05TAIPEI846
[編輯]分類
文件索引 Reference ID 標題 Topic 建立日 Created 解密日 Released
Classification 出處使館 Origin 翻譯完成度
05TAIPEI846 2005年扁政府反核鬆動秘辛 2006-01-06 09:38 2011-08-
01:44 CONFIDENTIAL 美國在台協會 已完成
[編輯]標題
2005年扁政府反核鬆動秘辛 台灣:對於通用電力核能電廠之展望有所改善
[編輯]中文翻譯
分類：AIT副主任葛天豪，理由：1.4 (B/D)
1。(c) 摘要。在2000年首度執政之陳政權承諾要封殺核四電廠(FNPP)，但卻失敗了。自那
時起，反核勢力曾尋求其他方式以試圖減低台灣對核電能源之依賴。直到2005年6月中旬，
那些反核努力隨著執行「台灣非核家園」之政策勇往向前下，看似成功有望。陳水扁仰賴於
反核積極人士來確保2004年總統和立法院(LY)大選之得票。在選舉過後以及京都議定書近期
之實行，陳政權正試圖軟化其強勢反核立場。自民主進步黨 (DPP)執政來的頭一次，核電能
源的倡議開始獲得支持。此一發展將會預示著爭議性通用電力核四電廠最終完工所需之追加
經費和政治支持。摘要終。 核電能源在台灣之角色
2。(c) 核能電力目前是台灣最廉價之能源來源。政府能源專家表示讓核四電廠上線，及避
免提前除役台灣的三座現有核能電廠，兩者都很重要。沒有來自四座核電廠之能源，台灣會
在2010年面臨嚴重能源短缺。
3。(u) 儘管如此，對核能電力之通盤反對(及特定之反核四電廠建造)，已成為自民進黨建
黨以來之意識形態的關鍵部份。在陳水扁的第一屆任期，及對2004年總統與立法委員選舉之
競選，陳總統都在迎合其反核的支持基礎。該議題於2000年11月達到緊要關頭，當為努力實
現其2000年總統競選承諾時，新當選之陳水扁總統停建核四電廠。此舉導致國民黨罷免陳總
統、專案完工日期之重大延誤、及專案成本增加(三千萬美金)，並削弱對台灣整體之投資信
心。
4。最終在2001年2月，陳政權同意重啟建廠。然而同一時間，如在 ref h中所報告，立法院
之民進黨與國民黨代表雙方同意，即台灣將努力走向「非核」。為了該一目的，在陳的首屆
任期期間，行政院(EY)通過了一項環境基本法案，承諾要讓台灣變為「非核家園」(ref g)
並起草規章來將台灣之三座現役核能電廠，較原訂日程提前七年除役(ref d)。此外，政府
官員及出版品運用極端之反核語氣諸如宣稱「在台灣有超過6百萬人，因後院的核能定時炸
彈，而生活在安全陰影下」 (「定時炸彈」意指台灣核能電廠)。
5。(u)在2005年1月，諾貝爾獎得主及台灣中研院長李遠哲公開聲明即陳政權之「非核家園
」政策可能需要延期至2050年，以便讓台灣能符合依照京都議定書之排放要求。這標示著陳
總統自2000年上任以來，高層公眾人物首度擁核之公開聲明。李院長的聲明反映出對於台灣
接受京都協定上之脆弱性的顧慮，其於2005年2月16日生效。
6。(c) 由於需要掌握2004年總統及立委選舉選票，幕後加上京都議定書近期之實施，陳政
權正試圖軟化其強勢反核立場。跟隨李遠哲之發起，多位行政院官員開始公開支持完成核四
電廠。謝閣揆(謝長廷)和經濟部長何美玥並公開對此做出聲明。如在 ref e中所註，謝閣揆
告訴AIT即他會親自告訴有影響力之反核積極份子及前民主進步黨(DPP)主席林義雄，即行政
院仍受與立法院於2001年2月協定之約束，需完成核四電廠專案(ref h)。
7。(c) 再者，如在ref i中所報導，何部長於2004年於幕後協助爭取到臨時經費，以維持核
四電廠之續存。於2005年2月14日，何部長再進一步並公開聲明她個人對完成核四電廠之支
持。然而她也同時說明，即最後決策將需有更廣泛之共識。為達成這種共識，何宣佈行政院
計畫於2005年6月舉辦一場國能源大會，以討論台灣需要如何調整其能源組合，以符合乎其
京都協定之義務。(註。AIT在負責安排該大會之行政院能源委員會中的連絡人，告訴AIT有
多位高階政策制訂人員，準備藉6月之國家能源大會，同時確認支持核四電廠完工，及重新
檢討較原訂時程提前除役台灣之三座運作中的核電廠。註終.)。
8。(c) 最後，剛卸任之民進黨副秘書長鍾家濱，但仍為民進黨內有力之新潮流派系的具有
影響力人物，近是告訴AIT即民進黨於12月底做出明確決定，與反核積極人士分道揚鑣。他
說資深官員決定，即與反對黨掌控之立法院合作，比繼續迎合該黨之反核選民更為重要。
9。(u) 儘管這些近來舉動顯示出，陳水扁政府試圖軟化其反核立場，就該議題之一場主要
政治鬥爭很可能會浮現。在政府內外之反核積極人士，不太可能在此核心民進黨議題上不戰
而退。
10.林義雄，還有行政院研考會(RDEC)及行政院非核家園委員會主任委員葉菊蘭。林義雄已ꘊ新上任之謝閣揆施壓，要持續執行陳水扁之「非核家園」政策，而為此目的，他號召進行核
四公投。
11。註。林義雄據了解對其反核立場為狂熱，而陳政權之反核政策，有一部份為試圖安撫林
之結果。然而AIT POL和EST官員與林義雄在2月25日會面，並發現他是理性的。林說他不預
期政府會轉變方向或舉行核四公投，而只會就現行政策尋求自圓其說的解釋。林抱怨說，沒
有引用台灣的能源需求或環保考量，官方只會責怪美方施壓續建核四電廠。AIT澄清即AIT對
核四電廠之注意，僅限於確保台灣遵守其與通用電力公司之簽約義務。在此澄清後，林表示
他完全支持履行台灣對通用電力之簽約義務。註終。
12。於2005年2月2日，林率領數十位積極人士所參加之，在立法院和行政院外的抗議，呼籲
謝長廷實現陳政權之承諾(將reftel G中所報導之基本環境法法制化)讓台灣變為非核。行政
院研考會及非核家園委員會主委葉菊蘭為與環保NGOS有關之前任教授。能源委員會連絡人相
信，葉有負責為要求台灣成為非核之環境基本法添加條文。(評論。葉雖留任新內閣中，但
其影響力來自與閣揆游錫(方方土)之密切連繫。其在謝閣揆下的影響力還不能確定。評論終
)
評論
13。民進黨如何處理這些議題將會重新界定關鍵黨綱。民進黨掌握京都協定即將實施，做為
試圖遮掩其對核電能源，在擁「綠」條件下，較為實際之考量的權宜之計。陳政權軟化對核
電能源立場之作為，是否會轉為最終完成核四電廠興建之政治意願及經費，尚有待觀察。對
支持核電能源的穩固承諾，會導致損害部份之民進黨傳統的草根支持基礎。未來幾個月之台
灣的核電能源和京都政策，將會透露陳政權的第二任，會不會繼續讓政治掛帥，還是會更為
注重於穩當的經濟政策。評論終。
[編輯] 新聞報導和網路討論連結
維基解密披露 2005年扁政府反核鬆動秘辛
[編輯] 原文出處
http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05TAIPEI846.html
[編輯]英文原文
SUBJECT: TAIWAN: PROSPECTS FOR GE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT IMPROVE
REF: A) 2004 TAIPEI 02862 B) 2004 TAIPEI 02475 C) 2004 TAIPEI 00450 D) 2005
TAIPEI 00892 E) 2005 TAIPEI 00555 F) 2005 TAIPEI 00490 G) 2002 TAIPEI 03912 H)
2001 TAIPEI 00477 I) 2004 TAIPEI 02861
Classified By: AIT Acting Director David Keegan, Reason: 1.4 (B/D)
¶1. (c) Summary. The first Chen Administration came into office in 2000
committed to killing the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP), but failed. Since
then, anti-nuclear forces have sought other ways to try to reduce Taiwan's
dependence on nuclear energy. Until mid-January 2005, those anti-nuclear
efforts appeared to be succeeding with policies to implement "Taiwan's Nuclear
Free Homeland" steaming forward. Chen relied on anti-nuclear activists to
secure votes for the 2004 Presidential and Legislative Yuan (LY) elections.
With the elections behind it and with the recent implementation of the Kyoto
Protocol, the Chen Administration is trying to moderate its strong anti-nuclear
stance. For the first time since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has
been in power, proponents of nuclear energy have begun to gain support. This
development could presage the supplemental funding and political support needed
to finally complete the controversial General Electric FNPP. End Summary.
Role of Nuclear Energy in Taiwan
¶2. (c) Nuclear power is by far Taiwan's cheapest source of energy. Energy
experts in the government say that it is critical both to bring the FNPP on
line and to avoid the early decommissioning of Taiwan's three existing nuclear
plants. Without energy generated by all four nuclear plants, Taiwan could face
critical energy shortages by 2010.
¶3. (u) Nonetheless, opposition to nuclear power in general (and the
construction of the FNPP in particular) has been a key part of the DPP's
ideology since the party's inception. Throughout Chen,s first Administration
and during the run up to both the 2004 Presidential and LY elections, President
Chen pandered to his anti-nuclear support base. The issue came to a head in
November 2000 when, in an effort to live up to a 2000 Presidential campaign
commitment, newly elected President Chen Shui-bian halted work at the FNPP.
That move led to an abortive KMT effort to recall President Chen, a significant
delay in the projected completion date, increased costs (USD 30 million) for
the project, and weakened investor confidence in Taiwan overall.
¶4. Ultimately, in February 2001, the Chen Administration agreed to resume
construction. At the same time, however, as reported in ref h, both DPP and KMT
members in the LY agreed that Taiwan would work to become "nuclear free." To
that end, during Chen,s first term, the Executive Yuan (EY) passed an
Environmental Basic law committing Taiwan to become a "nuclear free homeland"
(ref g) and drafted regulations to decommission each of Taiwan,s three
operating nuclear power plants seven years earlier than originally scheduled
(ref d). In addition, government officials and publications used extreme
anti-nuclear rhetoric such as the claim that "over 6 million people in Taiwan
are now living in the shadow of insecurity, because of the nuclear time bombs
in their back yards." (The "time bombs" refer to Taiwan nuclear power plants.)
Kyoto Protocol Paves Way for More Serious Nuclear Debate
¶5. (u) In January 2005, Nobel Prize Laureate and Taiwan Academia Sinica
President Lee Yuan-tseh publicly stated that the Chen Administration's "Nuclear
Free Homeland" policy might need to be postponed until 2050 in order for Taiwan
to meet emissions requirements under the Kyoto Protocol. This marked the first
pro-nuclear public statement by a high-level public figure since President Chen
took office in 2000. Lee's statement reflects growing concerns about Taiwan's
vulnerability to sanctions under the Kyoto Protocol, which went into effect on
February 16, 2005.
Post Elections Anti-nuke Lobby Loses Ground
¶6. (c) With the need to secure votes for the 2004 Presidential and
Legislative Yuan elections behind it coupled with the recent implementation of
the Kyoto Protocol, the Chen Administration is trying to moderate its strong
anti-nuclear stance. Following Lee Yuan-tseh's lead, several officials from the
EY have begun to openly support completion of the FNPP. Both Premier Frank
Hsieh (Hsieh Chang-ting) and Economic Minister Ho Mei-yueh have made public
statements to this effect. As noted in ref e, Premier Hsieh told AIT that he
would personally tell the influential anti-nuclear activist and former
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairman Lin I-hsiung that the EY remains
bound by its February 2001 agreement with the LY to complete the FNPP project
(ref h).
¶7. (c) Furthermore, as reported in ref i, Minister Ho helped secure
behind-the-scenes interim funding to keep the FNPP alive in September 2004. On
February 14, 2005, Minister Ho went further and publicly stated her personal
support for completing the FNPP. She concurrently noted, however, that the
final decision would require a broader consensus. In order to reach such a
consensus, Ho announced EY plans to hold a National Energy Conference in June
2005 to discuss how Taiwan might need to adjust its energy mix in order to meet
its Kyoto protocol obligations. (Note. AIT contacts in the EY,s Energy
Commission, which is responsible for organizing the conference, told AIT that
several high level policy makers intend to use the June National Energy
Conference both to affirm support for the completion of the FNPP and to repeal
current plans to decommission Taiwan's three operating nuclear plants earlier
than originally scheduled. End Note.)
¶8. (c) Finally, Chung Chia-bing, who was just replaced as DPP Deputy
Secretary General but remains an influential figure inside the DPP's powerful
New Tide faction, recently told AIT that the DPP made a conscious decision in
late December to break with anti-nuclear activists. He said senior officials
determined that working with the opposition-controlled LY was more important
than continuing to pander to the party's anti-nuclear constituency.
Battle May Be Yet To Come
¶9. (u) While these recent moves suggest indicate that the Chen Administration
is trying to moderate its anti-nuclear stance, a major political battle over
the issue is likely in the offing. Anti-nuclear activists both within and
outside the government are unlikely to concede on this core DPP issue without a
fight.
¶10. (c) Major figures that can be expected to continue to press the Chen
Administration to stay true to its anti-nuclear roots: former DPP Chairman and
anti-nuclear activist Lin I-hsiung and Chairman of the EY Research, Development
and Evaluation Commission (RDEC) and of the EY Nuclear Free Homeland
Commission, Yeh Jiunn-rong. Lin-I-hsiung is already pressuring newly appointed
Premier Frank Hsieh to continue implementing Chen,s "Nuclear Free Homeland"
polices and, toward that end, he has called for a referendum on the FNPP.
¶11. Note. Lin-I-hsiung is believed to be fervent in his anti-nuclear stance
and the Chen Adminstration's anti-nuclear policies are in part a result of
trying to appease Lin. However, AIT POL and EST Officers met with Lin on
February 25 and found him to be rational. Lin said he did not expect the
government to reverse its course or hold a referendum on FNPP, but simply
seeking a coherent explanation for the current policy. Lin complained that,
rather than citing Taiwan's energy requirements or environmental concerns,
officials simply blamed U.S. pressure for their decision to continue with the
construction of FNPP. AIT clarified that AIT's interest in the FNPP is limited
to ensuring that Taiwan lives up to its contractual obligations with General
Electric. After this clarification, Lin stated that he fully supports
fulfilling Taiwan's contractual obligations to General Electric. End Note.
¶12. On February 2, 2005, Lin led a protest attended by a few dozen activists
outside both the LY and EY urging the newly-installed Hsieh to realize the Chen
Administration's commitment (codified in its Basic Environmental Law as
reported in reftel G) to make Taiwan nuclear free. Chairman of the EY's RDEC
and Nuclear Free Homeland Commission, Yeh Jiunn-rong, is a former professor
linked to environmental NGOS. Energy Commission contacts believe Yeh is
responsible for adding provisions to the Environmental Basic Law that require
Taiwan to become nuclear free. (Comment. Although Yeh has been retained in the
new cabinet, his previous influence derived from close ties to former Premier
Yu Shyi-kun. His influence under Premier Hsieh remains yet to be determined.
End Comment.)
Comment
¶13. How the DPP handles these issues could redefine key party principles. The
DPP has seized on the Kyoto Protocol going into force as a convenient
opportunity to try to cloak its more practical considerations toward nuclear
energy in pro-"green" terms. Whether the Chen Administration efforts to
moderate its stand on nuclear energy will translate into the political will and
funding needed to finally complete construction of the FNPP remains to be seen.
A firm commitment to support nuclear energy could result in undermining some of
the DPP's traditional grassroots base of support. Taiwan's nuclear energy and
Kyoto policies over the next few months will reveal whether the second term
Chen Administration will continue to place politics first or has begun to place
more emphasis on sound economic policies. End Comment.