美國已開放的檔案中，有多份接觸聯絡孫立人的報告。但若依據張淑雅、林博文
所述，目前可能尚有部份孫立人的相關檔案仍未解密，因此密函可能是銷燬了，
也可能有朝一日被發掘出來。
小弟把關於美國策劃支持孫立人進行政變的檔案段落貼上來，出處為：
Top Secret, 1950 Formosa And Hainan islands (Jan-Jul), CA Records,
Archives Unbound, pp. 164-165.
檔案圖文 Google文件 - https://goo.gl/70EZiX
檔案影像 - http://imgur.com/a/BYqqj
6. Procedures to implement decision, if made, to insure re-
tention of Formosa in non-Communist hands.
(a) Confidential Declaration to Chiang Kai-shek, K. C. Wu
and Sun Li-jen.
It is not believed that the course of action suggested here
is desirable or that it would be in the U.S. national interest.
So long as the Generalissimo and his group of followers remain on
Formosa, they will be a source of embarrassment and trouble to
the U.S. By experience we know that they will be ready enough
with promises of action desired by the U.S. and equally ready
to fail in fulfillment of such promises. They will inevitably
look upon the course of events as providing them another oppor-
tunity of returning to power on the mainland and their efforts
will be directed chiefly to that end, even to the extent of
doing everything in their power to bring about a third world
war. For these reasons, it seems logical that the U.S. should
adopt one of two courses:
(1) It should make clear to the Generalissimo, K. C. Wu,
Chen Cheng and Sun Li-jen that the U.S. must insist upon the
cessation of hostilities between Formosa and the mainland; that
the U.S. will assist the provincial government in its adminis-
trative and economic tasks; that as a condition for U.S. economic
aid and military advice and assistance the Generalissimo and the
present group of leaders of the National Government must be
willing to leave the Island and turn over the civil and military
administration to such Chinese and Formosan leaders as the U.S.
may designate; that the U.S. will then give military advice and
assistance to the commander responsible for the defense of the
Island; that the U.S. will expect the provincial administration
on Formosa to give high priority to the welfares of the Formosan
people; and that the U.S. will order units of its navy to visit
Formosa in order to prevent action by against Formosa for a
period during which the problem of Formosa would be made the sub-
jest of discussion with other concerned governments.
(2) The U.S. should inform Sun Li-jen in the strictest
confidence through a private emissary that the U.S. Government is
prepared to furnish him the necessary military aid and advice in
the event that he wishes to stage a coup d'etat for the purpose
of establishing his military control over the Island. Sun should
also be given ample funds (the total might run into several mil-
lion dollars) to assist him in buying over the other commanders
necessary to such an undertaking; he should be given firm
assurances of whatever additional funds he might need in this
connection during the early stages. Urgent preparations would
have to be made to arrange for the shipment from Guam or some
other nearby U.S. base of the arms and ammunition necessary to
meet Sun's military requirements at the outset of such an under-
taking.
參考資料：
張淑雅。韓戰救臺灣？解讀美國對臺政策。頁74-75、326-327。
林博文。1949石破天驚的一年。頁133-153。
黃美華。美國對華政策之研究(1947-1950)。頁166-174、238-243。
雲程編。福爾摩沙‧1949。頁299-301、327-328。