The Wages of American Political Decay
美國政治衰敗的代價
原文：The American Interest https://tinyurl.com/ycm9at68
譯文：觀察者
https://www.guancha.cn/FuLangXiSi-FuShan/2020_05_18_550714.shtml
作者：Francis Fukuyama
譯者：凱莉
In human history, national emergencies, whether caused by war, invasion,
financial crisis, or an epidemic, have often been the occasions for major
political reform. Political systems get “stuck” in situations where they
desperately need reform, but are trapped in institutional arrangements that
do not permit them to solve their problems. It takes a huge external shock to
get people to recognize they have a common problem, and that extraordinary
measures will be required to get out of it.
在人類歷史上，無論是由戰爭、侵略、金融危機還是流行病引起的國家緊急狀態，往往都
是進行重大政治改革的時候。當政治體制亟須改革時，它們卻被卡住了，制度安排的羈絆
不允許它們解決自身問題。要讓人們認識到他們面對一個共同的問題的話，需要巨大的外
部衝擊，且需要採取非常措施才能擺脫困局。
This is what happened during the Great Depression. The latter began in 1929
with the stock market crash. Many Americans continued to believe in the
nostrums espoused by leaders like Herbert Hoover—that the country needed
fiscal austerity and sound money to start growing again—until the banking
crisis of 1931, which drove unemployment rates above 20 percent, and sparked
business failures across the land. The direct result was the election of
Franklin Roosevelt in 1932, along with Democratic majorities in both houses
of Congress, which then allowed the New Deal to lay the foundations of the
modern American welfare state.
大蕭條時期就發生了這樣的情況。1929年，大蕭條始於股市崩盤。許多美國人仍然相信赫
伯特‧胡佛等領導人所信奉的“靈丹妙藥”——美國需要財政緊縮和穩健的貨幣來重啟增
長——直到1931年爆發銀行業危機。這場危機導致失業率超過20%，還導致全國各地的企
業倒閉。直接結果是1932年富蘭克林‧羅斯福當選總統，民主黨在參眾兩院獲得多數席位
，這也促使羅斯福新政為美國現代福利國家奠定了基礎。
Something similar could happen in 2020. Trump’s efforts to downplay the
crisis and his failure to take early protective measures like expanded
testing have led to huge numbers of deaths and what looks to be a coming
depression on a scale of the 1930s. At a moment when international
cooperation was needed to meet a pandemic that didn’t respect national
boundaries, the United States has stepped away from any semblance of global
leadership. A rational response to the crisis would be to throw the current
team out and replace it with a more responsible and reassuring leadership,
both domestically and internationally. The decks might then be clear for
longer-term policy reforms, like the creation of a genuine universal health
care system, reform of the inequities of our electoral system, and new
international institutions to deal with future crises.
類似的事情可能會在2020年發生。川普努力淡化這場危機，且未能儘早採取保護措施比如
擴大檢測，導致了大量死亡以及即將到來的經濟蕭條，其規模堪比1930年代。當國際需要
合作應對一場不區分國界的大流行時，美國連表面上的全球領導地位都已放棄。要理性應
對這場危機，就得把當前的領導團隊換成更負責任、更讓人放心的領導，無論是在國內層
面還是國際層面。到那時，長期政策改革的形勢可能會明朗起來，比如建立真正的全民醫
療體系，改革我們選舉制度的不平等，建立新的國際制度來應對未來的危機。
But while we may hope that this optimistic scenario may indeed play out,
there are many reasons to think that it will not. Our problems are rooted in
two structural conditions we find ourselves in, something that I have
elsewhere described as political decay.
儘管我們可以期望這種樂觀情況真的能實現，但有很多理由讓我們相信它不會實現。我們
的問題根源於我們所經歷的的兩種結構性失衡，我曾經在其它場合稱之為政治衰敗。
The first condition is the American system of checks and balances that
distributes powers very broadly between the branches of government, and among
the different levels (federal, state, and local) in a highly diverse society.
These checks on power make tyranny less likely, but they also make the most
routine decision-making very difficult. Many of our institutional rules like
the Electoral College are laid out in the Constitution, which is extremely
difficult to amend when compared to other democratic constitutions.
第一個失衡是美國的制衡制度。在高度多樣化的社會中，在政府各部門之間以及不同級別
（聯邦、州和地方）之間廣泛分配權力。這些對權力的制約使出現暴政的可能性降低，但
也使最日常的決策變得非常困難。我們的許多制度規定都寫入了《憲法》，比如選舉團制
度。與其他民主憲法相比，我們的規定極難修改。
This system of checks and balances was not an insuperable obstacle to
decision-making through much of the 20th century, but it has become one due
to the second structural condition, which is the extraordinarily high degree
of political polarization that has emerged over the past two decades. This
polarization has many causes, beginning with the Southern realignment
beginning in the 1960s that sent many white voters into the Republican Party
and minorities into the Democratic, as well as the emerging social divisions
between large urban agglomerations and more rural areas. When combined with
our system of checks and balances, polarization has led to political stasis
where even things like annual budgets could not be passed by Congress.
20世紀的大部分時候，這種制衡制度對決策而言並不是不可踰越的障礙。但因為第二個失
衡，即過去20年出現的高度政治極化，這種制度成為了不可踰越的障礙。這種極化有許多
原因，從20世紀60年代的美國南部政黨重組開始，許多白人選民轉向共和黨，少數族裔進
入民主黨，而且大城市群和更多農村地區之間開始出現社會分裂。加上我們的政治制衡制
度，兩極分化已經引發過政治停擺，甚至連年度預算法案在國會無法通過這樣的事也會發
生。
This inability to get things done has in certain ways been a good thing in
recent years. There are many actions that Donald Trump has threatened, like
blocking Muslims from entering the United States, or building his border
wall, that have been stopped by the courts or Congress. In the current
COVID-19 crisis, American federalism has permitted governors of states like
California or New York to take action in the absence of leadership from
Washington.
近年來，從某種角度來說這種無法做成一些事反而是好事。許多川普總統威脅說要採取的
行動，如禁止穆斯林入境美國，或修建他的邊境牆，已被法院或國會阻止。在當前的新冠
肺炎疫情危機中，美國聯邦制允許加州或紐約州等州州長可以不聽命於華盛頓方面領導單
獨採取行動。
In a perfect world, this unprecedented pandemic would have been an occasion
for Americans to put aside their differences and rally around the flag, as
the “pandemic as war” metaphors suggest. There was indeed bipartisan
cooperation in passing the $2 trillion COVID-19 relief act. But overall, the
pandemic has served to deepen polarization, and that is likely to get worse
as time goes on.
在理想的世界裡，這場前所未有的大流行本來可以是美國人拋開分歧、團結在旗幟周圍的
機會，正如“疫情如戰爭”所比喻的那樣。在通過2萬億美元的新冠肺炎疫情救濟法案上
，確實有兩黨合作。但總體而言，這場大流行已經加深了政治極化，隨著時間的推移，情
況可能會更糟。
From the beginning, there was a sharp partisan divide in how to interpret
events. President Trump spent January and February minimizing the importance
of the epidemic, claiming that it was under control and that it would
disappear quickly. In this he was simply echoing legions of conservative
commentators who decried the fake media panic and maintained that COVID-19
was no worse than the flu. Even when Trump pivoted to taking the disease
seriously in mid-March, conservatives continued to attack public health
experts like Anthony Fauci. As the economy deteriorated, they started to
argue for a quick lifting of stay-at-home orders and a return to work.
Liberals took the opposite position, emphasizing the need for medical
expertise and pushing for stronger government interventions in ramping up
testing, medical supplies, and the like.
從一開始對各種事件的詮釋上就存在著尖銳的黨派分歧。川普總統在1月、2月一直試圖將
疫情的重要性淡化至最低，還聲稱疫情已經得到控制，病毒會迅速消失。在這一點上，他
只是呼應了大批保守派評論員，他們譴責媒體製造恐慌，並堅持認為新冠肺炎病毒並不比
流感可怕。即使川普在三月中旬轉而開始嚴肅對待這種疾病，保守派仍繼續攻擊像安東尼
‧福奇這樣的公共衛生專家。隨著經濟的惡化，他們開始主張迅速解除“居家令”、重返
工作崗位。自由派持相反的立場，他們強調專業醫學知識的必要性，並推動政府加強對擴
大檢測和醫療物資等事宜的干預。
The ground of the argument has now shifted to the manner and timing of the
lifting of restrictions. Conservatives in many states have begun to mobilize
to protest their state’s lockdown orders in a manner reminiscent of the
early days of the Tea Party, which grew in reaction to the 2008 financial
crisis. Liberals, while not denying the importance of restoring the economy,
have tended to urge continuing caution. President Trump made an extraordinary
pivot from saying on one day that he wanted governors to make their own
decisions as to when and how to reopen their states, to encouraging
protesters to in effect disobey their governors if they felt the rules were
too strict.
目前爭論的方向轉為解除隔離的方式和時間。許多州的保守派已經開始動員起來，抗議他
們所在州的封鎖令，這讓人想起茶黨早期時在2008年金融危機的應對期間逐漸壯大。自由
派人士雖然不否認恢復經濟的重要性，但傾向於敦促人們繼續保持謹慎。川普總統的說法
發生了巨大轉變，有一天他還在說希望各位州長自己決定何時以及如何重新開放他們所在
的州；後來又說如果大家覺得規矩太嚴，鼓勵抗議者以實際行動違背他們州長的命令，
There are many things we still don’t know about the disease, beginning with
the degree of social distancing needed to keep infections under control over
the long run. In a less polarized world, we should be making empirical
judgments about this. If infection rates suddenly started to go up in states
like Florida or countries like Sweden that didn’t order early lockdowns, or
if people attending an anti-lockdown rally fell victim to COVID-19 in large
numbers, then we would have more information about the causal relationship
between policies and outcomes. The converse is also true: If states or
countries opening up early don’t see a sudden rise in new infections, we may
decide we erred on the side of excessive caution.
關於這種疾病，我們不知道的事情還有很多，首當其衝就是從長遠來看到底要保持多遠的
社交距離才能把握好疫情防控。在一個不那麼極化的世界裡，我們應該根據實際經驗對此
作出判斷。如果沒有儘早宣佈封鎖令——像佛羅里達這樣的州，或像瑞典這樣的國家，或
者參加反對鎖措施的集會者大批感染新冠肺炎，那麼我們可以清楚看到政策與結果之間的
因果關係。反之亦然：如果提前開放的某州或某國，沒有出現新增病例突然上升，那麼我
們可以說我們犯了過度謹慎的錯。
But there are many reasons why new evidence will not be analyzed impartially,
with partisan politics standing at the top of the list. Existing divisions
were doubtless made worse by the fact that there will be an election in
November. The relaxed response of Trump and his supporters was driven by
fears that the epidemic and economic collapse would hurt his electoral
chances, while Democrats saw a huge vulnerability open up for the president.
Many people on both sides were making judgments about what they genuinely
believed to be in the public’s best interest. But those judgments have
increasingly come to be colored by another factor that belies rational
explanation, which is cultural identity.
但是，有很多原因說明新證據無法得到公正分析，因為目前黨派政治是優先考慮要素。11
月即將舉行總統大選，無疑會讓當前的分歧進一步加劇。川普及其支持者之所以消極抗疫
主要是擔心疫情和經濟崩潰會縮窄他的贏面，而民主黨人則在其中看到川普總統存在巨大
脆弱性。兩黨都有許多人在評判他們到底相信怎樣才是最符合公眾利益的。但是，這些判
斷越來越受到另一個掩蓋理性解釋的因素所影響，那就是文化認同。
There is a quaint model of human cognition that is widely believed by many
economists and earnest reformers, in which human beings take in empirical
information about the world, make inferences from it, and come to preferences
and choices based on careful examination of those facts. If people seem to be
making wrong choices—for instance, if they are skeptical about climate
change or believe that COVID-19 mortality rates are overstated—the reason is
that they are receiving bad information (a.k.a. “fake news”), or that they
are poorly educated and don’t know how to critically analyze the information
they get.
有一種人類認知的古樸模式是許多經濟學家和改革熱忱者普遍認同的：人類憑經驗瞭解這
個世界，從中做出推斷；在仔細研究這些事實的基礎上，得出偏好和選擇。如果人們似乎
做出錯誤的選擇——比如他們對氣候變化持懷疑態度，或者認為新冠肺炎的死亡率被誇大
了——原因是他們在接收不良信息（又稱“假新聞”），或者他們受教育程度低，不知如
何對他們獲取的信息進行批判分析。
Both of these are obviously big problems. The internet is awash in bad
information, conspiracy theories, and Russian bots seeking to manipulate
people’s views. The ability to critically analyze online information varies
by age, with young people having grown up to be more skeptical of what they
see on the internet than their grandparents who have had less experience.
這兩個問題顯然都是大問題。互聯網上充斥著不良信息、陰謀論以及試圖操縱人們觀點的
俄羅斯電腦機器人。對網絡信息的能力批判分析因年齡而異，年輕人比他們祖父母輩的互
聯網使用經驗更多，對網上所看到的內容更具懷疑精神。
But the problem with human cognition goes far deeper than this. Jonathan
Haidt and other social psychologists have shown how people tend to begin with
moral or political outcomes that they prefer, and to use their cognitive
skills to defend those positions. This is where cultural identity comes into
play: Where you stand on COVID-19 depends not on facts but on whether you see
yourself as red or blue, and the desire to be part of that identity overrides
even personal self-interest in health or safety. We have already seen a
milder form of this in the opposition of working-class voters in the South to
Obamacare, despite the fact that they were among the biggest beneficiaries of
the program. Today, it takes the form of risking your life to take part in an
anti-shutdown rally.
但是人類認知的問題遠不止於此。喬納森‧海德（Jonathan Haidt）和其他社會心理學家
已經說明，人們傾向於首先相信他們喜歡的道德或政治結果，並運用他們的認知技能來捍
衛這些立場。這就是文化認同發揮作用的地方：在新冠肺炎疫情這個事情上的立場不取決
於事實，而取決於你認為自己屬於紅色還是藍色陣營，而且加入這種身份認同的慾望甚至
凌駕於個人健康或安全方面的自身利益之上。在南方工人階級選民對奧巴馬醫改方案的反
對中，我們已經看到一種較為溫和的表現形式，儘管這些人是該方案最大受益者之一。當
前它的表現形式則是：冒著生命危險參加反對封鎖措施的集會。
In this kind of atmosphere, providing better facts or encouraging better
media literacy does not necessarily improve decision-making. Indeed, there
are studies that show that with highly partisan people, having more facts and
education actually makes them more partisan, because they are able to marshal
more information to defend positions they believed to be true to begin with.
This is why fact-checking organizations like Snopes have been preaching to
the choir, with little impact on people who really want to believe
alternative narratives.
在這種氣氛下，提供更好的事實或倡導更高的媒體素養並不一定能改善決策。事實上有研
究表明，黨派性很強的人掌握更多事實依據、教育程度更高，這實際上使他們更具黨派色
彩，因為他們能夠調動更多的信息來捍衛他們最初堅信的立場。這就是為什麼像Snopes這
樣的事實核查機構一直在向唱詩班布道，但實際上對那些打心底想相信其它敘事的人影響
甚微。
Demonstrating causality in social behavior has always been difficult, even
for social scientists armed with high-powered statistical techniques. Many
conservatives continue to argue even today that the epidemic has “only”
killed some tens of thousands of people, which is comparable to other flu
mortality rates and not worth the economic damage caused by shutdowns. Many
states are finding they don’t need as many ventilators as they thought, and
are shipping them to other jurisdictions. Public health experts respond that
the number of mortalities and infections would have been far higher had the
shutdowns not happened, and hospitals became overwhelmed with patients. The
problem is that you cannot prove a counterfactual, given the many other
factors that may also explain the outcome. And in particular you cannot prove
it to a committed partisan who wants to interpret outcomes in a certain way.
揭示社會行為的因果關係一直都是難點，即使對於擁有高能統計技術的社會科學家也是如
此。直到今天，許多保守派人士今天還在爭辯說疫情“僅僅”造成數萬人死亡，和其它流
感的死亡率相當，因為採取封鎖措施而造成經濟損失並不值得。許多州發現他們不需要他
們想像的那麼多呼吸機，於是正把它們運送到其它行政轄區。公共衛生專家回應說，如果
沒有採取封鎖措施，那麼死亡和感染病例數會更高，而各大醫院其實已經不堪重負。問題
是，你無法證明與當前事實相反的情況，因為有很多其它因素或許也能解釋該結果。尤其
是，你無法向那些希望以特定方式來詮釋結果的忠誠黨派人士證明這一點。
There are many reasons to think that the polarization will deepen as the
crisis evolves. Americans are shifting rapidly from concern about the disease
to concern about their jobs. At this point, it looks as if there will not be
a sudden moment when things snap back to pre-COVID-19 times, but rather a
prolonged period of experimentation, openings, and re-infections. This will
generate huge arguments over how to interpret this experience in every state.
Economic disputes over the government’s extraordinary response to the
pandemic, from the Fed’s flooding of the economy with liquidity to the
support pledged to businesses and workers, will start to displace arguments
over public health. Policymakers will undertake huge discretionary choices
with regard to who gets help and who does not. Transparency and
accountability in this process are critical if money is to be distributed
impartially, but this is an administration that has not been particularly
known for either. All of this creates grounds for bitter partisan litigation
and ill-will stretching indefinitely into the future.
有許多理由讓我們相信，隨著危機的發展，極化會不斷加深。美國人擔心疫情正迅速轉為
擔心工作。目前來看，情況似乎不會突然回到新冠肺炎疫情之前的樣子，而會是一個漫長
的過程：試驗、封鎖解除和第二波感染。這將促發有關如何解釋各州情況的巨大爭論。圍
繞政府在這場大流行中不尋常響應的爭論，將從公共衛生層面轉向經濟層面，包括美聯儲
向經濟猛注流動性，承諾向企業和工人予以補貼。有關誰得到幫助、誰得不到幫助，政策
制定者將承擔巨大的自由裁量權。如果要公平分配資金，這一過程中的透明度和問責制至
關重要，但這屆政府始終都沒怎麼體現這兩個方面。這些都為激烈的黨派訴訟和惡意無限
期地延續到未來創造了溫床。
The long-term consequences of the dual health and economic crises are
impossible to foresee. No one after Sept. 11 foresaw the way that the Middle
East would ultimately be transformed; nor did anyone anticipate that the 2008
financial crisis would give birth to global populism. Conspiracy theories
were rife in the United States well before the crisis; as the stress and pain
deepen, it is easy to imagine that new political movements and even religions
will be spawned as a result.
公共衛生和經濟雙重危機的長期後果是無法預見的。“9‧11”事件後，沒有人預見到中
東最終會被徹底改變，也沒有人預料到2008年的金融危機會孕育全球民粹主義。陰謀論在
危機前就在美國盛行；隨著壓力加重、痛苦加深，很容易想像新的政治運動甚至新宗教會
因此產生。
It is entirely possible that the Democrats will come roaring back in November
as voters tire of the current administration. But even if they do, they will
inherit a country on its knees and bitterly divided along identity lines. In
the good times prior to the crisis, the Trump Administration had built up a
level of national debt not seen since the 2008 crisis, which has now suddenly
been tripled. It is not just the next administration, but the next
generation, that will have to live under this burden. The left wing of the
Democratic Party was considering huge increases in taxes to pay for ambitious
new social programs like free college tuition and Medicare for all. These
increases will now have to be directed at paying back the liabilities
incurred in a single year fighting COVID-19.
由於選民對本屆政府的厭倦，民主黨完全有可能在11月捲土重來。但是，即使他們這樣做
，他們也會繼承一個屈膝的並沿著身份切割線嚴重分裂的國家。在這次危機之前情況不錯
的時候，川普政府累積了自2008年危機以來從未有過的國債水平，現在突然增加了兩倍。
不僅下屆政府，而且下一代，將不得不生活在這一重擔之下。民主黨的左翼正在考慮大幅
增加稅收，以支付新的雄心勃勃的社會福利項目，如免除大學學費、全民醫療保險。這些
增加的稅收現在不得不用於償還在抗擊新冠肺炎的這一年內發生的負債。
If one looks at the different degrees of success of countries around the
world fighting the pandemic, two factors emerge as critical. The first is the
degree of state capacity at their disposal, which has to do with the numbers
of health workers, emergency responders, infrastructure, and available
resources. The second critical factor has to do with the degree of trust that
citizens have in their government. All countries need to rely on a high
degree of voluntary compliance with the state’s rules, whether they are
democratic or authoritarian. They are in big trouble if they have to rely on
coercive enforcement, something American governors need to keep in mind.
Germany and South Korea are democracies where this degree of trust exists,
and they have outperformed many of their neighbors as a result.
如果你比較一下世界各國在抗擊大流行方面取得成功的不同程度，那麼有兩個因素將顯得
至關重要。首先是他們所能支配的國家能力的程度，這與衛生工作者、應急人員、基礎設
施和現有資源的數量有關。第二個關鍵因素與公民對政府的信任程度有關。無論是民主還
是威權國家，都得依靠高度自覺遵守國家規定。如果它們必須依靠強制執法，就會遇到很
大的麻煩，這是美國州長需要牢記的。德國和韓國是存在這種信任程度的民主國家，所以
它們的表現好過許多鄰國。
The United States has a tremendous amount of state capacity, at federal,
state, and local levels, even if a lot of it is being underutilized right
now. What it does not have, unfortunately, is a high level of social or
political trust. The bitter polarization that has overtaken the country
remains America’s biggest weakness, something that has been gleefully
exploited by opponents like Russia. This polarization has increased
dramatically during the Trump administration, and shows no sign of abating
despite the common threat faced by all Americans. While one can imagine
better and worse futures a year out, the United States will not be able to
address its long-term problems unless the fundamental divide over cultural
identities is somehow overcome.
美國在聯邦、州和地方各級擁有巨大的國家能力，即使現在很多國家能力未得到充分利用
。不幸的是，它缺乏高度的社會或政治信任。目前佔據著整個美國的極化現象仍然是美國
最大的弱點，俄羅斯等對手一直幸災樂禍地利用著這一點。在川普政府執政期間，這種極
化在快速加劇。儘管全體美國人面臨著共同威脅，但這種極化絲毫沒有減弱的跡象。即便
人們可以想像一年之後情況會變好或變壞，但美國將無法解決其長期問題，除非文化認同
的根本分歧以某種方式得到克服。