
談到法規管制風險
In some businesses, regulatory changes have a big impact, others none. We
just try to think intelligently about any business that we’re in. What
regulatory changes might there be? What might the impact be? If we’re in
furniture retailing, we’re not going to think about it. It’s up to Charlie
and me to think about this and weigh it in our evaluation of a company.
對某些產業來說，法規的改變影響很大，但有些產業則沒有太大的差別，我們只是試著了
解所處的這些產業，會受到哪些法規的影響，如果是傢具零售業，那我們就不必太費心，
這部份的判斷必須仰賴查理跟我本人，將之納入到評估企業價值的因素之中。
Munger: In our early days, we tended to overestimate the difficulties of
regulation. We refrained by buying the stocks of television stations because
we thought it was peculiar that someone could ask to have the government pull
your license any year – and the government could do it.
曼格：在Berkshire早期，我們時常過度高估法規的困難性，我們之所以沒有投資電視台
的股票便是覺得電視台的執照隨時都可能被地方政府所撤銷。
Buffett: Tom Murphy [the former head of Capital Cities and Cap Cities/ABC;
click here to read a 2000 interview with him] was way ahead of us on this one.
巴菲特：Tom Murphy(資本城/ABC的前領導人)在這方面比我們懂得太多。
Index Funds
指數型基金
[When asked whether one should buy Berkshire, invest in an index fund, or
hire a broker, Buffett replied:]
[當被問到投資人應該買Berkshire，還是買指數型基金，或是直接找投資顧問，巴菲特回
答到：]
We never recommend buying or selling Berkshire. Among the various
propositions offered to you, if you invested in a very low cost index fund –
where you don’t put the money in at one time, but average in over 10 years
–you’ll do better than 90% of people who start investing at the same time.
我們從來不建議大家買進或賣出Berkshire，在各種投資機會當中，如果你投資手續費很
低的指數型基金，且不是一次而是分十年慢慢投入，那麼你的績效可能超過其他90%的投
資人。
Munger: It’s hard to sit here at this annual meeting, surrounded by smart,
honorable stock brokers who do well for their clients, and criticize them.
But stock brokers, in toto, will do so poorly that the index fund will do
better.
曼格：要我在年度股東會中批評，周遭坐滿了非常聰明且受人尊敬的股票經紀人，實在是
難以啟口，但我還是必須說股票經紀人，總的來說還是比不上指數型基金。
==
BUSINESS AND INVESTING TOPICS
企業與投資
Outlook for the Market
股票市場的前景
[In response to a shareholder laying outexpressing all of his the many
reasons why he is concerned s about the future outlook for the economy and
the market, Buffett replied:]
[當股東問到他在判斷未來經濟與股票市場的前景時，會考量哪些因素，巴菲特回答到：]
I would say that at any given point in history, including when stocks were
the cheapest, you could find have found an equally impressive list of
negatives. In ‘74, you could have written down all kinds of things that
would show the future would be terrible.
我認為不論是什麼時候，即便是股票價格便宜到不行，你都可以找到一大串負面的因素，
就像1974年，在那個時候，你可以列舉出一堆未來前景極其悲觀的理由。
We don’t pay any attention to this kind of thing. Our underlying premise is
that this country will do very well and that businesses will do very well. We
used nuclear bombs, endured the cold war, etc., but over time the
opportunities have won out over the problems.
我們不理會這類事物，我們背後的前提是這個國家不會有問題，企業也不會有問題，我們
動用核子彈、渡過冷戰時期，事後證明機會一再凌駕問題之上。
I expect this will continue, barring use [against us of] weapons of mass
destruction – it would be hard for businesses to win out over this.
而我預期這樣的情勢將繼續維持下去，除非有人運用大規模的毀滅武器來傷害我們，我想
這是一般企業所無法獨立對抗的。
Going back to ‘59, I can’t think of any discussions Charlie and I have had
in which we’ve passed on something because of a view on macro conditions. It
won’t be the economy that will do in investors; it will be investors
themselves. If you’d just owned stocks over time, you’d do fine. We’re
unaffected by the variables that you mentioned. Show us a good business
tomorrow and we’ll jump.
時光回到1959年，我記不起來任何一次查理跟我因為總經情勢的關係而錯過什麼投資機會
的，經濟情勢對投資人不會有什麼影響，會影響的是投資人本身，如果你打定主意長期投
資股票，那麼你就不會有問題，我們並不會受到你所提的那些因為所影響，只要有好的企
業出現，我們就會大舉買進。
Munger: We wouldn’t be surprised if professionally managed money in the US
will have unimpressive returns relative to the high returns we had until
three years ago.
曼格：如果過去三年美國專業管理的基金績效表現遠低於我們，我們一點都不會感到訝異
。
Buffett: Our expectations were more modest than most three years ago [see
Buffett’s Fortune article, Mr. Buffett on the Stock Market, 11/99]. We didn’
t project the end of the world, but said anyone who thought they could sit at
home and day trade to double digit returns was living in a fool’s paradise.
It’s hard to understand how people could believe such things. To some
extent, they’re sold these beliefs.
巴菲特：目前我們的預期比起三年前稍微樂觀一點[參見巴菲特在1999年11月在財富雜誌
發表關於股市的看法]，我們並不是預期世界末日要到了，只是要提醒哪些整天坐在家裡
買賣股票就妄想每年有兩位數以上投資報酬率的人不要再傻了，實在很難想像怎麼會有那
麼多人會相信這樣的事，就某種程度而言，他們被這些想法給賣掉了。
Impact of Inflation
通貨膨脹的衝擊
The best thing to combat the threat of inflation is to have a lot of earnings
power of your own. If you’re the only surgeon in town, you’ll be OK
[because you can simply raise your prices to keep up with inflation and
people will pay it]. Charlie and I think it’s best to own fine businesses
that can price in inflationary terms and don’t require big capital
investments. See’s Candies can handle an inflationary world and maintain
value.
對抗通膨最好的武器就是自己擁有賺錢的能力，如果你是鎮上唯一的一位醫生，你就可以
安心，[因為你大可隨心所欲地提高你的收費]，查理跟我都認為面臨通膨最好的方式就是
擁有可以隨時反應售價又不必再投入大量資本的優質企業，像喜斯糖果都能安度高通膨以
維持既有價值。
Unfortunately, most businesses will not come out well in real terms. Earnings
might be up, but the business will be compelled to invest more and more
dollars into the business to stay in place. The worst businesses compel you
to put more and more in, without any rise in profits.
不幸的是，大部分的企業處境都不那麼好過，盈餘或許會提高，但企業卻必須被迫投入更
多的資金才能繼續生存下去，更慘的企業是一再又一再投入的結果是獲利不增反減。
TIPS [Treasury Inflation Protected Securities] are not a bad investment for
people worried about inflation heating up, which we’re seeing signs of.
TIPS[預防通膨的國庫券]是害怕通膨高漲人士不錯的投資選擇，目前我們確實看到某些通
膨績效。
Munger: Most people will see declining returns [due to inflation]. One of the
great defenses if you’re worried about inflation is not to have a lot of
silly needs in your life – if you don’t need a lot of material goods.
曼格：大部分的人會眼看投資報酬率下滑[受通膨影響]，如果你真的擔心通膨的話，最好
的防衛方式就是降低生活不必要的需求，擺脫那些不必要的物質享受。
Buffett: Charlie, we’re selling a lot of material goods in the other room,
so keep quiet. [Laughter.]
巴菲特：查理，我們在隔壁房間有許多東西在出售中，所以還是少說一點，[現場一陣大
笑]。