Fukuyama’s Inner Civic Republicanism
福山內心的公民共和主義
原文：The new Republic
https://tinyurl.com/resd8nt
https://tinyurl.com/t7qk82z
作者：Win McCormack
譯文：觀察者
https://www.guancha.cn/WinMcCormack/2020_01_18_532077_s.shtml
In his recently published study Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the
Politics of Resentment, Francis Fukuyama wants to modify his best-known
thesis, published first as a 1989 essay, “The End of History?,” then as a
book-length treatment in 1992, The End of History and the Last Man. The word
“end,” he now says, was not meant in the sense of “termination,” but
rather signified “target” or “objective”; similarly, “history” was
referencing the process of “development” or “modernization,” not recorded
time. Marx had argued that, in his own interpretive scheme, the historical
process would culminate in a communist utopia; Fukuyama says that in his
end-of-history thesis he was supplying a more moderate and measured gloss on
Marx, employing instead Hegel’s version of the dialectic’s endpoint: a “
liberal state linked with a market economy.”
弗朗西斯·福山在最近發表的研究著作《身份:對尊嚴的需求和怨恨的政治》中，希望修
改他最著名的論文，這篇論文首先發表於1989年的論文《歷史的終結》，然後在1992年發
表為一本長達一本書的著作《歷史的終結與最後之人》。他現在說， “終結” 一詞指的
並非 “終止” ，而是 “目標” 或“客觀”；與之，“歷史”指的是“發展”或“現代
化”的過程，而不是被記錄的時間。馬克思主張，在他自己的解釋方案中，歷史進程將在
共產主義烏托邦中達到頂峰；福山說，在他的歷史終結論題中，他在馬克思的論述上提供
了更溫和、更有條理的解釋，取而代之的是黑格爾對辯證法終點的解釋版:“與市場經濟
相聯繫的自由國家”。
There is much wrong here. To begin with, Hegel was not an advocate of liberal
democratic capitalism. He critiqued both political and economic liberalism
for promoting a selfish individualism inimical to community, his highest
political ideal. Fukuyama was working from the idiosyncratic reading of Hegel
supplied by Alexandre Kojeve, a Russian émigré who conducted a series of
legendary seminars on the subject in Paris in the 1930s. According to Shadia
Drury, a chronicler of the intellectual roots of modern neoconservatism,
Kojeve’s Hegelian teachings—which also strongly referenced the Nietzschean
idea of the Superman—proved very influential in the development of postwar
existentialism and postmodernism.
這裡錯漏較大。首先，黑格爾不是自由民主的資本主義的倡導者。對於政治自由主義和經
濟自由主義，他均持批判態度，認為二者宣揚一種自私的個人主義，不利於他的最高政治
理想——“社群”。福山的作品取材於亞歷山大·科耶夫對黑格爾的獨特解讀。科耶夫是
俄羅斯移民，他於20世紀30年代在巴黎舉辦了一系列相關主題的著名研討會。現代新保守
主義思想根源的編年史家沙迪亞·德魯裡認為，科耶夫的黑格爾教義——也強烈引用了尼
采的超人思想——對戰後存在主義和後現代主義的發展產生了巨大的影響。
In The End of History and the Last Man, Fukuyama argues that liberal
capitalist democracy satisfies what Plato contended were the three basic
needs of the soul: The rational side of capitalism facilitates the desiring
part’s appetite for material goods, while the liberal-democratic political
order confers on its citizens the dignity of political equality and
individual rights. But Fukuyama vacillates throughout on how great a threat
aspiring Supermen in the Nietzschean mold might pose to the peace at the end
of history. In The End of History and the Last Man, he actually singles out
Donald Trump as a successful capitalist who might still seek affirmation
beyond mere financial accomplishment, and might conceivably pose a danger to
the nation if he were to choose to enter politics.
福山在《歷史的終結和最後之人》一書中指出，自由資本主義民主滿足了柏拉圖所主張的
靈魂的三個基本需求: 資本主義理性的一面促進了渴望獲得物質財富的一方的慾望，而自
由民主的政治秩序賦予了其公民政治平等和個人權利的尊嚴。但是，對於尼采模式下，有
抱負的超人會對歷史末期的和平造成多大的威脅，福山的態度一直搖擺不定。在《歷史的
終結和最後之人》一書中，他事實上將唐納德·川普作為一位成功的資本家單獨挑選出來
。在該書的論述中，福山認為，川普可能仍在尋求超越單純財務成就的肯定，如果他選擇
從政，可能會對國家構成威脅。
Fukuyama was originally an elitist pessimist of the old neoconservative
school; he studied Western philosophy with Allan Bloom (himself a student of
Leo Strauss) in his undergraduate years at Cornell. But Fukuyama seems to
have finally made a break from the profound cultural pessimism of the
Straussian neocons. Liberalism, as Fukuyama notes, has from the beginning
presented itself as a universal creed, calling for the extension of basic
political rights to every citizen, even if those rights have not often been
evenly or justly enforced, Recently, historically excluded subgroups within
liberal political orders have organized to achieve equal status for their
groups qua groups. One prominent recent instance of this demand for identity
and recognition has been the gay community’s campaign for the right to marry
same-sex partners. Fukuyama also mentions parallel efforts from a host of
other historically marginalized subgroups, such as the disabled, African
Americans in areas where there is routine police violence, Native Americans,
immigrants, and transgender individuals. He commends their achievements, but
cautions that neither the American left, as a movement, nor the nation as a
whole can function and prosper if it functions as a congeries of disparate,
impermeable subgroups. And here is where civic republicanism comes in; where
the ambitions of liberalism as a universal-rights–based creed appear to be
succumbing to the pressures of ethno-nationalist reaction on the right and
identity-based agitations for recognition on the left, the particularist,
historically informed character of the republican tradition may prove more
adaptable to the world’s shifting and radically contingent political
landscape. Where the liberal order envisioned as the summit of political
development in The End of History and the Last Man has grown notably brittle,
hidebound, and inward-looking, the participatory and locally embedded
traditions of republicanism, aimed at cultivating virtue and self-sacrifice
as a civic bulwark against the corrosive forces of vice, luxury, and
atomistic individualism, now speak to an increasingly unmoored political age
with fresh urgency.
福山原本是舊的新保守主義學派中的精英悲觀主義者；他在康奈爾大學讀本科時與艾倫·
布魯姆(師從利奧·施特勞斯)一起學習西方哲學。但福山似乎終於擺脫了施特勞斯學派新
保守派深刻的文化悲觀主義。正如福山所指出的，自由主義從一開始，就作為一種普遍信
條出現，呼籲將基本政治權利擴大到每一個公民，即使這些權利往往並未得到平等或公正
的實施。最近，歷史上被排斥在自由政治秩序之外的亞群體 組織起來，以實現其作為群
體的平等地位。其中的一個突出例子，便是同性戀群體要求身份和承認、爭取同性伴侶婚
姻權利的運動。福山還提到了許多其他在歷史上被邊緣化的亞群體所做出的類似努力，如
殘疾人、警察暴力地區的非洲裔美國人、美洲原住民、移民和變性者。他讚揚他們的成就
，但也告誡道，如果將美國左翼作為一個運動，或者作為一個整體，以一個不同的、不可
滲透的小團體的集合體進行日常工作，是無法運行下去、無法繁榮發展的。而這正是公民
共和主義的用武之地；自由主義作為以普遍權利為基礎的信條的野心似乎屈服於右翼的種
族民族主義反應和左翼基於身份的爭取承認的鼓動的壓力，事實證明，共和傳統的特殊、
歷史淵源豐富的性質可能更能適應世界不斷變化和激進的政治格局。在《歷史的終結和最
後之人》中，自由秩序被設想為政治發展的頂峰，但在那裡，它變得明顯脆弱、守舊和內
向，而參與性和地方根深蒂固的共和主義傳統——旨在培養美德和自我犧牲精神，作為對
抗邪惡、奢侈和原子式個人主義等腐蝕性力量的公民堡壘——如今正以新的緊迫感向日益
脫離的政治時代發出呼聲。
In the chastened pages of Identity, Fukuyama himself concedes as much: “
Democracies require certain positive virtues on the part of citizens...,” he
writes: Alexis de Tocqueville in particular warned of the temptation of
people in democratic societies to turn inward and preoccupy themselves with
their own welfare and that of their families exclusively. Successful
democracy, according to him, requires citizens who are patriotic, informed,
active, public-spirited, and willing to participate in political matters. In
this age of polarization, one might add that they should be open-minded,
tolerant of other viewpoints and ready to compromise their own views for the
sake of a democratic consensus.
在《身份》這本書中，福山本人也坦言：“民主制度需要公民具有某些積極的美德……”
他寫道: 「亞歷西斯·德·托克維爾特別警告說，民主社會中的人們很容易變得向內，只
關心自己和家人的福利。他認為，成功的民主需要愛國、見多識廣、積極主動、熱心公益
、樂於參與政治事務。在這個兩極分化的時代，還可以補充一點，成功的民主還需要人們
思想開放、容忍其他觀點，可為了達成民主共識而進行一定讓步。」
This is a perfect description of the republican political ethic—as well as
of the public-minded virtues most lamentably absent from American politics
today.
這是對共和黨政治倫理的完美描述，也是對當今美國政治中最令人遺憾地缺乏的公眾意識
的美德的完美描述。
“For virtually coeval with the enunciation of Lockean Liberalism,” Francis
Fukuyama wrote in a passage in his 1992 book, The End of History and the Last
Man, “has been a persistent unease with the society thereby produced, and
with the prototypic product of that society, the bourgeois. That unease is
ultimately traceable to a single moral fact, that the bourgeois is primarily
preoccupied with his own material well-being, and is neither public-spirited,
nor virtuous, nor dedicated to the larger community around him or her. In
short, the bourgeois is selfish.”
福山在其1992年的著作《歷史的終結和最後之人》的一段中寫道：“實際上，與洛克自由
主義的表達是同時代的，這是對由此產生的社會以及該社會的典型產物資產階級的持續憂
慮。這種憂慮最終可以追溯到一個道德事實，那就是資產階級主要關心的是自己的物質福
利，既不熱心公益，也不講道德，也不獻身於他或她周圍更大的社會。簡而言之，資產階
級是自私的。”
These were strange sentiments coming from the author of the controversial
1989 essay “The End of History?”—a work best known for asserting that the
impending collapse of the Soviet empire and its system of communism signified
the final triumph of liberal democracy over all possible alternative systems
of government. However, even in the original exposition of his thesis, there
were clues that Fukuyama did not fully endorse the political and economic
system he was claiming was the best human civilization would ever produce. In
particular, he noted a “broad unhappiness with the impersonality and
spiritual vacuity of liberal consumerist societies,” which intimated to him
“the emptiness at the core of liberalism.”
這是1989年頗具爭議的論文《歷史的終結?》作者提出的奇怪觀點。這本著作最著名的論
斷是，蘇維埃帝國及其共產主義制度即將崩潰，標誌著自由民主最終戰勝了所有可能的替
代政府制度。然而，即使在該論文最初的闡述中，也有一些線索表明，福山並沒有完全贊
同他所聲稱的人類文明所產生的政治和經濟制度是有史以來最好的。他特別指出了“對自
由消費主義社會的客觀性和精神空虛性的普遍不滿”，這暗示著他“自由主義核心的空虛
”。
Fukuyama also summarized Alexandre Kojeve’s judgment of the postwar European
countries as “precisely those flabby, prosperous, self-satisfied,
inward-looking, weak-willed states whose grandest project was nothing more
heroic than the creation of the Common Market.” Kojeve was the actual
originator of the End-of-History thesis Fukuyama propounded—or, rather, he
was an idiosyncratic interpreter of G.W.F. Hegel who asserted that the
philosopher had identified Napoleon’s defeat of the Prussian army at the
battle of Jena in 1806 as the precise moment history ended. That moment,
Kojeve argued, marked the permanent triumph of the principles of the French
Revolution over the reactionary forces of European royalty. However, as
Shadia Drury has clarified, Kojeve was interpreting Hegel’s complex
philosophical ruminations through a distorting Nietzschean lens.
福山還將科耶夫對戰後歐洲國家的判斷概括為“恰恰是那些軟弱、繁榮、自滿、內向、意
志薄弱的國家，它們最宏偉的計畫無非是建立共同市場。”科耶夫是福山所提出的歷史終
結論的真正創始人，或者更確切地說，他是 G. W. F.黑格爾的一位獨特解釋者。黑格爾
斷言，這位哲學家認為拿破崙在1806年耶拿戰役中擊敗普魯士軍隊的那一刻，正是歷史終
結的時刻。科耶夫認為，那一刻標誌著法國大革命原則對歐洲皇室反動勢力的永久勝利。
然而，正如沙迪亞·德魯裡所澄清的那樣，科耶夫是通過扭曲的尼采視角來解讀黑格爾複
雜的哲學思想的。
Hegel posited a Master-Slave relationship that emerged at the dawn of
civilization, and identified the central dynamic of history as a mutual “
quest for recognition” of their humanity arising from both parties to this
relationship. The Slave did not receive the recognition he sought because of
his inferior status; the Master did not garner the recognition he wanted
because recognition from an inferior was meaningless; only when they
acknowledged each other as equals could they attain the recognition they both
craved. Transmogrifying this Hegelian motif, Kojeve interpreted the French
Revolution as the necessarily violent triumph of the slave class over its
masters. Like Nietzsche, he also condemned the victory of the slave class as
a reversion to the base animality of primitive society—a condition in which
people attended only to their gross physical needs and not the higher ideals
of an aristocratic order.
黑格爾提出了一種出現於文明開端的主人與奴隸的關係並將歷史的核心動力定義為雙方對
人性的共同“對認可的尋求”。奴隸沒有得到他想要的認可，因為他的地位低下；主人沒
有得到他想要的認可，因為來自下位者的認可毫無意義；只有當他們平等地認可彼此時，
他們才能得到所渴望的認可。科耶夫對黑格爾的這一主題進行了深刻的解讀，他將法國大
革命解讀為奴隸階級對其主人必然的暴力勝利。和尼采一樣，他也譴責奴隸階級的勝利是
原始社會基本動物性的倒退；在原始社會裡，人們只關心自己的物質需要，而不關心貴族
秩序的更高理想。
Fukuyama’s cynicism about the bourgeois order in The End of History and the
Last Man manifestly had its origin in Nietzsche’s worldview; the addition to
the title of the phrase “the Last Man,” Nietzsche’s term of derision for
the bourgeoisie—“men without chests”—gave the game away. Yet much of the
terminology Fukuyama deployed in the book—terms such as “public-spirited,”
“virtuous,” and “larger community”—is unmistakably akin to the
vocabulary of civic republicanism. In a subsequent book, The Origins of
Political Order, however, he dismissed classical republicanism as a viable
alternative, on the grounds that “it did not scale well.” As the ancient
republics of Greece and Rome grew in size, he explained, “it became
impossible to maintain the demanding communitarian values that bound them
together.”
福山在《歷史的終結和最後之人》一書中對資產階級秩序的冷嘲熱諷顯然源於尼采的世界
觀；尼采對資產階級的嘲諷——“沒有胸膛的人”——在標題“最後之人”的基礎上增加
了這個詞，暴露了這場文字遊戲。然而，福山在書中使用的許多術語——如“熱心公益”
、“善良”和“更大的社區”——無疑類似於公民共和主義的詞彙。但在隨後的一本書《
政治秩序的起源》中，他駁斥了古典共和主義作為替代方案的可行性，理由是“它的規模
不夠大“。他解釋說，隨著古希臘和古羅馬共和國規模的擴大，“不可能繼續維持將其綁
定在一起的苛刻的社群主義價值觀了。”
That judgment is sensible enough, but Fukuyama, in his latest book, Identity,
finds value in the republican ethic as a means for fortifying liberalism
against the onslaught it now faces from identity politics. Abroad,
ethno-nationalism has already turned formerly democratic nations against
liberal democracy entirely, and the overwhelmingly white American right-wing,
crazed by America’s rapid evolution toward a multiethnic society, seems
intent on accomplishing the same feat here at home. Meanwhile, the American
Left, he surmises, believes that diversity, in and of itself, can pass for a
national identity. But Fukuyama argues that America’s national identity must
remain a credal one, founded on a strong belief in liberal and democratic
political values. He also acknowledges that simply sharing a creed is
insufficient to fully sustain a democratic order: Achieving that goal
requires an active and involved citizenry, exactly as civic republicanism
stipulates. To that end, he recommends a national service requirement for all
of America’s youth, an idea that civic republicans throughout America
heartily endorse.
這一判斷是非常明智的，但福山在他的新書《身份》中發現，共和倫理作為一種加強自由
主義抵禦身份政治帶來的衝擊的手段，具有重要的價值。在國外，民族國家主義已經讓以
前的民主國家完全反對自由民主，而被美國向多民族社會的快速發展所瘋狂的絕大多數美
國右翼白人似乎也想在國內實現同樣的壯舉。同時，他推測，美國左翼認為多樣性本身就
可以被視為一種國家認同。但福山認為，美國的民族身份必須是建立在對自由和民主政治
價值觀的堅定信念基礎上。他還認為，僅僅分享一個信念，是不足以完全維持一個民主秩
序的：實現這一目標，需要積極參與的公民，正如公民共和主義所要求的。為此，他建議
為所有美國年輕人提供國家服務，這是全美國公民共和黨人衷心贊同的觀點。
“National service,” he writes, “would be a contemporary form of classical
republicanism, a form of democracy that encouraged virtue and
public-spiritedness rather than leaving citizens alone to pursue their
private lives.” To meet the challenges posed by the end of history, in other
words, we need to revivify the historic civic-republican creed.
“國民服務，”他寫道，“將是一種當代形式的古典共和主義，一種鼓勵美德和公共精神
而不是讓公民獨自追求私人生活的民主形式。”或者說，為了迎接歷史終結所帶來的挑戰
，我們需要重振歷史上的公民共和主義信條。