How big tech is dragging us towards the next financial crash
科技巨頭將把我們拖入下一場金融崩潰
原文：The Guardian https://tinyurl.com/y65thsma
作者：Rana Foroohar
中譯：察網http://www.cwzg.cn/theory/201912/53740.html
In every major economic downturn in US history, the ‘villains’ have been
the ‘heroes’ during the preceding boom,” said the late, great management
guru Peter Drucker. I cannot help but wonder if that might be the case over
the next few years, as the United States (and possibly the world) heads
toward its next big slowdown. Downturns historically come about once every
decade, and it has been more than that since the 2008 financial crisis. Back
then, banks were the “too-big-to-fail” institutions responsible for our
falling stock portfolios, home prices and salaries. Technology companies, by
contrast, have led the market upswing over the past decade. But this time
around, it is the big tech firms that could play the spoiler role.
當代管理學教父彼得‧德魯克（Peter Drucker）曾說過：“在美國歷史上任何一個重大
經濟危機裡，‘罪魁禍首’們也往往是之前經濟盛世中的‘英雄’。”我不禁猜想：在美
國（或許世界範圍內）經濟疲軟的背景下，下一場經濟危機是否也出現同樣的情況？歷史
上經濟低迷總是每十年出現一次，而自2008年金融危機後其出現次數更加頻繁。回過頭看
，銀行要為我們下跌的股票投資組合、家用開支以及工薪負責，因而其“大而不倒”。與
此相對，儘管科技公司也在過去十餘年引領經濟增長，但時移世異，這一次科技公司或許
會成為破壞者。
You wouldn’t think it could be so when you look at the biggest and richest
tech firms today. Take Apple. Warren Buffett says he wished he owned even
more Apple stock. (His Berkshire Hathaway has a 5% stake in the company.)
Goldman Sachs is launching a new credit card with the tech titan, which
became the world’s first $1tn market-cap company in 2018. But hidden within
these bullish headlines are a number of disturbing economic trends, of which
Apple is already an exemplar. Study this one company and you begin to
understand how big tech companies – the new too-big-to-fail institutions –
could indeed sow the seeds of the next crisis.
當然，現下看這些規模龐大、資金充裕的科技公司，你可能不會作此猜想。以蘋果公司為
例，其在2018年成為世界首個市值1兆美元的公司。沃倫‧巴菲特（Warren Buffett）曾
說他希望有更多蘋果公司的股票（其創建的伯克希爾‧哈撒韋公司（Berkshire Hathaway
）已經持有蘋果公司5%的股份）。高盛公司（Goldman Sachs）也正與這個科技巨頭合作
籌備推出一種新型信用卡。但在這些一片大好的新聞頭條下卻暗藏令人不安的經濟趨勢，
蘋果公司也不能倖免。深入研究這個公司就會開始理解：這些科技巨頭公司（新的“大而
不倒”機構）是怎樣為下一場經濟危機埋下種子。
No matter what the Silicon Valley giants might argue, ultimately, size is a
problem, just as it was for the banks. This is not because bigger is
inherently bad, but because the complexity of these organisations makes them
so difficult to police. Like the big banks, big tech uses its lobbying muscle
to try to avoid regulation. And like the banks, it tries to sell us on the
idea that it deserves to play by different rules.
不論那些矽谷巨頭們如何爭論，正如當初的銀行一樣，規模始終是一個問題。這並非指越
大越壞，而是因為這些機構的複雜性使得其難以被監管。與大型銀行相似，大型科技公司
也竭力避免被規制，並試圖使人們相信：它應當適用不同的規則。
Consider the financial engineering done by such firms. Like most of the
largest and most profitable multinational companies, Apple has loads of cash
– around $210bn at last count – as well as plenty of debt (close to
$110bn). That is because – like nearly every other large, rich company – it
has parked most of its spare cash in offshore bond portfolios over the past
10 years. This is part of a Kafkaesque financial shell game that has played
out since the 2008 financial crisis. Back then, interest rates were lowered
and central bankers flooded the economy with easy money to try to engineer a
recovery. But the main beneficiaries were large companies, which issued lots
of cheap debt, and used it to buy back their own shares and pay out
dividends, which bolstered corporate share prices and investors, but not the
real economy. The Trump corporate tax cuts added fuel to this fire. Apple,
for example, was responsible for about a quarter of the $407bn in buy-backs
announced in the six months or so after Trump’s tax law was passed in
December 2017 – the biggest corporate tax cut in US history.
正是這些公司推動著經濟發展。與大多數最大、最盈利的跨國公司類似，蘋果公司擁有大
量現金儲備：最新數據為約2100億美元；也有巨額債務：近1100億美元。這是由於其在過
去十年間將大量閒置資金投放於離岸債券投資組合中，該做法與其他大型盈利公司相同。
這是一場卡夫卡式的金融騙局，並且早在2008年金融危機中上演過一次。那時，利率降低
，中央銀行家們大量注入低息資金，試圖推動經濟復甦。但主要受益者卻是大公司：它們
藉機獲取低息資金，用以回購股份，支付紅利。該舉措刺激股價回升，但卻並未真正促進
經濟發展。川普的減稅政策則進一步推波助瀾。在2017年12月川普的稅法——美國歷史上
力度最大的公司稅法通過後的約6個月內，宣佈回購的股份已達4070億美元，其中蘋果公
司約佔四分之一。
Because of this, the wealth divide has been increased, which many economists
believe is not only the biggest factor in slower-than-historic trend growth,
but is also driving the political populism that threatens the market system
itself.
正基於此，貧富差距更加激化。許多經濟學家認為這不僅導致史上最低的經濟增速，也誘
發了政治民粹主義（其也威脅著市場本身）。
That phenomenon has been put on steroids by yet another trend epitomised by
Apple: the rise of intangibles such as intellectual property and brands (both
of which the company has in spades) relative to tangible goods as a share of
the global economy. As Jonathan Haskel and Stian Westlake show in their book
Capitalism Without Capital, this shift became noticeable around 2000, but
really took off after the introduction of the iPhone in 2007. The digital
economy has a tendency to create superstars, since software and internet
services are so scalable and enjoy network effects (in essence, they allow a
handful of companies to grow quickly and eat everyone else’s lunch). But
according to Haskel and Westlake, it also seems to reduce investment across
the economy as a whole. This is not only because banks are reluctant to lend
to businesses whose intangible assets may simply disappear if they go
belly-up, but also because of the winner-takes-all effect that a handful of
companies, including Apple (and Amazon and Google), enjoy.
在以蘋果公司為例的科技主導下，與有形商品相比，無形資產（如知識產權和商標）在全
球經濟的份額上升。在此趨勢下，貧富差距愈演愈烈，財富分配差距愈來愈大。正如喬納
森‧哈斯克爾（Jonathan Haskel）和斯蒂安‧韋斯特萊克（Stian Westlake）在《沒有
資本的資本主義》（Capitalism Without Capital）一書中寫道：該轉變在2000年前後顯
露，但真正發跡則始於2007年蘋果手機上市。軟件和網絡服務應用廣泛，並享受著互聯網
紅利（實際上，其促使許多公司快速成長，並在競爭中搶佔其他公司的“蛋糕”），因而
數字經濟總是會有領頭人出現。但依據哈斯克爾和韋斯特萊克的觀點，這似乎也將導致經
濟投資整體減少。這不僅由於銀行不願貸款給這些企業（一旦其破產，這些無形資產將化
為烏有），也受到“贏者通吃”規則的影響（蘋果、亞馬遜以及谷歌等許多公司均在其中
）。
This is likely a key reason for the dearth of startups, declining job
creation, falling demand and other disturbing trends in our bifurcated
economy. Concentration of power of the sort that Apple and Amazon enjoy is a
key reason for record levels of mergers and acquisitions. In telecoms and
media especially, many companies have taken on significant amounts of debt in
order to bulk up and compete in this new environment of streaming video and
digital media.
當下，創業減少、就業困難、市場需求下降以及經濟分化下其他種種態勢令人擔憂，而導
致這一經濟現象的重要原因或許正是數字經濟。蘋果與亞馬遜的權力集中是併購達到峰值
的關鍵因素。在流媒體和數字媒體時代，許多公司大肆舉債以擴大規模，增強競爭力，其
中以電信和媒體行業為甚。
Some of that debt is now looking shaky, which underscores that the next big
crisis probably won’t emanate from banks, but from the corporate sector.
Rapid growth in debt levels is historically the best predictor of a crisis.
And for the past several years, the corporate bond market has been on a tear,
with companies in advanced economies issuing a record amount of debt; the
market grew 70% over the past decade, to reach $10.17tn in 2018. Even
mediocre companies have benefited from easy money.
但現下其中一些債務似乎搖搖欲墜，這凸顯出下一場大危機可能從這些公司中爆發，而非
銀行。從歷史上看，負債水平的快速增長往往預示了危機的到來。近年來，公司債務市場
一直處於漲勢，屬於先進經濟體系的公司債券發行也創下了紀錄；過去十年來市場增長
70%，2018年已達10.17兆美元。即便是普通公司也能從中獲益。
But as the interest rate environment changes, perhaps more quickly than was
anticipated, many could be vulnerable. The Bank for International Settlements
– the international body that monitors the global financial system – has
warned that the long period of low rates has cooked up a larger than usual
number of “zombie” companies, which will not have enough profits to make
their debt payments if interest rates rise. When rates eventually do rise,
warns the BIS, losses and ripple effects may be more severe than usual.
但隨著利率環境變化（或許比預期更快），許多債務將會變得不堪一擊。監管全球金融體
系的機構——國際清算銀行（The Bank for International Settlements）已發出警告稱
：長期低利率催生了比原來更多的“殭屍”公司，如果利率升高，這些公司將沒有足夠的
盈利抵債。國際清算銀行進一步強調：當利率上升時，破壞力與連鎖效應或許比以往更甚
。
Of course, if and when the next crisis is upon us, the deflationary power of
technology (meaning the way in which it drives down prices), exemplified by
companies like Apple, could make it more difficult to manage. That is the
final trend worth considering. Technology firms drive down the prices of lots
of things, and tech-related deflation is a big part of what has kept interest
rates so low for so long; it has not only constrained prices, but wages, too.
The fact that interest rates are so low, in part thanks to that tech-driven
deflation, means that central bankers will have much less room to navigate
through any upcoming crisis. Apple and the other purveyors of intangibles
have benefited more than other companies from this environment of low rates,
cheap debt, and high stock prices over the past 10 years. But their power has
also sowed the seeds of what could be the next big swing in the markets.
當然，如果新危機真的來臨，以蘋果為例的科技力量所導致的通貨緊縮（其以壓低價格的
方式）可能會更加難以應對。這是值得考慮的最後一個趨勢。科技公司壓低產品價格，而
與科技相關的通貨緊縮則是長期低利率的重要原因；其壓低的不僅僅是價格，還有工資。
同時，這也意味著中央銀行在應對將來的危機中會更加捉襟見肘。過去十年，相比其他公
司，蘋果公司以及其他無形資產的公司在低利率、高負債、高股價的環境中獲益更多。但
這也為下一場市場大波動埋下了種子。
A few years ago, I had a fascinating conversation with an economist at the US
Treasury’s Office of Financial Research, a small but important body that was
created following the 2008 financial crisis to study market trouble, and
which has since seen its funding slashed by Trump. I was trawling for
information about financial risk and where it might be held, and the
economist told me to look at the debt offerings and corporate bond purchases
being made by the largest, richest corporations in the world, such as Apple
or Google, whose market value now dwarfed that of the biggest banks and
investment firms.
幾年前，我與美國財政部金融研究辦公室（US Treasury’s Office of Financial
Research）（該機構成立於2008年經濟危機之後，旨在研究市場問題，但川普上任後削減
了其資金）的一位經濟學家對此進行討論。我曾試圖蒐集有關金融危機以及其爆發地點的
信息，但這位經濟學家建議關注世界規模最大、資金最為雄厚的公司，如蘋果和谷歌，要
去研究其債券發行以及債券購買情況。這些公司的市值已超過最大的銀行和投資公司了。
In a low interest rate environment, with billions of dollars in yearly
earnings, these high-grade firms were issuing their own cheap debt and using
it to buy up the higher-yielding corporate debt of other firms. In the search
for both higher returns and for something to do with all their money, they
were, in a way, acting like banks, taking large anchor positions in new
corporate debt offerings and essentially underwriting them the way that JP
Morgan or Goldman Sachs might. But, it is worth noting, since such companies
are not regulated like banks, it is difficult to track exactly what they are
buying, how much they are buying and what the market implications might be.
There simply is not a paper trail the way there is in finance. Still, the
idea that cash-rich tech companies might be the new systemically important
institutions was compelling.
在低利率的環境下，這些上游公司每年有數十億美元的收入，發行廉價債券並買入其他公
司的高收益債券。為了獲取高回報與利益，其倣傚銀行，很大程度上支撐了新公司債券發
行，並且實質上像摩根大通銀行（JP Morgan）和高盛（Goldman Sachs）那樣為公司投資
保駕護航。但這類公司始終並非像銀行一樣運作，這一舉措的意義不大，其難以準確追蹤
其投資對象的動向、投資方式以及市場變化。金融業不是紙上談兵。儘管如此，資金充裕
的科技公司也極有可能成為規範的重要金融機構。
I began digging for more on the topic, and about two years later, in 2018, I
came across a stunning Credit Suisse report that both confirmed and
quantified the idea. The economist who wrote it, Zoltan Pozsar, forensically
analysed the $1tn in corporate savings parked in offshore accounts, mostly by
big tech firms. The largest and most intellectual-property-rich 10% of
companies – Apple, Microsoft, Cisco, Oracle and Alphabet (Google’s parent
company) among them – controlled 80% of this hoard.
因此，我開始關注這個話題。大約2年後，也就是2018年一份瑞士信貸報告證實了該想法
。該報告的撰寫人佐爾坦‧鮑茲（Zoltan Pozsar）精確地分析：離岸賬戶中存儲的1兆美
元公司資本，大部分來自於科技公司。而其中80%集中在10%的公司手中，蘋果、微軟、思
科、甲骨文以及谷歌母公司（Alphabet）就在其間。它們擁有最大的規模與最多的知識產
權。
According to Pozsar’s calculations, most of that money was held not in cash
but in bonds – half of it in corporate bonds. The much-lauded overseas “cash
” pile held by the richest American companies, a treasure that Republicans
under Trump had cited as the key reason they passed their ill-advised tax “
reform” plan, was actually a giant bond portfolio. And it was owned not by
banks or mutual funds, which typically have such large financial holdings,
but by the world’s biggest technology firms. In addition to being the most
profitable and least regulated industry on the planet, the Silicon Valley
giants had also become systemically crucial within the marketplace, holding
assets that – if sold or downgraded – could topple the markets themselves.
Hiding in plain sight was an amazing new discovery: big tech, not big banks,
was the new too-big-to-fail industry.
根據鮑茲的統計，這些資本大部分並不是現金，而是債券，並且其中一半是公司債券。基
於此，以川普為首的共和黨認為這些美國最富有的公司擁有著巨大的“現金”儲備，並通
過備受詬病的稅收“改革”計畫。但其實質上是龐大的債券投資組合。其所有者既非銀行
也非共同基金（譯註：共同基金為投資公司或投資銀行一方面以發行股票的形式從基金股
東處籌集投資資金，然後投資於各種股票、債券、期權契約、商品和貨幣管理市場。），
而是全球最大的科技公司。此外，矽谷除了是賺錢最多，規制最少的行業，還對市場至關
重要，其資產若售出或貶值，則會動搖市場自身。顯而易見，科技巨頭才是新的“大而不
倒”機構，而非銀行巨鱷。
As I began to think about the comparison, I found more and more parallels.
Some of them were attitudinal. It was fascinating, for example, to see how
much the technology industry’s response to the 2016 election crisis mirrored
the banking industry’s behaviour in the wake of the financial crisis of
2008. Just as Wall Street had obfuscated as much as possible about what it
was doing before and after the crisis, every bit of useful information about
election meddling had to be clawed away from the titans of big tech.
當有意識地進行比較時，就會發現二者更多的相似之處。其中一些是態度上的問題。例如
科技行業對2016年選舉危機的應對簡直是銀行業在2008年金融危機後做法的翻版。正如華
爾街極力混淆其在危機前後的所作所為，這些科技巨頭也竭力清除任何關於選舉干預的蛛
絲馬跡。
First, they insisted that they had done nothing wrong, and that anyone who
thought they had simply did not understand the technology industry. It was
under extreme pressure from both press and regulators that Facebook’s Mark
Zuckerberg finally turned over 3,000 Russia-linked adverts to Congress.
Google and others were only marginally less evasive. Similar to Wall Street
financiers at the time of the US sub-prime crisis, the tech titans have
remained, years after the 2016 election, in a largely reactive posture,
parting with as few details as possible, attempting to keep the asymmetric
information advantages of their business model that, as in the banking
industry, help generate outsized profit margins. It is a “deny and deflect”
attitude similar to what we saw from financiers in 2008, and has resulted in
deservedly terrible PR.
首先，它們堅稱自己沒有做錯過任何事，並且認為那些對它們的批評都是由於對科技行業
的一無所知。而在來自媒體與監管機構的巨大壓力下，臉書創始人馬克‧扎克伯格（
Mark Zuckerberg）終於向國會提交了3000條與俄羅斯有關的廣告。谷歌與其他公司也只
是沒有那麼明顯地避諱。與美國次貸危機時華爾街金融家們的做法類似，在2016年大選後
，科技巨頭們紛紛出手，儘可能少透露細節，試圖利用其商業模式下的信息不對等以獲取
優勢，當然這也產生了巨額利潤。其“不承認不合作”態度與2008年金融家的做法別無二
致，這也相應導致了糟糕的公關效果。
But there are more substantive similarities as well. At a meta level, I see
four major likenesses in big finance and big tech: corporate mythology,
opacity, complexity and size. In terms of mythology, Wall Street before 2008
sold the idea that what was good for the financial sector was good for the
economy. Until quite recently, big tech tried to convince us of the same. But
there are two sides to the story, and neither industry is quick to
acknowledge or take responsibility for the downsides of “innovation”.
此外，還有更多實體上的相似之處。根本而言，我認為金融巨鱷與科技巨頭有四大相似之
處：公司至上論、封密性、複雜性以及規模化。就公司至上論而言，2008年之前華爾街灌
輸這樣一種觀念：有利於金融行業的才是有利於經濟的。而最近，科技巨頭們也同樣試圖
說服我們。但這個套路還有另一面：這兩個行業都不會承認，更不會為所謂的“創新”失
敗買單。
A raft of research shows us that trust in liberal democracy, government,
media and nongovernmental organisations declines as social media usage rises.
In Myanmar, Facebook has been leveraged to support genocide. In China, Apple
and Google have bowed to government demands for censorship. In the US, of
course, personal data is being collected, monetised and weaponised in ways
that we are only just beginning to understand, and monopolies are squashing
job creation and innovation. At this point, it is harder and harder to argue
that the benefits of platform technology vastly outweigh the costs.
大量研究表明：隨著社交媒體興起，公眾對自由民主、政府、媒體以及非政府組織的信賴
度下降。在緬甸，臉書被用來支持種族滅絕。在中國，蘋果和谷歌需要應對政府審查。而
在美國，個人數據正在已各種方式被收集、交易以及用於攻擊，而我們意識到的僅僅是冰
山一角。此外，壟斷還會導致擠壓就業機會，遏制創新。就此而言，我們難以得出科技平
台的利大於弊的結論。
Big tech and big banks are also similar in the opacity and complexity of
their operations. The algorithmic use of data is like the complex
securitisation done by the world’s too-big-to-fail banks in the sub-prime
era. Both are understood largely by industry experts who can use information
asymmetry to hide risks and the nefarious things that companies profit from,
such as dubious political ads.
科技巨頭與金融巨鱷在公司運行上都具有封密性與複雜性。數據的運算就如同次貸時期那
些“大而不倒”的銀行所發行的證券一樣複雜。二者都同樣具有專業要求，而行業專家們
則可利用信息不對等的優勢以隱瞞風險和公司從中獲益的其他惡性事件（如可疑的政治廣
告）。
Yet that complexity can backfire. Just as many big-bank risk managers had no
idea what was going in to and coming out of the black box before 2008, big
tech executives themselves can be thrown off balance by the ways in which
their technology can be misused. Consider, for example, the New York Times
investigation in 2018 that revealed that Facebook had allowed a number of
other big tech companies, including Apple, Amazon and Microsoft, to tap
sensitive user data even as it was promising to protect privacy.
但這種複雜性也可能會適得其反。正如2008年前，許多大銀行的風險經理對該“黑箱”的
風險以及所將要引發的危機一無所知，大型科技公司的高管們也可能會因科技濫用而對其
失去控制。例如2018年《紐約時報》（New York Times）的調查顯示：儘管臉書承諾保護
隱私，但仍允許許多大型科技公司（如蘋果、亞馬遜以及微軟）利用用戶敏感數據。
Facebook entered into the data-sharing deals – which are a win-win for the
big tech firms in general, to the extent that they increase traffic between
the various platforms and bring more and more users to them – between 2010
and 2017 to grow its social network as fast as possible. But neither Facebook
nor the other companies involved could keep track of all the implications of
the arrangements for user privacy. Apple claimed to not even know it was in
such a deal with Facebook, a rather stunning admission given the way in which
Apple has marketed itself as a protector of user privacy. At Facebook, “some
engineers and executives … considered the privacy reviews an impediment to
quick innovation and growth”, read a telling line in the Times piece. And
grow it has: Facebook took in more than $40bn in revenue in 2017, more than
double the $17.9bn it reported for 2015.
臉書加入了數據共享協議。這對大型科技公司一般來說是雙贏的，其一定程度上增加了不
同平台的流量，為其帶來越來越多的用戶。2010年至2017年間，社交網絡獲得迅速發展。
但不論是臉書還是其他相關公司都無法保障用戶隱私安全。蘋果公司甚至稱其根本不知道
自己與臉書存在這樣的交易，且其竟然將自己定位為用戶隱私的保護者，這實在令人震驚
。《紐約時報》上的一篇文章很能說明這個問題：在臉書中，“一些工程師和高管……認
為隱私審查阻礙了創新和發展”。隨後文章指出：2017年臉書收入超過400億美元，是
2015年179億美元的兩倍多。
Facebook’s prioritisation of growth over governance is egregious but not
unique. The tendency to look myopically at share price as the one and only
indicator of value is something fostered by Wall Street, but by no means
limited to it. The obliviousness of the tech executives who cut these deals
reminds me of bank executives who had no understanding of the risks built
into their balance sheets until markets started to blow up during the 2008
financial crisis.
臉書重發展輕規制的立場顯然欠妥，但卻並不只此一家。將股價視作價值的唯一標準是華
爾街的短視。但無獨有偶，達成這些協議的科技公司高管們是健忘的：他們忘記了2008年
金融危機前的銀行高管們，也是在危機爆發之前對其資產負債表上的風險一無所知。
Companies tend to prioritise what can be quantified, such as earnings per
share and the ratio of the stock price to earnings, and ignore (until it is
too late) the harder-to-measure business risks.
公司總是傾向於優先考慮那些可以被量化的事項，如每股股利及股價與收益之比，並且忽
視那些難以測算的商業風險，而等其意識到之時，則為時已晚。
It is no accident that most of the wealth in our world is being held by a
smaller and smaller number of rich individuals and corporations who use
financial wizardry such as tax offshoring and buy-backs to ensure that they
keep it out of the hands of national governments. It is what we have been
taught to think of as normal, thanks to the ideological triumph of the
Chicago School of economic thought, which has, for the past five decades or
so, preached, among other things, that the only purpose of corporations
should be to maximise profits.
世界絕大部分財富集中在越來越少的富人與公司手中，這絕非偶然。這些富人與公司使用
離岸稅收和回購等金融手段以規避政府干預，確保財富不落入政府手中。這也正是芝加哥
經濟學派所提倡的：公司應以利潤最大化為唯一目的。而該思想在過去五十多年中一直被
奉為圭臬。
The notion of “shareholder value” is shorthand for this idea. The
maximisation of shareholder value is part of the larger process of “
financialisation”. It is a process that has risen, in tandem with the
Chicago School of thinking, since the 1980s, and has created a situation in
which markets have become not a conduit for supporting the real economy, as
Adam Smith would have said they should be, but rather, the tail that wags the
dog.
該思想的關鍵詞是“股東利益”。股東利益最大化是金融化進程的重要組成部分。自二十
世紀八十年代，該進程與芝加哥學派一同興起，並使得市場不再如亞當‧斯密（Adam
Smith）口中的那樣：應當為實體經濟提供渠道支撐；現在則與之相反，本末倒置了。
“Consumer welfare,” rather than citizen welfare, is our primary concern. We
assume that rising share prices signify something good for the economy as a
whole, as opposed to merely increasing wealth for those who own them. In this
process, we have moved from being a market economy to being what Harvard law
professor Michael Sandel would call a “market society”, obsessed with
profit maximisation in every aspect of our lives. Our access to the basics –
healthcare, education, justice – is determined by wealth. Our experiences
of ourselves and those around us are thought of in transactional terms,
something that is reflected in the language of the day (we “maximise” time
and “monetise” relationships).
“消費者福利”成為我們的首要考慮，而非公民福利。我們認為股價上升對經濟整體而言
有利，但不能僅僅增加了股票持有者的財富。在這一進程中，我們已經由“市場經濟”轉
為哈佛大學法學院教授邁克爾‧桑德爾（Michael Sandel）所稱的“市場社會”——利益
最大化充斥在我們生活的方方面面。醫療、教育、公正等基本生活需要的獲得均由財富決
定。社會交往是交易性的，這也體現在當今的用語表達中：我們最大限度利用時間，用金
錢衡量社會關係。
Now, with the rise of the surveillance capitalism practised by big tech, we
ourselves are maximised for profit. Remember that our personal data is, for
these companies and the others that harvest it, the main business input. As
Larry Page himself once said when asked “What is Google?”: “If we did have
a category, it would be personal information … the places you’ve seen.
Communications … Sensors are really cheap … Storage is cheap. Cameras are
cheap. People will generate enormous amounts of data … Everything you’ve
ever heard or seen or experienced will become searchable. Your whole life
will be searchable.”
當下，隨著科技巨頭引發的監控資本主義（surveillance capitalism）興起，我們自身
也成為利益最大化的對象了。請牢記這些公司和其他獲取信息的公司所收集的個人信息主
要用於商業用途。正如拉里‧佩奇（Larry Page）在被問到“什麼是谷歌”時的回答：如
果真的要把我們做一個歸類的話，那應該就是個人信息…你所看到的景象以及交流通信…
傳感器真的很便宜…存儲很便宜，攝像頭也很便宜。人們會產生大量的數據…人們所聽、
所看、所感知到的一切都將被搜索到。你的整個生活將會是可以搜索的。”
Think about that. You are the raw material used to make the product that
sells you to advertisers.
設想一下，你既是廣告製作的原材料，又是廣告推送的接收者。
Financial markets have facilitated the shift toward this invasive,
short-term, selfish capitalism, which has run in tandem with both
globalisation and technological advancement, creating a loop in which we are
constantly competing with greater numbers of people, in shorter amounts of
time, for more and more consumer goods that may be cheaper thanks in part to
the deflationary effects of both outsourcing and tech-based disruption, but
that cannot compensate for our stagnant incomes and stressed-out lives.
隨著經濟全球化和技術進步，金融市場為這種擴散式、短期、利己的資本主義大開方便之
門。我們陷入了循環之中：在更短的時間中，我們不斷與更多對手競爭，以獲取更多商品
。由於離岸外包與科技所導致的經濟下滑，這些商品或許更加便宜，但這並不能彌補我們
停滯不前的收入和不堪重負的生活。
But you could argue that, in a deeper way, Silicon Valley – not the old
Valley that was full of garage startups and true innovators, but the
financially driven Silicon Valley of today – represents the apex of the
shift toward financialisation. Today the large tech companies are run by a
generation of business leaders who came of age and started their firms at a
time when government was viewed as the enemy, and profit maximisation was
universally seen as the best way to advance the economy, and indeed society.
Regulation or limits on corporate behaviour have been viewed as tyrannical or
even authoritarian. “Self-regulation” has become the norm. “Consumers”
have replaced citizens. All of it is reflected in the Valley’s “move fast
and break things” mentality, which the tech titans view as a fait accompli.
As Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen wrote in an afterword to the paperback
edition of their book, The New Digital Age: “Bemoaning the inevitable
increase in the size and reach of the technology sector distracts us from the
real question … Many of the changes that we discuss are inevitable. They’re
coming.”
但你可以認為，從更深層的角度來看，矽谷不再是之前那個滿是車庫創業者和真正創新者
的矽谷了，而今天這個受金融驅動的矽谷代表了其金融化轉變的頂點。在與政府對立，追
求利益最大化的時代，如今大型科技公司的掌權者創建了他們的公司。在那個時代，尊重
市場被視為是促進經濟，乃至社會發展的最佳途徑。對公司行為的規制和限制都被認為是
專制乃至獨裁。“自我監管”才是王道。“消費者”取代了公民。這些科技巨頭對此深以
為然，而這在矽谷“雷厲風行”的態度中體現得淋漓盡致。正如埃裡克‧施密特（Eric
Schmidt）與傑瑞德‧科恩（Jared Cohen）在其平裝本後記中寫道：“哀嘆科技行業不可
避免地壯大，會分散我們對真正問題的注意力…我們所討論的許多改變無法避免，它們真
的來了。”
Perhaps. But the idea that this should preclude any discussion of the effects
of the technology sector on the public at large is simply arrogant. There is
a huge cost to this line of thinking. Consider the $1tn in wealth that has
been parked offshore by the US’s largest, most IP-rich firms. A trillion is
no small sum: that is an 18th of the US’s annual GDP, much of which was
garnered from products and services made possible by core government-funded
research and innovators. Yet US citizens have not got their fair share of
that investment because of tax offshoring. It is worth noting that while the
US corporate tax rate was recently lowered from 35% to 21%, most big
companies have for years paid only about 20% of their income, thanks to
various loopholes. The tech industry pays even less – roughly 11-15% – for
this same reason: data and IP can be offshored while a factory or grocery
store cannot. This points to yet another neoliberal myth – the idea that if
we simply cut US tax rates, then these “American” companies will bring all
their money home and invest it in job-creating goods and services in the US.
But the nation’s biggest and richest companies have been at the forefront of
globalisation since the 1980s. Despite small decreases in overseas revenues
for the past couple of years, nearly half of all sales from S&P 500 companies
come from abroad.
或許真是如此。但若認為這將排除對科技行業影響的討論，則不免有妄下斷言之嫌。並且
有這種想法是要付出巨大的代價。美國最大、擁有最多知識產權的公司將1兆美元留置海
外。1兆美元可謂不小的數目：這是美國年度國內生產總值的十八分之一，其中很大一部
分或許來自於政府資助的核心調查與創新者研發的產品與服務。但由於離岸稅收，美國公
民並未獲得與其投資相稱的收益。近來美國公司稅由35%降到21%的意義不大：因為得益於
各種漏洞，大多數公司早已只繳納其收入20%的稅收。不同於工廠和商店，數據和知識產
權可以離岸，因而科技行業納稅數額甚至更少：約11%至15%。這引出了另一個新自由主義
疑問：僅靠降低美國稅率，就能讓這些“美國”公司轉回資金，並用於提升商品和服務嗎
？但這些國家的龍頭企業早在二十世紀八十年代就走在了全球化的前列。儘管近年來海外
收入略有下降，但標普500指數的公司近一半的銷售額仍來自海外。
How, then, can such companies be perceived as being “totally committed” to
the US, or, indeed, to any particular country? Their commitment, at least the
way American capitalism is practised today, is to customers and investors,
and when both of them are increasingly global, then it is hard to argue for
any sort of special consideration for American workers or communities in the
boardroom.
那麼又怎麼能說這些公司“完全屬於”美國或其他任何一個國家呢？不過從美國資本運行
方式來看，它們至少歸屬於消費者和投資者。當二者全球化程度持續深入時，美國工人或
團體在董事會中則更難有一席之地了。
Tech firms are more able than any other type of company to move business
abroad, because most of their wealth is not in “fixed assets” but in data,
human capital, patents and software, which are not tied to physical locations
(such as factories or retail stores) but can move anywhere. And as we have
already learned, while those things do represent wealth, they do not create
broad-based demand growth in the economy like the investments of a previous
era.
相比其他類型的公司，科技公司更有能力將業務轉移到海外。這是因為其大部分財富並非
“固定資產”，而是數據、人才資本、專利和軟件。這些都無需特定地點（而工廠和零售
商店則需要），可以隨意移動。如前所述，儘管這些確實代表了財富，但其本身卻無法像
前一個時代的投資那樣，拉動廣泛的經濟需求增長。
“If Apple acquires a licence to a technology for a phone it manufactures in
China, it does not create employment in the US, beyond the creator of the
licensed technology if they are in the US,” says Daniel Alpert, a financier
and a professor at Cornell University studying the effects of this shift in
investment. “Apps, Netflix and Amazon movies don’t create jobs the way a
new plant would.” Or, as my Financial Times colleague Martin Wolf has put
it, “[Apple] is now an investment fund attached to an innovation machine and
so a black hole for aggregate demand. The idea that a lower corporate tax
rate would raise investment in such businesses is ludicrous.” In short,
cash-rich corporations – especially tech firms – have become the financial
engineers of our day.
康奈爾大學教授，金融學家丹尼爾‧阿爾珀特（Daniel Alpert）致力於研究該投資轉變
的影響。其認為：“如果蘋果公司獲得了一項手機技術許可，但卻是在中國生產，顯然該
許可並不會增加任何就業，當然，如果該技術的發明者在美國的話除外。應用軟件、網飛
（Netflix）和亞馬遜的電影也不會像一個新工廠那樣創造就業機會。” 或者正如我《金
融時報》（Financial Times）的同事馬丁‧沃爾夫（Martin Wolf）所說：蘋果公司現在
是依附於技術創新的投資基金，其背後利益糾葛複雜，利益需求巨大。國家試圖通過降低
公司稅來提高這類企業的投資，無異於痴人說夢。” 總而言之，資金充裕的公司，尤其
是科技公司，已成為當下金融行業的重要一員。"
There are the ways in which big tech is driving the mega-trends in global
markets, as we have just explored. Then, there are the ways tech companies
are playing in those markets that grant them an unfair advantage over
consumers. For example, Google, Facebook and, increasingly, Amazon now own
the digital advertising market, and can set whatever terms they like for
customers. The opacity of their algorithms coupled with their dominance of
their respective markets makes it impossible for customers to have an even
playing field. This can lead to exploitative pricing and/or behaviours that
put our privacy at risk. Consider also the way Uber uses “surge pricing” to
set rates based on customers’ willingness to pay. Or the “shadow profiles”
that Facebook compiles on users. Or the way in which Google and Mastercard
teamed up to track whether online ads led to physical store sales, without
letting Mastercard holders know they were being tracked.
如前所述，科技巨頭以各種方式推動全球市場迅猛增長。而科技公司也有各種方式在市場
中獲取不對等的優勢地位。例如，谷歌、臉書以及最近的亞馬遜均用於數字廣告市場，可
隨意投放任意廣告。其算法的封密性以及其在各自市場的主導地位，使得用戶無從比較，
無法選擇。此外，這也會導致壟斷價格或者（以及）用戶隱私危機。這並非危言聳聽：優
步採用“峰時價格”（動態價格），以用戶支付意願設定價格；臉書製作用戶“影子檔案
”（shadow profiles）；在用戶不知情的情況下，谷歌與萬事達信用卡聯手追蹤網上廣
告是否促進實體銷售。
Or the way Amazon secured an unusual procurement deal with local governments
in the US. It was, as of 2018, allowed to purchase all the office and
classroom supplies for 1,500 public agencies, including local governments and
schools, around the country, without guaranteeing them fixed prices for the
goods. The purchasing would be done through “dynamic pricing” –
essentially another form of surge pricing, whereby the prices reflect
whatever the market will withstand – with the final charges depending on
bids put forward by suppliers on Amazon’s platform. It was a stunning
corporate jiu-jitsu, given that the whole point of a bulk-purchasing contract
is to guarantee the public sector competitive prices by bundling together
demand. For all the hype about Amazon’s discounts, a study conducted by the
nonprofit Institute for Local Self-Reliance concluded that one California
school district would have paid 10-12% more if it had bought from Amazon. And
cities that wanted to keep on using existing suppliers that did not do
business on the retail giant’s platform would be forced to move that
business (and those suppliers) to Amazon because of the way that deal was
structured.
抑或是亞馬遜與美國地方政府達成了一項不同尋常的採購協議。截止至2018年，全國1500
個公共機構（包括當地政府和學校）的辦公物資與教學用具均在非固定價格下購買。該購
買通過“動態定價”完成，其實質是另一種形式的峰時定價：價格反映市場，最後定價取
決於亞馬遜平台供應商的報價。批量採購合同的意義在於通過捆綁需求使得公共部門獲得
優惠價格，但亞馬遜在交易中明顯處於上風，這實在令人震驚。而關於亞馬遜折扣的炒作
，一個非營利組織——地方自立協會（Institute for Local Self-Reliance）調查發現
：若加州的一個學區從亞馬遜購買的話，將會多支付10%至12%。一些城市想要延續現有供
應商，而未與這個零售巨頭交易（包括其供應商）。但由於交易結構的原因，這些城市（
包括供應商）也將會被迫將這些業務轉移至亞馬遜。
It is hard to ignore the parallels in Amazon’s behaviour to the lending
practices of some financial groups before the 2008 crash. They, too, used
dynamic pricing, in the form of variable rate sub-prime mortgage loans, and
they, too, exploited huge information asymmetries in their sale of
mortgage-backed securities and complex debt deals to unwary investors, not
only to individuals, but also to cities such as Detroit. Amazon, for its
part, has vastly more market data than the suppliers and public sector
purchasers it plans to link.
顯然，亞馬遜的行為與2008年經濟危機之前一些金融機構的放貸行為有相似之處。該金融
機構也以浮動利率的次貸形式，使用動態定價；其在與不謹慎的投資者交易時，也利用信
息不對等優勢，銷售抵押擔保證券與交易複雜債務（包括個人與城市，如底特律）。就亞
馬遜而言，其所掌握的市場數據遠遠超過其計畫聯繫的供應商與公共部門購買者。
As in any transaction, the party that knows the most can make the smartest
deal. The bottom line is that both big-platform tech players and large
financial institutions sit in the centre of an hourglass of information and
commerce, taking a cut of whatever passes through. They are the house, and
the house always wins.
在任何交易中，知道最多的一方獲益最多。最重要的是，不論是科技巨頭還是金融巨鱷，
其好似穩佔信息與商業的必經之路，不論中間通過了什麼，總能分一杯羹。它們就是莊家
，而莊家總是贏家。
As with the banks, systemic regulation may well be the only way to prevent
big tech companies from unfairly capitalising on those advantages.
與銀行一樣，系統性規制很可能是防止大型科技公司濫用其優勢地位獲取資本的唯一途徑
。
There are questions of whether Amazon or Facebook could leverage their
existing positions in e-commerce or social media to unfair advantage in
finance, using what they already know about our shopping and buying patterns
to push us into buying the products they want us to in ways that are either
a) anticompetitive, or b) predatory. There are also questions about whether
they might cut and run at the first sign of market trouble, destabilising the
credit markets in the process.
有人質疑亞馬遜或臉書是否真的能夠利用其在電商或社交媒體的地位獲取金融優勢：不論
是壟斷式還是掠奪式，利用其掌握的用戶購物信息以促進消費？也有人質疑它們是否會在
市場出現問題後一走了之，破壞信貸市場的穩定？
“Big-tech lending does not involve human intervention of a long-term
relationship with the client,” said Agustín Carstens, the general manager
of the Bank for International Settlements. “These loans are strictly
transactional, typically short-term credit lines that can be automatically
cut if a firm’s condition deteriorates. This means that, in a downturn,
there could be a large drop in credit to [small and middle-sized companies]
and large social costs.” If you think that sounds a lot like the situation
that we were in back in 2008, you would be right.
國際清算銀行總經理奧古斯丁‧卡斯滕斯（Agustín Carstens）認為：“大型科技公司
借貸並不會影響與客戶的長期關係。嚴格意義上來說，這些貸款是交易性質的，通常為短
期信用額度。而一旦公司狀況惡化，則會自導削減額度。這意味著，在經濟危機中，對中
小型企業的貸款會大幅下降，而社會成本則將大大增加。”這無疑與2008年的那場經濟危
機如出一撤。
Treating the industry like any other would undoubtedly require a significant
shift in the big-tech business model, one with potential profit and share
price implications. The extraordinary valuations of the big tech firms are
due in part to the market’s expectations that they will remain lightly
regulated, lightly taxed monopoly powers. But that is not guaranteed to be
the case in the future. Antitrust and monopoly issues are fast gaining
attention in Washington, where the titans of big tech may soon have a
reckoning.
毫無疑問，若對科技行業進行與其他行業作同等對待：進行政府規制，則要求科技行業經
營模式的巨大轉變。而這則會對利潤與股價產生潛在影響。科技巨頭的巨大估值一定程度
上是由於對其寬鬆監管、較低稅收的壟斷權力的市場預期。但凡事無絕對。國家很快地意
識到反壟斷與壟斷問題，或許也會很快與這些科技巨頭有個了斷。